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This thesis departs from the traditional historiographical views that portray Philby as 
having no political influence either while he was serving his country or after his 
resignation from government service when he was settled in Saudi Arabia. It also 
departs from picturing him as a man who tended to undermine British policy, arguing 
that he was loyal to his country, as was plain during his years of service. The thesis 
examines his background, from his early years to the work he did for his country in 
India, Iraq and Transjordan and takes an analytical and historical approach. It seeks to 
present a more comprehensive understanding of Philby’s mission to Arabia, its 
objectives and outcomes, focusing on his political work in Arabia and his efforts to 
solve problems which otherwise might have threatened British interests. In the second 
part of his mission to Arabia, three considerable issues are addressed: first, that of the 
Ajman tribe which revolted against Ibn Sa‘ūd  and Philby’s efforts to resolve their 
dispute and not let the tribe be diverted from the common cause; second, the 
blockade, directed successfully by Philby, which greatly influenced the war against the 
Ottoman empire; and third, the invasion of  Ḥail – why Philby regarded this objective as 
crucial for making peace between Ibn Sa‘ūd  and Hussain and saw how far it would 
contribute to British interests in the region. This thesis deals with Philby’s efforts in the 
conflict between Najd and Hejaz and his actions in the border dispute between Ibn 
Sa‘ūd and his rival, Hussain, and assesses whether Philby played a major part in the 
collapse of the Hejazi kingdom. It considers Philby’s contribution to the American 
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recognition of Saudi Arabia and the methods that he used to secure it. It examines 
Philby’s method of settling political conditions in Arabia after the Idrisi revolt against 
Ibn Sa‘ud. It asks why Philby visited Yemen and if it would somehow have enhanced Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s position. It also focuses on Philby’s role in the Buraimi crisis between Britain 
and Saudi Arabia and illustrates the persuasive arguments by which Philby upheld the 
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The author has used the modified version of the Library of Congress Arabic 
transliteration system shown in the two columns of the table below: 
Table 1. Transliteration note: consonants 
 
Arabic letters Romanization Arabic letters Romanization 
 ḍ ض ā ا
 ṭ ط b ب
 ẓ ظ t ت
 ‘ ع th ث
 gh غ j ج
 f ف ḥ ح
 q ق kh خ
 k ك d د
 l ل dh ذ
 m م r ر
 n ن z ز
 h ه؛ة s س
 w و sh ش
 y ي ṣ ص
 
Table 2. Transliteration note: vowels 
Long Short 
َ   ā ا  a 
َ   ī ي  i 




However, in this thesis, the names of prominent individuals and places are spelled as 
they appear in the English primary sources rather than in the Library of Congress Arabic 
transliteration system; for instance, Mecca rather than Makkah, Madina rather than 
Medina, Shaikh rather than Sheikh, and Hussain rather than Hussein. 
The 'al' preceding family names, such as al-Sa‘ud and al-Rashid, which refers to 
prominent family and tribal groups, and the names of Arabic books, such as Tārīkh  al- 
Māmlākah al- arabiahal- Sū‘diah (The History of Saudi Arabia), are written with a small 
initial.Furthermore, the author has used the name of the founder of Saudi Arabia, 
Abdul Aziz Ibn Abdulraḥman, as it commonly appears in English sources, i.e. ‘Ibn Saud ’. 
In addition, the Library of Congress Arabic transliteration system is not used for the 
name ‘Ibn Sa‘ud’when it is cited. It is written as ‘Ibn Saud’ when it appears in the titles 
of books and articles. 
Regarding the titles of Arabian sources and references, they are all written in their 
Arabic source (but in Romanized letters) followed by their English translation between 
brackets as shown in the example below: 
Hafiz Wāhbāh, Jazīrat al-ʻArab fī al-qarnal-ʻishrin̄ [The Arabian Peninsula in the 20th 
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The importance of the thesis 
Writing biographies of political officials may be regarded as one of the difficulties that 
historians face; they require scientific methodology in particular when their outcomes 
depend on the fulfilment of impartiality and objectivity. Furthermore, in dealing with 
such biographical history, historians may need to trace all the historical accounts of 
their subject’s life from original sources, starting with their upbringing and going on to 
their education and career. Such an examination enables historians to figure out what 
the main factors were that shaped the temperament of political officials and what led 
to their distinction and special gift.It is plain that some English political figures have 
played a vital role in political events and have formed British policy in Arabia as well as 
the Middle East in general; figures such as Sir Percy Cox,1 Captain William Shakespear2 
                                                          
1
 Sir Percy Zachariah Cox (1864–1937) may be considered one of the great British political leaders who 
guided British policy in the Persian Gulf. The relationship between him and the Persian Gulf began when 
he was appointed political agent at Muscat in 1899. The course of his vocation improved rapidly until he 
became the High Commissioner in Iraq in 1920. He retired from government service in 1923. See his 
biography in his article, Some Gulf Memories (London: [S.I: s.n.], 1928); Philip Graves, The Life of Percy 
Cox (London: Hutchinson & Co Ltd., 1950); John Townsend, Proconsul to the Middle East: Sir Percy Cox 
and the End of Empire (New York: I. B Tauris & Co Ltd.,2010); Robert Charles, ʻMajor-General Sir Percy 
Zachariah Cox’, The Geographical Journal, vol. 90, no. 1 (July. 1937), pp. 1-5; R.C.T, ʻ Sir Percy Cox’, British 
Institute for the Study of Iraq ʼ, vol.4.no.1 (Spring, 1937), pp.1-2; The Geographical Journal; ʻ Obituary: Sir 
Percy Zachariah Cox, G. C. M. G, G. C. I. E, K. C. S. I.’,vol.89,no.3 (March,1937),pp.295-296. 
2
 William Henry Irvine Shakespear (1878–1915) was a British officer and prominent explorer. He 
graduated from the Royal Military College, Sandhurst in 1896. After a while, he was appointed to the 
political department of the GI. Shakespear proved himself proficient in Oriental languages such as Pshto, 
Urdu, Persian and Arabic. In 1909 he was assigned the post of Political Agent in Kuwait and remained 
there until 1915 when he was killed in the battle of Jarrab in central Arabia. For further accounts, see Cox 
to the GI, 16 February 1915, IOR, L/P&S/10/387; H.S.B. John Philby, Saudi Arabia (London: Ernest Benn 




and T.E. Lawrence.3 John Philby was one of them; he made a significant contribution to 
the implementation of British policy not only during his tours of duty with the British 
Empire in India but also in Iraq and Transjordan. After his resignation from British 
service, when he settled in Saudi Arabia. Philby continued to make immense political 
contributions to Saudi foreign policy and had a fundamental role in strengthening the 
position of Ibn Sa‘ūd, the founder of Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it can be said that this 
thesis mainly deals with Philby’s political roles in the Arabian Peninsula and explores 
the influence of psychological, emotional and family history factors on his personality. 
Definition and aim of the topic 
This thesis examines Philby’s background, from his early years to the work he did for his 
country in India, Iraq4 and Transjordan. It investigates Philby’s mission to Arabia, its 
objectives and outcomes, focusing on his political work in Arabia and his efforts to 
solve problems which otherwise might have threatened British interests. For instance, 
during World War One(WWI), British allies in Arabia, such as Hussain in Hejaz and Ibn 
Sa‘ūd in Najd had a serious dispute, which might have had serious consequences for 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Journal, vol.59, no. 5 (May, 1922), pp. 321-334; Jacob Goldberg, ʻ Shakespear and Ibn Saud: A Balanced 
Reappraisal’, Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 22, no.1 (Jan. 1986), pp. 74-88.    
3
 Thomas Edward Lawrence (1888-1935) was one of the most significant intelligence officers in the 
history of the British Empire. His legend emerged when he led the Arab revolt against the Ottomans in 
Arabia and this was the reason why he was later called ‘Lawrence of Arabia’. For further information see 
his book, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Jonathan Cape, 1926); David Garnett (ed.), The Letters of 
T.E. Lawrence (London: Jonathan Cape, 1938); Richard Aldington, Lawrence of Arabia: A biographical 
enquiry (London: Collins, 1955); Scott Anderson, Lawrance in Arabia: War, Direct, imperial Folly and the 
Making of the Modern Middle East (London: Atlantic Books,2013). 
4
 Until August 1921, Iraq was known as Mesopotamia. See Warren Dockter, Churchill and the Islamic 
World: Orientalism, Empire and Diplomacy in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), p.164. The 





Britain in its war with the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Philby was sent out to advocate 
cooperation to Britain’s allies in Arabia against the Ottoman Empire. Three 
considerable issues are also addressed as part of his mission: first, the issue of the 
Ajman tribe which revolted against Ibn Sa‘ūd and Philby’s efforts to resolve the 
situation and not to let the tribe be diverted from the common cause; second, the 
blockade, which Philby successfully directed, which greatly influenced the war against 
the Ottomans; and third, the invasion of Ḥail – why Philby regarded this objective as 
crucial for setting  the pace between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain and how far it would 
contribute to British interests in the region. This thesis deals with Philby’s efforts in the 
conflict between Najd and Hejaz and his actions in the border dispute between Ibn 
Sa‘ūd and his rival, Hussain, and asks whether Philby played a major part in the collapse 
of the Hejazi kingdom. It considers Philby’s contribution to the American recognition of 
Saudi Arabia and the methods that he used to secure this. It examines Philby’s method 
of settling the political conditions in Arabia after the Idrisi revolt against Ibn Sa‘ud. It 
asks why Philby visited Yemen and if it would somehow have enhanced Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
position. It also focuses on Philby’s role in the Buraimi crisis between Britain and Saudi 
Arabia and illustrates the persuasive arguments by which Philby upheld the Saudi 






The research questions 
In order to fulfil the central aims of the thesis, there are seven major research 
questions that require an answer: 
1-  What were the main factors that formed Philby’s character and the outcomes 
of his outstanding proficiency in Oriental languages? 
2- When he was working in India, Iraq and Transjordan, did Philby implement his 
tasks effectively and was he loyal to his country? 
3-  Was Philby successful in fulfilling the objectives of his mission to Najd? How did 
his success continue to serve Britain during WWI? 
4- What were the major methods that Philby used to bring American recognition 
to Saudi Arabia? Did he betray his country by procuring the oil concession for 
the US instead of Britain? 
5- Was Philby regarded as important in ending the Idrisi revolt against the Saudi 
Government? 
6- Was Philby’s mission to the south of Yemen related to his desire to explore 
Arabia or was it an attempt to increase the extent of the Saudi expansion in 
Yemen?  
7- By what methods did Philby seek to include the oasis of Buraimi under Saudi 
sovereignty and was his campaign successful in showing the world that Britain 






To answer the research questions stated above required an analysis of primary data 
such as archival materials, documents and reports, in order to interpret and form a 
notion of Philby’s life and his work in the Middle East. Deductive, inductive and 
descriptive approaches were the main ones taken in this thesis. The author also 
conducted many research interviews in particular with members of Philby’s family, in 
Britain and Saudi Arabia, such as Mr. Michael Engelbach, the son of Helena, Philby’s 
youngest daughter, and Faris, the son of Philby, who is still living in Riyadh.  
Archival sources 
The most important primary sources consulted for this thesis are stored in Britain’s 
official archives. The author examined a great number of documents in different 
departments of the National Archives at Kew, such as the Foreign Office (FO) and 
Colonial Office (CO) records and the records of Cabinet Files (CAB). Another important 
source for this thesis was the British Library, where many documents in and related to 
the records of the Government of India (GI) can be found, in particular the Political and 
Secret Department Subject Files (L/P&S) and those of the British Residency and 




Philby, Cox, Herbert Samuel5 and Sir Reader Bullard6 held at The Middle East Centre 
Archives (MECA), St. Antony’s College, Oxford University and the collected papers of Sir 
Gilbert Clayton7 at Durham University. Beside the official published documents, the 
author also examined the memoirs written by the British officials who had a connection 
with Arabia and Philby as well as a wide range of primary and secondary Arabic 
sources. 
Efforts were made to trace all the secondary sources dealing with Philby from his early 
life and work for the British Government to the time of his resignation, after which he 
settled in Saudi Arabia until his death in Beirut in 1960. Before dealing with the 
historiography on Philby, it may be useful to provide some examples of the 
                                                          
5
 Herbert Louis Samuel (1870-1963) was an eminent British politician. He had engaged in politics since his 
time at Oxford University. In 1905 he was Under-Secretary for the HO and from this was promoted as far 
as High Commissioner for Palestine between 1920 and 1925. Before WWI, he had not been a believing 
Jew but afterwards became an important advocate for the Zionist Organization and for the 
establishment of a National Home for the Jewish People in Palestine. For further accounts, see his 
Memoirs (London: The Cresset Press, 1945); Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel, A Political Life 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
6
 Sir Reader William Bullard (1885-1976) was a British diplomatist who spent most of his life in the 
Middle East, working as consul, minister and an ambassador. At the end of WWII, he decided to retire 
and devoted himself to write many historical works. See additional accounts in his books: The Camels 
Must Go: an autobiography (London: Faber and Faber Ltd., 1961);Letter from Tehran: A British 
Ambassador in World War Two Persia (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991); E.C. Hodgkin (ed.), Two Kings in Arabia: 
Sir Reader Bullard’s Letter from Jeddah 1923-5 and 1936-9 (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1993); Sir Reader 
Bullard collection, The Middle East Centre Archive (MECA), St. Antony's College, Oxford University, Re. 
GB165-0042; E. C. Hodgkin, ʻ Bullard, Sir Reader William (1885–1976)’, Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, accessed 3 Jan 2016. 
7
 Sir Gilbert Clayton (1875–1929) was a British army officer. He worked in Sudan and Egypt until 1909 
when he retired from the army. Afterwards, he worked as a colonial intelligence officer and became in 
1913 the Director of Intelligence in Egypt. Between 1922 and 1925 he was the Chief Secretary to Samuel, 
the High Commissioner in Palestine. From 1928 to 1929 he was the High Commissioner in Iraq. For 
further information see his biography in Robert Collin (ed.), An Arabian Diary (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969); Clayton’s papers, Durham University Library: Archives and Special Collections 
(DULASC), Re.GB-0033-SAD; Timothy Paris, Britain, The Hashemites and Arab Rule1920-1925, The 
Sherifian Solution (London: Routledge, 2003), p.38, et seq; M. W. Daly, ‘Clayton, Sir Gilbert Falkingham 




historiography on the British engagement with the Middle East during WWI as well as 
Britain’s post-war policy in the region. 
Historiography on the British involvement in the Middle East 
One of the most significant recent books that touches on the British Empire in the 
Middle East is Churchill and the Islamic World by Warren Dockter. In Dockter’s view, 
Winston Churchill8 was a central figure with considerable impact on the history of the 
British Empire from its golden era to its disintegration after World War II (WWII). What 
distinguishes this book is that, of the many books that have been written about 
Churchill and his political career, Dockter’s book may be considered the most 
important academic study to tackle Churchill’s relations with the Islamic world. Dockter 
states that Churchill’s perception of Islam developed throughout his political career. He 
describes Churchill’s first contact with Muslims in 1897  when he served as a young 
officer on the North West Frontier of India (now called Afghanistan and Pakistan).9 
Specifically, Churchill had his first encounters with the Arabs in the Middle East when 
he became Colonial Secretary in the early 1920s and established the Middle East 
Department in order to run the affairs of the Arabs with a coherent policy and to avoid 
                                                          
8
 Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill (1874-1965) was one of the most important British politicians of 
the 20
th
 century. He spent the early years of his career in the British army. In 1900, he engaged in politics 
and afterwards held several political posts, finally becoming Prime Minster in 1940. His party was 
unsuccessful in the general election of 1945, but he returned to Downing Street on 26 October 1951 and 
led his party until 1955 when he decided to resign. For further information see Henry Pelling, Winston 
Churchill (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1974); V. G Trukhanovskiĭ, Winston Churchill [translated by Kenneth 
Russel] (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1978); Paul Addison, Winston Churchill (Oxford: Oxford University, 
2007). 
9




the conflicting policies of the War Office, the Foreign Office and the India Office. 
Dockter illustrates the change in Britain’s policy from direct to indirect control after 
WWI and the considerable efforts made by Churchill to set up a new Arab government 
in Iraq and Transjordan, as the Cairo Conference suggested in March 1921. Dockter 
presents this change in the British policy and the shaping of a new map in the Middle 
East, together with the reasons behind the new British policy. He states that Churchill 
wanted to instil major pro-British sentiment among the Arabs to preserve and advance 
British interests, at the same time as the British Government wanted to reduce its 
financial expenditure in Iraq and Transjordan.10 
In John Townsend’s Proconsul to the Middle East: Sir Percy Cox and the end of Empire, it 
is clearly implied that while Cox spent most of his career and sacrificed much of his 
personal life to serve the British Empire in the Persian Gulf, the British Government 
ignored him once he left the service in 1923. The book outlines Cox’s biography from 
his early life to his first connection with the Persian Gulf, when he was appointed as 
Political Agent at Muscat in 1899. Townsend believes that Cox was anxious regarding 
the Hussain-McMahon correspondence, in which Hussain was promised prominent 
leadership among the Arabs; Cox wondered how this would affect British interests in 
the Gulf. In addition, Townsend believes that Cox was a typical imperial figure who was 
                                                          
10




influential in implementing the British policy in the Middle East, especially when he 
proclaimed the succession of Faiṣal,11 the third son of Hussain, as king of Iraq.12 
The creation of Saudi Arabia: Ibn Saud and British Imperial Policy, 1914-1927 by Askar 
al-Enazy is related to the birth of Saudi Arabia, revealing how this country was 
connected to the policy of Britain from the eve of WWI to the Jeddah treaty signed 
between Saudi Arabia and Britain in 1927. Al-Enazy asserts that the Saudi expansion 
was motivated by the political aspirations of Ibn Sa‘ūd, who deployed the Wahhabi 
ideology as an essential factor in establishing his regime. The most important finding in 
this book is that the establishment of Saudi Arabia was a fulfilment of British imperial 
policy, in which Ibn Sa‘ūd’s charisma and his religious ideology were considered the 
most effective political instruments.13 
John Darwin can be considered one of the significant historians of the British empire 
who views his subject in the light of world history. In addition to several important 
books – Britain and Decolonization (1988); The End of the British Empire: The Historical 
Debate (1991); and After Tamerlane: The Global History of Empire since 1405 (2008) – 
he has recently written his magnum opus The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the 
                                                          
11
 Faiṣal Ibn Hussain (1883-1933), with T.E. Lawrence, had remarkable success in fighting the Turks during 
the WWI. During his reign as King of Iraq he succeeded in establishing a constitutional government and 
generally maintained friendly relations with neighbouring countries. He died in Switzerland from a heart 
attack and his body was transferred to Iraq and buried there. For more detail, see, al-Zereky, al-a‘lām 
[Biographical Dictionary], vol.5, p.165-166; Peter Sluglett, Britain in Iraq: Contriving king and country 
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British World-System 1830-1970. This enormous book consists of two parts, each of 
seven chapters. He examines the history of the British empire from the early decades 
of the Nineteenth century to the end of Empire in the 1970s, focusing on its salience 
and fall and its relations to the evolutional trajectory of the current world-system. The 
book explores both formal and informal roles and spheres of influence of Britain in its 
imperial geopolitical expansion, in Australia, New Zealand, India, Africa, the Middle East 
and Asia. The first section of the book examines the rise of the empire to WWI, arguing 
that this rise was undoubtedly a conscious project. His argument is based on the fact 
that the evolution of British imperialism was among the consequences of the political, 
economic, and social changes that were happening in Britain and of a variety of 
external incidents, to which Britain was obliged to respond. The second section deals 
magnificently with the collapse of the Empire from the beginning of WWI to the end of 
the 1960s. In Darwin’s view, hostilities and imperial rivalry were a major threat to 
British interests.14 Furthermore, the war against the Turks resulted in the frustration of 
Indian Muslims with British policy and the financial cost of the war put the colonial 
economies under pressure.15 In his conclusion Darwin states that some of the reasons 
behind the decline of the British empire in the interwar period were the economic 
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decline, political appeasement in India, the rise of the US as a world power and 
antagonism to any form of imperialism.16  
Priya Satia wrote Spies in Arabia: The Great War and the Cultural Foundations of 
Britain’s Covert Empire in the Middle East. This book is divided into two parts: the first 
is called “War and Hope” while the other is entitled “Peace and Terror”. Generally, the 
book presents a cultural history of British intelligence in the Middle East during WWI 
and afterwards. In Satia’s view, culture played a crucial part in British intelligence since 
most of the British agents were orientalist and scholars, such as D.G. Hogarth,17 who 
had great knowledge of the Arabs and their customs as well as the geographical nature 
of their lands. In addition, British intelligence benefited from agents such as Lawrence 
and Bell, who admired the romance of Arabic culture and who had ventured into the 
region before the outbreak of WWI and visited many places in the Middle East18 and 
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were then recruited as intelligence agents to serve the British Empire. As a result, Satia 
argues that such an intelligence service justifies the view that these agents made the 
cardinal contribution not only to the British triumphs against the Ottomans but also 
during the British mandatory administration, after establishing a new form of imperial 
rule, which Satia calls the “covert empire” in the Middle East.19 
Another significant study of British policy in the first quarter of the 20th century is 
Britain, The Hashemites and Arab Rule 1920-1925, The Sherifian Solution by Timothy 
Paris. In great depth, Paris explores the relations between Hussain and Britain from 
those in wartime to the time of Hussain’s removal to Hejaz by Ibn Sa‘ūd, focusing on 
the reasons that led Hussain to head the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. Paris sheds 
light on the most controversial case between the Arab nationalists and Britain 
regarding the Hussain-McMahon correspondence, arguing that the correspondence 
between the two men was “an informal exchange of ideas” leaving Britain “free to 
make any post-war arrangements it wished”.20 Paris focuses also on the British 
Mandates in Iraq and Transjordan and treats in great detail the considerable efforts 
made by Lawrence to advocate the Sharifian solution of proposing Faiṣal as the king of 
Iraq and his brother Abdullah21 as ruler of Transjordan. He illustrates how Lawrence 
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was able to implement this policy against his rivals, A. T. Wilson22 and the India Office, 
who wanted the Arab lands of the Ottoman Empire to be under the direct control of 
Britain.23 
In his chapter ‘Britain’s informal Empire in the Middle East’, Glen Balfour-Paul, 
moreover, argues that British policy in the Nineteenth century was to protect the 
Ottoman sovereignty in western Asia, for the underlying reason of securing both British 
India and the eastern Mediterranean against the plans of other European powers, such 
as Tsarist Russia and France. Balfour-Paul interprets the great expansion of Britain 
between the Mediterranean and India, as a crucial point from which it set up its 
informal empire in the Middle East, especially after the collapse of the Ottomans who 
had entered the Great War against Britain.24 Balfour-Paul asserts that Britain ceased to 
operate by formal annexation, for two main purposes: to avoid adverse world reactions 
and to escape “the financial and manpower implications for an Empire already 
overstretched”.25 Balfour-Paul sheds light on the relations between Britain and the 
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Arabs, especially Hussain, who requested an independent Arab state as the price of his 
assistance with Britain’s war against the Ottomans. However, Balfour-Paul maintains 
that there was a misunderstanding between Britain and Hussain, especially with regard 
to the subject of the Hussain-McMahon correspondence. This persuaded the Arabs to 
believe that Britain had not fulfilled its promise of independence.26 Balfour-Paul 
explores the great effort by the British authorities in Cairo after the Arab revolt broke 
out, to assist this revolt; after the defeat of the Ottomans, the British officials in Cairo 
sought to put the region under the control of the Hashemite family. He goes on to 
examine the conflict of opinion between Whitehall and Delhi regarding the form of the 
British regime in the Middle East. While Whitehall preferred indirect control, Delhi 
insisted otherwise: “direct British control of Mesopotamia was judged essential”.27 In 
his conclusion, Balfour-Paul states that the nature of British control over the Middle 
East had not at the outset been driven by empire-building but rather as a matter of 
securing communications with India.28  
‘The British Empire and the Muslim World’ is the title of a chapter by Francis Robinson. 
The chapter covers the relations between the British empire and the Muslims from 
1765, when the East India Company received from the Mughal Emperor the right to 
increase revenue and administer justice in Bengal, to the end of British empire in the 
1970s. In this chapter, Robinson reveals that by the 1920s Britain ruled more than half 
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the Muslim peoples of the world. In his view, the considerable dominance of Britain 
had in effect a crucial influence on the lives of Muslims and their development. 
Robinson claims that this can be seen from the fact that imperial techniques formed 
the developing politics, economies and knowledge of Muslim nations and finally 
transformed them into modern Muslim states; it can be said that the “British Empire 
was the context in which many Muslims experienced the transition to modernity”.29 
Regarding the Arabian Peninsula, Robinson suggests that Britain's interests were 
significantly strategic; Britain had control over its coastline and the routes to India. In 
the Aden Protectorates, the British ruled the region from Aden to Oman, its officials 
assisted by advisers. In the Gulf, the sheikhs of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Trucial 
Coast had all signed treaties “with the British in the nineteenth century and existed 
underneath the umbrella of British power”.30 The British Government let these regions 
rule themselves and would not intervene except when necessary and the situation 
required it. In Central Arabia, the British had at one stage thought of adopting Sharif 
Husain Hussain as their agent, but later abandoned Hussain and “wisely allowed the 
local leaders to fight for supremacy”.31 
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Historiography on Philby  
The first biography of Philby, as far as is known, was written by Khairī Hammād; it is 
Abdullah Philby: Ket‘h min Tārīkh al-Arab [Philby: A Piece of Arab History].32 The book is 
divided into two very long chapters, the first in seven sections and the second in eight. 
This book concerns Philby’s life from childhood to his work in India, Iraq, Transjordan 
and Saudi Arabia. It is evident in this book that the most trustworthy materials that 
Khairī used were Philby’s own books; he translates the accounts of all the historic 
events that Philby supplied and interprets them with a strongly antipathetic bias. 
Although Philby himself had ceased to work for the British Empire and had begun to 
support revolutions and freedom fighters in all of Britain’s colonies, and despite the 
many years that he spent in Saudi Arabia, Hammād still believed that Philby was 
seeking to implement British imperial policy not only in Saudi Arabia but also in other 
Middle Eastern countries.33 However, Hammāddid not generally touchon Philby’s 
political efforts in the Middle East and his book may be called a kind of biography 
extracted from Philby’s original autobiography and his other books. 
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The Desert King: A Life of Ibn Saud is written by David Howarth .34 As the title suggests, 
the book is about Ibn Sa‘ūd, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, focusing on his 
significant efforts to unify most of the territories of the Arabian Peninsula. In the 
second chapter, Howarth allocated a section to Philby and his mission to Riyadh. Unlike 
Khairī, Howarth did not believe that Philby was a spy for his country but he criticised 
Philby for being a strange and eccentric Englishman who began almost to worship Ibn 
Sa‘ūd and made every effort to serve him. Howarth strongly believed that Philby failed 
to implement the mission’s objectives most signally in his failure to reduce the tension 
between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain. More importantly, he claimed that Philby damaged the 
mission by his sudden visit to Hejaz and that Philby’s absence let a golden opportunity 
be missed to let Ibn Sa‘ūd invade the territory of Ibn Rashid, the ally of the Ottomans.35 
On this evidence, Howarth seems to have been convinced that Philby did not play any 
leading role in Arabia, a conclusion with which this thesis entirely differs. The author 
believes that Philby’s mission served British interests in the war against the Ottomans 
and enhanced Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position in central Arabia.  
Britain, India, and the Arabs 1914-1921, is by Briton Cooper Busch.36 Busch speaks first 
about Philby’s personality and suggests that one reason for Philby’s resignation from 
Britain’s foreign service was his constant clashes with his superiors. On the subject of 
Philby’s mission, Busch claims that Arnold Wilson’s difficulties with Philby led to his 
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being put in charge of the mission.37 It is obvious that Busch did not examine the 
motivation behind Philby’s resignation and also did not understand the relations 
between Philby and Wilson; the present thesis, it is hoped, will show that the political 
factor was perhaps the main reason behind Philby’s leadership and not Philby’s 
personality. Generally, Busch focused, in great depth, on one aspect of the mission’s 
objectives, which was the Hejazi-Najdi conflict, and did not deal fully with other aims of 
the mission, such as the issues of the blockade and the Ajman revolt, which were 
resolved by the great efforts of Philby during WWI.   
Another book on Philby is Elizabeth Monroe’s Philby of Arabia.38 This book may be 
considered a major biography of its subject by a recognised pioneering authority in the 
field. She met him in 1938 and learned a great deal about him. She also travelled to 
every country where Philby had worked and lived – Pakistan, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Saudi Arabia – before covering in chronological order all the events of Philby’s life. 
The fundamental factor that distinguishes her book from the others is that it quotes 
and cites some original sources by Philby, such as his books, political correspondence, 
articles, reports and personal letters. However, Monroe did not discuss Philby's political 
work in much depth; for instance, his mission to Najd, the part he played in the conflict 
between the rulers of Hejaz and Najd, his communicating with American politicians in 
order to reorganize the affairs of Saudi Arabia or even Philby’s efforts in the Buraimi 
crisis between Britain and Saudi Arabia. 
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Another book referring to Philby is The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the 
House of Saud by Gary Troeller.39 The book covers all the historic events of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
life from his capture of Riyadh in 1902 to the elimination of the Hejazi kingdom in 1925. 
The considerable space devoted to Philby relates to his mission. Like Busch, Troeller 
describes Philby as a man who tended to clash with others; he draws attention to the 
dispute in Riyadh over the leadership of the mission between Philby and Robert 
Hamilton.40 Although Troeller lists the mission’s objectives, he focuses on two of them, 
namely intervening in the Hejazi- Najdi conflict and in the Ḥail invasion.41 Thus, Troeller 
does not examine any other aspects of the Najdi mission and, more important, he 
ignores Philby’s remarkable achievements in Arabia.  
A further book touching on Philby is The House of Saud by David Holden and Richard 
Johns.42 Although the book covers the whole history of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
from 1902 to 1979, it does not include Philby’s efforts either in the case of the oil 
concession between Saudi Arabia and the US or those related to the Saudi expansion in 
Buraimi and Yemen. The whole account of Philby that Holden and Johns give in their 
book is concerned with his personal character as seen in his mission to Najd. These 
authors claim that if Philby had had the chance and towed the line, he could have 
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reached high political rank in the British Government or administration. However, he 
failed to accomplish this, due to a combination of his lack of diplomacy and his 
behaviour, which tended always to react fiercely to events.43 Such beliefs lead them to 
condemn him and his failures, but writers who do so may be misinformed or over-
subjective and may not realize the primary factors and circumstances that influenced 
Philby’s relationship with his country. These were what inclined him to oppose Britain’s 
policy in the Middle East and finally to stop working for the Empire and pursue business 
interests of his own in Saudi Arabia.  
Joseph Kostiner’s book, The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to 
Monarchical State,44 is a further secondary source that contains an account of Philby. 
Like the above historians, Kostiner bases his entire narrative on Philby’s mission to 
Najd, concentrating on the relations between Hejaz and Najd and the invasion of Ḥail. 
It is plain that Kostiner gathered fundamental documents regarding Philby and his 
mission but he does not show the positive impact of Philby’s visit to Hejaz nor Philby’s 
profound efforts to serve the British interests in central Arabia. In addition, Kostiner 
stresses that Philby was captivated by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s personality, as evidenced by his 
taking the responsibility of furnishing Ibn Sa‘ūd with £20,000.45 The author argues that 
Philby’s admiration was not the only reason but, as will be seen, the conflict between 
British officials in Cairo and Baghdad was probably the main factor behind Philby’s 
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financial grant to Ibn Sa‘ūd. Furthermore, Kostiner does not include the important 
matter of the documents in the National Archives, which show the several meetings of 
the Inter-Departmental Conference,46 illustrating Philby’s opposition to the British 
policy in Cairo; this strengthened Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position against Hussain, the prominent 
leader in Arabia. 
Another book containing an account of Philby is Travellers in Arabia by Robin Bidwell .47 
Bidwell writes about a number of Western explorers in the Arabian Peninsula. His 
chapter on Philby states that no Western traveller “saw as much of the Peninsula, nor 
visited it, as he did, practically every corner of it nor traversed it so many times in so 
many different ways. None of them spent more than 20 months in Arabia: Philby was 
there for most of forty years”.48 He summarises Philby’s activities and life and includes 
several photographs taken by Philby. He concludes that the era of exploration ended 
with Philby and no one has provided such knowledge of the Arabia Peninsula since his 
attempt to map all the areas of Arabia that had not yet been explored by Europeans. 
However, he suggests that Philby was an opponent of British policy, who always 
assumed that his own way of seeing issues was right.49 This portrays Philby as 
implacable; it seems unfair for Bidwell to pass over Philby’s true motivation and the 
reasons behind his views, in particular because Bidwell is known to have relied simply 
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on the account of Philby given by the British officials who were at odds with him.50 In 
any case, the title of Bidwell’s book makes it clear that it focuses only on travellers to 
Arabia and says nothing about the rest of Philby’s life nor his political activities in Saudi 
Arabia.  
Tawḥid al- Māmlākahal- arabiah al- Sū‘diah [Arabia Unified], written by Mohammed al-
Man‘a, the head translator for Ibn Sa‘ūd, who met Philby for the first time in 1926.51 
Unlike Khairī Hammād, al-Man‘a believed that Philby was honest in his relations with 
Ibn Sa‘ūd and found it hard to accept the allegation that he was a spy for his country.52 
However, although al-Man‘a devoted one chapter to Philby; he did not present 
historical accounts of Philby’s early life or indicate that Philby had much political 
influence on the history of Saudi Arabia. 
Another book that deals with Philby is Treason in the Blood: H. St John Philby, Kim 
Philby and the Spy Case of the Century, by Anthony Brown.53 As the title indicates, 
Brown takes a strongly condemnatory view not only of Philby but also of his family. He 
is convinced that Philby was a traitor to his country, who destroyed the plans and 
projects of Britain in the Middle East, in particular in his vital contribution to the 
negotiations over oil in Saudi Arabia. In his view, Philby was the one who suggested 
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that Ibn Sa‘ūd should award the concession to the American company Standard Oil of 
California (SOCAL), rather than to Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). Brown also criticised 
him in forceful language, portraying him as a spy for Ibn Sa‘ūd and the US.54 This book 
seems to be wholly subjective, for Brown cannot substantiate his allegation with 
documentary evidence. Nevertheless, the thesis examines Brown’s view of Philby at 
greater length below and counters Brown’s claim by evidence that Philby was in fact 
loyal to his country and not a spy for Saudi Arabia or the US. In addition, like the 
previous writers, Brown does not tackle Philby’s precise political role in Saudi Arabia 
nor indicate that Philby worked hard to serve his country during WWI. 
Kingmakers: The Invention of the Modern Middle East is a book by Karl Meyer and 
Shareen Brysac. The authors focus on the history of the Middle East, especially in the 
first half of the 20th century. The book consists of a series of biographical vignettes, of 
Mark Sykes,55 for example, Lawrence, Arnold Wilson, Gertrude Bell and John Philby. In 
the view of the authors, these prominent British individuals were “instrumental in 
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building nations, defining borders and selecting or helping to select local rulers”.56 
Chapter Seven is devoted to Philby. It traces the remarkable events of Philby’s life from 
his birth in Ceylon in 1885 to his education in London and Cambridge. Then it focuses 
on Philby’s career from joining the ICS in India, to Iraq and then to the end of Philby’s 
service with Britain in Transjordan, where he resigned from his post as Chief British 
Representative.57 The book also sheds light on Philby’s relations with Saudi Arabia, 
illustrating how he became an important advocate for Ibn Sa‘ūd and worked to further 
Saudi Arabia’s  interests, with especial attention to his role in the oil concession 
between the US and Saudi Arabia in 1933. The authors suggest that Philby “emerged as 
the Western kingmaker who left the deepest strategic imprint on the Middle East”.58 
Indeed, Philby played a profound role while he was working as a British official but his 
opposition to the imperial policy of Britain contradicts the claim that he ‘left the 
deepest strategic imprint of any on the region’; his efforts cannot be compared with 
those of Sykes or Lawrence, who helped to shape the map of the new Middle East. 
A further book is John Philby wa- Saudi Arabia fi ‘hd al -Malik Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa‘ūd [John 
Philby and Saudi Arabia in the Era of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Sa‘ūd] by Sabri al- Hamdi.59 
The book is composed of a preface and five chapters and, as its title suggests, focuses 
on Philby’s life in Arabia. Hamdi examines Philby’s varied role there, focusing on the 
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conflict between Ibn Sa‘ūd, the ruler in Najd at the time, and Hussain, the ruler of 
Hejaz. He also sheds light on Philby’s role in the Saudi-British relations with Ibn Rashid, 
the ally of the Ottoman Empire, in Ḥail. In addition, he provides information on Philby’s 
expeditions in the Arabian Peninsula as well as examining Philby’s character and his 
views on the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, it should be 
noted that Sabri’s book contains several mistakes, not only regarding Philby’s mission 
but also in the historical events of the first quarter of the 20th century. For example, he 
states that Philby’s mission began in November 1915,60 but in fact it commenced in 
November 1917.61 The reason for such mistakes is probably that Hamdi depended on 
Khairī Hammād for his source, although the latter’s translation of Philby’s 
autobiography is not completely accurate.62 What it is notable in Sabri’s book is that he 
uses no primary sources, not even the Philby collection in the MECA, St. Antony’s 
College at Oxford nor the original documents in the National Archives and British 
Library, to say nothing of the great number of Philby’s articles and books written to 
justify his views.  
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Kesāt Abdullah Philby min khelāl al-wathaeq al-Britaniyah [The Story of Abdullah Philby 
through British Documents] by Ḥasan Sati.63  A short account can be found in this book 
of the early life of Philby and his career with the British Government. However, as the 
title indicates, the book concerns the translation into Arabic of files KV 2/1118 and 
1119 held by the National Archives and released on 25-26 November 2002.The two 
files deal with Philby’s activities in Arabia and his criticism of British policy in the Middle 
East. The book also discusses Philby’s detention order signed by the Home Secretary in 
1940, under Defence Regulation 18B. However, this book has nothing to say about 
Philby’s influence in Iraq, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. 
ʻSaudi–British diplomatic relations, 1918-1920: The Khurmah dispute’ by Hussain al-
Zaydey 64 is a doctoral that includes an account of Philby and precisely examines the 
military and political aspects of the Hejazi-Najdi competition over the oasis of Khurmah. 
It is obvious, however, that al- Zaydey does not bring out the main factors in Philby’s 
decision to assist Ibn Sa‘ūd and to control the Khurmah oasis under Saudi sovereignty. 
In addition, al- Zaydey does not focus on Philby’s success in safeguarding Ibn Sa‘ūd 
from the British officials in Cairo and London who wanted Hussain to be the dominant 
figure in Arabia. Furthermore, al- Zaydey does not examine the reasons why Philby’s 
prediction before the battle of Turabah regarding the decisive triumph of Ibn Sa‘ūd 
against Hussain came true. 
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In Saudi Arabia, the King Faiṣal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies contains a 
Master’s thesis under the title ʻJohn Philby wa- dawrūh al-siāsifi Transjordan 1921-
1924’ [John Philby and his political role in Transjordan], by Brijet Abu al- Rab.65 This 
clearly focuses on the political activities of Philby when he was Chief British 
Representative in Transjordan. Abu al- Rab also explores the political conflict between 
Philby and Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner of Palestine, which was obviously 
one of the main reasons that Philby chose to resign and work instead with Ibn Sa‘ūd in 
Arabia. Other causes are discussed below. 
Mohammed al-Naqbi wrote ʻOil Concession Agreement: An exploration of the effect of 
asymmetric negotiations on conflict creation in three Middle Eastern countries 
between the years of 1900-1975’.66 This thesis illustrates the impact of these 
negotiations over the oil agreements in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq. Regarding Saudi 
Arabia, al- Naqbi stresses that Philby was the essential player in the negotiations with 
Saudi representatives for oil concessions, a legendary figure who acted on behalf of 
SOCAL.67 Although al- Naqbi’s claim is well supported, he does not ask why Philby was 
so anxious for Saudi Arabia to give the oil concession to an American company. As 
shown below, one of the most important purposes behind Philby’s efforts was to have 
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Saudi Arabia recognized by the US, as suggested by hitherto unrevealed private letters 
between Philby and American officials.   
On a similar theme to al- Naqbi, Harit Intakanok wroteʻThe Emergence of Private 
Authority in the Oil Industry: The Case of Oil Concession Agreement’.68 This thesis 
examines the emanation of private authority in the oil industry, focusing on the 
negotiation and the application of oil concession agreements in four countries: Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran. Intakanok believes that Philby was one of the principal 
advisers to Ibn Sa‘ūd and describes him as the one who suggested improving the 
conditions in Saudi Arabia by investing in the country’s mineral resources.  Intakanok 
agrees with al- Naqbi that Philby played a major role in the negotiations between the 
Saudi Government and SOCAL.69 However, again like al- Naqbi, Intakanok does not 
focus on the essential steps that Philby took in his contacts with the US, which ended in 
that country’s recognition of Saudi Arabia. 
As far as is known, the first academic article to deal with Philby was ʻThe Philby Mission 
to Ibn Sa‘ūd’ by Daniel Silverfarb.70 Silverfarb states that he consulted the following for 
an account of Philby’s mission to Ibn Sa‘ūd: Briton C. Busch, Britain, India, and the 
Arabs: 1914-1921, Elizabeth Monroe, Philby of Arabia, and Gary Troeller, The Birth of 
Saudi Arabia. However, he argues that Busch is less than fair to the remarkable role 
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played by the British officials in Cairo in authorizing the Philby mission to Ibn Sa‘ūd in 
1917. Regarding Monroe, Silverfarb asserts that she was mostly concerned with 
outlining Philby's life rather than debating the implementation of British policy in 
Arabia. Of Troeller, he says that he did not use an important account of the minutes of 
the War Cabinet’s Middle Eastern Committee that reflected the formulation of British 
policy in Arabia.71 In fairness, since Silverfarb’s central topic purports to be Philby’s 
mission, it is surprising to find that he does not examine the mission itself at any great 
length; for instance, Philby’s role in dealing with the blockade and the question of the 
Ajman revolt are not treated in much depth. More importantly, he does not use the 
substantial collection of Philby’s documents at present in the MECA at St. Antony’s 
College, Oxford. Silverfarb concludes that Philby’s mission strained relations between 
Britain and Ibn Sa‘ūd and concludes that Philby, isolated as he was in central Arabia, 
failed to fulfil the purposes of the mission.72 
Silverfarb wrote another article that contains historical narrative about Philby. Its title 
is ʻThe British Government and the Khurmah Dispute, 1918-1919’.73 This article is 
certainly based on primary sources such as documents from TNA and IOR.  He covers 
the political conflict between the British officials in Cairo and Baghdad regarding the 
Hejazi-Najdi contention over the oasis of Khurmah. Although Silverfarb refers to 
Philby’s views in the conflict between Hejaz and Najd, he does not examine Philby’s 
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effort to strengthen Ibn Sa‘ūd and does not precisely investigate the reasons that led 
Philby to predict that the victory would be on the side of Ibn Sa‘ūd and not Hussain.  
ʻPhilby as a Historian of Saudi Arabia’ is written by George Rentz.74 It highlights the 
importance of Philby’s writings on the history of Saudi Arabia. Rentz describes Philby as 
the most productive Western writer as far as the history of Saudi Arabia is concerned. 
Despite some praise for Philby and his historical writings, he claims that Philby’s 
accounts need to be revised and criticised objectively, pointing out errors over the 
dates of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s battles against his rivals. Rentz compares the treatment of some 
historical events in Philby’s writings with that in other sources. He concludes that 
Philby’s historical accounts sometimes contain inaccuracies and ambiguity.75 Although 
this paper with its comparisons is a distinguished assessment and is very useful for a 
critique of Philby’s writings, it does not cover any aspect of Philby’s political role in 
Arabia. 
Jacob Goldberg has a similar article to Rentz’s, called ʻPhilby as a Source for Early 
Twentieth Century -Saudi History: A Critical Examination’.76 Goldberg surveys Philby’s 
close association with the Arabian Peninsula in general and Saudi Arabia in particular. 
He describes Philby’s interest in Arabia as truly impressive and comprehensive, 
covering multiple fields. He also analyses Philby’s writings on the history of Saudi 
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Arabia, showing the influences on these writings and criticising them when he sees fit. 
He focuses on the accuracy of Philby’s writings on three main topics: King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
policy regarding Britain from 1902 to 1914, the King’s policy regarding the Ottoman 
Empire and his role and potential for advancing British interests during WWI. However, 
Goldberg assumes that Philby’s accounts were influenced by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s character, 
which turned him into an official apologist for Saudi international policy in the Western 
world.77 On the whole, Goldberg’s attitude to Philby seems generally to highlight 
negative rather than positive aspects. Furthermore, the article considers no political 
aspects of Philby’s role from the Najdi mission to the Buraimi crisis. 
Mohammed al- Zulfah also contributes an article about Philby, entitled ʻKitābāt Philby: 
al-mṣdar al-mansifi Tārīkhnā al-wātāni’[Philby’s writings: the forgotten source in our 
national history].78 In his article, al- Zulfah alleges that, while Philby deserves academic 
study in recognition of what he did for Saudi Arabia, no one from that country has 
written about him. He also suggests that John Philby may be considered one of the 
greatest historians and explorers of the Arabian Peninsula in the 20th century. His works 
include not only fundamental historical accounts, but also key writings on Islam, 
entomology, zoology, archaeology, politics, economics and geography, together with 
hundreds of photographs of people and images of cities that reflect the geographical 
features of the time. In addition, al- Zulfah asserts that, during Philby’s settlement in 
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Saudi Arabia, he wrote several books and hundreds of reports, which cover the whole 
history of Saudi Arabia.79 However, al- Zulfah does not mention that, after Philby’s 
resignation from the British foreign service, he worked for political ends in Saudi 
Arabia; consequently, his article, as the present paper seeks to show, conveys nothing 
of what Philby did for Saudi’s international standing. 
Another article is ʻAbdullah Philby:  ḥayātūh wa- a‘malūh’[Abdullah Philby: His Life and 
Works] by ‘Umar al-‘Umary.80 This article may be considered a descriptive and 
analytical study of Philby, not only as a writer of historical accounts but also as an 
individual. Al-‘Umary stresses that Philby was a most remarkable figure, he encourages 
everyone to write about and explore the diversity of his scientific works. He sees Philby 
as a representative of British diplomacy and politics during the period of British 
colonialism. Al-‘Umary then outlines Philby’s life, from childhood to his studies and his 
work for the British Empire in India, Iraq, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. Finally, Al-
‘Umary summarizes his views and concludes that Philby may be considered a Western 
explorer who dominated all the writers on the Arabian Peninsula of his time.81 
However, al-‘Umary is merely compiling a short biography of Philby with no special 
attention to his political role in the Middle East. 
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Sabri al- Hamdi has written two articles about Philby. The first is ʻNashat John Philby 
wa- al-waẓāyf alti tawaldah fi ḥūkūmāt al-hind’ [The Background of John Philby and his 
posts in the India Government]82and the second is ʻPhilby wa- al-siāsih al-Britaniyah 
bishn al-‘elaqāt al-Najdiah-Kuwaitiah wa al-‘elaqāh ma‘aḤail’ [Philby and the British 
policy toward the Najdi-Kuwaiti and the relations with Ḥail].83 Both of these articles are 
evidently extracted from Sabri’s book (2013), as discussed above, and there is 
therefore no need to review their content. 
It is notable that the missing element in the literature is any study of Philby’s political 
role in Arabia that is based on archival sources. This thesis, as far as is known, is thus 
the first to tackle Philby’s actions in Arabia based on primary evidence and, it is hoped, 
to demonstrate comprehensively some findings about his profound involvement there. 
Organization 
The thesis will consist of an introduction, six chapters and a conclusion. The 
introduction addresses the importance of the thesis, definition and aims of the topic, 
the research questions, the research methods, archival sources, the historiography on 
Philby and overall organization. Chapter One focuses on the making of Philby: seminal 
Influences on the formation of his character, under five headings: his family; its roots; 
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his birth and childhood; his education at Westminster; and his days at Trinity College, 
Cambridge until the start of his work for the British Empire in India. Chapter Two 
introduces the beginnings of Philby’s activities and influence in the Middle East. This 
chapter has two sections: on his work in Iraq as a political administrator and his work as 
Chief British Representative in Transjordan. Chapter Three deals with Philby and the 
British contact with Arabia during WWI: the first part of his mission to central Arabia. It 
describes this mission, focusing on its objectives and findings. Chapter Four illustrates 
Philby’s efforts in the common cause: the second part of the Najdi mission. It has three 
main sections: on the Ajman revolt, the blockade question and the invasion of Ḥail. 
Chapter Five explores Philby’s role in the Khurmah crisis between Najd and Hejaz and 
tries to determine whether he had any influence on Ibn Sa‘ūd’s elimination of the 
Hejazi Kingdom. Chapter Six is about Philby’s contribution to Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
policy. It contains a number of sections: on Philby and the American recognition of 
Saudi Arabia, the Idrisi revolt, his visit to the south of Yemen and his remarkable role in 
the British-Saudi conflict over the Buraimi crisis. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the 
principal finding reached in the course of writing this thesis as well as the 





THE MAKING OF PHILBY:  






The aim of this chapter is to shed light on Philby’s background, from his early years up 
until his work for the British Empire in India. It is an attempt to understand the 
environment and the circumstances in which Philby developed. It aims to examine the 
main factors that shaped his knowledge. Although he was poor and studied under 
some hardship, Philby was an outstanding student, showing all the evidence of his 
intelligence. Therefore, it is worth asking how he was able to overcome the obstacles 
and achieve outstanding academic results. In addition, his personality was influenced 
by teachers and scholars and by his environment at Westminster School and Cambridge 
and it is therefore important to identify the characteristics, tendencies and attributes 
that he owed to them, which remained all his life and influenced his approach to the 
Middle East. The chapter deals with the main factors that made Philby change his 
outlook, at first Conservative, to a more liberal one. It also seeks to discover the 
reasons behind Philby’s desire to join the ICS, what kinds of training courses he was 
trained in and what posts he occupied. It examines how and why Philby became 
qualified in Oriental languages. It also traces the acts of Philby as he served his country 
with total loyalty, before leaving India and being sent to join the war in Iraq. 
The Philby family and its roots 
In his autobiography, Philby asserted that England was not the original home of his 
family. His ancestors emigrated from Finland to Britain at an uncertain date and 




England.1 Brown asserts that Philby’s ancestors moved to the town of Chigwell, in 
southern Essex, in the seventeenth century.2 However, Philby’s account differs from 
Brown’s, which states that his ancestors moved at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century.3 It seems wiser to trust Philby’s view than Brown’s, for two reasons. First, after 
examining the material on the Philby family at St. Antony’s College, Oxford and the 
Records of the India Office in the British Library or the archives of Westminster School, 
there seems to be nothing to confirm the date when Philby’s ancestors emigrated to 
England; this being the case, one may believe that Philby was probably better able than 
others to provide an account of his own family’s history. Second, although Michael 
Engelbach, the son of Helena, Philby’s youngest daughter, has no definite information 
regarding the history of his family, he tends to believe that his maternal grandfather 
was not likely to have often been factually wrong about his ancestry.4 Furthermore, the 
Chigwell parish registers, which contains some names of Philby’s forebears and the 
date of their baptism and marriage as well as the dates of their birth, do not go back 
further than 1837, which seems to be consistent with Philby’s claim that they moved to 
Chigwell in the first half of the nineteenth century.5 
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Philby recorded that his ancestors were ordinary people with no eminence or celebrity 
in the annals of virtue or criminality and if they had any share of fame it would have 
been small.6 This may explain why he was so ambitious; he sought fame as well as 
distinctiveness from others. He confessed that his ambition was “fame, whatever that 
may mean and for what it is worth. I have fought for it ... If my ambition had been to 
make money; it would have been easier to understand”.7 
Although Philby claimed that he did not search for the tombstones of his forebears, this 
may indicate that they had been moved elsewhere. He simply assumed that the parish 
registers in Filby or Chigwell might record their marriages or dates of birth.8 Moreover, 
Monroe suggested that the parish registers in Chigwell showed some details of two 
branches of the Philby family, one which related to the Taylors and another, bigger, 
one, known as the Belmont branch, which had been affiliated since 1824 with the 
Bridgers, a family which was respected in trade in the mid-nineteenth century. George 
Bridger, Philby’s great-great-grandfather, sold poultry and rabbits in Leadenhall Street.9 
Philby remarked that George Bridger owned the greater part of Leadenhall Street and 
would have been rich if he had continued in his business, instead of trying to rise in the 
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world.10 It was evident that Philby’s desire to be rich seems to date from the difficult 
conditions that he experienced throughout his childhood which are discovered later. 
Harry Montagu Philby was the father of the Philby in the present study. The parish 
registers state that he was born in Epping, Essex in March 1857.11 There seems little 
information about the early life of Montagu or even his education in youth. At this 
stage, in the 1870s, Monroe suggests that Montagu was sent to Ceylon to seek his 
fortune in the coffee trade.12 Philby’s opinion regarding the departure of his father 
contradicts Monroe’s opinion. He believed that his father had not been sent out there 
by his family but had made his own decision to leave. He explained that, as in any big 
family at the time, people had to depend on themselves, especially the youngest 
sons.13  The second view seems the more likely, for several reasons. First, the historical 
event of the departure was perhaps known only to Philby’s family and Philby was the 
only member to have revealed it. Second, a reason which deserves to be mentioned: in 
her book, Monroe does not give the source of her information that Harry Montagu had 
been sent away, which may be seen as impairing the reliability and accuracy of her 
contention. 
In any case, Harry Montagu sailed to Ceylon and once there decided to purchase a 
share in a hill farm called Badulla, before he realised that the golden era of coffee 
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growing had come to an end.14 Philby claimed that after a while his father’s business 
was successful, though due to the monotony of his isolation he sometimes succumbed 
to the temptations of society in Kandy and Colombo.15 It is very important to 
understand how Montagu could have purchased a share in a coffee plantation while he 
was still in his twenties. The answer probably is that Montagu may have borrowed 
money from his family, most likely his eldest brother, James Philby,16 who, as Monroe 
suggests, rose to the highest level of the learned professions and studied at Oxford; or 
else Montagu borrowed the money from his sisters whose husbands were a 
respectable succession of soldiers and merchants.17 Furthermore, it should not be 
forgotten that some of Montagu’s ancestors were respected merchants in trade; he 
may have inherited enough money to travel to Ceylon and set up his own business.18 
According to Monroe, Montagu was handsome, sociable and cheerful and when he had 
the chance of going to Kandy or Colombo, he enjoyed dancing and gaming.19 On one 
occasion, he met a girl and fell in love with her. Her name was Queenie (or May, as 
Philby called her) and her father, Colonel John Duncan,20 commanded the local 
garrison.21 She was pretty, animated, good at dancing and very quick-witted. She was 
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 His biography will be provided below. 
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19 when she married Harry Montagu.22 Her mother belonged to the Cardew family and 
her ancestors were priests and soldiers. Cornelius Cardew, her great-grandfather, had a 
doctorate in theology and provoked his acquaintances by expressing the wish that the 
Americans would defeat Britain and become independent. His family was productive 
and plain-spoken. He died in 1831, the father of many children; indeed, 141 of his 
descendants fought in WWI, four of them from the Philby family. The Elliots, Lockharts, 
Bethunes and Hoopers among his descendants distinguished themselves in the army or 
in diplomacy. General Bernard Montgomery23 was the greatest and most celebrated of 
these, the hero of the battle of Al-Elamein.24 
May’s father, Colonel John Duncan, had a disturbing history. One day his son, also 
called John, who had been searching without success for all those relatives who carried 
the name of his family, asked his father what his grandfather’s job had been. His father 
replied evasively that the grandfather had died young. The truth was that the real 
name of his grandfather had been Duncan McCleod and he had left Geanies in Easter 
Ross (in Scotland) to serve in the army, reaching the rank of lieutenant-general before 
his death in a fashionable part of London at the age of 76. He married and had a lively, 
quick-witted son, Duncan, who was born in India and raised by his grandfather in the 
home country. Duncan worked in India and eventually became Deputy Governor of the 
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Punjab. His son died and he had no more children of his own, but, before his death, he 
adopted two illegitimate children and gave them his surname. One of them, John 
Duncan, became the father of Philby’s mother. Illegitimacy never disturbed Duncan, 
although it was socially a matter of shame at the time. When John Duncan, as a 
legitimate son, applied for membership of the East India Company, he provided the 
name of his adoptive father, Duncan McCleod, and then forgot the past and established 
a distinct line of succession in his own right.25 However, Monroe’s statement that John 
Duncan “cut the painter with the past”26 seems not quite to be true. As stated earlier, it 
can be inferred from his reply to his son that his grandfather had died young and that 
he himself had probably not been reconciled to the fact of being adopted. 
Despite his discontent, Duncan was successful enough in India to have been nominated 
as Vice- Consul; because of his expertise in foreign languages, he became a teacher at 
the Staff College at Camberley in the 1870s. A decade or so later he held a highly 
responsible post in the Adjutant-General’s department of the Irish Command in Ceylon. 
By the 1890s, he was Deputy Assistant-General at the War Office. He died in 1898 while 
serving in Bombay, leaving his wife, Emily, and 11 children. May, Philby’s mother, was 
the eldest of these.27 Before ending this section and embarking on Philby’s birth and 
childhood, it may be interesting to ask whether May was the social superior of her 
husband Montagu? In fact there seems to have been little difference in social rank 
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between them, given that some of Montagu’s relatives were merchants and lawyers 
and that, as Monroe asserts, the Montagu family considered themselves gentlemen 
and ladies.28 Furthermore, Montagu, was at the beginning of his business a respectable 
trader and financially successful enough; this may have persuaded May’s parents to 
accept him as a husband for their daughter. 
Birth and childhood 
On Friday 3rd April 1885, Harry St. John Philby Bridger was born in Ceylon, where his 
father, Harry Montagu, had sought his fortune in the coffee trade.29 As Philby 
mentioned in his autobiography, he was born at Easter, the festive season marking the 
crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ. However, he did not consider that the date 
of his birth was any kind of omen and decided to choose figures and days which others 
dreaded as tokens of his own good fortune.30 Such consideration may encapsulate 
Philby’s character, which rejected the errors of perception of his time. Equally, it may 
illustrate Philby’s conviction that life reflected the optimism of those who prospered. 
Commenting on his first name, Warren Dockter states that Philby’s first name was 
Henry.31 However, it seems that the name was actually Harry. Philby surmised that his 
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wathaeq al-Britaniyah [The Story of Abdullah Philby through British Documents], p.9. 
30
 Philby, Arabian Days, p.5.  
31




first name probably originated from the name of his father, Harry Montagu Philby, 
which is compatible with the details of the parish registers containing the names of 
Philby’s father.32 Abdullah al-‘ūthimin asserted that Philby’s second name, St John, may 
have derived from the province of this name in Ceylon, where Philby was born.33  His 
third name, Bridger, came from the Bridger family, which resided in Chigwell and 
enjoyed close a friendship with Philby’s family.34 In addition, with the exception of the 
British documents and Western and Arabic historical authors, among his family and 
close friends Philby was known as and called St. John.35 In 1930 and under the advice of 
Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby changed his name to Abdullah Philby when he made his religious 
conversion to Islam.36 
Apart from Philby, her second child, who was nicknamed Jack, May had three other 
boys. The eldest was Ralph Montagu, who was born in 1884 in Taylors in Chigwell, 
where his parents were on holiday; he was nicknamed Tom. The third male was Harold 
Payne, born in 1887 in Ceylon, who was known as Tim. The fourth boy, Dennis, was 
born in England in 1889 and was called Paddy by his family.37  Hammād and other 
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historians alleged that Philby had four brothers – Tom, Jack, Tim and Paddy.38 However, 
this claim is undoubtedly mistaken. Philby, in fact, had only three brothers, Ralph, 
Harold and Dennis; the name Jack (a diminutive of ‘John’) was the nickname of Philby 
himself.39 
It is worth noting how many members of Philby’s family worked for the British Empire. 
Apart from Philby, his three brothers all served their country. While his eldest brother, 
Tom, worked in the Royal Indian Navy; the third brother, Tim, was an army captain, 
who fought in France during WWI and was killed in 1916 at Ypres; Paddy, the youngest 
brother, was also a soldier, a sub-lieutenant in Bombay province, later also killed in 
action at Ypres at the beginning of WWI.40 
Philby stated that his mother travelled to England in 1888 for the birth of her fourth 
child.41 She left her three older boys in Ceylon in the care of an Irish nursemaid who 
was extremely religious and was always reminding Philby and his brothers about the 
Crucifixion or telling frightening tales of the punishments in wait for sinners. The Irish 
nanny was a Roman Catholic and had a firm conviction that the correct approach to 
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raising children was to fill them with the fear of God, people and the universe.42  Such 
fear and cruelty seem to have had a comprehensive impact on Philby’s personality, in 
particular on the Christian conservatism of his childhood and early youth, which 
persisted until his time at Trinity College, Cambridge. In a revealing passage of his 
autobiography, he stated: 
I suppose I was born a Christian and a Conservative, though life in Ceylon had scarcely 
been affected by such considerations despite the lurid insistence of our nurse on a 
proper respect for the wrath of God. I was certainly a Christian and a Conservative 
when, thirteen years later, I went to Cambridge as an undergraduate to find honest 
and serious-minded people like myself challenging the whole basis of such an ethic ... 
And when, in the last lap of my educational career, I came to doubt the justice of my 
convictions, I discarded them without remorse or bitterness. I had seen the light and 
never thought to temporize with expediency.43 
His father suffered business difficulties due to the coffee blight, which had started in 
the 1880s and extended to the highlands of Ceylon. In 1890, it destroyed the livelihood 
of all the farmers who had not been enterprising enough to change the produce of 
their land and transfer to tea cultivation. Although the father suffered a relatively light 
loss, he took to wine and women to assuage his woes.44 May, Philby’s mother, reached 
a point where she could no longer tolerate her husband and his inconsiderate 
escapades. Therefore, in 1891, she took the important decision to leave him and depart 
Ceylon.45 However, Hammād presented an unimaginable story regarding the departure 
of May and her boys. He mentioned that it was Philby’s father, not May, who decided 
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that the family should leave Ceylon in order to have his sons taught in English 
institutions.46 Hammād’s claim seems not to be quite logical. This is because Philby’s 
father, who was suffering from a lack of money, did not show due responsibility 
towards his wife and children. Even after the departure of May with her little children 
to England, he did not regularly send them money.47 After sailing for a few weeks, they 
arrived in England, where Philby’s grandparents were waiting for her and took the 
family home with them and stayed at Princes Square in London. Philby remembered 
that life in his grandparents’ house was simple and unpretentious. All the members of 
the family joined in daily prayer and they tended to go to Church on Sundays as a staple 
of existence.48 
Although the house was large, the grandmother, Emily, could not endure great noise 
and May realised that she had to look for an independent way of raising her children. 
She decided to move out of the house and at first chose rooms for herself and the four 
boys to settle in.49 Life was a struggle and something akin to the life of a nomad until 
the year 1903. Philby realised how much his mother had suffered from the lack of 
money and how she had fought poverty with no support from her husband.50 
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It is probable that the social and economic difficulties which Philby experienced 
generated in him a spirit of challenge, determination and perseverance as well as the 
ambition underlying his multi-talented competence in both planning and implementing 
projects. Monroe noted that his relationship with his mother was the strongest of all 
the brothers. He never forgot her and, as soon as he started working, he continued to 
support her financially, sending substantial funds to her every month.51 
The first stages of Philby’s education were in Rothe’s nursery, which was in 
Westbourne Grove, London.52 His honourable, honest, religious and rigorous 
grandfather, John Duncan, paid his fees and those of his elder brother Tom.53 It is 
noteworthy that his support and encouragement played a vital role in Philby’s 
education; without his assistance, Philby might perhaps have chosen another outlet for 
his ambition and a different career. 
Of this kindergarten period, Philby had little memory. However, he provided 
considerable evidence of being a vigorous and hard-working boy. His vitality, energy 
and sometimes fractious behaviour surprised his uncles and aunts, who, true to British 
traditions, tended to be more still and phlegmatic and who considered Philby and his 
                                                          
51
 Monroe, Philby of Arabia, p.21. 
52
 Philby, Arabian Days, p.16. 
53




brothers to be strange creatures originating from the outskirts of a very different ethnic 
realm.54 
The family considered that Philby and his elder brother should be transferred to a boys’ 
school which offered more discipline and good order than the kindergarten with its 
girlish atmosphere. The boarding school that the family chose was under the 
supervision of a Mr. William Keeling55 in Gloucester.56 Once again, the maternal 
grandfather paid the boys’ fees. Here, Philby was influenced considerably, not only by 
the teaching but also by its concept of life. Montie (Harry Montagu), Philby’s father, 
appeared suddenly and suggested in 1894 that Philby and Tom should be entrusted to 
the school at Henfield House in Sussex, where the education was perfect and the 
amusements varied.57 
After this visit to England, his father never saw Philby again. Harry was drowning in the 
difficulties of his financial problems. For a small salary, he worked in Ceylon and then 
he decided to fight in the South African War in a Bombardier regiment.58 In 1907, he 
sent a letter telling Philby that he was still alive, but was remorseful to be so far away; 
his difficult circumstances had forced him to join the army. Although Philby kept this 
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letter, he did not reply to it,59 which may show how upset he was that his father had 
deserted his mother and that his father’s negligence was the unforgivable sin.60 
Consequently, it may not be surprising to discover the few historical events in Philby’s 
autobiography that portray his dissatisfaction with his father.  
Philby indicated that his departure to boarding school was not easy for his mother, 
whom he left in floods of tears.61 His treatment at this school had a major impact on 
him and formed some of his lifelong predilections. For instance, he was impressed by 
the Classics, bird-watching and the game of cricket.62 It can be assumed that boarding 
school was his gateway to his hobbies and it conferred its distinctive mark on his later 
work as one of the most important explorers in the history of the Arabian Peninsula.63 
Though the teaching techniques at Henfield House were old-fashioned, the framework 
of its interests was immense. The aim of the staff was to infuse knowledge of the 
Classics into the pupils’ minds. Such an education was intended to create scholars in 
various subjects among the Humanities.64 Combined with the method of teaching, it 
may be noted that some of the personalities of the staff had a significant impact on 
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Philby and this is likely to have resulted in his diligence and success in the later stages 
of his education. 
After more than two years at Henfield House, the dutiful Philby assumed that it was 
time to increase his knowledge and competitiveness in another institution. In view of 
his mother’s poverty, his maternal grandfather, in 1897, again contributed the boys’ 
tuition fees. Philby, Tom, and his young uncle were dispatched to J. V. Milne’s school, 
Street Court. Philby was well prepared and in the preliminary examination to 
determine his level of proficiency, he outdid his brother and his uncle and was placed in 
the first class.65 In studying, Philby performed outstandingly and, within a year, he had 
been awarded a scholarship to Dover College. However, the headmaster of the Milne 
school, who had the ability to discover talented students, advised May not to accept 
this award. He persuaded her that Philby deserved better and should apply in the 
following year for a place at Westminster School, where he could be better educated 
than anywhere else.66 From this advice, it is evident that Philby performed 
outstandingly as a student; his record at the school was distinctive enough to be 
admired not only by his headmaster but also his teachers. 
It is likely that, while Henfield House provided Philby with the pillars of his education, 
Street Court defined in him a sense of what education meant and what its purposes 
were. In addition, J.V. Milne was possibly one of the most important educators and 
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Philby’s time at Street Court marked a milestone in his life. Milne was a believer in 
discipline and, although demanding in character, he mitigated it with tenderness. 
Arriving in1894, when he started as a teacher, he went on to become headmaster; 
Street Court was one of his achievements. Moreover, other members of staff held a 
conspicuous place in Philby’s memory. Mr Chittenden, the deputy head, who also went 
on to become its headmaster, was good at teaching, although he had no patience with 
his students. H.S. Ladell was the second master, who taught games. He too had a great 
impact on Philby, through being so devoted to his career.67 
Westminster  
Westminster may be described as one of the greatest public schools in the United 
Kingdom. The founder and the date when it was established are still uncertain, but the 
school seems to have developed from the original school appended to the Benedictine 
Monastery of Westminster.68 In 1898, at the age of 12, Philby took up the challenge to 
enter Westminster and won a Queen’s Scholarship, which, as Brown stated, may be 
considered a great act of personal fulfilment.69 Westminster School archives show the 
subjects of the Challenge Examination that students had to pass before enrolling in the 
school. It consisted of papers on Latin Prose, Latin Verse, Latin Grammar, Latin Unseen 
Translation, Greek Prose, Greek Iambics, Greek Unseen Translation, Practical 
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Chemistry, French, Euclid, Scripture Knowledge, General Grammar and Maths.70 The 
papers of the Candidates Minors positively indicate how high Philby’s marks were 
compared with other candidates’ who were older than him. He was one of the best 
candidates in order of merit, achieving 336 marks in total.71 
It may be added that, by entering Westminster, Philby proved that he was not only an 
intelligent student but also, despite his family’s poverty, was studying very hard to 
advance in knowledge and achieving success.  
Although the teaching was one of its strengths, the life there, as Monroe suggested, 
was rough and challenging, somewhat resembling life as a soldier.72 In line with 
Victorian expectations, the boys ate simple food, took regular cold baths and rose 
early.73 During the six years that Philby spent at Westminster, it is probable that he 
learnt discipline, confidence, responsibility and the maintenance and enforcement of 
law. It may be inferred that his ability to thrive in this environment led to his becoming 
the captain of the school.74 
During Philby’s time at Westminster, the first headmaster was Gunion Rutherford,75 
who had a remarkable personality.76 Although he attracted the animosity and criticism 
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of conventional Conservatives, he rejected the charge that the school’s outlook was 
based only on its ancient past. The ultimate radicalism of his reforms was outstanding. 
For instance, he abolished the supremacy of ‘college’ and inaugurated the Queen’s 
scholarships to others, in particular the more intelligent of the town boys who were 
non-scholars.77 
Philby was deeply impressed by him, although Rutherford assumed that he should not 
teach students below the Seventh Form and Philby viewed this as a flaw in his 
perfection. Philby had the opportunity, when he was in the Sixth Form, of a closer 
approach to Rutherford, for he spent an hour each week discussing and interpreting 
the Greek Testament with him.78 Such an opportunity perhaps shows Philby’s desire 
from an early age to increase his knowledge in Classical subjects in particular. In 
addition, it can be assumed that Westminster was the main factor in creating Philby’s 
interest in Ancient History and turning him into a Classical scholar. Consequently, it is 
not surprising to find Philby, after more than a quarter of a century, producing a mass 
of writings about the ancient history of the Arabian Peninsula and collecting its 
inscriptions.79 
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Rutherford’s successor was James Gow,80 who came from Nottingham High School. He 
was also condemned for his reforms and innovations. He fought the old customs of the 
school and one day came to school wearing a short jacket rather than the customary 
cassock.81 He was gifted in many diverse subjects, such as Classics, mathematics and 
languages, and Philby believed that the three years that he spent with him were the 
happiest of his life.82 Philby stated: 
At any rate by the time that he became head of the school and of College in 1903-4, 
Gow seemed to have settled down comfortably to an easy stroke and I do not 
remember a single occasion of serious disagreement between us on any matter 
connected with the maintenance of discipline, though there were matters on which, as 
I see it in retrospect, he might well have questioned my action or judgement had he 
had the slightest desire to interfere with our customs. He proved indeed to be a pillar 
of strength to the monitorial body, which responded to his support by working with 
him on a basis of mutual trust and friendliness ... a man of such sterling good sense and 
imperturbability. Gow was not born great and no one ever sought to thrust greatness 
upon him, but I think he did achieve greatness.83 
The quotation above well illustrates the relationship between Gow and Philby 
especially when the latter became captain of the school in 1903. In Philby’s judgement, 
Gow encouraged students to work freely without any major intervention so this might 
strengthen their capacity and self-confidence to cope with later issues. However, the 
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quotation also shows Philby’s fascination with the ideas of fame and self-
aggrandizement. It also reflects how much Philby wanted to be in contact with a great 
man such as Gow, working with him and being close enough to appreciate his qualities 
and praise them.  
A further opportunity to increase the knowledge that Philby was accumulating was to 
attend debates in the two Houses of Parliament. The archives of the Westminster 
magazine, The Elizabethan, show moreover that Philby was an active participant in the 
school’s debating society, attending meetings on many occasions and showing his 
capacity for knowledge and debate. For instance, on 6 March 1902, the debating 
society met to discuss the motion: 'That in the opinion of this House the system of 
education at the Universities is in urgent need of reform.’ In his speech Philby stated 
that there were two types of men who went to university: one group went to have a 
good time, the other went to get the degree they needed to obtain a job. Those who 
were not sporty, who wanted to work or had something useful to do, were not idle. It 
would be foolish to waste your money at university if you could not afford it. If 
somebody needed a profession, he would go somewhere else to learn about it.84 
From the above it may be assumed that being exposed to parliamentary debating 
would strengthen Philby’s personality and self-esteem, as well as adding to his scientific 
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knowledge. During his study in Westminster, Halperin described him as a successful 
student who performed well in all of his academic subjects.85 
The wider activities of the school may be seen as a further influence in terms of 
increasing Philby’s knowledge. He was an enthusiastic participant in several different 
fields. For example, he very much enjoyed games such as football and cricket, where he 
“harvested every available prize”.86 He was stocky and generally healthy. Sometimes, if 
he was beaten at cricket he became upset 87 but in general his performance at this 
game was remarkable.88  
At the same time, he was an excellent chess player, reflecting his intellectual side; for 
his proficiency he was elected president of the school chess club in 1903.89 In addition, 
he was very keen on social and intellectual activities even if they took place in the early 
morning, for he would awaken his friends early to read Greek plays in the belief that 
they were easier to understand if read in a group.90 
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At this stage, Monroe suggested that Philby’s speeches in the school debates tended to 
be in favour of orthodoxy and the establishment. In 1903, he supported the employers 
as opposed to their employees.91 However, the school debating society met on 21 
January 1904 and discussed the crisis between Japan and Russia. Philby, in the view of 
Monroe, appeared to contradict himself when he took the side of Russia in its war 
against Japan.92 Indeed, it seems unusual that a Conservative should support Russia at 
a time when the British Government had signed a treaty with Japan in 1902 that 
posited Russia as Britain’s traditional rival in Asia.93 But before examining such a 
contradiction, note should be taken of Philby’s views in the magazine of the school. It 
runs: 
The OPPOSER (Philby) defended Russia. He said Japan had no more right to Korea than 
England had to France. Russia, as she had been checked in Turkey, had every reason to 
expand; she was in favour of peace if possible. Japan does not want English help, but if 
she were defeated we should be drawn into the struggle. Although it is the general 
opinion that Russia is simply delaying to get troops ready, the Czar, who is all-powerful, 
is himself in favour of peace. To favour Japan because she is the smaller nation is 
absurd and unpractical.94 
The above paraphrase, although showing Philby’s support for Russia against Japan, 
does not reflect that he altogether opposed the British policy of support for Japan. 
Philby at this stage was 18 years old. He was speaking in a debating society which kept 
                                                          
91




 For further account about the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, see G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley 
(eds.), British Documents on the origins of the war 1898-1914, vol.II The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the 
Franco- British Entente (London: H.M.S.O., 1927), pp.89-137. Regarding the British- Russian rivalry during 
the 19
th
 century, see Jennifer Siegel, Endgame: Britain, Russia and the final struggle for central Asia 
(London: I.B Tauris, 2002). 
94




the formal roles of Proposer, Seconder and Opposer and the reason behind this 
formality was probably to encourage students to defend any position critically and 
logically in order to expand their capacity for learning and critical thinking, teaching 
them to accept differing views in a friendly atmosphere. Furthermore, Philby, during his 
time at Westminster, represented the idea of conservatism and Meyer and Shareen 
suggest that Philby, in this period, “defined himself as a Conservative and Christian”.95 
Even after entering Cambridge, Philby’s orthodox views remained; they led him to take 
the side of the British Government and criticise the Liberals who had objected to the 
policy of the British Government in the Denshawai episode in Egypt in 1906, as 
described below. 
It seems plain that Philby was whole-heartedly under the influence of the thought and 
tradition at Westminster in his time there. Although substantial reforms had been 
introduced by Rutherford and Gow, Philby was still Conservative in his outlook. This 
may be interpreted as his taking the side of the Conservative staff in their struggle 
against the reformers. However, once he became an undergraduate of Trinity College, 
Cambridge, Philby changed his ideas and became more open to logical and rational 
thinking than to retaining his conventional habits of mind. Financially speaking, life was 
still a struggle for Philby’s mother. In 1903, therefore, her brothers lent her enough 
money to open a boarding-house in London in order to support her boys.96 Although 
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Tom, her eldest son, had enlisted in the Royal Indian Navy, the three younger boys had 
to adjust to the new environment as best they could. The mother surrendered her 
room to Philby when he visited them; he stayed with her during his final term at school. 
May’s venture was successful; all her rooms were occupied by well-disposed people 
and many friends from India and the army boarded with her. While Tim and Paddy 
wanted to be soldiers, Philby was trying to join and perhaps to get a high place in the 
ICS.97 
This raises the question of why Philby sought to be a member of the ICS. The answers 
may be wide-ranging. First, Philby was probably influenced by some members of his 
family who had occupied high positions in India. For instance, as previously noted his 
mother’s father, John Duncan, had spent many years in serving the British Empire in 
India and then became a Deputy Assistant-General at the War Office. A second reason 
is his urge to be famous like his maternal grandfather. He was remarkable for this, 
given his background and may have believed that a shortcut to it was associated with 
India. Philby stated: 
It was certainly due to him [sc. his maternal grandfather] I was earmarked at a very 
tender age for the Indian Civil Service, which was regarded in our perhaps excessively 
military family circle of those days as a glittering prize only [for] the best Brains in the 
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country! The army and Navy were good enough in their way for the average boy who 
could be crammed into them at a pinch.98 
Thus the second motive may be associated with personal pride. Patriotism may be 
considered the third justification. Like any British patriot, Philby may have believed that 
serving his country was an essential duty and what he did for the British Empire 
illustrates his national loyalty and sense of duty, despite the fact that he later became, 
after his resignation from British service, the most important opponent of the policies 
of the British Government in the Middle East, India and Europe. 
When Philby became captain of the school and a King’s Scholar in 1903, he was widely 
criticised by some historians for the autocracy that he imposed during his captaincy. It 
seems that those historians’ opinions were based on the account by Philby’s forebear 
and associate, Percival Waterfield,99 who described Philby’s captaincy as a mixture of 
good and evil. He stated: 
That he[Philby] raised morals from the low estate into which they had fallen [and] … 
restored order and discipline where before had been little less than chaos, I do not 
deny. Nevertheless, although his system will I trust bring forth good fruit, at the 
moment it … [is] not a success. Autocracy was his aim and autocratic rule his avowed 
intention. He meant to rule with an iron hand and had not the good sense to conceal it 
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in a velvet glove. The result was that his year was conspicuous for internal 
dissensions.100 
In addition, during his captaincy, Philby was also described as a student who had some 
fierce encounters with masters and members of the school chess club. Furthermore, he 
was disdainful of the day-boys at his school, who were non-scholars, and he wanted to 
challenge teachers rather than cooperate with them.101 However, it should be borne in 
mind that Philby, at this period of his life, seems to have been a Conservative and 
conventional in outlook. He tended entirely to enhance the role of Westminster in 
practice, its tradition and its strict discipline. According to the old system of the school, 
the students who had gained scholarships were the impressive ones and were given 
greater freedom than the town boys. This, coupled with his own propensities, 
therefore, discouraged any reforms that might have advantaged the town boys and he 
tried to instil strict obedience to the rules. This may explain why Waterfield was so 
censorious of Philby’s behaviour. However, it should be said that, while his way of 
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Trinity College, Cambridge 
According to the record of Westminster School, Philby finished his studies there in 
1903.103 Westminster had long been connected with Trinity College, Cambridge and 
Philby was awarded a scholarship in Classics in March 1904, joining the university seven 
months later.104 In Cambridge, Philby encountered a new world in terms of 
philosophical sparkle, but not one that restricted his opportunities to amass knowledge 
according to the methods that he had learnt at Westminster. The method of teaching 
in Cambridge was based on criticism and discussion and was the most fundamental 
element of university life.105 
Although Philby admired this way of thinking, in particular when discussing issues of 
morality and the universe, he was not convinced at first by the new freedom of 
thinking until the final year of his studies. He was at first an advocate for the orthodox 
and the teachings of Christ.106 For instance, his Conservative outlook is shown in a 
speech at the Cambridge Union: he criticised the Liberals who had opposed the policy 
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of the British authority in the Denshawai episode in Egypt, in which some Egyptian 
farmers had been killed by British soldiers in 1906.107 
It can be assumed in his defence that Philby would have been influenced by the 
conditions in which he had lived and been raised. Moreover, the atmosphere at 
Westminster, which was controlled by conventional conservatism, seems to have made 
a significant impact on his personality and above all on his religious views.  
Philby became a member of the Trinity College Sunday Essay Society, which tackled 
controversial questions on subjects linked to religion. When he was asked to provide a 
paper, he chose as his title: ‘The convenience of convention’. In this paper, he 
enthusiastically defended orthodoxy.108 However, a certain diffidence and internal 
conflict in his personality revealed itself after this and he began to embrace free 
thought, Socialism and agnosticism.109 
Of the scholars who taught Philby as an undergraduate and had a major influence on 
him, Edward Browne110 appears to have been the most inspirational. Browne was 
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extremely enthusiastic with a great depth of knowledge in Persian literature and many 
of the students who were trained by him later held influential positions in the ICS, such 
as Gerard Young,111 who rose from the rank of district officer to the secretaryship of 
the Army Department of the Government of India in 1926.112 Philby was one who was 
influenced by Browne’s regard for the East and its nations113 and, more importantly, by 
the spirit of free speech, especially when it became known that Browne was the most 
important critic of British policy before 1914. Philby’s relations with Browne continued 
after Philby’s graduation from Cambridge and even when he was working for Britain 
between 1908 and 1924. The private letters between Browne and Philby illustrate the 
close relationship and how keen they were to share a knowledge of the Middle East. 
One of the letters shows Browne’s concern to arrange a lecture for Philby in Trinity 
College about his explorations in Arabia between 1917 and 1918.114 
When it came to encyclopaedic knowledge and the ideal way to address it, John 
Mayor115 was a teacher whom no one could defeat. William Ridgeway116 was another 
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who increased Philby’s store of knowledge, in particular by his unexpected theories and 
unorthodox explanations “of the sources from which they were derived”,117 which may 
have provided Philby’s scientific methodology in searching for knowledge from original 
sources. 
Although Philby was not affiliated with any groups, such as the Fabians, he made 
friends among people of all groups, owing to his passion for reading plays. As far as 
possible, he devoted his spare time to reading plays and writing jingles about his 
friends.118 With regard to acting, Philby took a small role in a play by Molière called Le 
Médecin Malgré Lui.  In 1907 he also had a part in the Marlowe Society’s production of 
Doctor Faustus.119 It can be seen that Philby’s acquaintance with plays and his 
participation on the stage may have helped to open up a new horizon of social 
knowledge which led him to modify his Conservative outlook and free his thinking.   
Philby became active as a member of the Trinity Debating Society, whose meetings 
were held on Friday evenings, but this seems to have been designed for thoughtless 
students who wanted to debate trivial subjects. In one of these discussions, Philby was 
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asked to speak on the abolition of the ordinary male dress of the day. Afterwards, he 
became the secretary of this society. At Cambridge, Philby was not as noticeable as he 
had been at school. However, he was dynamic and was popular enough in his last 
undergraduate term to become president of Trinity’s ‘M and S’ Society, as well as 
participating in intercollegiate play-reading.120 
Concerning his educational achievements, Philby does not mention in his 
autobiography that he was greatly upset when he heard that Donald Robertson121 had 
taken first place in the first part of the Classical Tripos, leaving him second.122  After 
such dissatisfaction and discomfiture, Philby conceived the plan of changing to a 
degree in modern languages. Therefore, in 1906, he arranged a summer holiday 
starting in Paris and roved around France on his bicycle. Moreover, he proceeded to 
develop his German by spending two holidays in Germany, studying harder than 
before. Monroe stated: 
Within days he had learnt the distressing news that whereas Donald Robertson had got 
a First in the first part of the Classical Tripos, he had only got a second. Worried and 
humiliated, he decided to switch to a subject at which he could shine – modern 
languages. He spent the summer vacation of 1906 working at French in Paris, and 
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bicycling about France ... He improved his German by spending two vacations with a 
family at Elberfeld with whom he kept up for years.123 
Hence, it may be assumed that his efforts point to a state of ambition, perseverance 
and enthusiasm to be the first among his fellows which was rewarded by outstanding 
proficiency in modern languages. Consequently, it may not be surprising to find that he 
was awarded a First in modern languages.124 In 1907, while he was in France studying 
the language, his mother, May, forwarded a telegram telling him that he had won a 
Trinity scholarship, which would enable him to spend another year in Cambridge, after 
which he would have to do well in the entrance exam of the ICS.125 
Philby was accepted for the ICS and stayed in Cambridge for a further year to study 
oriental languages under the supervision of Browne and Reynold Nicholson,126 studying 
the law and the history of India, Hindustani and Persian before his sailing to Bombay in 
order to start his career with the ICS.127 
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Philby at Cambridge, 1904-8 







Civil servant in India: 1908-1915 
Before the thesis touches on Philby as a civil servant in India, it should briefly describe 
the ICS. The term ‘India Civil Service’ (or ICS) was first used by the East India Company, 
which was established formally in 1600, as a term for its establishment of non-military 
personnel. Its civilian members were originally traders, who were known as civil 
servants to distinguish them from the members whose duties were naval or military. It 
is believed that this term was well-established by 1765.128 According to Ann Ewing, the 
ICS was a tiny administrative elite and the recruitment of its members was based on 
competitive examination held first in London and afterwards in India. Members of the 
ICS were appointed under Section XXXII of the Government of India Act of 1858.129 
However, after the Indian rebellion India was transferred to the British Crown and the 
ICS was headed by a member of the British Cabinet, the Secretary of State for India.130 
The ICS sought to appoint male university graduates from Oxford and Cambridge,131 of 
whom Philby was one. Even so, the ICS reforms were incremental rather than radical. 
Its three most far-reaching reforms, altering its whole approach, were to bring in 
competitive examinations instead of patronage in recruitment; more organised and 
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less ad hoc training for staff; and the employment of a far greater proportion of 
indigenous workers.132 
On 6 November 1908, Philby left Liverpool for India and arrived in Bombay on 1st 
December133 from where he was ordered to proceed to Lahore. Philby, accompanied by 
Gerard Young, a new recruit to the ICS, took the Panjab Express to Lahore. On the 
second night of the journey, near the district of Ambala, their train crashed head-on 
with another express. The accident would have left Philby greatly shocked, as a survivor 
of almost certain death, who saw a huge number of corpses and casualties. 
Furthermore, given his youth and inexperience, this dramatic introduction could easily 
have been left psychologically affected, even wishing to give up his new career and 
return to England. However, although there is no direct evidence of this, Philby never 
allowed this incident to disrupt his plans for the future. Consequently, after 12 hours, 
he reached Government House in Lahore and the hospitality of Louis William Dane, the 
Lieutenant-Governor.134 
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On 8 December 1908, Philby went for training from Lahore to Jhelum. In this amazing 
city, Philbyʼs experience, as Khairī Hammād suggested, was extended only by H.H. 
Jenkins,135 the sub-divisional officer.136 However, Philby’s autobiography stated that he 
also owed something to Captain G.L. Brayne137 who educated him in the rules and 
standards of administration.138 At this time, India was benefiting from new projects 
under Minto’s reforms,139 which generally widened the opportunities for Indian people 
to participate in government; for example, despite a current of resentment, Minto 
appointed the first Indian to the Council.140 It should be noted that Philby scandalized 
his friends by proclaiming Indian independence as an the ideal. It seems that his 
socialist ideas had influenced him ever since his final year at Cambridge, when he 
became “a closet Fabian (i.e., a Socialist) and freethinker”;141 these were the main 
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reasons behind the opposition to imperialism that became unmistakable in the last 
years of his service in Iraq, as shown below. Therefore, it was not surprising that Philby 
was enthusiastic over the new order and Minto’s reforms.142 Furthermore, it should be 
borne in mind that Philby’s attitude seems to be the first sign of his opposition to the 
British policy; the situation is not as portrayed by Abu al- Rab that Philby only began to 
argue against his country when he was working in Iraq.143 
Philbyʼs tour with British officials brought him into contact with local inhabitants 
teaching him their customs and ways of life and, more importantly, letting him practise 
and grapple with the language of Western Panjabi. Philby’s proficiency in Oriental 
languages was remarkable. While he was at Cambridge, he studied the basics of Urdu 
and Persian. His autobiography suggests that, in India, he made amazing progress, 
despite the short time he had to prepare for the exam. His own account of it is 
revealing: “In the departmental Examination at Lahore in April, less than five months 
after my arrival in India, I passed my language tests with credit”.144 
Without providing any reasons or supporting evidence for his opinion, John Halperin 
asserted that Philby “worked hard and quickly learned Urdu”.145  It may be inferred that 
the proclivity and proficiency that Philby showed in understanding Urdu and then the 
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 Abu al-Rab, ʻJohn Philby wa- dawrūh al-siāsi fi Transjordanʼ [Philby and his political role in 
Transjordan], p.21. 
144
 Philby, Arabian Days, p.41-42; Monroe, Philby of Arabia, p.21. 
145




higher standard examination in Urdu depended on many factors. First, he had been 
born and had spent his first six years in Ceylon and this may have laid the foundations 
of his skill with languages. Second, his grandfather on his mother’s side, Colonel John 
Duncan, who had worked in India for many years, exerted a fundamental influence on 
him. Philby indicated that it was probably from his grandfather that he “inherited a 
certain facility for mastering the various languages of India and kindred lands”.146  This 
facility probably gave him enough confidence to be well-equipped for his Indian career 
and, more importantly for his personal ambition, as far as administrative promotion 
was concerned.147 
Philby spent nine months in Jhelum, learning and being trained regarding 
administration and public life in India.148 It should not be forgotten that he owed much 
to the members of staff who built up his knowledge. For instance, Major Fox-
Strangeways was a competent administrator and helpful chief. He and his wife were his 
hosts for a few weeks and Mrs. Fox-Strangeways supervised his social education, 
teaching Philby about life in India and provided him with a list of the civilian and 
regimental ladies to be called upon in his morning tours.149 Jhelum, it is clear, was the 
gateway to Philby’s subsequent life experiences and actual career. 
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In September 1909, Philby was ordered to depart to Rawalpindi.150 There A. J.W. 
Kitchen151 was not only an administrator of magnificent intelligence, but also was 
anxious to train the men who would become junior officials and was very keen to see 
that they gained all the benefits they required.152 In this city, Philby’s primary duty was 
to work on assessing the value of crops damaged by British armed forces and to 
estimate the level of compensation for the local landowners.153 
Philby was also asked to make a census report of the district cattle. His report was 
approved by Kitchen and, significantly, praised and published by the Panjabi 
government.154 In conjunction with a colleague, he also compiled a manual of local 
customary law.155 Such achievement seems to have boosted Philby’s self-confidence as 
well as his capacity to tackle more useful work. Although he worked as a magistrate 
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and a judge, he seems not to have been interested in legal processes due to their 
“tedious and over-elaborated” nature.156 It may be argued that Philby’s dislike of 
judicial work seems to conflict with the zeal for maintaining discipline that he learnt at 
Westminster. If this is true, then the only explanation of the conflict probably rests on 
two main features. One of the most important aspects of judicial work that lessened 
Philby’s interest in it was its rigour. The first official task he was assigned was to 
supervise the hanging of a man sentenced to death,157 which may have disheartened 
Philby as a judge. However, it should be acknowledged that this incident is derived 
from Philby’s account and there is no further account to collaborate this, especially 
from Hammād and Monroe, the Philby’s biographers.  Second, the conflict may suggest 
that Philby had no taste for the routine of daily work in an office and tended to prefer 
fieldwork and the more important chance to engage in social activities so as to absorb 
the local languages, in which he was markedly successful, as shown below. 
The club in Rawalpindi held the main recreations of life for Philby, where he indulged 
his enjoyment of tennis, cricket, bridge and dancing. This was where he met Dora, the 
daughter of Adrian Hope Johnston158 and the grand-daughter of Alexander Johnston.159 
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On 20 September 1910, they were married at Murree,160 a marriage which lasted for 45 
years.161 
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Dora, Philby’s wife 
Source: Philby, Arabian Days. 
In the meantime, Philby completed the training phase and graduated “well above the 
average”.162 It seems that there was no doubt that Philby was very determined to 
prove himself as an outstanding district officer among his peers and to reach the 
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highest ranks of the ICS. Such an aspiration and ambition is illustrated by his concern 
over his matrimony. He wrote: 
He [Kitchin] and certainly his wife, who watched over us juniors with a truly                  
maternal solicitude, had doubtless observed my steady progress down the slippery 
slope toward matrimony; and he may well have recommended for me a transfer from 
the fleshpots of Pindi and the insidious charms of Murree, where I would spend a 
considerable part of the hot weather. In fact, if he did so, he was too late to save me 
for bachelorhood, as I was already committed to another course irrevocably and to my 
entire satisfaction. But I had no reason to complain of his intervention, for I found 
myself posted, in the ordinary course of the normal summer changes necessitated by 
the department of officers on leave, to the temporary charge of the Sargodha sub-
division.163 
Anthony Brown claimed that Philby’s marriage, which took place in the second year of 
his service in India, provoked serious dispute and contravened the rules of the Civil 
Service.164 At this time, it was obvious that all the British authorities in India, including 
the Army, the Civil Service, businesses and banks, deplored matrimony for young 
people who had been less than five years in post. However, although the ICS tended to 
discourage marriage, its rules did not state clearly that its employees should not marry 
before five years had elapsed and “as the authority’s power was not absolute, [Philby] 
went ahead with his plans for a wedding”.165 It seems that he considered his marriage 
his own affair, since it was not officially opposed to the rules or regulations of the Civil 
Service, but merely foreign to its traditional system. To substantiate this claim, it can be 
said that ever since the development of the administration the conditions of 
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recruitment (from 1834 to 1936) had made no indication of any proscription of marriage 
for members of the ICS.166  Therefore, Brown’s claim seems to be far from reality. 
Sargodha 
In May 1910, Philby was appointed temporary officer for Sargodha,167 which had been 
built as one of the newest colonial cities of the Panjab and which had progressed under 
the supervision of G.D. Rudkin.168 In Sargodha, Philby experienced serious issues which 
could have affected his career and distorted his reputation in the ICS. During his tour of 
Sargodha, he reached a Muslim town called Bhera and there came across a wedding 
between members of two privileged families. Without warning, a Hindu beggar, who 
had approached in search of alms, was beaten to death.169 
As the responsible magistrate, Philby ordered that an autopsy should be carried out on 
the corpse and this was undertaken by a Muslim assistant-surgeon. The report 
indicated that the deceased man suffered from splenomegaly and could have died as 
the result of a mere push.170 However, Philby suspected that the surgeon had been 
bribed to provide false evidence and therefore he suspended the surgeon from his 
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duties, which frustrated the Muslim faction but overjoyed the Hindus.171 Philby made a 
serious mistake in refusing to release the surgeon, who was forced, as a condition of his 
bail, to walk the 20 miles from Sargodha to the District Commissioner in Shahpur, 
although the law held that the offence of perjury was beyond doubt punishable.172 
Consequently, the incident was inflated by the Indian press into a great furore which 
obliged the British authorities to pacify the people and finally to exonerate the 
surgeon. It was proposed that Philby should be divested of his responsibility for a sub-
division until he had proved his efficiency. However, the resolution was not enforced 
against him and he remained in charge of Sargodha.173 
Multan 
At the beginning of 1911, Philby was dispatched to Multan in order to continue his 
judicial training.174 As stated earlier, Philby had no liking for judicial work, so the 
authorities concluded that he was unfit to preside in a court of law.175 Although he 
remained an Assistant Commissioner, he never curtailed his desire to learn more 
Oriental languages. By mixing in native society he was able to learn the Belushi 
language within six weeks and made such progress that he could efficiently carry out 
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his duties in this language and was awarded Rs 500.176  Then he started to master the 
Arabic language.177 
For the first time, Philby’s superior officer was an Indian, Diwan Narendra Nath, a man 
who competently and sympathetically guided him; the period that he stayed with him 
was one of the most enjoyable of his life. In the summer of 1912, Philby was again sent 
to a town called Chorutta, which had been built in the desert. His work was restricted 
to receiving requests for houses and shops and dealing with them and also to 
developing by-laws for managing municipal administration.178 It may be inferred that, 
beside his knowledge of Oriental languages, Philby became a pioneer in dealing with 
administration, as became obvious during his time in Iraq. 
Ambala 
In 1911, during a difficult time of drought and famine, Philby was ordered to move to 
Ambala as the Revenue Assistant.179 With his wife, he spent 14 months in this district180 
and because the work was light he continued studying Oriental languages and in 1912 
obtained good enough exam scores to earn a certificate of High Proficiency in Urdu.181 
Halperin suggested that Philby broke the Civil Service tradition by inviting Indians to his 
house and, more flagrantly, in putting forward an Indian as a member of the local 
                                                          
176
 Philby, Arabian Days, pp.58-59. 
177
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club.182 In fact, Philby promoted what he believed to be Indian people’s right to 
exercise authority together with the British. It should not be forgotten that he was 
simply following the new British policy in India, which was based on Minto’s reforms 
and allowed the Indian people to join the Civil Service. However, Philby went beyond 
official policy and did not hide his contempt for racial discrimination when he 
condemned a presidential campaign that would have made an Indian vice-president 
ineligible. Philby proposed his Indian friend for membership of the club and finally 
prevailed, not only despite the wrath of its members but also at the risk of forfeiting his 
own membership, which he threatened to resign if the Indian was not elected.183 
The excellence of his work, however, was put in jeopardy through another incident. On 
a hot morning, when he was walking alone along a narrow path, he met an Indian 
teacher with a small group of schoolboys. The teacher spoke shamelessly to Philby, 
who could not tolerate his behaviour and boxed the Indian’s ears.184 Hammād, a writer 
who tends to be a fanatical nationalist, has suggested that Philby’s action reflected his 
imperialistic outlook, which he normally concealed and which contradicted his 
reputation for liberal ideas.185 
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However, Hammād’s verdict appears unduly subjective and it seems that there was no 
contradiction in Philby's character. Philby's view regarding the imperial policies of his 
country matured and developed throughout his life. Philby at this stage was an 
extremely loyal Indian Civil Servant and he did not start to function on his own firm 
principles in opposition to imperial policies until the last year of his service in Iraq, as 
explored below.186 Second, Philby confessed his action, which he said he regretted, as 
quite wrong; he in fact respected the new spirit of independence in India and had 
simply been out of temper on that day. As Philby stated:  
Times had changed, of course, and were changing rapidly as a result of the new 
spirit of independence of which I approved so wholeheartedly … That [his 
behaviour] was of course quite wrong.187  
Speaking impartially, it is harsh to judge someone’s wrong action and infer from it a 
general judgment about his behaviour without studying the motives behind the 
incident and also without full knowledge of his life. Whatever the cause, Monroe 
suggested that someone writing under a pseudonym sent details of the incident to the 
Governor of the Punjab. The Governor, Sir Louis Dane, who had previously been 
angered by Philby’s marriage and feared that the incident would be aired in the local 
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press, decided to take a serious stand against Philby’s lapse and punished him by a 
“stoppage of all promotion for two years.”188 
Amritsar 
In 1913, Philby was transferred to Amritsar for the purpose of settlement training.189 
There, he had the chance to develop his experience of revenue resettlement and was 
able to preserve a reasonable ratio “between the revenue payable by the landowners 
and the profits derived by them from their land”.190 Philby was pleased to make a 
comprehensive land survey of Amritsar and it is quite evident that his trainer made 
considerable efforts to educate him and teach him the essentials of cadastral survey, 
which equipped him for tasks in later years.191 
At this point, Philby was devoting himself to gaining qualifications in Farsi, the Persian 
language, probably reflecting his desire to transfer to Persia. Although there was no 
evidence that his transfer had been declined, he immersed himself in learning Persian. 
The Philby collection at St. Antony’s College shows how keen a student he was. He sent 
a letter to the Office of the Board of Examiners, to obtain the right books before 
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applying for an honours degree examination in Persian.192 In addition, in order to 
prepare for the exam, Philby hired a teacher from Khurasan who stayed with him.193 He 
took the exam in 1913, once he felt capable of doing well. In the event, his exam scores 
were astonishing.194 
Lyallpur 
In 1914, Philby became Acting District Commissioner at Lyallpur, the most ancient and 
considerable of the canal colonies. His own letter to his mother, May, revealed the 
extent of his enjoyment of power: 
The feeling of real power and importance is of course very pleasant and I have 
not yet got used to seeing my police guard do sentry-go over me as I sleep.195 
While Philby was in this post, WWI broke out and he tried in various ways to take an 
active part in it, even after a Government circular instructed all civilians to remain in 
post.196 The news of the conflict spread widely through India; the local press increased 
the spirit of insurgency, which soon made itself felt. The Viceroy declared war on 
Germany on behalf of Britain. It seems that Philby tackled the resulting sedition wisely. 
He had good relations with the proprietor and the editor of the newspaper,197 whose 
name was Hardit Singh, and refused to order his arrest because the detention of such a 
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figure would lead to dire consequences. Philby met Singh and managed to persuade 
him to stop criticizing Britain.198 Moreover, Philby continued his work prudently, 
keeping prices low, receiving loyal delegations and registering outlanders.199 
Simla 
In 1915, another job was offered to Philby. He was asked to join the Panjab 
Government Secretariat and take charge of the Press Office of the Investigation 
Department.200 It was notable that he was particularly pleased with his new post 
because he had been chosen on merit and without any mediation or influence. He was 
working under the supervision of Sir Michael O’Dwyer,201 who was a highly important 
administrator in the area of land revenue settlement. It is noteworthy that Philby 
served his country very well in this post; for instance, Monroe suggested that he had to 
write a weekly bulletin. His job required him also to keep his eye on places where a 
spirit of nationalism was rising, such as Aligarh University.202 
In February 1915, Philby went to Calcutta in order to take the degree exams in Urdu. 
Again, the results were outstanding, as the following table shows: 
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Philby's proficiency in Urdu exams 
Source MECA, Philby collection, F. 1/2/3 
After this achievement, the Government of India's Department of Education, in Delhi, 
authorized a donation to him of Rs 3,000.203 This money was indeed welcome to Philby, 
who needed it to support his wife and his mother, now in a bad financial situation.204 
Philby was soon appointed Secretary to the Board of Examiners in Calcutta,205 the last 
post that he held in the country. His accomplishments probably paved the way to 
securing his high reputation and some fame as a scholar of Oriental languages. 
Monroe indicated that Philby started to perfect his knowledge of Urdu and was 
insistent on learning this language, at the same time as Persian. This may testify to his 
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 See the appointment of Philby in L.C. Porter’s letter, 10 February 1915, MECA, Philby Collection, 
F.1/2/1. 
Subject Score Subject Score 
A written examination on the prescribed books. 
The papers included questions on Grammar and 
Prosody 
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desire to work in the Political Department, which he had always had his eye on, not 
only for its eminence, but also because it would have given him a job in Persia, the 
Persian Gulf or Iraq.206 
Sir Percy Cox, the Chief Political Officer in charge of Mesopotamia’s occupied 
territories, declared his urgent need for linguists and civilian administrators.207 Philby’s 
hopes were fulfilled when he was ordered to join the Indian Expeditionary Force in Iraq 
which had first been sent out in September1914.208 Beside the shortage of civilian 
administrators, it is possible that Philby’s outstanding work as an administrator and his 
capability as a scholar of Oriental languages were the main reasons behind his 
appointment to the Indian Expeditionary Force. 
Overview 
The chapter showed that the move of Philby’s family from Norfolk to Chigwell occurred 
in the nineteenth, not the seventeenth century. It is worth considering that Philby’s 
ambition to be famous may have been due to the lack of celebrity of his antecedents. 
The chapter suggested that Philby’s account of the departure of his father, who 
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decided to go to Ceylon in order to invest in the coffee trade, is more accurate than 
Monroe’s who claimed that Philby’s father was sent off by his family. First, the reason 
for the departure of Philby’s father was recognized only by Philby, the one who first 
recorded this event and could interpret it better than subsequent accounts did. 
Second, Monroe does not reveal the source that suggests Philby’s father was sent away 
and hence Philby’s account emerges as the more trustworthy one.  
The chapter concluded that Monroe’s statement that John Duncan, Philby’s 
grandfather, ignored his past as a legitimate son is probably not quite true. It is plain 
that, despite his high status and successful career, the fact of his adoption had a 
negative impact on John Duncan for the rest of his life. This can be seen from his 
keeping the story of the adoption secret from his son. 
The chapter revealed that Philby had three siblings, not four, as some historians 
believed. Moreover, the chapter showed that Philby’s mother was the person who 
decided to leave Ceylon because of her difficult relationship with her husband and his 
unsatisfactory behaviour as a spouse. It is obvious that Philby had known difficult 
conditions as a result of his father’s failure to support his mother, who took the full 
responsibility of raising her little boys. This resulted in May’s decision to leave her 
husband and return to England. In his early education, it is noteworthy that Philby 
owed most to John Duncan, his maternal grandfather. Without his financial support, 




Henfield House may be considered a vital factor which provided a basic pillar of Philby’s 
education. Moreover, it may be inferred that the boarding school created Philby’s 
hobbies, notably bird-watching and insect collections, whose results can be seen in 
Philby’s later writings. Through his mother’s support and his own intelligence, Philby in 
his early years was able to overcome the family’s poverty and showed a significantly 
high capacity to learn. Hence, it may be considered that his early achievement is 
summed up by his gaining entrance to Westminster School in 1898 and becoming a 
Queen’s scholar at the age of thirteen.  
The religious environment in which Philby had been brought up had a significant impact 
on his thought. In addition, it is notable that the nature of the atmosphere at 
Westminster School, which seems to have given first place to ruthlessness and 
remorselessness, may have generated in Philby some idea of the power of his 
personality, and the value of rigorous perseverance in learning. Moreover, despite the 
radical reforms by some teachers to develop the educational system of Westminster, 
Philby remained Conservative and was long influenced by conventional conservatism. 
Still, the wider curriculum at Westminster may have had a further impact in terms of 
increasing Philby's knowledge. The chapter illustrated that Philby was extremely keen 
to follow the strict rules of Westminster which made his captaincy less than admirable 




It is also clear that it has some bearing on the reasons why Philby chose to work for the 
ICS, though this was primarily due to the influence of his maternal grandfather, his 
desire to acquire celebrity and his ambition to serve his country.  
It might be thought that Philby would remain staunchly Conservative or politically 
orthodox in outlook for the whole of his four years at Cambridge. However, his attitude 
slowly changed and he became more of a free-thinker, following his encounters with 
the university’s spirit of debate and controversy. In addition, he was influenced by the 
method of teaching that relied on criticism and discussion and the methodology of 
searching for knowledge from original sources made him abandon his early religious 
views. 
 It is also obvious that Philby was influenced by the scholars who enhanced his 
knowledge, in particular Browne, who made a huge impact in terms of Oriental 
languages. Vitality in his activities and his membership of a range of societies were the 
benchmark for Philby during his university years, which may not only have increased his 
knowledge but also undermined his reliance on conservatism. In his exam, Philby 
showed high enough levels of attainment to qualify for the ICS, where proficiency in 
Oriental languages was vital. The personality traits, which became apparent when he 
ventured to the Middle East, were therefore formed during his childhood and early 
adulthood, with his education providing him with the necessary skills and free thinking 




The chapter showed that the tragic sequence of incidents at the outset did not have 
enough impact on Philby to shake his resolve to work for the British Empire. Philby’s 
experience was augmented by members of staff who taught him details of 
administration and public life in India. It is notable that Philby was not only influenced 
by Minto’s reforms to provide the Indian people with freedom but also by the ideals of 
communism, perhaps the main factors behind his support for libertarian ideas. Hence, 
Philby’s behaviour in India indicates apparently his first objections to the policies of his 
imperial government. It can be inferred that Philby’s journeys generated in him a 
knowledge of the traditions and customs of various peoples. It is clear that Philby’s 
proficiency in Urdu was not only due to his efforts and diligence, but also to his birth 
and residence in India for six years as well as the efforts of his grandfather. These 
undoubtedly had some influence on his proficiency in the language. 
It is clear that, although he showed remarkable skill in making fiscal arrangements, he 
seems not to have been interested in acting as a judge. The routine of the daily work 
and the strictness of the legal tasks were probably the main reasons for his wanting to 
explore, which he did in the next few years. The chapter revealed that Philby’s 
marriage was not against the rules of the Civil Service so much as against its traditions. 
Moreover, the Arabic allegations that Philby held imperialistic beliefs was shown to be 
far from accurate and to contradict entirely the historical evidence of what he did for 




The Philby collection at St. Antony’s College illustrates Philby’s superiority in the 
Oriental language examinations, Urdu and Persian in particular. Such results 
contributed to his fame as a scholar of Oriental languages which probably explained his 
desire to obtain a high position in the British overseas services, most of all in the 
Middle East. Concerning his duty throughout WWI, Philby was able to deal with 
seditious movements, which reflect some aspects of his loyalty and sense of his duty.  













This chapter examines the beginnings of Philby’s activities and the influence of his work 
for the British Empire in Iraq and Transjordan. It looks at various posts that he occupied 
in Iraq and assesses how far he proved himself as an adequate administrator on behalf 
of his country. It also seeks to define Philby’s relationship with Cox and the methods 
that Philby used to strengthen Cox’s authority in Iraq. It looks at the way in which 
Philby was able to augment the financial status of the occupied territories. It focuses on 
the main controversy between Philby and Cox and the circumstances that led to the 
end of Philby’s career in Iraq. In addition, it examines the views of British officials about 
Philby and his appointment as Chief British Representative in Transjordan and asks why 
these views of him were negative. The chapter also deals with Philby’s political role in 
Transjordan and illustrates his considerable efforts there and the steps that he took to 
gain independence for the territory. It also seeks to shed light on the main 
disagreements between Philby and the Amir Abdulla, the ruler of Transjordan. Finally, 
it investigates the facts behind his resignation not only from the ICS but also from the 
British foreign service. 
Iraq: 1915-1921 
After working for seven years in India without returning to England,1 Philby, in 
company with some of his fellow-linguists, sailed to Iraq and arrived in Basra on 20 
                                                          
1
 In his article, Hamdi ʻ Nashat Philby’ [The Background of Philby], p.263, indicates erroneously that 
Philby spent eight years in India, whereas Philby asserted distinctly that the period was seven years. See 




November 1915.2 During his stay there, Philby had to deal with various tasks and, 
therefore, it may be helpful to discuss them first in some detail in order to assess his 
performance more easily. 
Chief civilian at Basra   
One week after his arrival, Philby met Cox and was informed that his task was to 
examine the finances of the occupied territory and to set up a permanent system for its 
financial accounting.3 Under the supervision of Sir Henry Robert Dobbs,4 the Revenue 
Commissioner, Philby worked hard to design a new system for the civil accounts. 
However, the system that he generated did not meet the requirements of the 
determined figure, Arnold Wilson, who had remarkable influence with Cox. Despite his 
opposition, however, Philby proceeded with his plan.5 It was perhaps this occasion that 
marks his first collision with Wilson and it may be true that political rivalry between 
these two was the main reason for their disagreement. According to their memoirs, it is 
apparent that Philby and Wilson shared some facets of personality: ambition, 
outspokenness and immense self-belief. In addition, both had great physical stamina, 
unusual skills as linguists (Arabic and Persian), and complete self-confidence, spending 
most of their career in the Middle East. However, the differences between the two 
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men can also be easily illustrated. While Philby was a member of the ICS and had 
graduated from Cambridge, Wilson was an army officer who had come through the 
Royal Military College, Sandhurst.6 He retained the single principle of supporting the 
imperial policy of Britain even though he endeavoured to impose his own views and 
argued against British policy in the Middle East especially in the post war period. In 
general, however, he did not move far from the embrace of British imperial policy. 
Indeed, he had immense self-belief and like Philby he believed that his views were right 
rather than those of officials in the Foreign Office.7 In contrast, as discussed in Chapter 
One, Philby’s character was in many ways the diametric opposite of that of the typical 
British official. Such politically-minded people, who dominated British imperial policy, 
were wholly in favour of a steady increase in the lands owning British sovereignty and 
in the degree of administrative control imposed on them.8 Philby’s personality, 
however, was capable of a flexible response to events, for instance when his allegiance 
moved to the Liberal party (from a more right-wing position) in the year of his 
university graduation.  This probably plunged him into chaos and intellectual self-
conflict, wondering whether to follow what he believed in, a movement towards 
liberation, or remain an official of the Empire. This internal conflict continued until his 
time in Iraq, when he started to believe in the right of people to rule themselves, in 
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particular when he met Arabs “with a capacity for leadership”.9 In addition, when 
Philby visited Central Arabia, for the first time in 1917, he was captivated by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
charisma and  became fond of the Arabs and their lands, language and traditional life. 
This may have implanted in Philby the desire to take a leading part in the struggle for 
Arab freedom, believing that Ibn Sa‘ūd was “destined to lead and unite central 
Arabia”.10 When he was on leave in Persia after being dismissed from his post in Iraq, 
he started to criticise the imperial policy of his country.11 Furthermore, what made 
historians, Howarth for example, describe Philby as an eccentric Englishman12 was 
probably that Philby was fond of being critical or sarcastic; he enjoyed what he called 
‘twitting’ others and making them feel awkward. The following admission by Philby 
clearly portrays his behaviour in conversation: 
T.C. Fowle, who had come to the Political Department from service in Persia.  
… was an intelligent but uninspired person who always said                             
commonplace things in a commonplace way … I twitted him one day at dinner 
with always talking like a leading article in the Daily Telegraph, and I think he 
took it as a compliment. One day he was prosing away and suddenly, my 
attention being arrested by a remark of his, I was actually heard to say: “I 
didn’t hear what you said but I entirely disagree with you.” Of course, there 
was a roar of laughter … This remark has often been held against me by my 
friends to illustrate my tendency to be critical of everything.13  
At any rate, Cox was very pleased with Philby’s efforts and his capacity to regulate the 
accounting system and decided to establish a new finance branch which was directly 
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associated with his political office. He also decided to put Philby in charge of the new 
branch under the name of Financial Assistant.14 It seems that some crucial matters then 
came up. Dobbs, the Revenue Commissioner, rejected the new procedure because, as 
he may have been right to suspect, the new branch related to his own responsibility as 
Revenue Officer. But Cox instructed that all questions of civilian and military accounts 
should be under his personal supervision.15 To interpret Cox’s action, it may have been 
the case that he wanted control of all the money that was being spent, sometimes 
recklessly, by officers during the war.  
Monroe suggests that Philby was not “popular with lesser colleagues because he was 
too high-handed”.16 Indeed, Philby’s personality tended to be strict and domineering, 
in particular at work, but it should not be forgotten that Philby’s constant contact with 
Cox and his remarkable efforts of regulating the account system and his post as 
Financial Assistant may have been to blame for the feuds or animosity and jealousness 
among the staff preventing Philby from being universally admired by his colleagues, not 
least when Cox decided to send him on an official mission to India. 
Indian Mission 
The alliance of Cox and Philby became unusually close and Cox’s confidence in his 
junior increased rapidly. The closeness is apparent from Cox’s agreeing to Philby’s 
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proposal that the financial administration in the occupied territories should be 
independent and any acts of expenditure could be undertaken without the need to 
seek the authority of the Government of India. This meant that Cox, as the Chief 
Political Officer, would be responsible for all the funds disbursed in the Iraq 
administration and more importantly would control all the money that was spent ad 
hoc.17 It seems that such a financial change would not occur until the outcome was 
known of any conflicts between the Indian Government and Whitehall regarding the 
future of Iraq. After occupying Basra, despite London’s warning that Basra was not an 
Indian territory, the Government of India ran the Iraqi law, justice, customs and police 
systems on the lines of the ICS and Indian officials were still arguing that only the Indian 
Government had made any sacrifice for the campaign.18 In contrast, to challenge the 
Indianization of Mesopotamia by the Government of India, Mark Sykes, who had held 
several influential positions in Whitehall during the war, appeared as one of the most 
important opponents to the policy of the officials in India. He argued that India’s 
customs and laws were entirely different from those of the Arabs, asserting that Cox 
and his staff should be responsible to the Foreign Office and not the India Office.19 
However, it should be noted that Sykes was intensely frustrated by the intervention of 
the Government of India in his secret negotiations with France over the division of the 
Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire into British and French spheres of influence. 
These negotiations led to what was known as the Sykes-Picot agreement in May 
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1916.20 Consequently, it can be said that while Cox was under pressure from Whitehall, 
especially after the transfer of the Mesopotamia campaign to the War Office, he had 
no desire to Indianize Iraq or to establish Indian legal codes there 21 and, therefore, 
that the effect of Philby’s mission to Simla was probably to diminish the influence of 
India in Iraq.  
At this particular juncture, Philby’s vision of Iraq’s future was determined by his being 
to all intents a Government of India man. He criticised the FO and the Arab Bureau 
which supported Arab independence under the leadership of Hussain and refused to 
include Iraq under the Government of India. Philby wanted the occupied territories to 
be under the control of the Government of India,22 believing that Iraq should enjoy a 
parallel status to that of the Indian provinces, but that Cox in Iraq should be 
responsible for all its expenditure. As he put it: 
The Administration of the Occupied Territories should enjoy the same status as 
the provincial government in India and the Chief Political Officer [Cox] should be 
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the supreme sanctioning authority for all expenditure from the funds collected 
by the administration”.23 
At any rate, in order to implement Whitehall’s policy, Cox evidently had to conduct two 
main procedures. The first was to embark on full correspondence with the Secretary of 
the Government of India, presenting logical arguments that these territories had not 
been annexed by the His Majesty’s Government and therefore it could not be regarded 
as a British territory. He also pointed out that these territories were still under military 
operation, and thus should be considered enemy territory. In addition, Cox asserted 
that the establishment of the new administrative department in Iraq would facilitate 
the military campaign against the Ottoman forces.24 The second procedure was the 
despatch of Philby to Simla in order to persuade the Indian authorities to agree to the 
new arrangements.25 Before his departure, Philby wrote a memorandum, presenting 
persuasive arguments and explaining that the Chief Political Officer (Cox) in Iraq did not 
have time for any objections from the Indian Accounts Department; any such objection 
would impede the military operations on the battlefield. Furthermore, according to the 
further expansion and achievements of the Indian Expeditionary Force in Iraq, Philby 
made it clear that the responsibility of the Chief Political Officer made it urgently 
necessary to establish an independent administration in order to organize the financial 
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revenues, which financially would serve not only the population of these territories but 
also the British exchequer.26 
After providing the memorandum, which filled Cox with enthusiasm for its logical 
arguments, Philby sailed to Simla by an old Orient Line ship. He reached Karachi and 
then proceeded via Panjab until he reached Simla in the north of India. There, he had 
to go through a thicket of negotiations with the officials of the Indian Government. He 
was recalled to attend a first meeting in the Foreign Department.27 At the outset, the 
finance officials of the Indian Government remarked that if Philby’s memorandum was 
not withdrawn it would be responsible for the negotiations ending prematurely. It is 
quite interesting to speculate on the reaction of the finance officials. Approving Philby’s 
memorandum would mean that the authority of the occupied territories would 
increase rapidly and, more important, they would enjoy the same status as a provincial 
government in India. In any case, it is clear that Philby, with his strong personality and 
high confidence, replied that he had no authority to withdraw the memorandum, 
which carried the approval of Cox and his task was simply to negotiate the content of 
the memorandum; he would accept any rational modifications to the project proposed 
but if major amendments were suggested he would have to return to Cox for further 
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instructions. He concluded by stating that if the conference refused to discuss the issue 
he would inform Cox in any case.28 
In this confrontation, the Secretary to the Government of India intervened and asked 
for the conference to be adjourned until the following day; this delay would enable him 
to deliberate the matter with the Viceroy. The next day, the conference resumed and it 
was soon plain that Philby’s project had gained the consent of the Viceroy, who also 
added some improvements to the proposed scheme. Therefore, it was agreed that Cox 
was authorized to take the fullest responsibility for the financial administration of the 
territory – no financial decisions that he took would be rejected, which meant that Iraq 
became indirectly controlled from the Government of India, especially when it related 
to the control of the financial expenditure.29 
Consequently, Cox seems to have been very pleased with Philby’s success in the 
difficult negotiations with the British authority in Simla. The outcome of Philby’s 
mission suggests that he had shown himself to be a competent negotiator with a 
thorough knowledge of financial administration. In addition, Cox may also have 
considered Philby a significant ally who had secured much power and independence in 
his position as Chief Political Officer in Iraq. However, it should be remembered that 
the account of this conference is derived only from Philby’s own memoirs, which 
sometimes reflect his self-confessed desire for fame and tendency to inflate his own 
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achievements. Although Monroe mentioned that Cox sent Philby on a quick mission to 
Simla in order to resolve some procedures that concerned the civilian and military 
accounts and Philby secured much financial power for Cox,30 the main reason for his 
success was not only his competence as a negotiator but also, as stated earlier, to the 
strong tendency of Whitehall to include the occupied territories under its policy instead 
of the India Government. 31 At any rate, with the success of the Indian mission, it seems 
that Cox decided to offer Philby the post of Revenue Commissioner. 
Revenue Commissioner 
Despite the difficulties of life in wartime, Philby added to his success with the Indian 
mission by maintaining his high efficiency at work. Much impressed, Cox decided in July 
191632 to raise him to the position of Revenue Commissioner in place of Dobbs, who 
had been ill and had requested eight months leave.33 Philby was proud of the new job 
because he thought that he was the youngest civilian officer to have been given this 
honour.34 He spent most of his time out of the office, touring the Basra district, 
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discussing the season’s crops and their prices with farmers and merchants.35 The Philby 
collection reveals accounts of his tours of inspection in the occupied areas and the 
remarkable effort that he put in. For instance, on 14 September 1916, he toured the 
whole portion of Mattawa, an estate located in the Shatt – al- Arab district in the south 
of Iraq, and provided a basic description of its suitability for cultivation. In addition, in 
his report, he concluded that the district could be divided into two parts; the first one 
regarded as of poor quality whereas the second was superior for the miscellaneous 
cultivation of dates and vegetables. Moreover, there would be a great opportunity to 
increase its income through agricultural reclamation.36 Furthermore, other inspections 
took place in Suwaib, Abuda and al- Duwa, other districts located near the Shatt – al- 
Arab. While Suwaib and Abuda were districts covered with small date plantations, the 
al- Duwa and other lands nearby were suitable for the cultivation of rice and corn, 
suggesting that these agricultural areas could be extended.37 
Obviously, Philby was entirely qualified for this work, since he had learnt to do fiscal 
planning in India. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that he increased the budget of 
the occupied territories to allow the expenditure of £120,000 by Cox on the military 
exchequer.38 Such an increase may have come from his knowledge of ways to collect 
taxes from farmers;39 it generated the means to ensure that Arab traders paid taxes on 
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the fortunes that they had amassed during the occupation. Furthermore, he 
understood how to keep prices low, persuading Cox to open a local bank to break the 
monopoly of the Persian Bank at Basra.40 
Under the command of General F. Maude,41 the advance of British forces towards 
Baghdad increased the need for political officers for the new lands. Philby was 
infuriated to be told that he was to be one of these, the Political Agent at Amara, which 
would have meant the loss of his previous post as Revenue Commissioner.42 It is 
possible that, having reached so high a rank, he became indignant at the prospect of 
losing advancement. Philby claimed that his demotion would never have taken place 
without the influence of Wilson, the Deputy Chief Political Officer.43 Possibly this claim 
is quite true; his fruitful activities and the progress that he had made in so short a 
period could hardly have gone unnoticed by Wilson, given their political rivalry. 
However, Cox’s action in effectively demoting Philby was indeed unusual, but the 
remarkable increase in occupied territories certainly presented him with a problem of 
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understaffing.  At any rate, it seems that Philby could do nothing about the change in 
his position and he finally accepted the new arrangement.44 
 
Political Agent at Amara 
It is not clear exactly when Philby started his new job. In addition to the obscure years, 
the reader will find it difficult chronologically to trace the events in Philby’s 
autobiography, due to the length of his digressions, which made him liable to forget or 
not be precise over the years. However, it emerges from Gertrude Bell’s letters, that 
Philby arrived in Baghdad from Amara in May 191745 and from Philby’s accounts that 
he spent four or five months at Amara.46 Thus he may have begun work there in 
February 1917. In addition, to strengthen this conjecture, it can be observed from the 
Philby collection that the last memorandum showing Philby as Revenue Commissioner 
was written on 23 January 1917. This was not followed by any further reference to this 
post, but the collection goes on to show his new position as the political officer in 
Amara.47 
To make things easier for Philby, Cox consented to allow Dora, Philby’s wife, to 
accompany him to Amara.48 His most important achievement in the short time he 
                                                          
44
 Ibid, p.123. 
45
 The letters of Bell, p.335.                                   
46
 Philby, Arabian Days, p.123. 
47
 See Philby’s report, ʻ Revenue Matters ʼ, 23 January 1917, MECA, Philby collection, F.1/3/1/2. 
48




spent there was that he managed to supply the army with sheep. Ghḍbān, one of the 
important tribal Shaikhs,49 broke his agreement with the army when he refused to sell 
his herd; he also sent his cattle to the Persian hills to be out of the army’s reach.50 After 
the army failed to obtain the cattle, Lieutenant-Colonel Gerard Leachman51 suggested 
that it would be better to arrange a punitive force against Shaikh Ghḍbān and his tribe. 
It was clear that Leachman’s proposal would have had dire consequences, in particular 
at a moment when most Arabs were taking the British side against the Ottomans.52 
Here, Philby intervened and suggested a different approach, to which Cox consented. 
He decided to visit Shaikh Ghḍbān in his own region and was able to persuade him to 
supply the British army with 10,000 sheep at a reasonable price.53 From the above, it 
can be seen that Philby played an important role, resolving the issue diplomatically and 
saving the British army from engaging in a needless military operation. 
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At Amara, Philby’s isolation made him depressed. Another reason for his depression, as 
Monroe suggests, is that he was jealous of the political personnel who had been called 
to join Cox in Baghdad.54 Philby’s own claim to political advancement was perhaps 
justifiable, considering the extraordinary performance that he had put in for more than 
a year and he may have thought that he deserved more appreciation. He wanted to be 
close to the political administration in Baghdad, in order to play the important role 
which he thought was inevitably suited to his political ambition; he also may have had a 
desire for distinction and a certain degree of prominence. Therefore, he requested a 
transfer and was eventually invited to join Cox as his personal assistant.55 It might be 
asked why Cox agreed to let Philby join him in the same office. In fact, it seems that 
there is no recorded explanation of this initiative by Cox, but from Monroe’s account 
Cox was “doing everything himself … even correcting articles in the newspapers”;56 he 
was in need of someone who was an efficient administrator and could assist him in the 
work of administration and it was likely that no one was better at this than Philby, who 
had worked before with Cox in Basra and proved himself a competent administrator, in 
various posts, since his arrival in Iraq in November 1915.  
Personal Assistant 
On 17 May 1917, Philby arrived in Baghdad and was warmly greeted by Gertrude Bell, 
the first person he met at the Political Office. After this, relations between them 
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developed increasingly as they worked together in Cox’s office. In her letters, Bell 
illustrated how good a freind Philby was to her and says that she was delighted to work 
with him, describing him as a quick and intelligent person.57 As a famous explorer, 
linguist and archaeologist, it is quite evident that she made a considerable impact on 
Philby, especially in view of her explorations into Central Arabia and her knowledge of 
Arab affairs. Her influence was probably one of the main reasons behind Philby’s later 
explorations.58 Their relations remained harmonious, travelling together to negotiate 
with the Arab chieftains in the south of Iraq and “survey the Shatt-al-Arab ”.59  
However, their relations deteriorated in 1921 when Philby accused Bell of acting like 
the serpent in Ṭalib al-Naqib’s detention60 and of imposing Faiṣal Ibn Hussain as king of 
Iraq, as discussed in more detail below. 
In Philby’s current post, an important claim about his career should be checked. Brown 
claims that without Gertrude Bell Philby would not have advanced and that she was the 
key to his progress in Iraq.61 But Brown’s assertion contradicts the historical evidence. 
In the first place, Brown provided no substantiating statement or evidence to back up 
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this claim. In her personal letters, Bell provides no basis to support Brown’s allegation, 
since she never refers to any influence she may have had in securing the new post for 
Philby. The only historical account she presents is that of his arrival in Baghdad in May 
1917.62 Second, Philby came to Iraq in November 1915, whereas Bell joined Cox’s staff 
only in March 1916.63 Between Philby’s arrival and Bell’s advent, Philby was the object 
of Cox’s admiration, due to his successful efforts to improve the country’s financial 
administration. In addition, Cox knew of Philby’ s competence in his job; it explains why 
he appointed him first as Financial Assistant, second, as his official envoy to India and 
finally why he promoted him to the post of Revenue Commissioner. To Philby’s 
colleagues, Cox stated, ‘’ Mr. Philby is an officer whom I brought here and whose 
abilities and services I have greatly valued in the past’’.64 Consequently, to imagine that 
Brown might have ignored and concealed Philby’s achievement or sought to diminish 
Philby’s considerable efforts in his career seems to affront impartiality and neutrality. 
Because Cox tended to over-centralize his authority and attend to all matters himself, 
Philby found that he had been given a mighty task: to organize and arrange all the 
papers destined for Cox’s desk.65 He stayed for five months in Cox’s office, working 
every day from early morning until midnight. In order to deal with the arrears of the 
massive files and to regulate the work, he prepared a draft for each issue with its 
relevant files and from time to time took to Cox a batch of these drafts so that Cox 
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could issue instructions for each case.66 As a result, Philby’s ingenuity and innovation in 
the office enabled him to deal with all current business without delay and to keep all 
matters up- to- date. Cox was entirely satisfied with what Philby was doing.67 
In November 1918, however, when he returned to Baghdad, Philby found that Wilson 
had become the Acting Civil Commissioner for Iraq in succession to Cox, who had been 
sent to Persia to tackle the complicated situation in Tehran.68 
Wilson’s view regarding Britain’s post-war policy over Iraq was first that he rejected the 
Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918 that guaranteed Arab independence. 
Second, he countered Lawrence, who was supported by the FO; his plan was to 
position Hussain’s sons as rulers over Syria and Iraq, arguing that Lawrence’s proposal 
was impracticable.69 In order to challenge British Government policy, Wilson conducted 
a plebiscite in 1918, claiming that the result of the plebiscite revealed no consensus 
over a suitable ruler but that the inhabitants of Iraq preferred to be under British 
protection.70 
Before examining Philby’s view of Wilson’s scepticism about the capacity of Iraqis for 
self-government, it may be helpful to illustrate Philby’s views on the correspondence 
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between Sir Henry McMahon71 and Hussain. In his report to Wilson, Philby stated that 
while Hussain enjoyed great advantages in virtue of his spiritual position and of the 
resources placed at his disposal by Britain, his lack of political and administrative 
experience, as well as of tact and address, were some of the major reasons to doubt 
whether Hussain could fulfil his great ideal of Arab unity, or even whether he deserved 
his self-chosen title of Malik Diyar al-Arab (the King of the Arab countries). Hussain’s 
assumption of this title, when he declared his revolt against the Ottomans in 1916, was 
impracticable and contradicted the treaties that the British had signed with the Arab 
rulers in the Gulf,72 most notably Ibn Sa‘ūd, who had negotiated the Anglo-Saudi treaty 
in December 1915.73 In Philby’s view, Hussain strongly believed that his 
correspondence with McMahon embodied a solemn promise from Britain to make him 
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king over all the Arab countries; he “was convinced that the British Government would 
never go back on its plighted word”.74 In his outline of the political scene, Philby 
informed Wilson that such contradictions between British “promises” to Hussain and 
the Anglo-Saudi treaty would put the British Government in an awkward position after 
the end of WWI. To remove this inconsistency between the McMahon–Hussain 
correspondence and the British treaty with Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby suggested that the British 
Government must preserve its relations with the Arab rulers, while Ibn Sa‘ūd himself 
would admit Hussain’s sovereignty only as a King over Hejaz, but not over himself and 
his people. Furthermore, Philby suggested that the ideal of Arab unity under a single 
governor was impracticable, warning the British Government of the negative impact of 
the Caliphate if Hussain declared himself its spiritual leader.75 
Wilson’s assumption that the people of Iraq were not capable of governing themselves 
and not ready for independence until they were educated in democratic procedures 
encouraged, as Susan Pedersen has suggested, “an Indian style of direct 
administration”.76 Philby emerged as an important critic of this policy and portrayed 
Wilson as an imperialist, who saw the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918 as a 
veritable bombshell to destroy his grandiose vision of governing all the territories in the 
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Middle East.77 Predictably, Philby decided not to work with Wilson, preferring to take a 
period of leave in England, with which Wilson did not demur, suggesting a growing rift 
between them.78 However, even while he was on leave Philby seems never to have 
given up supporting the spirit of Arab independence, believing profoundly that a 
democratic constitution would suit the Iraqi people. He prepared three copies of a long 
memorandum illustrating the main practical steps in implementing the Anglo- French 
declaration on Iraq. Before leaving Iraq, he sent the first copy to Wilson who, as Philby 
believed, ignored it. The second he handed to the Arab Bureau while he was in Cairo 
awaiting a ship to London but he thought this copy had been lost. When he arrived in 
London, he sent the third copy to the India Office, but it met with the same fate as the 
first one.79 
While it was obvious that Wilson was an extraordinary man in terms of integrity, his 
devoted service to his country and his distinguished efforts to improve the 
administration in Iraq,80 he seems not to have realized the gravity of the Arab 
nationalists’ propaganda for independence and the transition that they were engaged 
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in. The war probably enhanced these and, more importantly, so did the Anglo-French 
Declaration of November 1918 under which their independence was guaranteed.81 
In May 1920, the Arab revolt broke out and spread all through Iraq. Although Wilson 
tried hard to pacify the rebels, it seems that the task was too much for him.82 The 
revolt shook the British Government and it was decided that Cox should immediately 
be ordered back from Tehran for consultations. Cox departed to London and accepted 
the new post as High Commissioner. Before leaving England for Iraq he selected some 
men to work under his administration, of whom Philby was one.83 As a result, it can be 
supposed that Cox selected Philby because he knew him already and had realized his 
familiarity and skill as an administrator, together with his intelligence and his constant 
energy at work. 
In late August 1920 Cox, accompanied by some of his staff, including Philby, sailed to 
Iraq. It was decided that the inhabitants should have their own government.84 
However, the British officials who worked with Wilson supposed that such political 
change was inconceivable. Cox, working together with Philby and Bell, insisted on 
proving that Wilson’s policy in Iraq was wrong. At any rate, Philby and Bell presented a 
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list of famous people who would be prepared to serve in a provisional Arab 
Government in order to bring about the change.85 
It should be noted that, throughout the war, Britain was in secret negotiations with 
France, which finally produced the Sykes-Picot agreement in May 1916; the intention 
was to divide the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire to create British and French 
spheres of influence. Under this agreement, Ottoman Asia would be carved into Red 
and Blue areas in which Britain and France could establish direct or indirect control. 
The Red area demonstrated the British influence in Basra and Baghdad, whereas the 
Blue area illustrated the French influence in Lebanon and Syria. Following this 
agreement, the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 promised a future Jewish 
‘Homeland’ in the British zone pf Palestine.86 At the San Remo Conference in April 
1920, Britain was awarded a mandate to govern Iraq, as well as Palestine and 
Transjordan. The idea was that Britain would teach these countries and lead them step- 
by -step to self-responsibility and independence.87 For several reasons, Britain would 
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not simply abandon Iraq. It saw Iraq as a crucial region connecting it with Egypt and 
India. The British presence would secure the British interest in the oilfields in the south 
of Iran in Abadan in particular, whereas a British withdrawal would allow Russia to 
consolidate its influence and finally would threaten the British interest in these 
oilfields.88 As a result, in order to protect the British interest, to curtail the financial 
expenditure and to satisfy Arab national aspirations, it was decided to create a sphere 
of indirect British control by putting an Arab government in place.89 In 1914, following 
the Ottoman empire’s choice to fight with the Central Powers, Britain immediately 
reacted by declaring that Egypt should be a British Protectorate. Egypt was too 
important to Britain to be left out of account, partly through its position as key to the 
route to India and partly because British cotton workers – and hence much of the 
Empire’s economy – depended upon Egyptian cotton. The Egyptian people, conscious 
of belonging to a developed country and of the tensions building up in the decades of 
British occupation,90 revolted in 1919. It took only two more years for Britain to cede 
formal independence to Egypt, but it must be admitted that the country was often in 
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practice still under Britain’s thumb. The latter would not give up its power over Egypt’s 
defences, Imperial communications, or the Sudan.91 
With the San Remo decision, it might be assumed that Philby, at least at the outset, 
had no qualms about the mandate system that would enable the inhabitants of Iraq to 
stand by themselves after reaching a certain point of political and administrative 
development. Such a presumption is seen in a secret letter from Cox to inform Philby of 
the draft of the mandate even before the official announcement of the San Remo 
decision. Cox stated: 
I see that my Secretary sent you a copy of the draft Mandate … I told him he might 
show the print to you and other advisers confidentially, but I only got it demi-officially 
and have no authority to make it known officially … You are not therefore authorised to 
communicate the text to your Minister and should take it off your files.92  
Therefore, the greater freedom and independence for the country seems to have 
satisfied Philby’s liberalism, for the idea of a mandate was that it would be only 
temporary. Hence, he devoted himself to the preparation of a Provisional Arab 
Government, working with Abdulrahman al-Khilani,93 who had been appointed 
President of the Arab Council of Ministers. Furthermore, it was decided also to appoint 
British advisers for each Iraqi minister in order to advise and train them in methods of 
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government and administration.94 In November 1920, the Arab government was 
established under the leadership of al-Khilani. It consisted of twenty-one notable Iraqis 
from Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. Although the Sunni Arabs held the most important 
posts, the Council of Ministers included some eminent members of Shi‘a, Christian and 
Jewish groups.95 It was evident that Philby and Bell worked very hard under the 
leadership of Cox and played a vital role in terms of regulating the secretariat and 
establishing the rules of the nexus between the Iraqi ministers and British advisers. The 
Iraqi administrative body composed 14 articles that defined the tasks of the Prime 
Minister and his ministers. It also indicates that Cox, as High Commissioner, had the 
fullest responsibility for running the country, representing the British Government until 
the Iraqi electoral law should be formulated. In addition, the council should meet once 
a week and its decisions would be effective and approved only after Cox’s 
consideration and approval.96 Since this arrangement was praised by Cox,97 it is fair to 
say that if Cox was the man who first created the modern Iraqi state, Philby and Bell 
formed its first ever modern Provisional Government. Moreover, Cox rewarded Philby 
for his remarkable efforts and appointed him adviser to the Minister of the Interior (the 
equivalent of Home Secretary), as discussed below. 
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British Advisor to the Minister of the Interior 
Philby strongly believed that Sayyid Ṭalib,98 the Minister of the Interior, would be the 
next prime minister, so he spent much time in training him and passing on the right 
ideas for the new administration.99 From the private papers at St Antony’s College, it 
can be seen that Philby showed a great deal of patience towards Sayyid Ṭalib who 
tended to arrive at the office very late and who believed that paperwork was not 
necessary or to be seen as important.100 However, Philby was apparently able to make 
a change in Ṭalib who soon began to attend the ordinary office regularly and create a 
satisfactory modus operandi for his job. Together, they worked hard to foster the new-
born democracy; modifying the draft of the electoral law and submitting it to the 
Council of State, which had a small committee composed of Philby himself, Ṭalib and 
other Arab ministers.  Many meetings of this committee were held, starting on 30 
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November 1920; it framed the text of the law and agreed to some principal resolutions; 
most important was to make sufficient provision for tribal participation and 
arrangements for this were drafted by Philby.101 
Hence, it can be supposed that Philby and some Iraqi ministers were among the first 
personnel who established a set of electoral laws in the modern history of Iraq. 
However, while the members of the committee continued their meetings in order to 
discuss the final draft of the electoral law, the Arab Council of Ministers could not 
discuss it because of the Cairo Conference, in March 1921, under the supervision of 
Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary. One of the most important decisions of this 
conference concerned the reward to the sons of Hussain for their help in the war. It 
was agreed there that Faiṣal, the third son, was a fit person to become the ruler of 
Iraq.102 
In the meanwhile, anxiety and rumours spread through Iraq regarding the appointment 
of Faiṣal. Ṭalib, with his enormous ambition to rule Iraq, showed opposition toward the 
introduction of Faiṣal and, because he was famous and had support in the south of 
Iraq, Cox decided to arrest him and send him to Ceylon.103 Hammād has suggested that 
Philby knew in advance about Ṭalib’s detention and therefore accepted Cox’s offer to 
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make him Acting Minister of the Interior in Ṭalib’s place.104 However, it seems that 
Hammād’s suggestion is not credible for a number of reasons. First, Hammād did not 
support his allegation with logical piece of documentary evidence. Second, Philby was 
Ṭalib’s most important supporter and his request for him to resign illustrates his 
disapproval of Ṭalib’s arrest. Third, Philby was entirely opposed not only to Cox’s action 
in this matter but also to the appointment of Faiṣal before an election could be held.105  
More importantly, there was a crucial piece of evidence of Philby’s indignation and his 
support for Ṭalib was his letter in 1924 to the Labour Colonial Office begging it to revise 
the decision to detain Ṭalib and allow him to return to Iraq. Philby stated: 
S.T. [Sayyid Ṭalib] Pasha, who was Minister of the Interior in 1921-22 and who deserved 
a better fate for the assistance he courageously gave us during the Iraq rebellion, was 
deported from Baghdad in circumstances exceedingly discreditable to the British 
government. Since then he has been in exile in various lands and forbidden to return to 
Iraq … So, the injustice, for which the British not the Iraq government is responsible, is 
perpetuated ... All I ask is justice.106 
In addition, Philby in another private letter, which has not been traced, identified 
precisely the personnel who were behind Ṭalib’s detention, picturing the actual plot of 
the detention as immoral behaviour on the part of Cox and Bell who, in Philby’s view, 
were the ones mainly responsible for the treachery. Philby wrote:  
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I am afraid that there can be no doubt that Cox, with Gertrude [Bell] acting the part of 
the serpent, deliberately stood to an act of treachery, which he justified to his 
conscience on high political grounds.107 
Furthermore, Philby’s intense frustration at Ṭalib’s treatment is well illustrated in Bell’s 
account; she indicated frankly that Philby ignored and sulked at her for a week after 
Ṭalib’s arrest, suggesting that she had something to do with his fate. On 25 April 1921, 
she stated: 
I can scarcely understand how Mr Philby, who was his Advisor, could have had any 
illusions about him [Ṭalib], but he was certainly – and indeed is – much distressed at 
what has happened. He boudéd [sulked at] me for a week until I forced a heart to heart 
talk upon him and made him admit that at any rate I had done nothing but what was 
obviously incumbent upon me.108 
From the above, it can be assumed that Bell had nothing to do with the conspiracy to 
arrest Ṭalib but she may have been one of the main factors in his detention, especially 
since he was, as she saw it, the main threat to the appointment of Faiṣal. She accused 
Ṭalib of mobilizing public opinion against the British decision to appoint someone such 
as Faiṣal who had not come from Iraq and of insisting that Iraq was for the Iraqis alone. 
Therefore, Bell wrote a report to Cox, alerting him to the danger of a pro-Ṭalib 
movement: she says: 
But didn't I tell you that there was no one like Sir Percy in the handling of a delicate 
political problem! For my part I feel a load off my mind. Talib was capable of anything. 
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He was already gathering round him the band of cut throats whom he used to employ 
in Turkish times at Basrah; a gentleman who was well known to have killed a Turkish 
general by Ṭalib’s orders (it is the most sensational episode in Ṭalib’s career) ... It was 
an item which I added to my report yesterday because I wanted to warn Sir Percy that 
he was almost certain to attempt the assassination of Faisal if the latter came here.
109
 
Acting Minister of the Interior 
Philby accepted this new post only after Cox had reassured and persuaded him that the 
detention of Ṭalib would not betoken the introduction of Faiṣal as king.110 In his new 
post, then, Philby continued to serve his country without knowing the outcomes of the 
Cairo Conference. The Prime Minister, Abdulraḥman al-Khilani, handed Philby a 
telegram to inform him that “His Highness Sharif Faiṣal sailed today for Basra: prepare 
suitable welcome”.111  Philby took the telegram to Cox, who reiterated his assurance 
that he had no further information about it. But, on 12 June 1921, the truth came out 
when Churchill announced that Faiṣal was on his way to Iraq to present himself as a 
candidate for the throne of Iraq.112 
Cox despatched Philby to Basra to receive Faiṣal in the hope that the latter’s poise 
would impress Philby and change his attitude. Regarding Faiṣal’s reception, Philby, 
according to the declared policy of holding a free election, made it clear to the District 
Officers and their British advisers that Faiṣal was coming only as a candidate, not a king.  
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Faiṣal was greatly angered not so much by his cool reception as by Philby’s telling him 
that there was no guarantee of his becoming king without a free election.113 
The turning point of Philby’s time in Iraq seems to have been when Cox, at the Cairo 
Conference on 12 March 1921, was informed by Churchill that Faiṣal should be 
appointed to rule Iraq and that it was time to adopt the Sharifian policy. The Cabinet 
soon fell in with this plan.114 Cox suggested and was promised at least the holding of a 
referendum in order to avoid the bad effect on public opinion.115 It was no surprise 
when, in response, Philby, who would have preferred a republic to a monarchy, 
indignantly rejected Cox’s order to hand in his resignation, since he disagreed with the 
policy of compelling people to accept  Faiṣal as their king.116 However, it should be 
noted that Philby was not only the British official who hesitated to welcome the 
prospect of a ruling Sharifian family. After the end of the war, the IO denounced 
Lawrence’s choice of Hussain and his sons as the outstanding leaders but the FO, 
influenced by Lawrence’s logic, differed from the India Office especially when any 
question arose over Britain’s future policy towards Iraq. Wilson, for instance, was the 
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main opponent of the Sharifian solution; the main difference between his view and 
Philby’s was that he preferred Iraq to be under direct control while Philby favoured a 
republican regime. In any case, as Paris suggests, the controversy between the FO and 
the IO remained until 1921 when the British Government accepted Churchill’s plan to 
make Faiṣal king of Iraq.117 
Be that as it may, aware of Philby’s reluctance, Cox sought to justify his order to expel 
Philby from Iraq. Cox stated: 
Mr. Philby is an officer whom I brought here and whose abilities and services I have 
greatly valued in the past. Unfortunately, his past experience has given him a 
somewhat pronounced anti-Sharifian bias, and he was I think constitutionally unable to 
accommodate his personal view and attitude to the now declared ‘Sharifian’ policy of 
His Majesty’s Government. It had in fact become a matter of common talk that he held 
views different from those of the High Commissioner and he was a strong advocate of a 
Republic.118 
The above suggests that the crucial controversy between Cox and Philby was based on 
two issues. The first one is illustrated clearly by Philby’s memorandum to Cox 
expressing his support for the adoption of the previous British policy, which set out the 
principle that the Iraqi people had a right to choose their own future.119 The second 
issue concerns Cox’s claim that Philby was anti-Sharifian, which does not seem logically 
to be altogether true, at least at this stage of Philby’s life. The historical support for this 
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assumption is that Philby, after leaving Iraq, was appointed as Chief British 
Representative in Transjordan in order to serve Amir Abdullah, the second son of 
Hussain. But it is likely that, if Philby had been opposed to the British policy toward the 
Sharifian family, at least at this stage, he would have not agreed to be sent to 
Transjordan to serve another Sharifian ruler, Abdullah Ibn Hussain. 
At any rate, after his request to resign and not to work with Cox, Philby found himself 
without a job. In order to avoid the embarrassment of his presence in Baghdad, he 
decided, on the advice of his wife, to take three months’ leave in Persia.120 In contrast, 
Cox communicated with Churchill and the latter agreed that Philby was “clearly 
unsuitable for the post in view of his pronounced anti-Sharifian tendencies”.121 
Furthermore, although Cox explained to John Shuckburgh,122 the Secretary of the 
Political Department in the IO, that he was extremely sorry for what had happened to 
Philby and had a great regard for him, he considered that his action against him was 
the only safe one for the policy of His Majesty’s Government (HMG).123 This would 
mean that Philby was not persuaded by the new British policy to control Iraq and this 
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may explain why he was thought to be a risk for the British presence in Iraq. His view 
would embarrass Britain, but he would have considerable influence not only on the 
junior British officials in Iraq but also the Iraqi nationalists. Therefore, to allow Cox to 
impose the new British policy in Iraq without any obstacle, it was agreed that Philby 
must leave the country. 
In putting Philby and his family in a difficult situation, Cox regretted in particular when 
he learned that Philby had not saved enough to support his wife, who was about to 
give birth, and his young family. Consequently, Cox sent telegram after telegram to 
India, Persia and the Gulf in order to find him a suitable post. The news came from the 
Middle East Department of the Colonial Office, offering him a post in Transjordan to 
replace Colonel Lawrence, the temporary Chief British Representative.124 This decision 
seems to place an unresolved contradiction on Philby’s appointment, since Philby had 
been assigned the task of serving the Hashemite family, the arch-enemies of Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
despite his own strong preference for Ibn Sa‘ūd in Central Arabia. Philby always had the 
good of Arabia at heart, in fact, and it is not surprising to find that he wrote a private 
letter to Cox, discussing possible alternative posts for him and indicating clearly that his 
“heart is in Arabia” and his desire was “to remain connected in some way with that 
country.”125 However, as stated above, Philby was probably not inimical to the 
Hashemite family but he was against any plan to make Hussain the spiritual and 
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political leader over all the Arabic countries in the Middle East. Furthermore, it can be 
asked why, if Philby was not anti-Sharifian, he opposed the appointment of Faiṣal Ibn 
Hussain as ruler of Iraq? To answer the question, it can be said that what Philby 
opposed was the method of imposing Faiṣal as a king on the Iraqi people without 
conducting a free election, especially when Philby had worked hard to organize the 
electoral law in Iraq, stating that Faiṣal could be one of the candidates. Consequently, it 
can be assumed that if Philby had been opposed to the British policy toward the 
Sharifian family, at least at this stage, he would not have agreed to be sent to 
Transjordan to serve another Sharifian ruler, Abdullah Ibn Hussain. 
Chief British Representative in Transjordan 1922-1924 
Before dealing with Philby’s role in Transjordan, it may be helpful to clarify the origins 
of the Emirate of Transjordan in order to understand the basis of its establishment and 
the circumstances in which it was created. At the end of WWI, Amir Faiṣal was 
announced as the new king of Syria, of which Transjordan was part. However, in 
accordance with the resolutions of the San Remo Supreme Council, which marked the 
spheres of influence between France and Britain, the French army drove Amir Faiṣal 
out of Damascus and reinforced French control over Syria.126 
Britain's intention not to include Transjordan in the promised Jewish National Home 
generated a new political system to administer the territory. For this, Herbert Samuel, 
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the High Commissioner for Palestine, met some notables from Transjordan, confirming 
that Britain had decided to set up a system of self-government in different parts of 
Transjordan and had appointed six British officers to run them in the hope of 
empowering the local people to begin governing themselves. The task of these British 
officers was also to teach the notables how to manage an administrative and taxation 
system.127 
The new autonomous government did not last, however, nor succeed in its objectives. 
This, as Walid Kazziha suggests, was due to the move to Amman by Amir Abdullah, who 
had in the past been frustrated in his attempt to become the ruler of Iraq and now was 
disgruntled by the removal of his brother, Amir Faiṣal, from Syria.128 However, it was 
perhaps Abdullah’s arrival in Amman that puzzled Britain, for it could not reconcile its 
support for the Sharifian party with the recent development of mandatory power. At 
the same time, it should never be forgotten that there were some additional reasons 
for the failure of the autonomous government. The first one is that the six British 
officers who ruled the government were, in fact, young, inexpert and suffered from a 
lack of knowledge of Arabic. A further reason is a lack of financial aid combined with 
limited British military support to the new regime.129 An additional reason, which may 
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be even more important, was the desire of the British Government to appoint Abdullah 
to rule over Transjordan. The desire of the British Government was probably not based 
only on consideration of its new policy to adopt the Sharifian solution, nor on the fact 
that Abdullah had been the first one to seek contact with the British authorities in Cairo 
and had persuaded his father, Hussain, to join Britain in its war against the Ottomans. 
130 Britain was also well-disposed towards Abdullah because his personality was 
deemed to be malleable; he would thus find it easy to follow the new British policy in 
the Middle East. Edwin Montague131 stated that “if Abdullah is the lascivious, idle 
creature he is represented to be, he is the ideal man, because he would leave the 
British Administrator to govern the country wholly”.132 As a result, it can be said that 
the scanty British support and the adoption of the new British policy to support the 
Sharifian solution combined with Abdullah’s malleable personality were together 
enough to bring an end to the experiment in Transjordan.  
As it happened, Abdullah’s advance to Amman, coincided with the Cairo Conference, in 
which Churchill showed himself determined to resolve all the issues with Hussain and 
his sons and to reward them for their efforts during the war. Therefore, he recalled 
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Amir Abdullah to Jerusalem and offered him temporary rule over Transjordan for six 
months with a monthly subsidy.133 
Other historians have backed Philby’s claim that the appointment of Amir Abdullah did 
not coincide with the wishes of Herbert Samuel, who as High Commissioner had a 
relationship with the Zionist Organization and who wanted Transjordan to be included 
as part of the Jewish National Home.134 Monroe takes a different view that the main 
reason behind Samuel’s intention to occupy Transjordan was to secure Palestine.135 In 
terms of objectivity, it seems beyond doubt that Samuel had connections with the 
Zionist Organization. In his memoirs, he illustrates his admiration for the purpose of 
Zionism: 
I said that I myself had never been a Zionist, because the prospects on any practical 
outcome had seemed so remote that I had not been willing to take a part in the 
movement. But now the conditions are profoundly altered. If a Jewish State were 
established in Palestine it might become the centre of a new culture. The Jewish brain 
is rather a remarkable thing, and under national auspices, the state might become a 
fountain of enlightenment and a source of a great literature and art and development 
of science.136 
However, Samuel’s fears over securing Palestine were quite logical, for a number of 
reasons. First, the tribes and their chiefs who inhabited the east of Transjordan and 
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who had led the Kura revolt, did not welcome Abdullah’s regime and their recalcitrance 
jeopardised the region’s security.137 Second, the Syrian nationalists, who had come 
from Syria to Transjordan after the ejection of Amir Faiṣal from Damascus, were a 
major threat to Palestine, notably when Amir Abdullah, having reached Amman, 
announced that he would cooperate with them.138 In addition, in 1921, the Jewish 
villages were exposed to attack by the Arab tribes who belonged to Transjordan and 
who stole most of its sheep and cattle.139 Furthermore, it seems that Samuel was under 
pressure, in particular after the French remonstrance against the Amir Abdullah and 
the Syrian nationalists. They were accused of trying to assassinate the French High 
Commissioner, who was in fact injured, and of killing one of his officers.140 
Consequently, it should be noted that, while Samuel could show his private feelings to 
the Zionist Organization and was unwilling to establish a Sharifian Arabic government 
that would conflict with the Palestine mandate, he was at the time struggling with the 
unstable political conditions in Transjordan.  
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, Samuel was not convinced of Amir Abdullah’s 
capacity to rule Transjordan; he sent a telegram to the Colonial Secretary, stating that 
Amir Abdullah should be relieved of his temporary assignment and Transjordan should 
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be administered in combination with Palestine.141 However, Samuel's opinion differed 
from that of the CO and the British Government in general, which had previously 
decided that Britain should support Hussain’s sons and assign Iraq and Transjordan to 
them to rule.142 Hence, Churchill decided to despatch Lawrence, his man, in order to 
figure out the facts of the situation and to report the conditions in Transjordan.143 
Lawrence arrived in Amman on 10 October 1921, and found that Samuel had 
exaggerated the facts about the Amir Abdullah. He suggested a remedy: that Abdullah 
should remain in charge of Transjordan and that all the British staff who were acting as 
advisers to Abdullah should be sent away. He also recommended total political 
separation between Transjordan and Palestine as well as the appointment of Philby as 
a new British Representative to replace Lawrence in Transjordan.144 It may be helpful to 
examine the reason behind Lawrence’s recommendation that Philby should succeed 
him in his post in Transjordan. The relations between the two men date back to 1919, 
when they met by chance in Crete and flew together to Cairo.145  Monroe suggested 
that the two Arabian specialists discussed Arabia affairs and Lawrence listened with 
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interest to Philby’s account of the recent developments in Arabia.146 This would provide 
evidence for Lawrence’s admiration of Philby, especially regarding his knowledge of the 
Middle East, which may be considered one of the factors that led Lawrence to 
recommend Philby as his successor. Although Lawrence differed from him when it 
came to the McMahon- Hussain correspondence, he admired and liked Philby and 
recommended him so long as he “would do well and play fair.”147 Consequently, it can 
inferred that Lawrence realized that Philby had first-hand knowledge of Ibn Sa‘ūd and 
Wahhabism and wished that Philby  could reconcile his opinion of Abdullah with that of 
Ibn Sa‘ūd, for example, after Abdullah’s defeat by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s forces in the battle of 
Truabah.148 
Indeed, Lawrence’s sympathy with the Hashemite royal family may not have been the 
only reason for wanting to enhance Abdullah’s position in Transjordan; it may also be 
attributed to the policy adopted by Churchill and some like-minded members of the CO 
staff that the Sharifian case had been disregarded and it was the time to consolidate 
Abdullah, who had little support from Britain.149 Therefore, Churchill, without asking 
any questions, accepted Lawrence’s recommendation and informed Samuel that he did 
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not wish to change the British policy but would retain Abdullah. He said of himself, in 
forceful language, that he and not Samuel was the one responsible.150 
According to the British officials, Philby’s appointment in Transjordan resulted in 
considerable controversy, given the circumstances surrounding Philby’s departure from 
Iraq. From a Minute by Shuckburgh, it can be observed that while Philby was described 
as a man of great capability and experience, he was not able to adjust to the policy that 
he was asked to implement and this was what made it hard or arduous for him to work 
amicably with his associates.151 Cox, the man whom Philby worked with for many years, 
referred to Philby as fanatical in nature and with opinions which always contradicted 
the interests and policy of His Majesty’s Government. He also sought to justify his 
decision to end Philby’s career in Iraq and did not want him to work under his 
administration because of Philby’s difficulty in reconciling his personal views with 
official ones, assuming that this would have a negative impact on his subordinates.152 
Andrew Ryan,153 the first British Minister in Saudi Arabia, had a strong adverse opinion 
of Philby, portraying him as a man who loathed the British policy in the Middle East.154 
Reader Bullard, who served in Iraq with Philby, shared Cox and Ryan’s view and added 
that Philby had a personality that tended to be truculent and contentious, always 
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He served the British Government in many places such as Turkey and Albania. See a further account in 
his autobiography: The last of the Dragomans. 
154




opposed to everyone, a characteristic that Bullard had never before encountered.155 
Like the above British officials,Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner of Palestine, 
indicated that, while Philby was a man of energy, ability and full awareness of the East, 
he entirely regarded “his own judgment as infallible and everyone else’s as very much 
the reverse”.156 
However, the question that should be asked is why these British officials agreed in 
describing Philby’s character in such wholly negative terms? To respond, it may be said 
that Philby was obviously stubborn and opinionated in his talk and discussion, but this 
is not at issue. The issue is that, while the British officials implicitly followed the policy 
of HMG, Philby attempted to distinguish himself by taking a different path; this was, 
indeed, at the bidding of his indomitable independence of mind which apparently 
contradicted the policy of his country in particular when ideas of liberation and 
independence were the issue. In his unpublished book, Philby wrote: 
It was the ''hard light'' of Cambridge which had opened my eyes to the true nature of 
the popular fallacies … And already, during my seven years of service in India, I had 
shown unmistakable signs of revolt against the conventions and shibboleths of the 
greatest administrative service … For its record in the past nobody had, or has, a 
greater admiration than myself: the modern India and Pakistan and Burma would have 
been impossible without it. But what I did find it difficult to condone was the inability 
of my colleagues … to adjust themselves in my time to the new strains and stresses of a 
changing world. I had left India, to spend the rest of my years in the Arab world: 
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developing and … assisting in the realization of my advanced ideas about Arab 
independence.
157  
However, it seems that the path of supporting the ideas of liberation and 
independence may not have been chosen only in the light of Cambridge but also in 
response to his own ambitious personality. Although he was supposed to follow orders 
as a government official, he may have thought that his chosen path would put him in 
the limelight in Arab society and lend him as much fame as Shakespear and Lawrence, 
whose reputation in these lands was considerable. At all events, Philby denounced the 
imperial policy of the British Government in the Middle East and, therefore, it is not 
surprising that his personality and his political views were not appreciated by his 
superiors and colleagues at work, nor by the important political officials of the British 
Government. This leads to the next question: with this character and these political 
concepts, why was he given the important post of representing British policy in 
Transjordan? The answer is perhaps two-fold. To begin with, Philby was characterized 
by his extreme administrative efficiency, which he acquired in India and Iraq. Combined 
with his awareness of Arab affairs, he also had an intimate knowledge of Arabic which 
was beyond question remarkable. Second, and in fact more important, was Philby’s 
political outlook, which supported Arab independence. Such views were in line with the 
desire of the British mandate to give the Arabs their freedom, but only after teaching 
them the requirements of administration and government. Consequently, Lawrence 
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and Churchill may have hoped that Philby would play a vital role in promoting Arab 
independence and would show Hussain and his sons that Britain kept its promise to 
reward them for the part that they had played in the war.  
However, Philby’s appointment seems to have been conditional on his meeting 
Churchill in London. The latter probably wished to figure out Philby’s personality and 
estimate how far Philby would implement the new British policy in Transjordan. After 
being interviewed by Churchill, it seems that Philby, as a fluent and attractive speaker, 
impressed Churchill by his explicit judgments.158 Philby was delighted by Churchill’s 
assurance that Arab independence in Transjordan would be encouraged. He stated: 
Mr. Churchill gave me all the assurance I needed. The mandate for Palestine and 
Transjordan, both under the supreme control of a single High Commissioner, would be 
administrated quite separately. The Zionist clauses of the mandate would on no 
account apply to Transjordan. And, so long as that country [Transjordan] refrained 
from being a nuisance to all its neighbours as it certainly had been of late, the British 
Government was prepared to let it develop as a self-governing entity.159 
At the meeting, Monroe stated, Churchill was impressed by Philby who was a lively, 
fascinating talker and who introduced “his ideas so lucidly that he won over …  
successive critics”.160 Monroe also indicated that Churchill did not want Philby to return 
to India. Instead, he outlined a new task in Transjordan, offering him the opportunity to 
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enhance Arab independence there without any supervision in recognition of his 
wholehearted efforts.161  From the above, it can be seen that Philby was given the 
chance to strengthen Arab independence, in line with his own political instincts. It can 
also be inferred that, if he took this new and important post, he would be free to 
perform his duties without any supervision. These reasons persuaded him to accept the 
post immediately.  
The arrival in Amman 
Philby was instructed by Cox that his service had been transferred from the 
administration in Iraq to the Secretary of State for the Colonies  and a military plane 
had been arranged to despatch him to Amman.162 After having interviews with Amir 
Abdullah, Lawrence in Amman, Samuel in Palestine and Churchill, as mentioned above, 
in London, he reached Amman in November 1921 but he did not take up his new post 
until Lawrence had left.163 The instructions given to Philby were that Transjordan 
should be under the control of the Palestine administration for a while, but at the same 
time the Amir Abdullah with his people should be left free to pursue their own course 
without intervention either from the Palestine administration or even Philby. The main 
reasons for the policy of non-interference are illustrated in Philby’s words:  
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I was wedded to the principle of non-interference in the internal administration of an 
independent country for several reasons. In the first place, interference would merely 
have exasperated the Amir and his government without doing any good to the people 
… in the second place, I did not think that the people were entitled to independence if 
they were unable to achieve it by their own effort … And finally, the collapse of 
Abdullah’s administration seemed to be bound to lead to the reimposition of Palestine 
control, which I regarded as disastrous.164 
In his new post, Philby had to tackle serious and complicated issues: first, how he could 
calm the tension with the French authorities in Syria regarding the arrest of the Syrian 
nationalists who had been involved in the attempted assassination of the previous 
French High Commissioner, Henri Gouraud. Second, how he could defend the 
disjunction of Transjordan from Palestine and then establish a new democratic 
government with a representative body elected by the citizens. These substantial issues 
are examined below.  
Philby and the French authorities in Syria 
From his unpublished diary, it appears that Philby pursued his first objective, aimed at 
reducing the tension between Transjordan and the French authorities in Syria. To this 
end, in April 1922 he visited Damascus and met the French officials, discussing various 
aspects of the relations between Syria and Transjordan. The attack on the French High 
Commissioner was raised. The French delegate was surprised to receive a report from 
Philby which indicated that 11 of the people demanded by the French authorities did 
not exist and two of them were in Syria already. Eventually, Philby was able to show 
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that the remaining names on the French list were women and children, two or three of 
whom had died before the incident in question.165 As a result, with France’s willingness 
to have a friendly relationship with Transjordan, Philby succeeded in reconciling the 
two parties.166 Furthermore, it was evident that Philby recognized that Transjordan had 
little in the way of economic resources. In order to increase its income, he took the 
opportunity to raise the question of the payment of taxes. He asserted that 
Transjordan was very keen to impose customs duty on all goods coming from Syria to 
Transjordan. The French authorities agreed with Philby’s proposal to increase the 
income from customs duties and promised that such an arrangement would be 
considered when the Federal Council in Syria was established.167  Consequently, it 
seemed that Philby not only tried to encourage Transjordan to further its own political 
interests in its relations with neighbouring countries, which would gradually erode the 
British authority’s influence in Palestine, but also to enhance the economic resources of 
Transjordan.  
Philby’s efforts to promote Transjordan’s independence 
Philby made it his priority to further the purpose of separating Transjordan from the 
Palestinian administration. From the historical events, it can be observed that he 
                                                          
165
 Philbyʼs Transjordan Diary ʼ, 2 and 4 April 1922, Philby collection, F.1/5/3/3. 
166
 After meeting with Philby, the French authorities in Syria became willing to recognize Amir Abdullah’s 
regime in Transjordan. See a report regarding the situation in Transjordan, 1 April 1922, TNA, CO 733/23; 
Mary, King Abdullah, Britain and the making of Jordan, p.71; Abu al- Rab, ʻJohn Philby wa- dawrūh al-
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managed to take some steps towards this separation. First, he recalled all the British 
staff who had supervised the districts of Transjordan in the past and sent them to 
Palestine.168 Such a procedure perhaps demonstrates that the presence of the British 
officers would weaken the regime of Amir Abdullah and also that the inhabitants of 
Transjordan would not accept their presence. More important, the existence of the 
British representatives would contradict Philby’s stated aim of securing independence 
for Transjordan. In addition, while this action on his part also shows how keen he was 
to play a leading role in his new post, he was, in fact, following the policy of Lawrence 
who was on the Sharifian side and had previously recommended the removal of the 
British officers from Transjordan.169 
A further illustration of Philby’s efforts to separate Transjordan can be seen in his 
telegram strengthening the financial independence of Transjordan and insisting that 
he, as the Chief British Representative in Transjordan, should be in charge of its 
administration, while Transjordan should be allowed all the rope it needed to exercise 
all the elements of administration including the administration of financial 
independence. This meant that he saw Transjordan as a distinct political unit. His 
concern is illustrated in his words to Samuel: 
Your Excellency is well aware that, while I enjoy full control of the C.O. vote and all 
disbursements in respect thereof, I am not in the same position as regards the revenue 
and expenditure of the Transjordan Government, which would resent any attempt on 
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the part of H.M.G. to enforce a detailed control over its finances and would have no 
difficulty in defeating any inquisition on my part.
170 
Philby also convincingly argued that Transjordan should be separate. His argument was 
based on the fact that Transjordan, if it were granted absolute independence and the 
necessary freedom, would rely on own its resources “without costing the British tax-
payer a penny” and this would benefit not only the treasury of Transjordan but also the 
economic interests of Palestine in terms of joint customs duty.171 In addition, his effort 
to promote Transjordan’s separation can be seen in his assertion that the removal of 
Palestine’s control over the part of the Hejaz railway that passed through the lands of 
Transjordan would make the economy of Transjordan more effective and enhance its 
administration to a decent state of capability.172 
Philby’s actions and his persistent efforts to gain de facto independence for 
Transjordan as well as de jure recognition were unceasing. It was clear that he put 
forward a persuasive argument and used political influence to exclude Transjordan’s 
financial administration from Palestinian supervision. Evidence of this lies in his 
conviction that, if Transjordan were not independent, the influence of its political 
leaders, who were Syrian and Palestinian, would reach Syria and Palestine.173 However, 
Samuel did not follow Philby’s recommendation, stating that the financial 
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administration of Transjordan should remain under the aegis of Palestine according to 
the terms of the British Mandate.174 
However, throughout the first 18 months of his posting, Philby demonstrated that he 
could make palpable progress and success for Abdullah’s administration and regime. 
For these reasons, in October 1922 Britain invited the Amir with his prime Minister to 
London in order to negotiate the terms and the independent status that would be 
admitted by the British Government.175 Britain assigned Gilbert Clayton (the Chief 
Secretary for Palestine) to be its representative in the negotiation. In his memorandum, 
Clayton asserted that Philby attended one meeting and, at his request, Philby 
translated the Arabic memorandum presented by Amir Abdullah, which proposed the 
unconditional acceptance of Amir Abdullah’s Emirate as well as the full secession of 
Transjordan from Palestinian administration. Consequently, the outcomes of the visit 
resulted not only in the promise that British financial aid to Abdullah would remain at 
£150,000 annually and the gain of a further £36,000 for his civil expenses but also 
Clayton’s assurance that the matter of British recognition of Transjordan was a vital 
issue and that a constitutional regime would have to be established.176 
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From the above, it can be said that Philby played an important role on Transjordan’s 
behalf. The turning point in his endeavour to secure its independence was when the 
Colonial Secretary agreed to his proposal to define the border between Palestine and 
Transjordan.177 More important, in March 1923, the League of Nations endorsed 
Britain's proposal that Transjordan should have its independence under the auspices of 
the British Government. 
Subject to the approval of the League of Nations His Majesty’s Government recognizes 
the existence of an independent administration in Transjordan under His Highness the 
Amir Abdullah provided that it shall be conducted on constitutional and democratic 
lines and shall, by an instrument to be negotiated hereafter, place His Majesty’s 
Government in a position to perform their international obligations in respect of the 
territory in question.178 
It is clear that such an announcement would betoken Transjordan’s political 
independence, above all because it extracted the country from Palestine administration 
and beyond the borders of the Jewish National Home. Consequently, with the 
announcement of the League of Nations, Samuel, the High Commissioner in Palestine, 
informed Amir Abdullah that Britain had promised to give Transjordan independence. 
For this historic occasion, he made a trip to Amman, where he met the Amir, assuring 
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him that he could set up a constitutional government, the vital condition that would 
bring independence to his Emirate.179 
Wilson asserted that such recognition did not entail independence from the British 
Government, meaning that Transjordan was still under the British mandate.180  This 
claim was entirely true but, at the same time, it should not be forgotten that Philby 
played a fundamental role in pressing for Transjordan’s recognition despite the 
obstacles from the British authorities in Palestine. Furthermore, it is likely that Philby 
was the one who took the first steps towards full independence for Transjordan which 
was granted some decades later.181 
At any rate, it seems that Philby was aware of the formulated announcement of the 
League of Nations which indicated that Transjordan would need a democratic and 
constitutional government in order to achieve independence.182 This would mean that 
Philby himself could not secure its formal recognition and would not be able to enter 
into any formal negotiations between Transjordan and Britain without generating an 
official representative assembly. Therefore, as his post required advice and invited 
criticism, Philby, without delay, put more pressure on Abdullah to set up a 
representative assembly, which would meet the known desire of the people of 
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Transjordan. However, Philby indicated that Abdullah was reluctant to take any steps 
which might lead to the restriction of his own autocratic power. He also presented a 
further reason for halting the establishment of a representative assembly. It was the 
fear of the mostly Palestinian, Syrian and Iraqi ministers and advisers of Abdullah, who 
had great influence on the Amir; they were worried that the establishment of a 
national government would weaken their influence and, more important, jeopardise 
their lucrative posts.183 However logical Philby’s reasons may have been, there was also 
a significant factor that led Abdullah to hesitate. It was his belief that Transjordan was 
part of his father’s kingdom in Hejaz; he was unwilling to risk any trouble with his 
father, preferring not to cut relations with Mecca, the capital of the kingdom of Hejaz. 
This prompts the suspicion that he hoped to succeed his father as ruler of the Hejazi 
kingdom and would have done nothing to endanger this prospect.184 
As a result, the introduction of a representative assembly remained in abeyance. Philby 
was patient with the reluctance of Abdullah and also with his maladministration.  He 
did not lose hope but tried to find another way to make the idea of a representative 
assembly acceptable. He exploited the financial crisis caused by the personal 
extravagance of Abdullah and his biased administration, which favoured some Bedouin 
tribes and their Shaikhs, exempting them from tax, while other poorer tribes were 
taxed more than their due amount. Philby informed Samuel of the chaotic financial 
administration, naming the financial management as the essential factor to improve if 
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the Emirate were to be saved but that improvement would not be successful unless the 
government’s exchequer was subject to or controlled by the representative 
assembly.185 
The other approach that Philby took to gain his purpose was to assure the prime 
minister of the Emirate, Madhar Raslan,186 that the best way to strengthen the Emirate 
was to set up bodies which would represent the inhabitants of Transjordan.187 It seems, 
however, that these initiatives were not sufficient to bring about the implementation 
of constitutional government. Philby’s purpose could not be achieved without 
eliminating the Arab nationalists, who had entered Transjordan from elsewhere and 
now had considerable influence over Abdullah. They had reasons of their own, as 
discussed above, for not wanting to establish a constitutional government. But the 
chance to get rid of them came when the Balqa revolt against Abdullah’s regime broke 
out in the summer of 1923. This is described in more detail below.  
 
 
Philby and the revolt of the Adwan  
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The Adwan were a tribe living in the west of Transjordan.188  Their revolt was a 
significant incident in the early years of the history of Jordan, which had a great deal of 
sympathy from most areas of the new Emirate. According to some historians, several 
factors led to the revolt. First, the Adwan tribes and their leaders were much frustrated 
by the policy of Abdullah, who had his favourites, as noted above, and lavished 
privileges, such as tax exemption, on Bani Shakir, another Bedouin tribe, while tribes 
such as the Adwan were ordered to pay not only the due taxes but also the uncollected 
taxes dating back to 1918, before the Emirate of Transjordan was even created. This 
led, predictably, to increased tribal rivalry and animosity between them. Second, the 
domination of the Arab nationalists, in particular those from Syria, in the governmental 
administration made the original inhabitants of Transjordan highly discontented at 
finding themselves without any participation or political influence in their homeland.189 
For all these vital reasons, the unequal taxation, the tribal competition and the 
marginalization of the original inhabitants in their own country,  the leader of the 
Adwan, Sultan al- Adwan,190 headed a revolt and marched on Amman at the end of 
August 1923 in the hope of driving Abdullah out of the country. It was evident that the 
Sultan was determined in this revolt, as can be observed in his letter to Philby: 
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The Arabs revolted to defend their rights and obtain justice in particular for the 
inhabitants of Balqa. Our aim was to get rid of Abdullah’s oppression. The revolt was 
just an internal affair and would not be considered [a revolt] against the British 
authority. I warn you, if you intervene in favour of Abdullah, I will report you to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies.191 
In response, Philby angrily told the Sultan to “disband or be attacked.”192 The Sultan 
then managed to block the road between Amman and Jerusalem. Philby, whose duty 
required him to protect Abdullah, sent a final letter to the Sultan, informing him that if 
he did not withdraw with his followers they would be attacked within the hour by the 
available forces. On the night of the revolt, Abdullah could not sleep and was on the 
verge of escaping. The Sultan ignored Philby’s warning and advanced with his rebels on 
Amman where they encountered the motor vehicles and armoured cars of the Royal 
Air Force. Within half an hour the revolution was suppressed, with about 70 casualties 
among the rebels.193 
Many historians have suggested that Philby was pleased that a revolt had occurred, in 
particular when it became known that the rebels had, among other things, demanded 
that the Syrians should be ousted and a representative assembly should be set up, an 
idea that had invariably been rejected by Abdullah. Historians have also blamed Philby 
for abandoning the rebels, for which he earned the distrust of the Adwan tribes, his 
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former friends.194 To be sure, Philby’s sympathy for the rebels before the revolt was 
obvious and what he had needed to do was simply to put more pressure on Abdullah to 
satisfy the League of Nations by transferring the country to constitutional government 
in the hope of achieving independence. In addition, Philby did not expect the fateful 
destiny that befell Sultan and his supporters when fighting broke out after a series of 
errors.195 Furthermore, Philby had been obliged to save Abdullah; moreover, even 
given the considerable progress already made by the Emirate, a successful rebellion 
would have been disastrous to the idea of Transjordan’s independence.  Hence Philby 
regretted and was disappointed over what happened to the rebels, accusing Abdullah 
of being the main cause of the revolt.196 
However, it should be noted that the most important result of the suppression of the 
revolt was the departure of the prominent Arab nationalists, which improved the 
position of Transjordan. In addition, Philby seems to have received the credit for this 
change by encouraging the Jordanians to join in ruling the country. However, he failed 
to persuade Abdullah to establish a constitutional regime and the serious tension 
between them increasingly came to a head.197 
Philby and the controversy with Abdullah  
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Combined with Abdullah’s refusal to become a constitutional monarch, there were 
further historical incidents that intensified the tension between him and Philby. For 
instance, the Wahhabis’ occupation of al-Jauf, the south-east frontier region of 
Transjordan, put the Amir Abdullah into a state of severe consternation; he announced 
that he would leave Transjordan if Ibn Sa‘ūd was not driven out of al- Jauf.198 Philby’s 
view of the occupation of al- Jauf was not the same as his and Samuel’s.  He pointed 
out that there was no need for an active attack to drive out the Wahhabis because Ibn 
Sa‘ūd and his people were already occupying the district. Ibn Sa‘ūd, as Philby stated, 
was aware of the British interest in the region and would not advance further to occupy 
Transjordan.199 
Another confrontation occurred between the Amir and Philby when the Amir decided 
to build a mosque for Amman. Philby welcomed the idea and volunteered to identify 
the right direction for the Qibla to face Mecca. However, the next day, Philby 
discovered that the Amir had ordered the construction workers to destroy a sixth-
century Byzantine bell-tower and part of a basilica wall. Philby lost his temper at what 
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he saw as a desecration, while the Amir, enraged at Philby for his outburst, announced 
that he himself was the sole judge of Islamic affairs.200 
It seems that, after these incidents, the parties had no wish to communicate with each 
other. The Amir informed the Palestine authorities that he and Philby could not work 
together and one of them had to leave.201 Instead of reaching reconciliation with the 
Amir, Philby exploited the intemperance of the other and reported to Jerusalem not 
only that he had initiated the demolition of a historic building but also that the Amir 
had not succeeded in setting up a constitutional government, which was a condition of 
Transjordan’s independence.202 
It may be noted that Abdullah’s displeasure with Philby was the initial factor in 
consolidating the relationship between the former and Samuel, the High Commissioner 
in Palestine. In addition, it was perhaps the case that Samuel was happy to hear of this 
conflict, for he could no longer tolerate Philby’s authority and sent his Chief Secretary, 
Clayton, to reduce the tension between the parties. Although the Amir Abdullah agreed 
with Clayton’s opinion that antiquities were a tourist attraction, he never forgave 
Philby for his threats.203 However, on the advice of Clayton, Samuel became satisfied 
that Philby should be got rid of as Chief British Representative. In his telegram to the 
CO, Samuel asserted that a change should be made in the office of the Chief British 
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Representative, suggesting that the main cause of the unsatisfactory conditions in 
Transjordan was allowing Philby “an unduly free hand”.204 It is perhaps pertinent to ask 
why Philby was given much authority and the question cannot in fact be answered 
without some consideration. in the first place, it should be noted that the British 
imperial system seems to have given much power to all British officials, not only Philby 
but also people such as Lawrence or Sykes who were fond of the Middle East and had 
explored its regions even before the outbreak of the Great War.205 Satia suggests that 
Britain, from the beginning of the war onwards, recruited these official agents because 
of their deep knowledge and their preconception of Arabia as a space of romance and 
adventure and gave them much authority to maintain the British policy,206 thereby 
extending its imperial power. Second, it may be true that Britain gave these individuals 
great authority because they had so much charismatic power or because Whitehall was 
too far away, leaving them to take a free hand in making policy.207 Third, it is evident 
that Whitehall deliberately encouraged such licence for its officials in the Middle 
East.208 For instance, Cox, who spent most of his life in the Middle East, was given much 
authority during the war; in August 1917 he became Civil Commissioner and was 
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authorised to report directly to HMG through the Secretary of State for India.209 After 
the Iraqi revolt in 1920, Cox became High Commissioner and held the main 
responsibility for the British mandate in Iraq, acting and ‘’playing with a free hand’’.210  
The above reasons allow one to surmise that Philby was given much authority in his 
post, which left him free to encourage his own ideas of Arab independence. He 
believed that Transjordan’s independence would have not been granted without the 
separation from Palestinian administration. Such authority would explain the 
frustration of Samuel, who was convinced that Philby’s policy was not in line with 
official British policy. 
It was perhaps the outcome of such contentions that forced Samuel to ignore Philby 
and allowed the Amir Abdullah to correspond with him directly.211 Such negligence may 
have left Philby in a state of frustration which in the end forced him to resign not only 
from his position as Chief British Representative but also from Government service.212 
Moreover, in terms of his relations with the CO, Philby may have believed that his 
efforts were not wanted. Without the specific authority of the CO, he visited Al. Jauf 
and Wadi Sirhan in order to extend the political influence of the Transjordan tribes of 
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the region.213 It was obvious that Philby’s behaviour was not satisfactory to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, who wrote to Samuel as follows: 
Both [the Amir] Abdullah and Philby should be informed without delay that this 
agreement was concluded without the authority of His Majesty's Government and His 
Majesty's Government are not bound thereby. Mr. Philby should also be informed that 
he should only proceed with negotiations under instructions.214 
It is possible that Philby wanted to make his name among such British officers as 
Lawrence, who had played a vital role in the war; however, his views and manner were 
not welcomed either by the British authorities in London or Palestine, which made him 
feel unappreciated. 
It may be concluded that the constraints on Philby form a political reason for his 
resignation. Perhaps the financial aspect should be considered a further cause. When 
Philby was in Iraq acting as adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, his salary was £2500 
annually but when he was despatched to Amman his salary was reduced to £2100.215 
Such a steep reduction may have caused difficulties for Philby, not least because he 
would have been earning no more than a District Commissioner in Palestine. As 
Monroe suggested, he was in need of money when he, in  innocence but in a state of 
resentment, allowed himself, without authority, to use some money from the 
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administrative budget.216 Philby explained to Whitehall the financial of his economic 
situation and after long debating, Whitehall came to the decision that Philby owed only 
£567.217 The Palestine authorities discovered the incident and found that Philby “owed 
and was ordered to give the money back”.218 Such difficult economic circumstances 
may have added to the causes of his resignation. There may be a further reason behind 
Philby’s decision. When Philby had previously resigned and no longer desired to work 
with Cox in Iraq, owing to his objection to the appointment of Faiṣal as king of Iraq, he 
wrote a private letter to Cox to explain the following statement: 
A possible alternative would be employment in the Persian Gulf but that involves the 
Gulf …As you know my heart is in Arabia and it’s my only desire to remain connected in 
some way with that country.219 
From the above, it can be extrapolated that, although Philby did not precisely state in 
what way his heart was connected with Arabia, his ambition to explore the unknown 
areas of Arabia seems perhaps to have been one of the main reasons for his 
resignation. Furthermore, the relations between Philby and Ibn Sa‘ūd were 
extraordinary and perhaps Philby felt that he would find every possibility of assistance 
not only for the exploration of Arabia but also to help with his  financial circumstances; 
this coincided with his decision to resign and leave Transjordan for Arabia, as discussed 
in more detail in Chapter Five.  
Before ending this chapter, it seems important to ask how Philby fitted into the gallery 
of kingmakers who played a vital role in the Middle East implementing British policy 
during WWI and in the years that followed. In their book, Karl Meyer and Shareen 
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Brysac suggest that British individuals such as Mark Sykes, T. E. Lawrence, Arnold 
Wilson, Gertrude Bell and John Philby were “instrumental in building nations, defining 
borders and selecting or helping to select local rulers”.220 The authors state that while 
Sykes and Lawrence wielded great influence in increasing the British presence and 
preserving British interests in the region by adopting the policy of indirect control, 
Wilson was the one who may be judged the builder or designer of the present Iraqi 
state, but with the addition of Bell who dedicated her life’s work to establishing the 
Hashemite dynasty in Iraq.221 As regards Philby, the authors claim that, although he 
opposed the policy of his country and then became the prominent champion of Ibn 
Sa‘ūd, when in the service of Britain he “emerged as the Western kingmaker who left 
the deepest strategic imprint on the Middle East”.222 However, Paris is not inclined to 
say that Wilson, Bell and Philby had considerable influence and made decisions with 
heavy impact on the Middle East. He believes rather that they ultimately were not key 
figures or kingmakers, while agreeing that Sykes and Lawrence were central figures 
who shaped British policy in the Middle East.223 He asserts that Wilson adopted a 
reactionary policy, wanting Iraq to be under direct colonial rule but this did not accord 
with the policy of Whitehall, which was content to exert indirect control and adopted 
the Sharifian solution. Wilson’s reactionary outlook ended his political career and he 
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was sent home in the end.224 Paris also argues that few historians would include Bell 
among the policy-makers in the Middle East and the claim that she established modern 
Iraq is not substantiated by evidence. His view is based on the fact that Bell became a 
leading defender of the Sharifian solution in 1920, just after the heroic efforts of 
Churchill and his man Lawrence to set Faiṣal up as King of Iraq which bore fruit in 
1921.225 As for Philby, Paris states that when Cox returned to Iraq as High 
Commissioner in 1921 he chose Philby as his main support, but the latter remained in 
Iraq for only a few months more, due to his objections to seeing Faiṣal as the king of 
Iraq. Thus, Philby did not leave the deepest strategic imprint on British policy. In 
addition, when Philby later became Chief British Representative in Transjordan, he was 
at odds not only with Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner in Palestine, and the 
British officials in the Colonial Office but also with Amir Abdullah, the ruler of 
Transjordan, whose relations with Philby became steadily more complicated. More 
importantly, the fate of Transjordan was in the hands of Lawrence and Winston 
Churchill, who “were primarily responsible for establishing and maintaining Abdullah’s 
rule” there.226 After his resignation from British service in 1924, Philby, according to 
Paris, had no connections with British policy in the Middle East; he even settled in Saudi 
Arabia and became the most important supporter of Ibn Sa‘ūd.227 Indeed, few would 
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argue the claim that Philby was not a typical imperial official. He cannot be compared 
with Sykes or Lawrence who created the nation-states of the modern Middle East. 
However, throughout his service for the British Government, Philby and Bell made 
efforts, which cannot be ignored, to establish self-government in Iraqi and to install the 
country’s first provisional government in modern history, regulating the secretariat and 
establishing a national administrative body before Whitehall decided to appoint Faiṣal 
as sovereign.228 Furthermore, as the following chapters show, Philby, in his mission to 
Arabia, was influential in preventing conflict between its foremost leaders, Ibn Sa‘ūd 
and Hussain, at least during the Great War. In addition, when Philby left the British 
service in 1924 and lived in Saudi Arabia, Ibn Sa‘ūd benefited from Philby’s political 
capacity in a number of different ways, such as securing American recognition for his 
country, the provision of wireless, which was a vital factor in preserving the internal 
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The chapter showed that Philby’s preparation of a permanent system for the Iraqi 
government’s financial accounts was remarkable; it led to Cox’s appreciation and 
Wilson’s resentment. In addition, the value of Philby’s talent for financial 
administration and his proposal for the control of the unsupervised expenditure 
probably led Cox to establish a new financial branch and appoint Philby as Financial 
Assistant. This chapter concluded that it was not only Philby’s manner that made him 
unwelcome among his colleagues but also his efficiency. His close relationship with Cox 
may also be considered a factor. 
 The Indian mission suggests that giving Cox such great authority over Iraq’s financial 
administration was not simply the result of Philby being a competent negotiator in his 
negotiations with the Indian authorities. Fundamentally, it was the controversy 
between the Government of India and Whitehall regarding the future of Iraq that was 
mainly responsible for it. 
As Revenue Commissioner, Philby played a vital role in increasing the budget of the 
occupied territories, which allowed Cox to exploit it during the war in the interests of 
military operations. Philby’s demotion from Revenue Commissioner to Political Agent 
was perhaps due to the political competition between Wilson and himself; Wilson saw 
Philby’s fruitful activities and progress as a threat to his own ambitions. However, it 




for more district officers and this too was behind Cox’s decision to offer such a post to 
Philby. 
By comparing Philby’s autobiography with his private papers at Oxford and also with 
Bell’s accounts, it seems clear that Philby commenced his new post at Amara in 
February 1917. There, Philby’s diplomatic training played a vital role in helping him 
prevent the British army from taking offensive action against the rebellion of the most 
important tribal leader in the south of Iraq. The chapter put forward the view that 
Philby’s isolated state and his personal ambition on the political scene were perhaps 
behind his transfer from Amara to Baghdad.  
The chapter also demonstrated why the allegation that Gertrude Bell created Philby’s 
career in Iraq is not quite true. This is because Philby entered Iraq before the arrival of 
Bell and he had already performed well enough to persuade Cox to promote him to 
Financial Assistant and then to Revenue Commissioner. Therefore, it can be assumed 
that the allegation is not likely to be accurate. As Cox’s personal assistant, Philby, with 
his capacity to organize and put things in order as well as his incredible energy, was 
able to relieve Cox from a huge backlog of papers and files. However, after the 
departure of Cox to Persia, it was obvious that differences of opinion between Philby 
and Wilson would have been enough to propel Philby back to England on leave.   
The chapter concluded that Cox, after his appointment as High Commissioner, chose 




organization. The chapter also showed that Philby had no quarrel with the mandate 
system as long as it was tentatively imposed and aimed at enabling the people of Iraq 
to acquire the principles of sound administration and government so that they could 
eventually rule the country by themselves.  
The chapter illustrated that Philby played an important part in organizing the 
secretariat and setting up the rules that defined the tasks of the Iraqi ministers and 
British advisers. Furthermore, the chapter makes the assumption that if the creation of 
modern Iraq is owed to Cox, still Philby and Bell, in view of their struggle and effort, 
may be seen as providing the main foundation of the first provisional government in 
the modern history of Iraq. In addition, Philby’s incredible industry made Cox decide to 
give him the post of adviser to the Minister of the Interior. 
In this post, the chapter revealed, Philby worked hard to change the personality of 
Sayyid Ṭalib, who tended to lack enthusiasm for ordinary office disciplines. The chapter 
also concluded that Philby, together with some Iraqi helpers, was the first to formulate 
an electoral law in the modern history of Iraq. 
The chapter brought evidence to show that it is not reasonable to accuse Philby of 
being involved in the conspiracy to detain Ṭalib. Private letters from Philby refute this 
accusation and suggest that Philby was disappointed over the arrest of Ṭalib who was 




Bell for the fate that Ṭalib met and asked the British Government to release him and 
restore him to his country. 
The chapter also indicated that Philby left Iraq because of his dispute with Cox. The 
cancellation of elections and the referendum on Faiṣal as the King were the main 
factors in Philby’s departure. Cox’s opinion that Philby was hostile to the Sharifian 
policy of His Majesty’s Government seems not to be logical, since he was appointed to 
a post in Transjordan to work with another Sharifian Amir.  
Concerning Transjordan, it may be observed that the major reason for the failure of 
self-government was not only Abdullah’s arrival in Amman but the lack of knowledge 
and experience among the British officers who administered the country and the 
absence of British financial and military support. The chapter suggested that while 
Samuel showed his partiality toward the Zionist Organization, he was at the same time 
working to stabilise the conditions in Transjordan which might have threatened the 
security of Palestine. 
The chapter indicated that the reasons behind Lawrence’s recommendation that Philby 
should succeed him in Transjordan were perhaps based on two main points. First, 
Lawrence may have been convinced that Philby had a wide first-hand knowledge of 
Arab affairs. Second, given the close relations between Philby and Ibn Sa‘ūd, Lawrence 
may have believed that Philby would do much to clear the atmosphere between the 




The chapter concluded that the dissatisfaction among the British officials over Philby’s 
appointment was not owing to Philby’s personality and opinions, which appeared to be 
eccentric. It was because Philby differed from the British officials who were entirely in 
favour of British policy. They all thought that British officials were not expected to 
object to any aspect of British imperial policy and this rigour presents Philby to his 
fellow-officials in such a bad light, as the first dissenting British official in the Middle 
East, who opposed British imperial policy and supported the nationalist movement. The 
chapter also asserted that Philby’s appointment as Chief British Representative was not 
only because he was a good administrator or a good speaker of Arabic but also perhaps 
because of his attitude in terms of advocating Arab independence, which matched the 
British commitment to rewarding Hussain and his sons for their participation in the 
war. In addition, in his new appointment, Philby was, for the first time, responsible for 
representing British policy in Transjordan without any supervision and this may have 
been another reason for him to have consented to take the post. 
As Chief British Representative, it was obvious that Philby’s visit to Syria was successful 
in reducing the tension between the French authorities and Transjordan and 
reconciling the two. It can also be seen from his visit that he endeavoured to 
strengthen the economy of Transjordan by proposing a system of customs duties 




With regard to the separation of Transjordan from the Palestine administration and its 
search for independence, it is clear that Philby was following Lawrence’s desire to 
provide independence for Transjordan. Clearly, Philby took some serious steps and 
used persuasive arguments which contributed to the recognition of Transjordan by the 
League of Nations. Such evidence supports the view that Philby was the one who made 
the first moves towards Transjordan’s independence, which it gained in the 1940s. 
In terms of the communication between Philby and the Amir Abdullah, it was 
apparently the establishment of a constitutional government with its representative 
assembly that disturbed the relationship between them. This was not only due to the 
Amir’s fear of losing his power but also to the Arab foreigners who at first had 
considerable influence on Abdullah’s regime and wanted to remain on the political 
scene in Transjordan. The chapter also indicates that Philby was in favour of the Adwan 
demand to impose constitutional government with his help and to get rid of the Arab 
foreigners. However, while Philby succeeded in expelling these foreigners and opened 
the door to Jordanian influence on Abdullah’s regime, he was not able to set up a 
constitutional government. 
The chapter concluded that the failure to establish a constitutional government was 
not the only cause of the damaged relations between Philby and Abdullah. The 
Wahhabis’ occupation of al-Jauf and the destruction of the sixth-century Byzantine bell-




substantial controversy between them. At the same time, these incidents probably led 
to improved relations between Abdullah and Samuel, the High Commissioner in 
Palestine, who took the opportunity to communicate with the former directly and thus 
reduced Philby’s role. Moreover, it may have been the case that these political 
incidents were not the only reasons for Philby’s resignation. There were also his 
political views, which were not appreciated either by the British authorities in Palestine 
or the CO; they led him to believe that he could never join the band of celebrated 
British officers and forced him finally to resign. However, it must be admitted that the 
reduction of Philby’s salary may have been a further cause of his resignation. 
Furthermore, Philby’s desire to explore Arabia and the good relations between him and 
Ibn Sa‘ūd may be regarded as further reasons for Philby to believe that Sa‘ūd would 
help him not only in his desire but also in his financial difficulties. 
The next chapter deals with the British contact with Ibn Sa‘ūd and the first part of 





PHILBY AND THE BRITISH CONTACT WITH ARABIA: 





This chapter seeks to shed light on the first contacts between Britain and central 
Arabia. Then it examines critically Philby’s mission to Arabia, studying first the main 
reason that he was so keen to lead it and second the objective that the mission 
undertook. It deals with the clash that occurred between Philby and Robert Hamilton 
regarding the leadership of the mission and asks why Philby was portrayed as initially 
responsible for this clash. It argues that the mission as a whole was not successful but 
seeks to show Philby’s success at least in persuading Ibn Sa‘ūd to play his part in the 
common cause, studying the factors that contributed to this success. It also focuses on 
the main reason for Hussain’s deciding not to send a Cairo mission to join Philby’s 
mission in Riyadh and asks why Philby, together, with Ibn Sa‘ūd, decided that Philby 
should cross the Arabian Desert to meet Hussain with the Cairo mission and what was 
gained from his journey to the Hejaz. It traces the main reasons for the failure of 
negotiations between Cairo and the Najdi mission and asks if Philby was to blame for 
the failure.  
Early British contact with Central Arabia 
Before dealing with Philby’s political role in Arabia, the beginnings of the relationship 
between Britain and central Arabia should first be clarified. From the primary sources, 
it may be noted that the first British Government official to visit the centre of Arabia 
was Colonel Lewis Pelly,1 the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, in 1865. It was clear 
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that the primary objectives of the Pelly mission were to bring to an end the state of 
hostility between Britain and the Wahhabis which marked British policy at the time of 
the slave trade; and to prevent the Wahhabis from interfering in the Persian Gulf. 
Furthermore, it seems obvious that Pelly wanted to prove to other British officers that 
central Arabia was not difficult to penetrate and also to gather some knowledge of the 
history and geography of this part of the Arabian Peninsula.2 
Pelly held three friendly interviews with Imam Faiṣal,3 the ruler of Najd; their 
negotiations concerned a variety of political subjects, such as maintaining peace in the 
Persian Gulf and British assistance, together with the case of the Sultan of Muscat. 
Imam Faiṣal wanted his country to be given British aid to fight the Ottoman forces or 
neighbouring tribes. Pelly made it plain that the British Government had no interests in 
the central region and would not provide any support that might lead to aggression, 
seeing all its neighbours as friends and traders in its territories.4 
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Philby asserted that the visit of Pelly resulted in a signed treaty, although no such text 
has ever been found in the archives of Riyadh.5 In any case, Philby’s assumption seems 
to have been unfounded, for a number of reasons. First, in the report of his visit, Pelly 
did not mention any treaty signed between him and Imam Faiṣal.6 Second, it seems 
that there is no indication either in the India Office Records or the National Archives 
that this treaty had been signed or ever existed. Furthermore, Captain William 
Shakespear, the Political Agent in Kuwait, specifically denied the existence of any such 
signed treaty. He stated: 
It was at about this time that the British Government showed how close were their 
relations with Najd by sending one of their officers (Colonel Lewis Pelly) to Riyadh and 
he renewed old treaties and friendship though not by an actual written document.7 
Therefore, it seems that the treaty was in fact only a spoken understanding. Even so, 
this suggests both the hope of opening a new and friendly relationship between the 
two states and Imam Faiṣal’s desire that the British residency would protect Saudi 
interests in the Persian Gulf, since he had vowed to punish his people for any acts of 
piracy that might be committed on the coasts of Qatif and Uqair.8 But unfortunately 
the visit did not produce any long-term advantage, since Imam Faiṣal died three 
months after Pelly’s departure.9 His son, Imam Abdullah,10 succeeded him, but the 
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country was disrupted during his regime by the civil war between him and Saud,11 his 
younger brother. The ensuing chaos resulted in the loss of Ḥasa province to the 
Ottoman and in the collapse of the Wahhabi state, which was conquered by its local 
enemy, Mohammed Ibn Rashid,12 the ruler of Ḥail. In 1890, Ibn Rashid overcame the 
last Wahhabi ruler, Imam Abdulraḥman,13 the father of Ibn Sa‘ūd, and exiled him with 
his family to Kuwait.14  
The Rise of Ibn Sa‘ūd and his relations with Britain 1902-1915 
The beginning of official British involvement in the Middle East dates back to 1763, 
when the East India Company set up its base in Bushire in order to engage in trade with 
Persia.15 It is equally clear that the British interest increased rapidly after the 
occupation of Aden in 1839, following the signing of some treaties with Arab Shaikhs in 
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the Persian Gulf in the same  century.16 It seems, as Abdol Rauh Yaccob claims, that the 
reason behind British expansion in the region was not only its desire to secure the sea 
route between Britain and India.17 It also had several equally important reasons for 
wanting this: to combat the piracy in the Gulf, to confront the slave trade, suppress the 
arms traffic and, above all, to prevent any advance by a Western power upon India.18 
Apart from the British sphere of influence over the Arab Shaikhdoms on the Gulf coast 
and Aden, the Ottoman Empire controlled the entire Arabia Peninsula. However, in 
view of the difficult geography and the massive desert areas of Central Arabia, the 
Ottomans decided to wield indirect control over the region through such prominent 
Arab leaders as Ibn Rashid.19 
In 1902, after some years in exile, however, Ibn Sa‘ūd, the ruler of Najd and the 
founder of the present kingdom of Saudi Arabia, was able to drive his arch-enemy, Ibn 
Rashid, out of Riyadh.20 In the next two years he defeated Ibn Rashid in several battles 
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and recaptured and extended his territory to the areas of Wadi al-Dawaser, located to 
the south of Riyadh, and of Qasim, to its north.21 
The considerable triumphs of Ibn Sa‘ūd were an obvious provocation to the Ottomans 
to take revenge on him for this defeat of their ally. Fearing this, Ibn Sa‘ūd sought a 
strong country to protect him and could find none better than Britain, the imperial 
power that had enforced its presence in the Gulf since the 19th century. Therefore, he 
opened communications with the British Government in the year 1902. Ibn Sa‘ūd may 
have asked his father, who was in Kuwait at the time, to contact the British Residency 
in the Gulf, suggesting himself as one of the men who might form a relationship with 
Britain, but the Residency and the Government of India suspected that Ibn Sa‘ūd might 
triumphantly set himself up in Najd and therefore they chose  not to respond.22 In his 
second attempt in November 1903, Ibn Sa‘ūd sent a Wahhabi envoy to meet the 
Political Agent in Bahrain, seeking British aid specifically to expel the Ottomans from 
Ḥasa and although the Government of India decided not to adopt any hostile stance 
towards the Ottomans, it recommended that Ibn Sa‘ūd should not be ignored  since he 
had now consolidated his position in Central Arabia and keeping contact with him 
would benefit the British interest in the Gulf coast.23 At the beginning of 1904, the 
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Indian Government suggested sending a British officer to study the political situation in 
central Arabia and to enter into direct dialogue with Ibn Sa‘ūd.24 At this period, the 
British Government was clearly consistent in its constructive policy toward Central 
Arabia while maintaining good relations with the Ottomans. Therefore, the FO, in 
February 1904, rejected the Government of India’s proposal and stated that “no steps 
should be taken to enter closer relations with Najd, or send Agents there, without the 
previous sanction of His Majesty’s Government”.25 Although the Government of India 
agreed with this British decision, in the following month it assented to the recent 
developments in Central Arabia, notwithstanding Ibn Sa‘ūd’s victories over Ibn Rashid, 
and over the Ottoman garrison, together with the capture of Qasim province in 1904. 
Therefore, when these developments occurred, the Government of India thought that 
Britain would soon be forced to take more interest in Central Arabian affairs. 
Furthermore, the Government of India also suggested that if Ibn Sa‘ūd extended his 
regime, which seemed likely, the British Government should again reconsider its 
decision not to contact Ibn Sa‘ūd and might then enter into relations with him.26 
This led Abdulraḥman, the father of Ibn Sa‘ūd, to reveal to Britain, via Shaik Mūbark,27 
the ruler of Kuwait, that negotiations had been held between the Russian Consul and 
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his son, Ibn Sa‘ūd, in which the latter rejected the Russia offer of aid.28 It could be 
inferred from Ibn Sa‘ūd’s continued and persistent pleas for British support that he had 
realised since his exile that the British Government was a trustworthy power which 
could be depended on against the Ottoman, not least when he saw that Mūbark had 
signed a treaty of protection with Britain in 1899.29 However, with the British refusal to 
enter into relations with Ibn Sa‘ūd, the latter found himself in a position to negotiate 
with the Ottomans and signed a treaty with them in February 1905. The main articles 
of the agreement were that the Ottomans recognised Ibn Sa‘ūd’s authority and 
committed themselves to forcing their ally, Ibn Rashid, to stop his intervention in Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s affairs. In return, Ibn Sa‘ūd consented to be a local governor of the Ottoman 
lands in Central Arabia.30 It is clear that after the peace settlement with the Ottomans 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s turned his attention to the Trucial Shaikhs, travelling in the summer of 1905 
until he reached the border of Qatar. There, he was warned that if he continued his 
advance he would be confronted by the forces of Qatar and Abu Dhabi. In response Ibn 
Sa‘ūd decided to send letters to the Trucial Shaikhs, informing them of his intention to 
visit them in the next few years.31 Daniel Silverfarb claims that the reason behind Ibn 
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 Letter from Ibn Sa‘ūd’s father to Mūbark, 1 May 1904. It is preserved in its Arabic text in IOR, 
R/15/1/476.  
29
 Regarding the treaty between Kuwait and Britain see Dickson, Kuwait and her neighbours, p.137; 
Busch, Britain and the Persian Gulf, pp.108-109. 
30
 Regarding the Saudi-Ottomans treaty, see al- Rihani, Tārīkh Najd al-ḥadīth wa-mulḥaqātih [The History 
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Sa‘ūd’s visit was that he may have wanted to levy taxes on the Shaikhs ,32 which meant 
that Ibn Sa‘ūd was seeking to increase his suzerainty. However, the Saudi primary 
sources, al-Rihani for instance, suggested that there was a civil war in Qatar and  Shaikh 
Qasim Ibn Thani33 recalled his friend Ibn Sa‘ūd to help him to supress the revolt against 
him.34 Whatever the cause, Ibn Sa‘ūd’s visit resulted in serious attention from the 
British authorities in the Gulf who wrote to Ibn Sa‘ūd warning him that any further 
intervention in the affairs of the Trucial Coast would be regarded as an unfriendly act.35 
In February 1906, Ibn Sa‘ūd replied that he did not mean any harm by his visit and had 
no intention of extending his suzerainty over the Trucial Shaikhs.36 
The agreement between Ibn Sa‘ūd and the Ottomans did not last long and the war 
between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Ibn Rashid started again; Ibn Sa‘ūd not only defeated Ibn Rashid 
this time but managed to drive the Ottoman garrisons from the northern part of 
Central Arabia.37 Therefore, in order to secure his regime against the Ottomans, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd, in late 1906, informed the British authorities that his intention was to occupy 
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Ḥasa,38 which was under Ottoman domination; he demanded British protection from 
any Ottoman naval assault if he could manage to seize the province. He also asked for a 
signed treaty and the appointment of a British Agent in Ḥasa.39 Cox now realized how 
strong a position Ibn Sa‘ūd was in and asked Britain to reconsider relations with him, 
suggesting the following points: 
- If Britain refused to enter into a relationship with Ibn Sa‘ūd, it would turn him 
into an enemy. 
- A friendly treaty between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Britain would clear the atmosphere and 
relieve the fear of the Trucial Shaikhs as well as the Sultan of Muscat regarding             
Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
- Such friendly relations with Ibn Sa‘ūd would help suppress piracy in the Gulf.40 
However, the response of the British Government, however, was on the same lines as 
usual; the traditional concern “of preserving the maritime peace of the Gulf”41 and an 
unbroken general policy of non-intervention in the affairs of central Arabia. 
Nevertheless, Cox, who had seen Ibn Sa‘ūd’s outstanding capacity to rule his 
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Shaikhdoms and his continuing desire to be one of Britain’s allies, had been brought to 
believe that Ibn Sa‘ūd could play a vital role in serving British interests in the Gulf.42 
When Captain Shakespear made his exploratory journey into the Arabian Desert, he 
had met Ibn Sa‘ūd in 1911 in his camp.43 Shakespear was impressed by his host’s 
generous hospitality and friendly manner. Ibn Sa‘ūd expressed his detestation of the 
Ottoman and repeated his previous demands for British protection if he could drive 
them out of Ḥasa; but in reply, Shakespear could explain only that he had no official 
authority to discuss such matters. At Ibn Sa‘ūd’s insistence on negotiations over 
political affairs, Shakespear had to inform him that Britain’s interests were limited to 
the Gulf coast and, besides, it was on friendly terms with the Ottoman Empire. 
However, Shakespear, in his report on this interview, proposed that the occupation of 
Ḥasa would reinforce the British position in the region.44 Nevertheless, the Foreign 
Office rejected such overtures and confirmed that the policy, as before, remained 
“strict non-intervention in the affairs of the desert”.45 
In the spring of 1913, after meeting Ibn Sa‘ūd, Shakespear informed Cox that the 
invasion of Ḥasa was only a matter of time and that Ibn Sa‘ūd was ready to attack it, 
wishing that the British Government would feel concerned over his interests and affairs 
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in this part of the world.46 Jacob Goldberg assumes that Ibn Sa‘ūd realized that he could 
not improve his relations with the British Government unless he could include part of 
the coast under his dominion and that the capture of Ḥasa would place Britain in a 
state of de facto recognition and cause it to revise its policy toward him.47 Goldberg’s 
assumption seems to be reasonable; in addition, Shakespear may have strengthened 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s action over Ḥasa by providing him with substantial information about the 
weakness of the Ottoman Empire, which for much of 1912 was engaged in a war 
against Italy (until October) as well as the first Balkan war.48 Consequently, Ibn Sa‘ūd 
captured Ḥasa without British help in May 1913, provoking no serious reaction from 
Constantinople. He ousted the Ottoman garrison from Ḥasa and thereby extended his 
territory as far as the Gulf Coast. This finally forced Britain to take notice of him, 
especially when he consolidated his suzerainty in Central Arabia, the eastern coastal 
region and the land to the north and south of Najd; he thus became one of the most 
powerful leaders in Arabia.49 
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The turning point of British-Saudi relations was on the eve of WWI, when Britain felt 
that the Ottoman Empire would enter the war on the side of Germany. Such a change 
in its policy was a response to the prospect of changes that would affect its interests in 
the Middle East, in particular regarding the oil in Persia and the naval routes from the 
Gulf to India.50 Consequently, it may be inferred that Britain found itself in the position 
of soliciting Ibn Sa‘ūd’s support, after more than a decade of neglecting him under the 
traditional policy of non-intervention. 
After the outbreak of hostilities between Britain and the Ottomans, the Government of 
India authorized the current Political Resident in the Persian Gulf to send a letter to Ibn 
Sa‘ūd saying that Britain wished the ruler to join the Shaikhs of Kuwait and 
Mohammarah for the purpose of capturing Basra from the Ottoman forces. In return, 
Britain promised to recognize Ibn Sa‘ūd as the independent ruler of Najd and Ḥasa, to 
guarantee him against attack by sea, to secure him against Ottoman revenge and also 
to negotiate a treaty with him.51 In answer, Ibn Sa‘ūd, on 28 November 1914, wrote to 
Cox, asserting that coordination and co-operation with the Shaikhs of Kuwait and 
Mohammarah were essential factors to enhancing the common interests of Britain and 
its cordial friends in the region. He also suggested that he should personally discuss 
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with Britain the general framework of a treaty based on the British guarantees 
mentioned in the letter from the Political Resident mentioned above.52 
Shakespear, who was always an ally of Ibn Sa‘ūd, was on leave in London and was 
ordered to return promptly to the Middle East in order to meet Ibn Sa‘ūd and dissuade 
him from helping the Ottomans.53 On 31 December 1914 Shakespear met Ibn Sa‘ūd 
when he was encamped to the north of Riyadh. According to Shakespear’s report, war 
would not change Ibn Sa‘ūd’s attitude toward Britain. He explained that he would not 
ally himself with Britain unless he could have a definite treaty of alliance which would 
safeguard him from Ottoman revenge and full British recognition of his position in Najd 
and Ḥasa.54 Shakespear sent a draft of the treaty to Cox which resulted in the Anglo-
Saudi Treaty concluded on 26 December 1915. The main terms of this treaty were: 
1- Britain would agree to recognise and guarantee Ibn Sa‘ūd and his dynasty as 
the independent rulers of Najd and Ḥasa. 
2- In the case of unprovoked aggression by any foreign powers, Britain would 
be prepared to defend and protect him to the extent and in the way 
required by the conditions. 
3- In return, Ibn Sa‘ūd would not be allowed to deal with any foreign powers 
without informing Britain. 
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4- Ibn Sa‘ūd would not be able to concede or confer any part of his territories 
to any foreign power without the approval of the British Government.55 
It is plain that the most substantial outcome of the treaty, as Troeller suggests, was the 
flagrant departure from the conventional British policy of steering clear of 
entanglement in the affairs of central Arabia.56 Furthermore, the treaty provided 
Britain with full control over Ibn Sa‘ūd’s land; it was not until 1927, when Ibn Sa‘ūd 
signed the Jeddah treaty, that he was released from British protection and his country 
given absolute independence.57 
As Cox was concluding this treaty with Ibn Sa‘ūd, Shakespear, despite several attempts 
by Ibn Sa‘ūd to restrain him from taking part in the fighting, was killed on 24 January 
1915. He was giving instructions for the firing of one of Ibn Sa‘ūd's guns in the battle of 
Jarrab against the forces of Ibn Rashid, the ruler of Ḥail and a Turkish ally.58 Some 
historians suggest that Ibn Sa‘ūd wrote to Cox, asking for another British official to 
replace Shakespear but no one was sent to Arabia for the next two years, due to the 
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lack of a suitable British officer in Iraq.59 However, it must first be said that the 
shortage of qualified British officers in Iraq seems not to be wholly accurate. Iraq did 
have suitable officers, such as Captain G. Leachman whose Arabic was perfect and 
knowledge of Arab affairs valuable. More important, he had visited Ibn Sa‘ūd in 1912 in 
his capital, Riyadh.60 As a result, it may be inferred that the main reason for the delay in 
despatching another officer to Ibn Sa‘ūd was perhaps that Shakespear’s death caused a 
severe shock and had considerable impact on the course of the war in Arabia, which 
made Cox afraid to send anyone else, lest he  met the same fate as Shakespear.  
In the event, due to the new development of the war and in the hope of organizing and 
unifying all the efforts against the Ottoman forces in Arabia, it was decided to despatch 
another officer to meet Ibn Sa‘ūd. Philby was assigned to head the mission to meet him 
in central Arabia, a mission that will be discussed in more detail below. 
Philby’s mission 
It may be useful, before resuming the account of Philby’s mission, to look at the early 
stages of divergence in the policies of Cairo and Baghdad and of the FO and the 
Government of India and ask why it was that some officials supported Ibn Sa‘ūd and 
others supported Hussain. In the first two years of the war, Britain sought cooperative 
allies in its war against the Ottomans in the Middle East. In the west of Arabia, where 
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Hejaz is located, was Hussain Ibn Ali, the ruler of Mecca. In the view of the Cairo 
authorities, Hussain was the logical choice of ally. From the religious standpoint, 
Hussain was the custodian of the Holy Places. As a member of the Hashemite family, 
that had descended from the Prophet Mohammed, he would be considered by all 
Muslims one of the most important figures in Islam.61 In addition, having Hussain on 
the side of Britain would be advantageous and would halt any decision by the Sultan of 
the Ottomans to declare al- Jihad (Holy War) against Britain. The latter naturally feared 
that such a declaration would have a negative impact on the Muslims who were under 
British authority in India and Egypt.62 A further reason might be considered as a 
strategic one. As the Hejaz railway crossed Hussain’s territories, a revolt by Hussain 
would deprive the Ottomans of any benefit from the railway, which it would be unable 
to use for military purposes.63 As a result, Britain entered into long negotiations with 
Hussain, known as the Hussain-McMahon correspondence. In the end, McMahon was 
instructed by the FO to inform Hussain that Britain would recognise and support the 
cause of Arab independence after the elimination of the Ottoman Empire. However, 
because Hussain desired to be Caliph or the pre-eminent ruler over all the Arab 
peoples, McMahon clearly indicated that districts such as Mersina, Alexandretta and 
the regions in Syria lying to the west of the cities of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo 
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were not purely Arab and the vilayet of Baghdad and Basra should benefit from special 
administrative arrangements from the British Government.64 
Reginald Wingate,65 who succeeded McMahon as High Commissioner in Egypt, strongly 
advocated the Arab Revolt under the authority of Hussain. His plan was to wean the 
Arabs away from the Ottoman Empire and thus prevent it from using Pan-Islamic 
propaganda, as described above. Furthermore, Wingate did not see the Arab Revolt as 
a temporary wartime solution to the problem of the Ottoman Empire. Rather, he 
“sought to utilise the Arabs to create a favourable post-war balance of power in the 
Middle East” because the Turks would remain anti-British after the war and would 
threaten British interests not only in the Middle East but also in India. Therefore, 
supporting Arab independence would reduce the Turkish influence and allow Britain 
some indirect control over all the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire.66 It is evident 
that most of the British officials in Cairo supported Wingate’s policy in the Middle East. 
For instance, Hogarth, the Director of the Arab Bureau, outlined the reasons behind 
British support for Hussain, saying that he  
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 … could exert throughout the Moslem world a moral influence which would, and did, 
make a very great difference indeed. His action, involving the secession of Holy Land 
from the Caliph’s War would, we know, be received variously – with at least as much 
reprobation as approbation; but everywhere it would create division and prompt 
action. In adopting this policy we were not looking beyond the War.67  
In contrast, Government of India officials were not inclined to support the Arab Revolt 
under Hussain’s leadership. They preferred to support the local leaders directly by 
means of subsidies,68 especially when most of the Arab Shaikhs in the Gulf had 
concluded treaties with Britain. In addition, they also saw little reason to support 
Cairo’s policy of establishing an independent state in the Middle East. Lord Hardinge,69 
the Viceroy, for example, in November 1915, strongly rejected the idea of creating a 
strong Arab State, which would have a negative impact on British interests in the Gulf 
and Iraq.70 After the treaty was signed between Britain and Ibn Sa‘ūd in December 
1915, Hardinge informed Wingate that he had little faith in Hussain’s potential to lead 
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the Arab Revolt, arguing that the Arab leaders would not recognise his suzerainty.71 
Furthermore, the officials of the Government of India had a further reason for not 
supporting the Arab Revolt under Hussain: it would create political difficulties with 
Indian Muslims who would believe that Britain had intervened in the Hejaz, where the 
Holy Places of Islam were located.72 Like Hardinge, Sir Hamilton Grant,73 the Foreign 
Secretary to the Government of India, disliked Cairo’s activities. He suggested that 
“What we want is not a United Arabia: but a weak and disunited Arabia, split up into 
little principalities so far as possible under our suzerainty-but incapable of co-ordinated 
action against us, forming a buffer against the Powers in the West”.74 It seems that 
with this policy from the Government of India, Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position strengthened 
rapidly in Central Arabia, especially after the signing of the Anglo-Najdi treaty in 
December 1915. In the opinion of the Government of India, the treaty not only 
precluded Ibn Sa‘ūd from siding with the Ottomans but also provided Britain with a 
long run of considerable benefits. For instance, the treaty gave Britain complete control 
of the eastern coastal strip of Arabia and control of the arms traffic in Central Arabia. In 
addition, the treaty provided for increased trade throughout the ports of the Persian 
Gulf due to Ibn Sa‘ūd’s control of his tribes and the strong security that British 
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domination brought. Furthermore, the power that Ibn Sa‘ūd had over the Arabian 
Bedouin tribes would increase as the Ottoman Empire collapsed, which would help 
Britain.75 Hence, beside these advantages and the choice of Ibn Sa‘ūd in defiance of the 
British officials in Cairo and London, the British officials in Iraq and India also wanted 
Ibn Sa‘ūd to play a significant role in the war by sending forces against Ibn Rashid, the 
Ottomans’ ally. In addition, they wanted Ibn Sa‘ūd to assist Britain to impose the 
blockade in order to prevent the caravans of smugglers in Arabia from falling into 
enemy hands.76  
Between the declaration of Hussain as king of all the Arab territories and the arrival of 
Philby in November 1917, tension grew between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain and it became 
time to send a mission to Arabia to clear the atmosphere between the two leaders and 
encourage them to cooperate in the war against the Ottomans in Arabia. This was the 
mission led by Philby as shown below. 
In mid-1917, Philby’s position as Cox’s assistant allowed him to be fully aware of Cox’s 
political papers regarding the disputes between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain and the 
disagreements between the British authorities in Cairo and in Baghdad in dealing with 
the two rival leaders. He was also charged with reporting to Cox about the developing 
events in Arabia and realized that a British mission had to be sent there.77 This mission 
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was under the supervision of Ronald Storrs,78 who had been selected to replace 
Shakespear. He arrived in Baghdad on 8 May 1917, on behalf of the Arab Bureau, to 
negotiate with Cox in order to see what Ibn Sa‘ūd could contribute to the common 
cause.79 
However, within two days of his departure for Arabia, Storrs went down with 
sunstroke, obliging him to return to Kuwait.80 Despite the failure of the mission, Cox 
was fully determined to proceed with his plan to send an envoy to Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
sympathising with his aversion to Hussain’s pretensions, which culminated in early 
November 1916, when he declared himself king of the Arabian nation.81 
Philby was not among Cox’s options for the leadership of a new mission. Thus, it is 
necessary to identify why Philby was appointed to lead it, although some personnel 
were more qualified and expert in Arab affairs than he was, for example, Leachman, the 
Political Agent of the Desert in Iraq, and Hamilton, the Political Agent in Kuwait, who 
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had previously been appointed to head the mission.82 It is also fundamental to ask why 
Philby was so enthusiastic to join the mission and why Cox consented to his 
appointment and in the end abandoned his previous decision that Hamilton was to lead 
it.83 
It seems that there were two main reasons behind Philby’s leadership. The political 
quarrels and differences of opinion between Cox’s staff regarding British policy with 
regard to Iraq may be regarded as the first reason. Philby – and others, such as 
Gertrude Bell, who worked at Cox’s Political Office in Baghdad – advocated the rights of 
the Arabs and were convinced that Iraq had to be self-governing, whereas Wilson 
insisted, on the lines of Britain’s policy in India, that Iraq would never become suited to 
self-government and that its future should be that of a British colony.84 The second 
reason may be seen in Wilson’s ambition; he was now far away from the Political 
Department of Baghdad and may have wanted to take over Philby's position as Cox's 
assistant.85 Consequently, being isolated in Basra, Wilson seemed not to tolerate these 
interventions by the political officials, Philby and Bell, and therefore decided to go to 
Baghdad. Together with Cox and Philby, he was able to reach a solution and to take 
over Philby’s position. Philby reported the following conversation: 
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Wilson: I don’t like the ways things are being done up here, and I have been talking 
things over with Cox. He suggested that I should discuss arrangements with you. Philby: 
Why, what is it really you want? Let us be perfectly frank. Do you want to take over this 
work that I have been doing? Wilson:  Yes, it amounts to that, I suppose. I can’t go on 
working at Basra if my proposals are criticized from here and turned down. Philby: 
Then I don’t think there is any need to quarrel about it. You know we have been 
making arrangements for this mission to Arabia. If I could be sent on that it would leave 
the field clear for you. If you can fix it up with Cox, I am prepared to hand over to you 
straight away. Wilson: Alright. I will go and see Cox at once. Philby: In five minutes he 
was back, saying: “Cox agrees”.86 
To compare the above quotation from Philby’s writings with Wilson’s historical 
account, it seems somewhat strange that Wilson did not provide any indication of the 
political deal that had been arranged with Philby. The only allusion to it that can be 
found is his criticism of Philby. In Wilson’s view, while Philby was on the one hand a 
distinguished traveller, an expert in Arab affairs, extraordinarily well qualified for the 
work, diligent and methodical in analysing the various issues that he had to cope with, 
on the other hand he was “one of those men who are apt to assume that everything 
they come across, from a government to a fountain- pen, is constructed on wrong 
principles and capable of amendment … and we did not always agree.”87 Hence, with 
Wilson’s negative opinion of Philby, it can be surmised that what deterred Wilson from 
revealing the actual terms of the deal between him, Cox and Philby was that he may 
not have wanted his book to uncover his political ambition to take over Philby’s post. 
However, John Marlowe, Wilson’s biographer, asserts that Philby and Wilson came to 
                                                          
86
 Philby, Arabian Days, pp. 142-143; Monroe, Philby of Arabia, pp.50-51; Meyer and Shareen, 
Kingmakers: The invention of the Modern Middle East, pp.236-237. 
87
 Wilson, Loyalties, vol.1, pp.281-282; Busch, Britain, India, and the Arabs p, 249; Troeller, The Birth of 




an agreement over the Najdi mission and, more important, he includes in his account 
the above quotation from Arabian Days. Nevertheless, Marlowe claims that Philby’s 
account of this historical incident is not entirely truthful. His argument relies on one 
main factor. He mentions that an official telegram conveyed Cox’s approval for 
Wilson’s move from Basra to Baghdad on 31 August 1917, while Philby’s account states 
that Wilson’s move to Baghdad was in September.88 However, it is clear that there is no 
contradiction between Philby’s account and Marlowe’s evidence in many essential 
respects. First, the documentary evidence (the official telegram) did not mean that Cox 
approved the substitution of Wilson for Philby as his assistant; all it indicates is Cox’s 
permission for Wilson to join the Political Department in Baghdad. Second, in his 
autobiography, Philby was merely writing about the political agreement between him 
and Wilson which came about in early September; he was talking not about the 
appointment of Wilson in Baghdad but about a telegram that came from Wilson, asking 
for ten days’ leave. Philby stated: 
Then in September came a telegram from Wilson to Cox, asking if he might come up to 
Baghdad for ten days, as he felt in need of a short respite from work and would be glad 
of a charge of air and scene.89 
Therefore, it would not have been acceptable for this agreement to have been reached 
in August, since the official resolution that Wilson should leave Basra was ratified only 
on the last day of August, as Marlowe himself suggests.90 
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To answer the question why Philby was so enthusiastic to head the mission, he may 
have been influenced by some of the Western explorers and travellers in Arabia, such 
as Bell and Leachman.91 In addition, it may have been true that Hamilton had a great 
influence on Philby and had awakened his enthusiasm for adventures of exploration in 
Arabia by telling him of Shakespear’s explorations.92 The evidence that supports this 
assumption can be seen in Hamilton’s visit to Cox’s Office at Baghdad in 1917 in order 
to discuss the mission to Najd that he had been put in charge of. Philby had a 
conversation with him which left him impressed by the extent of Hamilton’s 
knowledge. In his autobiography, Philby presents the following conversation between 
himself and Hamilton, which expresses how deeply Philby was influenced and how 
much he longed to take part himself in an Arabian adventure:  
In conversation I learned much from him [Hamilton] that I did not know, and I 
remember envying him his luck in going off on such a grand adventure.93 
Consequently, it can be said that Philby, at this stage, was probably eager to add his 
name to the list of these travellers and that a thirst for fame, ambition and a love of 
adventure seem to have been the main reasons behind his desire to travel in Arabia. 
This opened the door to his becoming one of the greatest explorers of the Arabian 
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Peninsula. However, Philby’s thirst for fame, ambition and love of adventure may not have 
outweighed his concern for the Arabs. Believing that the Arabs could run their affairs by 
themselves, his sympathy towards the Arabs increased after meeting some Arab 
leaders in Iraq.94 Furthermore, his compassion for the Arabs had grown rapidly after he 
visited their lands for the first time in 1917. There, his personality was captivated by Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s charisma and his prudent policies. Throughout his life in Arabia and his lengthy 
explorations, he loved the Arabs and the simplicity of their way of life, which not only 
helped to integrate him into their society but also to embrace their religion in 1930. 
The departure to Najd 
The mission consisted of Philby as head, in political charge of the mission, and 
Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe Owen95 as its military advisor. Before leaving Baghdad, Cox, 
who was very anxious about the safety of the mission’s members, gave instructions to 
the Political Agent in Bahrain to inform Ibn Sa‘ūd that the mission would leave Baghdad 
in four days and to ask him to lend it his help, not only at the Najdi ports but in every 
way.96 In addition, the Political Agent at Bahrain sent letters to Ibn Sa‘ūd as well as to 
his local governors at Uqair and Ḥasa to take the important steps needed to secure the 
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mission, which would not only guarantee its safety but would also help it to reach 
Riyadh very quickly.97 
Philby left Baghdad in late October 1917, having been, with Owen, instructed by Cox on 
the various objectives for the mission. Philby was to discuss with Ibn Sa‘ūd the 
Ottoman dominion in Arabia and form an opinion on the question of whether Ibn Sa‘ūd 
could uphold the common cause against the Ottoman. Second, the mission must try to 
relax the state of tension in Ibn Sa‘ūd’s relations with both Hussain, the ruler of Hejaz, 
and the leader of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, and Salim,98 the ruler of 
Kuwait. Furthermore, the mission was to manage a permanent or at least temporary 
solution to the question of the Ajman tribe, who had beaten the forces of Ibn Sa‘ūd and 
escaped to Kuwait, and also to unify the efforts to impose an economic blockade 
against the enemy inside Arabia.99 Finally, combined with Ibn Sa‘ūd’s request for the 
appointment of a permanent British Political Agent in Najd, the mission had to discuss 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s demand for the minting of a copper coinage.100 For his part, Owen was also 
ordered to supply a written report that illustrated the movement of the artillery which 
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would be used against Ibn Rashid, an Ottoman ally, and to describe the condition of Ibn 
Sa‘ūd's guns and ammunition, with the capacity of his gun detachments.101 
With his companions, Philby left Baghdad on 29 October, taking a launch to Basra 
where they arrived on 2 November. There, two vital tasks that had to be delayed for 
eight days were waiting for the mission. The first was that Philby had to gather the 
supplies, stores and equipment that the mission required. The second was that Philby 
had to hold discussions with some Arab chiefs who took the British side in the war 
against the Ottoman Empire.102 The most important of these chiefs was Sa‘ūd Ibn al-
Sabhān,103 the brother-in-law of the Ottomans’ ally, Ibn Rashid, and his personal 
adviser, who announced his opposition to the Rashidi Emirate. al-Sabhān had escaped 
with his followers to Basra and was asking for British support in order to succeed to the 
throne of this Emirate.104 Philby claimed that Ibn Sabhān was furnished with a monthly 
subsidy of Rs 6,000, together with ammunition, arms and supplies in the hope that the 
latter would actively operate to halt any caravans that might fall into enemy hands in 
Arabia. Philby also stated that Ibn Sabhān had not shown any positive action to join the 
common cause and for this reason his substantial subsidy was reduced to Rs 3,000 per 
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month.105 It is quite evident that Britain recognized Ibn Sabhān’s political project to rule 
Ḥail, a project which turned out fruitless, for two main reasons. First, such an ambition 
would conflict with one of the mission’s objectives, which was that Ḥail should be 
invaded by Ibn Sa‘ūd, the ruler of Najd, who was working to include Ḥail under his 
sovereignty and would not allow any competitors, including Ibn Sabhān, to snatch it 
away from him. Second, Ibn Sabhān was involved in the treacherous murder of his 
predecessor, his cousin, and his action had resulted in a state of discontent among the 
Shammar tribe who may not have accepted his authority.106 If, as can be said, Britain 
endeavoured to exploit every opportunity that would serve its interests throughout the 
war, then Philby’s visit to Ibn Sabhān would signify that the latter could rest assured in 
every way of British support, at least during the war. Most important, this reassurance 
would keep Ibn Sabhān away from any approach to a member of his close family, Ibn 
Rashid, the enemy of the Allies.  Thus Philby’s contact with Ibn Sabhān may be 
regarded as the first political activity of his mission that apparently met with good 
luck.107 
On 11 November the mission embarked on H.M.S. Lawrence and sailed to Bahrain, 
arriving on 13 November, where the Political Agent of Bahrain had prepared a dhow for 
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the mission to continue to Uqair. On 15 November, they were received at Uqair by the 
local governor of Ibn Sa‘ūd and proceeded to Ḥasa, reaching there on 19 November. 
They stayed with the Amir Abdullah Ibn Jiluwi,108 the Governor of Ḥasa.109  Monroe 
stated that Ibn Jiluwi equipped the mission with better camels and he ordered that the 
members of the mission should change their British uniform to local dress to keep 
them safe while they were crossing the fanatical territories of Najd.110  Indeed, the 
safety of the mission’s members was a crucial issue and it is relevant here to note that 
if the mission had been exposed to any attacks by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s tribesmen, it would have 
affected on his status and, worse, he might have lost the support of the British, in 
particular when it was well known that his relations with Britain had declined after the 
death of Shakespear, as noted above. 
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Philby after opting for Arab dress 
Source: Philby, The Heart of Arabia 
The journey on camel-back took eight days, until 30 November 1917, to reach Riyadh. 
Hamilton, who had previously launched out into the Arabian Desert, was chasing a 
smuggler who was travelling with Shammar's caravan and who had to be handed over 
to Ibn Rashid. Hamilton was now in Riyadh, awaiting the arrival of the mission 
according to Cox’s instructions111 and had no idea when he went to greet the mission 
                                                          
111




that the arrangements regarding its leadership had changed.112 Some historians 
suggest that Philby fell out with Hamilton on this matter and was responsible for the 
clash that made Hamilton return to Kuwait, a battle which Philby won.113 However, 
although Philby’s personality tended to be intransigent, it is not logical to believe that 
he was always wrong or was someone who creates problems. It seems that the reason 
why some historians seek to criticise Philby at every opportunity and present a black 
image of him was Philby’s continual criticism of his own country. To respond to the 
clash between Hamilton and Philby and explain why it took place, it should not be 
forgotten that the former was in a state of vexation at the change of the mission’s 
leadership. As Monroe stated, he had expected to head the mission, in particular 
because he was 14 years older than Philby and better acquainted with Arabian 
affairs.114 Hence it is difficult to accuse Philby of being the one who provoked the clash, 
for three considerations clearly exonerate him. The first one is the documentary 
evidence which suggests that the official decision to change the mission’s leader to 
Philby had been made by Cox, who sent a telegram to the Political Agent in Bahrain, 
asking for Hamilton to be informed.115 Second, further documentary evidence 
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exculpates Philby, in the form of a letter of explanation written by Cox who had given it 
to Philby to hand to Hamilton in Riyadh: 
 … I have been obliged to depute another officer whom after receipt of the views of 
H.M. Government I could equip with information and instruction up to date. The officer 
I have deputed is Mr. Philby, whom you know well. He will consult you fully and bring 
you all deliberations but you will I am sure realise that it is essential that the officer 
who is instructed by me from here must be himself responsible to me and I must 
therefore leave the management of the mission in his hands. I am sure I can depend on 
your loyal acceptance of this position in the event of your meeting, as I hope you 
will.116 
From the above, it can be said that while Hamilton, with his experience and knowledge 
of Arabia affairs, deserved to head the mission, he was responsible for the collision 
with Philby and if these historians need to blame anyone, it should not be Philby, of 
course, but Cox, the extraordinary and inimitable British officer who had made the 
decision.117 
Meeting with Ibn Sa‘ūd 
Philby arrived at Riyadh on 30 November 1917 and spent nine days conferring with Ibn 
Sa‘ūd on all the mission’s objectives.118 Daniel Silverfarb suggests that the first 
objective of the mission was to define the amount of military and monetary assistance 
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that Ibn Sa‘ūd would need before he could begin an active offensive against Ḥail.119 
However, when Hamilton no longer wanted to be a member of the mission, as stated 
above, he agreed with Philby that the first debate must be the question of the disputes 
between Ibn Sa‘ūd and the ruler of Kuwait.120 Therefore, the first objective was not 
British assistance to Ibn Sa‘ūd, as Silverfarb suggests, but the Kuwait question. 
Philby had more than 12 interviews with Ibn Sa‘ūd and it seems beyond doubt that 
they understood each other and their relations became increasingly harmonious until 
the death of Ibn Sa‘ūd.121  In his first book, which describes his mission and his first 
adventure of crossing the Persian Gulf eastwards to the Red Sea west of Arabia, Philby 
stated that it did not take him long to discover that Ibn Sa‘ūd was a figure of 
inexhaustible energy, who considered his own affairs the most important in the world. 
Philby also discovered some of the private aspects of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s life, such as the 
restriction of his sleeping hours to no more than four per night.122 In addition, from 
Philby’s report of his mission, it can be observed that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s knowledge and his 
political view of his relationship with Britain may have had more than a positive impact 
on Philby. They also greatly assisted Philby’s mission and enhanced Anglo-Najdi 
relations; one example is Ibn Sa‘ūd’s informing Philby that he was genuinely satisfied 
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with the British alliance, which would secure the interests of his country and people.123 
At the same time, Ibn Sa‘ūd was deeply impressed by Philby, describing him as a 
sagacious man in whom he saw all the signs of familiarity and long acquaintance. These 
persuaded Ibn Sa‘ūd that Philby and his mission would augment the friendly relations 
between Najd and Britain.124 Additionally, it seems that Ibn Sa‘ūd admired Philby for 
another reason. Philby’s adoption of the Arab character and life, for instance, his 
speaking Arabic, growing a beard, dressing in Arab garments, in particular the 
dishdasha (white shift) and the Thoab (overshirt), using only the right hand in eating, 
and sleeping on the ground had its influence on Ibn Sa‘ūd, who saw Philby as a sincere 
friend serving common causes in general and the Arab cause in particular.125 
Even before the negotiations in the Najdi-Hejazi dispute opened, there is some 
evidence that Philby would probably be successful in resolving the two issues that 
underlay the mission. First, behind the issuing of copper coinage, as Ibn Sa‘ūd 
demanded, Cox seems to have believed that Ibn Sa‘ūd had been seeking to strengthen 
his autonomy. Philby handled Cox’s instructions well, informing Ibn Sa‘ūd that his 
request was not practicable until the war ended and, more important, that his demand 
was inconsistent with the terms of the treaty that he had signed with Britain in 1915.126 
The second issue relates to the appointment of a British officer in Najd and Philby 
                                                          
123
 Philby, ʻ Report on Najd mission ʼ, 12 November 1918, IOR, L/P&S/10/390. 
124
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seems to have been able to persuade Ibn Sa‘ūd to relegate this for negotiation at some 
future date.127 
 
Philby’s role in the Najd-Hejaz rivalry 
 Silverfarb suggests that Philby distorted Cox’s instructions when he interpreted the 
prime object of the Najd Mission as the launching of Ibn Sa‘ūd on a campaign of active 
aggression against Ibn Rashid. Furthermore, he describes Philby's motives for deviating 
from Cox's instructions as not altogether clear and speculated that Philby perhaps 
visualized himself “in a glamorous leadership role comparable to that of T. E. 
Lawrence” with Hussain's forces in the Hejaz. Or perhaps he simply disliked the 
prospect of devoting so much time and effort to “a project barren of concrete 
achievement”.128 Indeed, the prime purpose of the Najdi mission was to clear the 
atmosphere between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain and any distortion of the mission’s 
objective would have meant that Philby desired to share the glory of Shakespear or 
that a Lawrence of Arabia necessitated also a Philby of Najd. However, beside the fame 
that Philby was looking for, the invasion of Ibn Rashid would ensure a crucial benefit for 
the Allied cause. It was to distract Ibn Sa‘ūd’s attention from Hussain and oblige him to 
take offensive action against Ibn Rashid and that would cement the improved relations 
between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain, just what Britain was looking for. 
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I was mainly interested in two problems. In the first place, it was of paramount 
importance to prevent any serious conflict between Ibn Saud and King Hussain, whose 
pretensions to hegemony in Arabia were daily growing more blatant and aggressive 
and whose continued co-operation was vitally necessary to Lawrence's campaign 
against the Turks on the flank of General Allenby's army, now within striking distance 
of Jerusalem. Secondly, and partly also to aid the attainment of my first objective, it 
was necessary to divert Ibn Saud’s attention from his grievances by inducing him to 
undertake operations against his other rival and our declared enemy, Ibn Rashid of 
Hail.129 
Therefore, to substantiate Philby’s view, it can be said that, before he reached Riyadh, 
Sir Mark Sykes, having met the British officials in Cairo, informed Cox that the capture 
of Ḥail by Ibn Sa‘ūd would be vital.130 More importantly,  while Philby was in Arabia 
Cox, in December 1917, informed the Government of India that the termination of the 
movement in Ḥail would no doubt be an ideal opportunity. He stated: 
Should the movement terminate by the capture of Ḥail Ibn Saud would I fancy install 
one of the members of Rashid family who have been refugees with him for some years 
past remaining with him until he had gained adherence of the Shammar and then leave 
him as his deputy.131 
From the above, it can be surmised that Philby may not have distorted Cox’s 
instructions but that he was following the policy of both Cairo and Baghdad. If he had 
shown any sign of distorting Cox’s instructions, his view would not have been 
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compatible with the desire of Cox and Cairo to capture Ḥail and thus improve the 
relations between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain. 
In any case, one of Britain’s major purposes may be considered to be a reduced state of 
tension and hostility between Najd and Hejaz. Thus, Philby, in his negotiations, found 
that there were some essential developments that disquieted Ibn Sa‘ūd. The first was 
that Hussain had taken for himself the title of Malik Diyar al- Arab (the King of the Arab 
countries) and Ibn Sa‘ūd suspected that Hussain’s title was based on some secret 
understanding between him and Britain. The second concern was that Ibn Sa‘ūd was 
very eager to have comparable treatment, political support and financial assistance 
from Britain with what Hussain was receiving. On these fundamental issues, Ibn Sa‘ūd 
wanted to know where he would stand after the war, so he requested more definite 
assurances in order to distinguish himself from Hussain.132 From these demands, it is 
apparent that Ibn Sa‘ūd may have realized that the conquest by the Allied forces would 
rapidly strengthen Hussain’s power among the Arab leaders and if this happened he 
may have believed that Britain would abandon him. Furthermore, Ibn Sa‘ūd was aware 
of McMahon’s undertakings to Hussein and knew that the British Government had 
decided to encourage Hussain to take the lead in the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans 
so that at some future date he would be the ruler or the head of an independent Arab 
state, which might have an essential effect on Ibn Sa‘ūd’s sovereignty. Ibn Sa‘ūd 
rejected the British-Hejazi understanding and in the negotiations before the Anglo- 
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Najdi treaty in December 1915, he informed Cox that Hussain could not be trusted, 
describing him as a trivial and unstable character. Ibn Sa‘ūd stated that he would not 
accept any intervention in his affairs or recognise the Caliphate, as Hussain claimed. 
After his meeting with Ibn Sa‘ūd, Cox described him and said that his 
present relations with … [Hussain] were quite normal and friendly, but that the Sharif 
was essentially a trivial and unstable character and could never be depended on … 
Sounded as to the general question of the Caliphate in the event of Turkey breaking up, 
he said his own view was that, as far as the ruling Chiefs of Arabia were concerned, no 
one cared in the least who called himself Caliph, and reminded me that the Wah[h]abis 
did not recognise any Caliph after the first four.133 
 
The month after the proclamation of Hussain’s revolt against the Ottomans in June 
1916, Ibn Sa‘ūd sent a letter to Cox to indicate his concern that Hussain would want a 
commitment from Britain that would enable him to rule the Arabs of the Ottoman 
Empire. In his letter, he also showed his extreme apprehension towards Hussain’s 
official communique which illustrated Hussain’s desire for political leadership over all 
the Arabs, stating that he and his people would never subordinate themselves to 
Hussain.134 
It is plain that Ibn Sa‘ūd was aware of the political developments surrounding him and, 
more importantly, he was aware of the controversy between Cairo and India regarding 
Hussain’s leadership. In his view, Cairo and the British Government were unable to 
understand the political conditions in Arabia.  He informed Cox: 
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I feel it incumbent on me to state to you (though you are much better informed in 
regard to the affair than I am) that my fear is that the Sharif [Hussain] may obtain from 
the British Government an undertaking for his independent control over the Hedjaz 
and the Arabs. Although you yourself probably appreciate my fear, it is possible that 
the representative of the British Government who is actually conducting negotiations 
with the Sharif is not acquainted with the position.135 
According to Hamilton,136 Briton Busch says, Ibn Sa‘ūd wished to see an Ottoman 
victory against Britain, so as to bring about the collapse at Ottoman hands of Hussain’s 
power.137 However, it seems that the allegations by both Hamilton and Busch are 
unlikely to be soundly based. Hamilton’s claim was presented and assessed in 
November 1917138 and all the military evidence and indications testify to the 
superiority of British military might against the Ottoman forces. These had been 
devastated not only in Iraq but also in Arabia and Britain’s superiority could not have 
been absent from Saud’s mind. 
Hence, in order to remove Ibn Sa‘ūd’s suspicions of Britain and Hussain, Philby had to 
dispel these ideas, confirming to Ibn Sa‘ūd that Britain had no intention of reneging on 
its obligations toward him, in particular the duties and commitments based on the 
Anglo- Najdi treaty that Ibn Sa‘ūd had signed with Cox. Consequently, Philby was able 
to extract a solemn promise from Ibn Sa‘ūd that he would abstain from all aggression 
against Hussain.139 It is should be described here how Philby managed to keep Ibn 
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Sa‘ūd away from Hussain, most of all at this crucial juncture of the war. First, regarding 
Hussain’s improved status, Philby probably explained to Ibn Sa‘ūd that he had no 
option but to engage in the common cause, not only to obtain the benefit from Britain 
(military support and financial assistance) but also to feature on the political scene, 
which would help to protect his sovereignty. Second, in the long negotiations, Philby 
appeared to be an able disputant, possessing all the means of persuasion. This can be 
seen, as Monroe suggested, when he reminded Ibn Sa‘ūd that Hussain was providing 
Britain with much valuable service while Ibn Sa‘ūd himself had not lifted a finger to 
assist Britain.140 As a result, it can be said that Philby not only succeeded in  suppressing 
or shelving the hatred and enmity between the two rivals but also gained Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
cooperation with Hussain, which would support Britain’s interests in the war while also 
improving relations between Britain and Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
Combined with Philby’s mission, it was decided that the British authorities in Cairo 
should once more send Storrs to Hejaz in order to meet Hussain. Storrs would be 
entirely guided by Hussain and would carry any messages to Ibn Sa‘ūd or raise any 
political questions that he wished.141 The Cairo officials hoped that Storrs’s visit to 
Riyadh would have the fruitful consequences of bringing the two parties into 
cooperative participation in the war against the Ottoman. In order to reach the 
convergence between the views from Hejaz and from Najd, Storrs was also instructed 
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to inform Ibn Sa‘ūd that the latter would be able to despatch his personal 
representative to negotiate with Hussain, who had previously welcomed and approved 
the Cairo mission and its objectives.142 
However, while Philby was waiting for Storrs to join him in Riyadh and continually 
recommending Storrs’s visit, Hussain prevented Storrs from setting out, stating that he 
could not guarantee that Storrs would be safe from Ibn Sa‘ūd’s tribesmen and, 
therefore, he would not permit him to risk a journey from the coast of Hejaz to the 
interior of Arabia.143 Although London and Cairo made considerable efforts with 
Hussain to revoke his decision regarding the Cairo mission, Reginald Wingate, the High 
Commissioner in Egypt, asserted that Hussain also prevented a native representative 
from being sent to the negotiations and from joining Philby’s mission in Riyadh; he 
confirmed that any attempt to press Hussain to change his decision would be 
worthless.144 Philby suggested that the reason behind Hussain’s action was to obstruct 
the aims of the mission and to “discourage any negotiations between his hated rival 
and Great Britain”.145 In the event, Hussain could not discourage or curtail Saudi-British 
relations because it was known that Ibn Sa‘ūd had signed a treaty with Britain in 1915. 
Furthermore, regarding the British interest, Britain was in need of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
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assistance both in the case of the invasion of Ḥail and in imposing the blockade against 
enemies in Arabia. As a result, it may be assumed that the motivation for Hussain’s 
refusal was political: he did not want to recognise Ibn Sa‘ūd’s sovereignty or his 
independent rule because he viewed the latter as one of his servants.146 Still, it may be 
noted that, while Ibn Sa‘ūd made it plain that he was not prepared to become a mere 
follower of Hussain, he showed more statesmanship than Hussain and he welcomed 
the deputation of Storrs to his territories. More important, he explicitly showed the 
British authorities in Cairo that he was able to send an adequate escort to the Hejaz 
and would make all the necessary arrangements to bring Storrs safely to Riyadh. Philby 
illustrated Ibn Sa‘ūd’s attitude toward Storrs’s visit as follows: 
Ibn Sa‘ūd heartily welcomes proposed deputation of Storrs as likely to give Egyptian 
authorities glimpse of other side of shield but spontaneously expressed the opinion 
that Sherif’s desire to disclaim responsibility after he leaves Hejaz frontier is merely 
ruse to deter Egypt from proceeding with proposal. He however agrees to send 
adequate escort and guarantee safety of Storrs in his territories.147 
After Hussain’s refusal to permit the Cairo mission to procced to Najd through his 
lands, it is likely that Philby and Ibn Sa‘ūd worked together to show the Cairo officials 
that the story of the disturbance on the boundaries between Hejaz and Najd was no 
more than imaginary. Evidence for this comes in Philby’s asking Ibn Sa‘ūd for 
permission to travel to Hejaz in order to meet Hussain.148 He sent an apology to Cox, 
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explaining his decision as occasioned by the urgency of the matter; he said that he 
believed that Storrs should be brought to Riyadh and wanted to show that Hussain was 
at fault in claiming that the country was unsafe. Without waiting for Cox’s response, 
Philby set off on his journey, leaving his escorts in Riyadh.149 Some historians claim that 
the reason behind Philby’s decision to travel to Hejaz was a desire for personal fame for 
his exploration and vanity in presenting himself as a distinguished explorer across 
Arabia from east to west, following in the footsteps of its greatest European 
explorers.150 They cite Philby’s comment on his motivation: 
I should confess, perhaps, that my motives in making that proposal were of a mixed 
character, and not wholly based on the actual requirements of the situation, but that is 
a trifle and I have never regretted my action.151 
Philby’s decision was not, of course, one of the mission’s objectives and it is possible 
that, as these historians suggest, he simply wanted to be famous for such a journey. 
However, from Philby’s confession in the above quotation, it is clear that his choice of 
words to describe his motivation is ambiguous. He never revealed precisely what he 
meant by “the mixed character” or the “trifle”. Of his long journey between Najd and 
Hejaz, Monroe remarked persuasively that Philby may simply have wanted to give the 
perceptive signal that Ibn Sa‘ūd was stronger than Hussain and had implicit control 
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over immense areas of central Arabia.152 In support of Monroe’s contention, it should 
not be forgotten that Philby shocked the British authorities in Cairo when he argued 
with D.G. Hogarth and announced, for the first time, that the destiny of Arabia lay with 
Ibn Sa‘ūd and not with “Hussain Ibn Ali, the darling of Cairo”.153 
Al-Man‘a, Howarth and Troeller criticise Philby because, in travelling to the Hejaz, he 
deviated from his war-time duty in order to satisfy his personal desire to explore.154 As 
stated above, perhaps the claim is quite proper as far as the desire is concerned, but 
not because he avoided his duty in war-time; his decision may have been beneficial in 
that it postponed the conflict between the two parties, which had been expected to 
break out at any time. Moreover, his decision was welcomed by Cox, who wanted to 
strengthen Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position against Hussain, the most powerful figure in Arabia, and 
who also had the full support of the British authorities in Cairo; Cox wanted Philby to 
meet Hussain and gauge the state of his suspicions about Ibn Sa‘ūd. In addition, it can 
be noted from Cox’s telegram to Philby that there was no indication of Cox’s 
displeasure over the unexpectedness of Philby’s visit to Hejaz. As Cox stated: 
Government know your movement and it will be worthwhile your waiting Jeddah few 
days pending communication on their decision. Please give my cordial respects to King 
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[Hussain] and endeavour to dispel his suspicions and wire appreciation after seeing 
him.155 
Furthermore, combined with Cox’s appreciation of Philby’s visit to Hejaz, Priya Satia 
makes the salient point that Cox opposed the officials of the Cairo Bureau who were 
determined to monopolise the policy-making in Arabia and, more significantly, tried to 
encroach on Cox’s affairs by the continual visits of their officials to Iraq, in the hope of 
weakening the policy of the Indian Government.156 It can be inferred from this that 
Philby’s visit may not only have safeguarded Cox’s rule in Arabia but also confronted 
and limited the interventions in Arab affairs from Cairo, in particular those concerning 
Ibn Sa‘ūd, who was regarded as under Cox’s authority. 
Further support for the view that Philby did not deviate from his war-time duty arises 
from the fact that his journey produced valuable information. To do this he crossed 
more than 400 miles, studying the mystery and society of the desert, mapping 
unknown areas, gathering geological specimens, listing the names of towns, villages, 
roads and mountains and marking the pilgrim route. Following his long journey, he also 
provided significant information about sections of the Arab tribes and their social 
customs and tribal genealogies.157 Consequently, it can be concluded that the benefits 
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of Philby’s journey included not only its scientific contributions but also its value to the 
British authorities both in Baghdad and in Cairo. It acquainted them with political 
conditions, namely, the disputed borders and the names of the tribes between Najd 
and Hejaz. It also gave Philby remarkable knowledge and allowed him to present Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s views in the negotiations held in Jeddah between Philby and Hussain, who was 
supported by the British officials in Cairo. 
On 9 December 1917, leaving Colonel Owen in charge of the current business of the 
mission, Philby proceeded from Riyadh to Hejaz;158 he was provided by Ibn Sa‘ūd with 
everything that the campaign might require and was escorted by 25 reliable men from 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s royal bodyguard, who were given strict instructions to obey Philby in all 
things.159 After 14 days he reached Ṭaif, where his host, on behalf of Hussain, was the 
Acting Ruler of Ṭaif. The Acting Ruler had been shocked and surprised to learn of 
Philby’s visit and more so when he received Philby’s messengers, telling him that Philby 
arrived at Ṭaif and wished to see Hussain. Philby had to stay there three days, waiting 
for Hussain to approve his visit. Although Hussain was not expecting Philby, he 
welcomed him and arranged an escort to bring him to Jeddah.160 At this stage, it was 
decided that Storrs would again confer with Philby, but in Hejaz, not Najd. Following 
the collapse of Jerusalem, however, Storrs was appointed its first Governor; Hogarth 
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was appointed to replace him and to join Philby in the negotiations with Hussain that 




Map 1. Philby’s Map, illustrating his crossing of Arabia from  
East to West 
Source: Philby, ʻ Across Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea’ 
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Meeting with Hussain 
Philby arrived in Jeddah on 31 December 1917 and arranged several interviews there 
between 8 and 15 January 1918. Hogarth conducted three interviews with Hussain, 
while Philby, who was introduced to Hussain by Lieutenant-Colonel J. R. Bassett162 as 
the leader of the Najd mission to negotiate active cooperation between Hussain and 
Ibn Sa‘ūd, attended two. On the first evening, the negotiations turned to the business 
of Najd. Hussain opened the meeting by talking about himself, his sons and the lineage 
of his family.163 Then various issues were discussed, but what is important here is to 
examine his strained relations throughout with Ibn Sa‘ūd. At first, Hussain did not want 
to discuss the case of Ibn Sa‘ūd, portraying him as a powerless figure of little 
importance, who showed no sincere attempt to ally himself with the common cause. 
He was also upset by the British tendency to place him and Ibn Sa‘ūd on an equal 
footing and when the latter received communications from Fakhri Pasha,164 the 
Ottoman Commander in Madina, Hussain accused him of collaborating with the 
enemy.165 
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However, it seems that Hogarth was able to bring up the subject again and induce 
Hussain to reach a peaceful settlement with Ibn Sa‘ūd. He began by stating that there 
was no evidence for accusing Ibn Sa‘ūd of treachery. He also indicated that Britain 
respected the Anglo-Najdi treaty signed with Ibn Sa‘ūd and would treat him as a friend 
unless he proved himself an adversary. Therefore, Hogarth informed Hussain that 
Britain was expecting him to respect and recognize Ibn Sa‘ūd, with all his tribal and 
territorial rights. However, it was clear that Hussain never lost his suspicion of Ibn 
Sa‘ūd. As Hogarth suggested, Hussain’s fears were substantially based. First, he strongly 
believed that Ibn Sa‘ūd was at the heart of the religious Wahhabi movement that 
formed a vital danger to the Hejaz territory. Second, Hussain was extremely frustrated 
by the implacable opposition of Ibn Sa‘ūd to his claim to be ‘king of the Arab 
countries’.166 
As Hussain did not show any sign of peaceful intentions toward Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby, in 
response, reverted to Hussain’s accusations, in particular that Ibn Sa‘ūd was 
collaborating with the enemy. He offered to show Hussain Fakhri’s original letters, but 
Hussain refused to take these letters or even to look at them, claiming that they were 
all a blind. In order to work out what was going on, Philby asked Hussain to produce 
evidence for his accusations but Hussain promised to do so the following day. If he had 
kept his word, he would have weakened the status of Ibn Sa‘ūd and showed his own 
full cooperation with the common cause. He said that he would be pleased if Ibn Sa‘ūd 
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could capture Ḥail and, if he could not, then he himself would try. Moreover, Hussain 
indicated that he knew Ibn Sa‘ūd’s plans, claiming that he himself was loyal to the 
people of Qasim province and the Ateibah and Mateir tribes, which were under Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s control.167 
The next day, Hussain made the point that, despite his feelings toward Ibn Sa‘ūd, which 
would not affect his cooperation, he was entirely in the hands of the British 
Government. In contrast, Hogarth, in his report, described how Philby brought up the 
subject of Fakhriʼs unanswered letters to Ibn Sa‘ūd, which the latter had given to 
Philby; in one of these, Fakhri complains of never receiving a reply. Again, Hussain 
refused to hear or read them and dismissed them as misleading although he had 
promised, the day before, to substantiate his accusations against Ibn Sa‘ūd.168 The 
Philby collection contains the original of Fakhriʼs last letter but does not include Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s reply, which might have undermined Hussain’s accusations.169 From the above, 
it can be assumed that Philby was not only conversant with the points of disagreement 
between Hussain and Ibn Sa‘ūd but also showed his marked ability to represent and 
press Ibn Sa‘ūd’s demands. 
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However, in terms of neutrality, it is quite evident that Philby’s report on Fakhriʼs 
unanswered letters was incompatible with the account that he gives in his 
autobiography.  There, Philby mentions that he also showed Hussain a copy of a reply 
by Ibn Sa‘ūd to Fakhri Pasha, in which he refused “Fakhri’s request for supplies”.170 It 
may be assumed in this case that Philby’s report and not his autobiographical account 
is to be trusted, for a number of reasons. To begin with, Hogarth’s sketch was entirely 
compatible with Philby’s report.171 Second, the account by Bassett, who attended the 
meeting, is not only similar to Hogarth’s and in general agreement with it, but also to 
Philby’s report.172 Third, Philby’s telegram to Cox says that he showed Hussain Fakhri’s 
letter, to which there was no sign of a reply from Ibn Sa‘ūd.173 To explain the 
discrepancies in Philby’s autobiography, it is probable that Philby, writing his 
autobiography in 1948 when he was living in Saudi Arabia and working as an advisor to 
Ibn Sa‘ūd, wanted to show the reader that Ibn Sa‘ūd was innocent of dealing with the 
enemy. Otherwise, he may have become confused because the meeting with Hussain 
had been held in 1918, a long time before the writing of the autobiography. In any 
case, whether or not Philby showed Hussain the copy of the reply by Ibn Sa‘ūd to 
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Fakhri, the ultimate result was that Hussain could not show that Ibn Sa‘ūd was in 
contact with the enemy, which put him in an invidious position.174 
Throughout the negotiations, it can be observed that, while Hussain insisted that Ibn 
Sa‘ūd should acknowledge his sovereignty over all Arabia and that he had Britain’s 
solemn promise, as he thought, to make him a king of all the Arab countries, Philby 
made it clear to Hussain that Ibn Sa‘ūd was an independent ruler, ready to 
acknowledge Hussain’s sovereignty only over the Hejaz, not the Arab world.175 
Hussain also raised the subject of the town of Khurma, another main cause of the 
dispute between him and Ibn Sa‘ūd. He stated that the inhabitants of the town were 
preparing to attack his people, the al-Buqum tribe. Philby had known of this since one 
of his conferences with Ibn Sa‘ūd; he had seen messengers from the Khurma tribe in 
Riyadh asking Ibn Sa‘ūd for help against the al-Buqum and a general mobilization 
declared under Hussain’s orders. Ibn Sa‘ūd replied to them, in Philby’s presence: “he 
[Philby] is an envoy of the British, and assures me that the Sharif will not be allowed to 
attack you. If he does, defend yourselves and send to me again. I will come to your 
rescue”.176 
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It appears that Hussain started to use forceful language and tried to change the 
subject, turning to discuss the sudden visit of Philby to Hejaz. In his view, Hussain 
stated, the visit was a great mistake; a Christian man (Philby) should not have ventured 
to cross his lands, resulting in damage to his prestige and giving a powerful sign to his 
enemies that he had sold Mecca (the Holy City) to the British.177 Hussain’s claim against 
Philby is plainly not logical, for several reasons. First, Philby had not even entered the 
route to Mecca; he had obviously crossed the mountainous country of the Hejaz and 
then travelled via the coastal plain until he reached Jeddah.178 Second, if Hussain was 
rightly angry at Philby’s visit and was anxious to protect his prestige and the Holy City, 
why had he then sent his emissaries to receive and escort Philby, who was about 100 
miles from Jeddah? Third, if Hussain was embarrassed by a Christian presence entering 
Hejaz, why were his sons fighting along with Lawrence in the north of Hejaz and, more 
important, why he then was receiving several European Agents in Jeddah, a city that 
lies about 49 miles from Mecca? Hence, it is clear that Hussain was simply trying to 
sabotage the negotiations not only at the time of Philby’s visit but apparently from the 
very beginning when he refused to allow Storrs to cross his land to reach Ibn Sa‘ūd in 
central Arabia. 
                                                          
177
 Bassett to the Director of the Arab Bureau, 12 January 1918, TNA, FO, 882/9. 
178
 To examine the course of Philby’s journey to the Hejaz, see Philby, ʻ Across Arabia ʼ, pp.461-463. For 
this journey, it should be remembered that Philby was awarded the Gold Medal of the Royal 
Geographical Society for crossing Arabia from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. See: Meetings: Royal 




Although Hussain treated Philby harshly and would not permit him to return to Riyadh 
overland, Philby seems not to have wished to take him up on this point because he 
wanted to control the negotiations on Ibn Sa‘ūd’s affairs. Hussain, however, 
disappointed not only Philby but also Hogarth by saying that it would be wise not to 
report Ibn Sa‘ūd’s crimes before he ended the negotiations that night.179 
On 10 January another night of discussions began. Hussain started by drawing attention 
to the Sharifi genealogy, in particular his own branch, claiming that his predecessors 
had considerably outranked other tribes. Then he turned to Arab affairs, apart from Ibn 
Sa‘ūd, and gave biographical sketches of Imam Mohammad al- Idrisi,180 another British 
ally and the ruler of Sabia, and of Imam Yahya,181 the ruler of Yemen, who were both 
fighting the Ottoman forces even before  WWI broke out.182 This suggests that Ibn 
Sa‘ūd was the most considerable thorn in his flesh, enough to make him determined to 
ignore the relationship between them. Consequently, because of Hussain’s digressions 
and his ignoring the subject of Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby seems to have been quite convinced 
that there would be no peaceful settlement capable of reducing the tension between 
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Hejaz and Najd. Therefore, Philby raised the subject of his return to Ibn Sa‘ūd, but 
Hussain did not forgive Philby’s sudden visit, stating that the visit had been a disaster, 
which had had an adverse political effect on his regime. In this way, Hussain declared 
emphatically that Philby should not take a land route out of Hejazi country but should 
go through India.183 
It seems that the negotiations broke down and there was no sign that they might ever 
be concluded. While Philby and other historians have suggested that the reason behind 
the failure to lessen the animosity between the two rivals was the intransigence and 
stubbornness of Hussain toward Ibn Sa‘ūd,184 other historians and some British officials 
in Cairo emphasized that the surprise visit of Philby to Hejaz, his demeanour in the 
negotiations and his advocacy of Ibn Sa‘ūd irritated Hussain and indisputably had an 
adverse effect on him.185 
In fact, it was not, perhaps, Philby’s manner that caused the collapse of the 
negotiations. The main factors may be judged to be the long history of hostility 
between Hejaz and Najd that had begun during the early decades of the 19th century, 
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which resulted in the capture of Hejaz by the Wahhabi Amir in 1803.186 Another factor 
in the collapse of the negotiations can be seen in Hussain’s political dream to be the 
king over all the Arab countries, a dream which was non-negotiable, while Ibn Saud in 
return, was prepared to recognize Hussain’s dominion over Hejaz alone, not other parts 
of Arabia.  A further crucial factor that led to the failure of the Hejazi-Najdi to be 
reconciled was that the competition between the British authorities in Cairo and 
Baghdad to shape British policy in Arabia may have contributed; the British officials in 
Cairo were always being encouraged by the Foreign Office. Bassett, for example, was 
frustrated not only by Philby’s manner but also by his insistence on representing the 
views of the British officials in Baghdad. He stated: 
On the whole, the discussions have done more than harm than good, in my opinion. 
Mr. Philby has had a very difficult part to play, and has been compelled to press the 
view of the Iraq administration upon King Hussain’s unwilling ears.187 [Italics by the 
author.] 
In contrast, Philby’s insistence on imposing the support of Ibn Sa‘ūd by the Baghdad 
authorities and opposing the British officials of Cairo, who desired to make Hussain the 
prominent leader in Arabia, may be considered an additional reason for the collapse of 
the negotiations. In his letter to Wingate, Hogarth described Philby as follows: 
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You will find Philby full of energy, push and ability. Although he began to learn Arabic 
only two years ago he speaks it better than nine out of ten who profess the language. 
But his knowledge of Arabian affairs does not go much beyond what he has seen. He is 
only thirty-two and having been ten years in the I.C.S., he has not [learned to] … look at 
things from any but an Indian and Mesopotamia standpoint.188 
In fact, it seems that Philby was not only following the views of the Iraqi administration, 
but also that he was aware of the Government of India’s view, rejecting any attempt to 
revive the Caliphate after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.189 In his report to 
Wilson, Philby spoke of his concern for Britain regarding the negative consequences of 
the Caliphate if Hussain declared himself spiritual leader; it would seriously affect 
British interests.190 
As peaceful compatibility between Hussain and Ibn Sa‘ūd was unattainable, Philby, as a 
leader of the Najdi mission, had to return to Ibn Sa‘ūd in Riyadh. Hogarth suggested 
that Philby should aim to return overland by a different route, crossing south of the line 
that he had previously taken en route for Hejaz, in order to discover the unknown and 
untouched lands of the wadis (valleys) of Asir.191 Changing the line of the return 
journey and choosing a more southerly route perhaps expressed the interest in 
geography that motivated Philby. However, his ambition was not gratified; it was 
opposed by Hussain, who forbade Philby, as stated above, to return to Riyadh overland 
and although Hogarth and Cairo tried several times to persuade Hussain to change his 
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decision, reminding him that Philby’s stuff and caravans were awaiting him at Ṭaif, 
Hussain insisted on Philby’s compliance and, to confirm his authority, ordered Philby’s 
baggage to be brought from Ṭaif.192 As a result, Philby finding his situation 
unproductive, decided to go with Hogarth to Egypt, sailing in H.M.S. Hardinge. They 
arrived at Cairo on 20 January 1918,193 where another round of negotiations awaited 
Philby. 
The meeting of the Cairo Residency 
The day after his arrival, Philby attended a meeting held in the Residency in Cairo with 
Sir Reginald Wingate, the High Commissioner, and some members of the Arab Bureau, 
such as Hogarth and Major Kinahan Cornwallis.194 In answer to a question from 
Wingate, Philby described the general attitude of Arabia, seeking to provide an 
alternative solution to the hostility between Hussain and Ibn Sa‘ūd. He suggested 
telling Hussain that Ibn Sa‘ūd would recognise him as King of the Hejaz, but nothing 
more and that he wanted to be King of Najd, including Ḥail. Philby then pointed out the 
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Wahhabi respect for Mecca and Madina and said that Ibn Sa‘ūd would totally recognise 
Hussain’s superior claim to these two cities.195 
A further comment by Philby is that Ibn Sa‘ūd had no intention of expanding his lands 
beyond Najd, although he was anxious to resolve in his own favour the difficult issue of 
who should control the Ateibah196 tribesmen. Although Wingate confessed that there 
was a conflict of policy between Cairo and Baghdad over the two parties, he treated 
Hussain as a special case, describing him as the protagonist of the Arab Revolt against 
the Ottoman, whose vital political and military contribution had benefited Britain in its 
war against its enemies.197 
It was not expected that Philby’s proposal for Ibn Sa‘ūd’s occupation of Ḥail would be 
appreciated because Hogarth had previously opposed such a suggestion, stating that 
the occupation would strength Ibn Sa‘ūd’s power which might become a danger to 
peace; hence, it was reasonable to keep Ḥail independent.198 In the meeting, Hogarth 
asserted that it was difficult to demarcate the Hejazi- Najdi boundary and each party 
should show good will, suggesting coordination as a tool to unify the policy in Arabia.199 
Hence, it is quite evident that Philby was the only official who represented the 
authority of Baghdad, which was, in fact, overwhelmed by the views of the Cairo 
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authorities, who were totally on the side of Hussain. Therefore, in order to make the 
views of the authorities in Baghdad prevail, Philby again asserted the importance of 
occupying Ḥail, which would eliminate the Ottoman presence in the territory. However, 
Cairo’s view was that the elimination of Ḥail was now of little importance, owing to the 
British victories in Palestine, and therefore it would not be of much use for Ibn Sa‘ūd to 
capture Ḥail; it would merely increase his power and upset the present balance of 
power with  Hussain.200 
It seems that Hogarth not only sought to strengthen Hussain’s position against his rival, 
Ibn Sa‘ūd, but also attempted to belittle Philby’s persuasive arguments by stating that 
Philby’s views were “not a judge's appreciation of the available evidence, but the ex-
parte pleading of an advocate for a client”.201 Furthermore, while Hogarth praised 
Philby for his ability in spoken Arabic, he suggested that Philby had had only ten years 
in the service, lacked experience and always looked at things from an Indian 
standpoint. Hogarth also described Philby as a man who alone believed that Ibn Sa‘ūd 
was a hero against Hussain, the “Cairo Champion”.202 Consequently, it may be inferred 
from the controversy over British policy in Cairo and Baghdad and the absence of a 
sincere desire to find a logical solution that the failure to reduce the tension further 
inflamed the subsequent conflict in Arabia between Hussain and Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
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Having spent more than 20 days in Egypt, Philby left Cairo on 16 February 1918 and 
took the long route to Basra, via Suez, Karachi and Bombay. He disembarked on 24 
March 1918.203 At this point the first part of Philby’s mission may be assumed to have 
ended. The second part started in March 1918, when he was asked to return to Arabia 
to discuss with Ibn Sa‘ūd an active offensive against Ibn Rashid in Ḥail, 204 which is 
described in the following chapter. 
Overview 
The chapter demonstrated that the first British official to enter into direct negotiations 
with the Wahhabis in central Arabia was Colonel Lewis Pelly in 1865. It showed that 
there was no treaty signed between Najd and Britain and Philby may have been wrong 
to have asserted that the negotiations had culminated in one. During his exile, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd perceived that the only power likely to assist him in his political project was 
Britain, not the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, more than a decade after he captured 
Riyadh in 1902, he was struggling for British assistance to protect him but the British 
Government had no interest in this part of Arabia and did not want to disturb its 
relations with Constantinople. Therefore, it exercised its traditional policy of non-
intervention in the affairs of Najd. Although the British Government refused to enter 
into formal relations with Ibn Sa‘ūd, it was obvious that Shakespear’s efforts, with Cox, 
to support Ibn Sa‘ūd were the main way of drawing attention to the importance and 
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strength of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position in Arabia. Shakespear probably helped the capture of 
Ḥasa by providing Ibn Sa‘ūd with important information regarding the weak position of 
the Ottoman forces in Europe and the Middle East. However, the turning point for the 
two parties occurred at the beginning of WWI, when Britain realized that its interests in 
the Gulf were in danger due to the attitude of the Ottoman Empire, which had entered 
the war on the side of Germany. Consequently, through the efforts of Cox and 
Shakespear, Britain concluded a treaty in 1915 which ended the British isolation from 
the rulers of central Arabia and enabled Britain to take complete control until the 
Jeddah treaty, which was signed in 1927, providing Ibn Sa‘ūd with complete 
independence. The chapter found that the reason behind the delay in sending another 
officer to Ibn Sa‘ūd after Shakespear’s death was probably not the shortage of suitable 
political officers; the main reason for the delay was that Shakespear’s death itself was 
regarded as a serious disaster. 
The chapter revealed that Philby’s appointment to the leadership of the Najd mission 
was made for several reasons. To begin with, the political dispute between Cox’s staff 
regarding the future of Iraq made Cox change his decision about this post from 
Hamilton to Philby. Second, the political aspiration of Wilson to be Cox’s assistant may 
be regarded as a further inducement to Cox to let Philby to head the Najdi mission so 




The chapter found that Marlowe’s allegation about the deal between Philby and Wilson 
– that it was made before September 1917 - is likely to be inaccurate for two main 
reasons. To begin with, the documentary evidence (the official telegram), that Marlowe 
points to, contains the only ratification of Wilson’s appointment in Baghdad. Second, in 
his book, Philby stated that the political understanding was with Wilson, who coveted 
Philby’s post. Since Cox agreed to transfer Wilson from Basra to Baghdad on 31 August 
1917 it would have been difficult for Wilson to conclude a political bargain at a time 
when he was still in Basra. Therefore, it can be said that Marlowe’s claim seems less 
than fair in describing Philby’s account of this incident as entirely incorrect. 
The chapter answered the question of the motivation behind Philby’s keenness to head 
the mission. Philby’s desire to pursue adventure, fame and exploration was influenced 
by the example of British officials who had travelled all over Arabia. Philby may have 
believed that he was no less distinguished than these and he desired to have his name 
placed among them.  
The chapter demonstrated that the first political act that Philby took in his mission was 
his communication with Saud Ibn Sabhān, who became a British ally. It provided 
evidence that Philby was able to reinforce Ibn Sabhān’s relations with Britain and 
resulted in keeping the latter among the Allies, distancing him from any 




The chapter concluded that the safety of Philby’s journey was a vital issue for Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
for two principal reasons. First, if the mission was endangered by any Wahhabi raids, it 
would reflect on Ibn Sa‘ūd’s reputation and his boast of having complete control over 
his territories. Second, if there had been any danger, the British support to Ibn Sa‘ūd 
might have diminished. The evidence for this assumption is that there was a slight 
hiatus in relations between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Britain after the death of Shakespear, who 
was killed fighting on the side of Ibn Sa‘ūd in the battle of Jarrab. 
The chapter suggested that the claim that Philby was mainly responsible for the conflict 
between him and Hamilton regarding the leadership of the mission is likely not to be 
accurate. The reason behind this slur on Philby is perhaps related to the public criticism 
that Philby tended to subject his country to, but this does not mean that Philby was 
always wrong or was the main cause of the clash with Hamilton. One reason is that 
Hamilton was more experienced than Philby, but seems to have believed that he was 
unfairly treated in not being giving the honour of leading the mission, which put him 
into a state of frustration and provoked the clash. Another reason is that the official 
decision to change the leadership from Hamilton to Philby was made by Cox and any 
reproach for it should lie with him. 
The chapter illustrated that Silverfarb’s assumption is probably incorrect: that the 
financial aid and military support were the first items that the mission discussed with 




that the first issue to be examined, before Hamilton left Riyadh and went to Kuwait, 
would be the relationship between Najd and Kuwait. 
The chapter suggested that Philby was successful in the first part of his mission. Indeed, 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s apparent belief that Britain was the strongest power to depend on may not 
have been the only factor that eased Philby’s mission. It was helped also by his 
capability, awareness and honest desire to be integrated into the Arab community; 
these were further factors that led to the total compatibility between the two men, 
which reinforced the Anglo- Najdi relations throughout the war. 
The chapter found that the accusation that Philby distorted Cox’s instructions by 
presenting the Ḥail invasion as a prime objective instead of clearing the atmosphere 
between Hejaz and Najd, may not be persuasive. Philby’s argument was based on one 
consideration, that the invasion of Ḥail would distract Ibn Sa‘ūd from acts of aggression 
against Hussain and thus lead to reconciliation between Hejaz and Najd. In addition, 
Philby, with his persuasive arguments and full explanation to Ibn Sa‘ūd about Hussain’s 
status in the war, was able to obtain a solemn promise from Ibn Sa‘ūd that he would 
not attack Hussain, which prevented any outbreak between Hejaz and Najd, at least 
during the war. 
The chapter showed that Philby’s visit to Hejaz may not only be regarded as part of 
Philby’s intention to go through the eastern region of Arabia to the west; there was 




Ibn Sa‘ūd who totally controlled the territories between him and Hussain. In addition, 
those historians who criticise Philby for exceeding Cox’s instruction by going to Hejaz 
must concede the evidence that Cox was very pleased by Philby’s visit, which provided 
him with the opportunity to limit all the interference from the Cairo officials in Arab 
affairs, and mainly in the east which was under Cox’s administration. Moreover, a 
further advantage of Philby’s visit is the scientific information about his journey that it 
yielded, but also its political benefit for Baghdad and Cairo. It let them see the specific 
conditions in Arabia and the tribal controversy between Najd and Hejaz. Moreover, the 
journey furnished Philby with all the information he needed to present Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
demands in the political talks that occurred in Jeddah later on. 
In the negotiation that took place in Jeddah, the chapter concluded that Philby showed 
a remarkable knowledge of the dispute between Hejaz and Najd and provided 
persuasive responses to Hussain’s accusations against Ibn Sa‘ūd. Although Philby stated 
in his telegram to Cox and in his report to Wilson that Ibn Sa‘ūd did not answer the 
letters of the Ottoman commander, Fakhri Pasha, Philby, three decades later, 
mentioned in his autobiography that Ibn Sa‘ūd had replied to the commander, refusing 
his request to support him against the Allied. This implies that Philby’s report was more 
accurate than his autobiography, according to the essential evidence that Hogarth’s 
and Bassett’s reports endorse Philby’s report, all written at the time. The contradiction 
between Philby’s report and his autobiography occurs perhaps because Philby, wanted, 




may have become confused in the long interval between 1918, when the incident 
occurred and 1948, when he wrote his autobiography. Whether Philby provided 
Hussain with the copy of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s reply to Fakhri or not, the outcome was that 
Hussain failed to substantiate his accusation that Ibn Sa‘ūd had communicated with the 
enemy. 
The chapter found that Hussain’s allegation that Philby, as a Christian, damaged 
Hussain’s status when he crossed the Hejazi lands and gave a sign to the enemy by his 
visit that Hussain had sold the holy places to Britain seems not to be logical, for a 
number of reasons. First, Philby avoided the whole route to Mecca. Second, Hussain’s 
allegation contradicts his order that Philby should be received and brought to Jeddah. 
Third, if Hussain was embarrassed by a Christian’s visit to the Hejaz territories why was 
he at the time receiving a great many European Agents in the Hejaz? Therefore, it is 
plain that Hussain’s allegation had only one intention: to damage the negotiations and 
avoid a peaceful settlement with Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
Finally, the failure to reduce the tension between Husain and Ibn Sa‘ūd could not have 
resulted from Philby’s visit nor from his behaviour in the negotiations, as some 
historians have misleadingly suggested. The long history of enmity between the two 
tribal families, dating back to the early decades of the 19th century, was one of the 
most important reasons for the continuing conflict between them. Hussain’s insistence 




the other Arab leaders may have led to the failure of the negotiations. Furthermore, 
the different attitudes to designing the policy in Arabia and the competing ambitions 
between the British authorities in Cairo and Baghdad may also be considered 
significant in the fuelling of the conflict and thus inflaming the hostility between Hejaz 
and Najd. 
The next chapter focuses on Philby’s efforts to promote the common cause throughout 





PHILBY’S EFFORTS IN THE COMMON CAUSE:  





The aim of this chapter is to shed light on three historical topics that developed in 
Arabia during WWI: the issue of the Ajman tribe, the question of the blockade and the 
invasion of Ḥail. The chapter presents a brief history of the relations between the 
Ajman tribe and Ibn Sa‘ūd and then examines the main reasons that led to the Ajman 
revolt against the former. It first asks why Philby resolved the Ajman issue before 
anything else and examines the arrangements that he prepared in order to resolve this 
issue and what the advantages of resolving it would contribute to the Allied cause. It 
focusses on Philby’s efforts in connection with the blockade and what arrangements he 
made to control the smuggling of goods in order to keep them out of enemy hands. It 
goes on to show how he persuaded Ibn Sa‘ūd to comply with the policy of the blockade 
and the fruitful outcomes of Philby’s efforts in this regard. It also deals with Philby’s 
efforts during the invasion of Ḥail and asks why he was so keen to impose this target 
and what arguments he advanced in support of Ibn Sa‘ūd, although the British 
authorities in Cairo, India and London were opposed to his action. 
The Ajman revolt 
During WWI Ibn Sa‘ūd and Mūbark, the ruler of Kuwait, joined the British Government 
in its war against the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, according to Joseph Kostiner, Cox 
regarded them as the most important East Arabian leaders capable of taking offensive 
action against the Ottomans and their ally in central Arabia, Ibn Rashid.1 However, it 
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appears that the Ajman revolt soured Saudi-Kuwaiti relations, even though Britain tried 
to relax the resulting tension. 
The causes of the Ajman revolt 
To comprehend precisely the issue of the Ajman tribe and the nature of the problem, a 
brief historical account is needed regarding the relations between this tribe and Ibn 
Sa‘ūd. Most of the Ajman tribe inhabited East Arabia and when Ibn Sa‘ūd captured 
Ḥasa in 1913, Ajman fell under his rule.2 In January 1915, Ibn Sa‘ūd, accompanied by 
Shakespear, faced their enemy, Ibn Rashid, in what was called the battle of Jarrab. 
According to the Arabic sources and British documents, the Ajman withdrew from the 
battlefield, ensuring the defeat of Ibn Sa‘ūd as well as the death of Shakespear.3 
It is obvious that the Ajman revolt raised serious issues. The question that should be 
asked is why the leaders of Ajman tribes betrayed Ibn Sa‘ūd by deserting him in this 
battle and why they determined to fight him thereafter. The answer can probably be 
summed up under one major point.  
During the Ottoman occupation before Ibn Sa‘ūd’s conquest of the eastern region of 
Arabia, the Ajman, thanks to the Ottoman authorities in Ḥasa, had enjoyed certain 
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privileges such as the tolls from the traders and pilgrim caravans which crossed the 
peninsula.4 But in order to impose stability in his territories Ibn Sa‘ūd had abolished this 
perquisite. Consequently, the Ajman continued to threaten this area and the flank of 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s forces in order to drive Ibn Sa‘ūd himself out of Ḥasa.5 
For their aggressive actions and their perfidious desertion at the battle of Jarrab, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd, in June 1915, prepared a military expedition against them. Comparing their few 
fighters to Ibn Sa‘ūd’s forces, the Ajman asked for a truce, which was, in fact, 
appreciated by Ibn Sa‘ūd. However, he imposed one condition: that they should meet 
the next day to arrange a permanent peace settlement.6 Then Ibn Sa‘ūd’s favourite 
younger brother, Sa‘d,7 who was absent when the armistice was arranged, rejected the 
agreement and insisted on a sudden attack against the tribesmen. Under this pressure 
from Sa‘d, Ibn Sa‘ūd acquiesced in the resumption of fighting. Despite their few 
warriors, the Ajman determined to fight to the death and their stubborn resistance not 
only defeated Ibn Sa‘ūd, who was wounded, but also killed his brother Sa‘d in the 
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battle called Kanzan.8 Soon after, they escaped to Kuwait where Shaikh Mūbark gave 
them refuge. Jabir,9 who had succeeded his father Mūbark, was willing to have good 
relations with Ibn Sa‘ūd and placated him by ejecting the Ajman from the Kuwaiti 
territory to the south-west of Iraq.10 
In these unsettled conditions, which were not in favour of Britain’s alliance with the 
Arab leaders to help them against their common enemy, Cox met with Ibn Sa‘ūd and 
Jabir in November 1916 in Basra. One of the outcomes of this meeting was a truce 
between Ibn Sa‘ūd and the Ajman which was intended to last for the duration of the 
war against the Ottoman Empire: Ibn Sa‘ūd promised not to molest the Ajman in their 
new lands; the Ajman, in return, undertook to abstain from molesting Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
tribes.11 However, this solution did not last long, owing to the resumption of raids by 
the Ajman in the East and the interior of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territories; some of them even 
made contact with Ibn Rashid, the enemy of the allies.12 
It seems that the political disagreements between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Salim, who succeeded 
his brother Jabir in February 1917, made the issue of the Ajman more difficult. For one 
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thing, Ibn Sa‘ūd started to levy taxes on the al-‘wazim,13 who were essentially a Kuwaiti 
tribe, and persuaded them to settle in his territories.14 In contrast, Salim’s reply to this 
behaviour was to provide protection not only to the Ajman rebels but also to the 
Shammari15 tribes.16 
Philby’s arrangements to resolve the Ajman issue 
Cox thought that it would be wise to despatch a British mission to Ibn Sa‘ūd in order to 
reduce the tension between the British allies and decided that Philby had to be the 
leader of this mission.17 It was one of the objectives of the British mission to Najd, to 
comply with Philby’s wish and induce Ibn Sa‘ūd to respond aggressively to the hostile 
action on the part of Ibn Rashid, an ally of the Ottomans. However, Ibn Sa‘ūd, as 
expected, asserted to Philby that he could not do so while the Ajman tribespeople were 
sheltering in Kuwaiti territory to the rear of the Najdi forces and were a danger to 
them. Indeed, Philby and Hamilton, the Political Agent in Kuwait, generally agreed with 
Ibn Sa‘ūd but Philby, given his desire to solve the Ajman issue, pointed out that it was 
not logical to expand the number of antagonists, in particular at this important 
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moment of the war. Therefore, Philby and Ibn Sa‘ūd, in the end, came to an agreement 
on the following actions:               
1-  The Ajman should leave Kuwait from the north and move towards Iraq where 
they would join Shaikh Fahad Ibn Hadhdal, an ally of the British and the chief of 
the section of the ‘Nzāzāh tribe called the Amarat. From this point, the Ajmans’ 
friendliness could be shown by their loyalty to the Allied cause or at least by 
their neutrality in the war. 
2- The leaders of the Ajman should declare officially their obedience to Ibn Sa‘ūd 
who, in response, should forgive their previous offensive on condition that they 
remained in the new region that Ibn Sa‘ūd would define and did not cause 
trouble. 
3- If the Ajman tribe rejected both of these options, they must remove themselves 
from any British occupied territory or Kuwaiti province and in this case they 
would be considered enemies.18 
From the above, it is plain that Philby played a crucial role in the resolution of the 
Ajman issue. He was of course aware that the primary objective of these conditions 
was to remove the Ajman tribe from Kuwaiti territory. If he succeeded in persuading 
them, his achievement would not only reduce the tension between Ibn Sa‘ūd and the 
ruler of Kuwait but would also give Ibn Sa‘ūd the chance to act against Ibn Rashid, the 
objective that he had long been pursuing. 
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Thus, on 2 December 1917, Philby telegraphed Cox and informed him of the new 
arrangements, stating that Colonel Hamilton, the Political Agent in Kuwait, consented 
to this procedure and would deliver the conditions of the agreement to the Ajman 
tribe. Consequently, after his arrival to Kuwait, Hamilton met Shaikh Salim and 
Ḍidāidan Ibn Ḥithlain,19 the leaders of the Ajman chiefs, and agreed to sign the treaty 
that provided asylum for the tribe in the south-west of Iraq on the following terms: 
1- The paramount chief of the Ajman should bring all his people and settle them in 
the region of Zubair or any other part of the occupied territories. 
2-  The Ajman tribe must abstain from crossing the borders of Kuwait. 
3- The Shaikhs of the Ajman would receive a substantial subsidy when they signed 
the agreement and henceforward would be considered under British protection 
like other tribes such as the Dhafir.20 
However, Philby suggested that, in spite of signing the treaty, the Ajman did not seem 
to be keeping their side of the agreement. They were delaying their departure from 
Kuwait to Zubair and, at the same time, Salim was not making any effort to force them 
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However, when the Ikhwan revolt broke out, Ḍidāidan joined the rebel leader of Ikhwan but he was 
killed on 1
st
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to leave his territory.21 Seeing their hesitation, Ibn Sa‘ūd announced his objection and 
sent constant letters complaining of the Ajman presence in Kuwait. Philby, in return, 
insisted on communicating with the Political Agent in Kuwait and the result was the 
eviction of the Ajman from Kuwait to a point about 20 miles south of Ṣafwan.22 
Although Philby had made a major effort not only to strengthen the common cause but 
also for the sake of Ibn Sa‘ūd who was struggling to contain the Ajman revolt, it seems 
that the Ajman were not satisfied with the agreement that they had been forced to 
sign. In evidence of this, they started to raid the interior lands of Ibn Sa‘ūd. For 
instance, they attacked the camps of the Subai23 and Muṭair,24 both tribes of Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
using the province of Kuwait as a springboard for their offensive.25 
Despite the unsettled conditions in Arabia, Philby was able to persuade Ibn Sa‘ūd not to 
take revenge for the Ajman provocation but to focus on preparing a military expedition 
against Ibn Rashid, their Ottoman ally. In addition, Philby suggested to Ibn Sa‘ūd that 
he take hostages from the Ajman in order to forestall any attempt from them to be 
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hostile, but his suggestion seemed to be ineffective or impractical.26 However, Philby 
did not lose hope of a resolution. He reported that the Ajman were raiding Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
tribal territory under the protection of the ‘wazim tribes who belonged to Kuwait and 
that their ruler, Salim, was responsible for them. He also suggested that Salim should 
be warned of future raids by the Ajman which crossed his territory, and that serious 
action would be taken against the leader of the wazim.27 The Political Agent in Kuwait 
recommended despatching “not less than half a Battalion and a Squadron of Cavalry to 
Kuwait”.28  It is evident that Philby played an essential role by expressing an opinion in 
favour of Ibn Sa‘ūd. His efforts not only resulted in warning Salim but also led to the 
following British announcement of actions to be taken against the Ajman tribe: 
1- The stoppage of the Ajman subsidies if they continued their raids or entered the 
local markets. 
2- A free hand for Ibn Sa‘ūd in facing the Ajman tribe, on condition that the railway 
would be safe.29 
It can be inferred from this that the Ajman tribe could do nothing but obey these 
orders; in the event, they remained quiet and did not constitute much of a threat 
against Ibn Sa‘ūd, especially after they had been expelled from Kuwait to the south of 
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Iraq. The British authority in Kuwait accepted Philby’s proposal and sent him the 
following: 
They [the Ajman] have been warned that if raids continue their small subsidy will be 
finally discontinued. Beyond this no other action is at present contemplated. Ibn Saud 
is therefore at liberty so far as we concerned to take action against the Ajman.30 
From the above, it may be noted that Philby achieved much, not only regarding the 
stability of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territory but also for Britain, in order to focus all effort in the 
common cause of fighting the Ottoman Empire and its allies. 
The question of the blockade 
After the Arab Revolt was announced in June 1916, the British organized naval 
blockades in both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea ports, especially in Kuwait and 
Hejaz. Although the Red Sea blockade was eased owing to the progress of the revolt, 
the Gulf blockage remained until 1918 in order to cut the supply lines of the Ottomans 
and Ibn Rashid in Iraq and Syria.31 In Central Arabia there were two main routes of 
egress towards the north: the Wadi Rummah, which began in Qasim and pointed 
north-eastwards to Basra, and the Wadi Sirhan, which started at al-Jauf and pointed 
north-westwards to Amman in Transjordan.32 
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The blockade was planned to cover all the territories in the northern area as well as the 
eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. This required the full cooperation of Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
Britain’s ally in Arabia, who was asked to prevent the infiltration of supplies to the 
enemy across his territories, and of Salim, the ruler of Kuwait, whose task was to deny 
the enemy any chance of accessing the Kuwaiti market.33 
However, Armstrong and other historians claim that Ibn Sa‘ūd took a position of 
neutrality during the war, as a wise policy for his country, and would not let himself be 
exploited by the English or by any foreigners for their own interests.34 In addition, Ṭālāl 
al-Ṭurifi suggests, in his article, that Ibn Sa‘ūd was not inclined to implement the British 
policy, in particular regarding the imposition of a blockade, since putting an embargo of 
goods caused serious resentment among his people.35 Such claims seem not to be 
logical, however, for it is clear that Ibn Sa‘ūd was in fact involved in the war, since he 
had signed a treaty with Britain in 1915 and was thus bound to take the side of the 
British Empire.  
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It is clear that the treaty put Ibn Sa‘ūd under British protection, the principal purpose of 
which for Britain was to “secure Ibn Sa‘ūd’s allegiance for participation in the war”.36 
Moreover, in 1916, after the treaty, Ibn Sa‘ūd was given Rs 300,000 by Britain,37 so he 
must have been in need of British assistance and not in a position to refuse any 
request. Furthermore, before Philby’s arrival in Najd, Ibn Sa‘ūd suggested that one of the 
strategies to defeat Ibn Rashid, the enemy of the Allied cause, was to impose a 
blockade against him.38 Therefore, it can be argued that by the time Philby arrived, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd was surrounded by British officials from the Persian Gulf to Iraq; he would, 
therefore, have had no chance to maintain his suzerainty without participating in the 
war and could not have rejected Philby’s proposal to mount a blockade. As can be seen 
in the following paragraphs, Ibn Sa‘ūd made a great effort to serve British interests, in 
particular when it came to supporting the blockade under Philby’s instructions. 
Although the borders between Central Arabia and Iraq were largely secured,39 Kuwait, 
during the life of the blockade, had obviously become responsible for a leakage of 
supplies to the enemy. It was described as a territory of monopolism, making big 
profits. In contrast, Qasim, the city of Ibn Sa‘ūd, which had an important overland trade 
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function, was “profiting by the enjoyment of corresponding advantages as a 
distributing centre”.40 
Philby’s contribution to the imposition of the blockade 
Before Philby’s arrival in central Arabia, the blockade was decisively contravened at the 
end of September 1917. Hamilton, the Political Agent in Kuwait, set off in pursuit of a 
caravan of 3000 enemy camels which had come from Kuwaiti territory to obtain dates 
and rice and was now heading for Qasim. The caravan was led by two Shaikhs of the 
Sinjara, a section of the Shammari tribe which had seceded from Ibn Rashid, the Amir 
of Ḥail, and joined Ibn Sa‘ūd.41 They were holding a letter of safe-conduct signed by 
Tūrki,42Ibn Sa‘ūd’s son. Tūrki’s function was not only to engage in military action 
against Ibn Rashid but also to be responsible for obstructing any leakage of supplies to 
the enemy.43 In a meeting in Qasim, Tūrki explained to Hamilton that the letter that he 
had supplied to the caravan was simply a safe conduct for a few Shammari crossing Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s lands and not a device for supplying goods to the enemy.44 Regarding the 
responsibility for the smuggling, Philby pointed out that Ibn Sa‘ūd had admitted that 
the caravan had reached the enemy lines and had accused Salim of being enmeshed in 
contraband business yielding a huge profit. In addition, Philby conveyed to the British 
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authorities in Kuwait Ibn Sa‘ūd’s belief that some of the Najdi people were also to a 
certain extent embroiled, but the bulk of the smuggling was done directly from 
Kuwait.45 Cox also blamed Salim, the ruler of Kuwait, for the smuggling and asserted 
that the latter had given permission for the caravan to load up and leave Kuwait before 
receiving a licence from Hamilton, the Political Agent there.46 
Although the British authorities in Baghdad decided to prevent the Shammar tribes, 
Ottoman allies, from reaching their usual marketplaces in central Iraq, the only gate 
through which these tribes could bring food for themselves and other enemies was in 
Kuwait.47 Philby evidently learned about the smugglers’ methods and more importantly 
he realized that the Shammar tribes were smuggling goods via the two main routes in 
Central Arabia that crossed Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territories on their way to Iraq and Syria. As 
Kuwait was the centre of the contraband trade, Philby suggested a system of passes for 
legal caravans to be reserved for the merchants who carried a license signed by Ibn 
Sa‘ūd or his local agent in Kuwait.48Ibn Sa‘ūd consented to this proposal and told his 
Agent that he must obtain permission from the British Political Agent in Kuwait for 
Najdian merchants to have passes. At the same time, Ibn Sa‘ūd warned his Agent that 
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he must refuse any requests from any traders who were dealing with Ibn Rashid, an ally 
of the Turks, or who had connections with the Turks in Syria.49 
Moreover, Philby began to put more pressure on Ibn Sa‘ūd over the blockade; he took 
more serious steps to prohibit any attempt by contraband caravans from Kuwait to 
reach the enemy. These were his arrangements: 
1- Ibn Sa‘ūd began to impose a powerful blockade on the enemy’s territory and 
consented to take personal responsibility for preventing any goods smuggled 
across his borders from reaching the enemy. 
2- The British Government should organize an efficient blockade in Kuwait. 
3- No-one was allowed to export anything from Kuwait unless they had the 
permission of or a signed pass from the Amir of his region. 
4- The permission would not be extended to Shammari allies unless they were 
escorted by a reliable representative of Ibn Sa‘ūd himself. 
5-   During the negotiation with Ibn Sa‘ūd, a form of pass should be arranged 
without delay and sent to the local regional governors for their use; those who 
held them should present them to the British authorities in Kuwait in order to 
get them ratified.50 
The above restates the point that Philby’s contribution – his insistence on Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
commitment to the blockade – should not be forgotten; he indicated to Ibn Sa‘ūd that 
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his interests, no less than those of the British Government, and the significance of 
preventing supplies from reaching the enemy could not be overstated.51 The outcome 
of Philby’s efforts can be seen clearly in Ibn Sa‘ūd’s announcement to his people:  
You realize that Britain is very anxious to prevent the flow of money [goods] that might 
reach the Turks or their ally, Ibn Rashid. I have promised Britain that I am fully 
committed to capturing any caravans that might be sent to the enemy.52 
At the same time, Philby, in a practical sense, moved to Qasim and it seems that this 
move put him in a good position to observe any movement of contraband that would 
reach the enemy in Syria and Iraq. From his surveillance, he evidently discovered that 
the Governor of the Zilifi region, who was under Ibn Sa‘ūd’s suzerainty, was involved 
with the Turks and was buying up food and other goods for profit. In addition, Philby 
was informed by the Political Agency in Kuwait that the son of the Amir of Zilifi had also 
engaged in smuggling, suggesting that Ibn Sa‘ūd should instruct his local governors to 
each provide a personal letter specifying the kind and quantity of merchandise required 
for their own town.53 Immediately after, Philby complained to Ibn Sa‘ūd about this 
behaviour by the Amir’s son. Ibn Sa‘ūd then wrote to the governor of Zilifi, accusing 
him of dealing with the enemies of God (the Turks) and castigating his action as an evil 
conspiracy. He not only exiled him from his Emirate but even from his own town.54 
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It cannot be denied that the blockade imposed hardship on Ibn Sa‘ūd and his people in 
central Arabia and Ḥasa. Its effect led to disturbances by the Najdi people which might 
have disrupted Ibn Sa‘ūd’s relations with Britain. In order to avoid such chaos and to 
supply the people of Najd with goods and also to control illegal leaks, Philby suggested 
some new arrangements, namely, that all Najdi caravans should be escorted by special 
emissaries on behalf of Ibn Sa‘ūd. In addition, Ibn Sa‘ūd’s political Agent in Kuwait was 
instructed to assign a personal representative to deal with the tribal parties who “were 
not in a position to come in to procure a special envoy, e.g. the eastern tribes such as 
the Muṭair and Subai and finally, that all regular town caravans should carry passes 
signed by the local Amirs”.55 As a result, the consent of the British authorities to 
Philby’s arrangements suggests that Philby both effectively contributed to controlling 
the smuggling and eased the harsh pressure on the people of Najd by ensuring that 
they were adequately supplied with goods. 
However, in April 1918 Philby encountered a major dilemma. A considerable number of 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s tribespeople, with 3000 camels, had come to Kuwait for the customary 
spring journey that would stock them up for the summer, but the Blockade Office was 
suspicious of the enormous quantities of goods that they were asking for and 
requested Salim to send them away with nothing. Shaikh Salim accordingly declared 
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that all Najdi caravans should return to central Arabia until he made contact with Ibn 
Sa‘ūd.56 
Naturally, the accusation of not supplying these put Ibn Sa‘ūd under serious pressure, 
which made the Kuwait Agency contact Philby and instruct him to assure Ibn Sa‘ūd that 
Salim had nothing to do with decision of the Blockade Office. The main reasons for this 
decision had been the large number of enemy elements escorting the caravans of his 
people as well as the great quantity of foodstuffs the tribes had requested.57 
In order to settle the issue, Philby, in reporting that the prohibition of the Najdi 
caravans had caused considerable irritation in Najd,58 suggested that it was not feasible 
to intercept the goods on their journey from Kuwait to central Arabia, in particular 
after arrangements had been made between these two trading centres. Philby’s 
argument seems to have been thought reasonable; he asserted that, since the 
imposition of the blockade on all the Arabian outlets such as Mecca, Damascus and 
Basra, as well as on the eastern ports, Kuwait was now the only territory that could 
supply central Arabia. Consequently, the British authorities in Kuwait agreed to his 
suggestions, which restored the confidence of the Najd.59 
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In fact, it may be conceded that Philby, to a large extent, was able, by his constant 
monitoring, to stop the flow of contraband from Kuwait to Central Arabia en route for 
Iraq and Syria. However, Salim, who had benefited from the illicit supplies, was 
extremely frustrated by Philby’s success. It was evidence that the reason why Salim 
opposed the blockade was that he was a trader and had good relations with all the 
merchants. Before going on leave, Hamilton, the Political Agent in Kuwait, described 
Salim as follows: 
I have said enough to show that to all appearances, Salim’s position in Kuwait is secure 
and his relations with the merchants (he is a keen trader himself) are good. Were this 
not the case, he would hardly have taken so firm a stand in the matter of the Blockade 
Post, for this was actually the first time since his accession that he had failed to comply 
with a definite request from us.60 
Indeed, because Kuwait was the centre of trade in Arabia, Salim was unwilling to stop 
any of it, including the activity of smuggling, which made a very high profit. Salim’s 
reluctance to restrict the smuggling had made Cox consider despatching troops to 
Kuwait to strengthen the blockade.61 However, despite his uncompromising opposition 
to the blockade, Salim, after considerable pressure, consented to comply with it and 
accept the fact that two British officers and four British soldiers were sent to monitor 
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the posts to the interior of Arabia and to control the blockade arrangements.62 
Notwithstanding of Salim’s compliance, it appears that foodstuffs and piece goods 
continued to be smuggled by Kuwaiti traders. This can be seen from the agreement to 
make a fresh effort to restrain the movement of contraband, following discussion 
between Cox and the Government of India. All exports from India to Kuwait had to be 
halted unless they had special authorization from the Political Agent in Kuwait and 
exports had to be organized monthly according to the needs of Kuwait and Arabia.63 
Moreover, Cox decided that it was necessary to impose a sea blockade of Kuwait 
because all the supplies from there were falling into enemy hands via Syria.64 As a 
result, even though Philby’s efforts and the policy of limiting the exports and imposing 
a sea blockade were able to reduce the level of smuggling, considerable controversy 
between Najd and Kuwait was generated. The first clash between them occurred just 
after the end of Philby’s mission.65 
Philby’s mission was also required to make contact with the autonomous Shaikhs in 
order to turn their capabilities to good use, with the especial purpose of preventing 
smuggled goods from reaching the enemy. One of the Shaikhs was Ḍāri Ibn Ṭawala.66 
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Ḍāri had quarrelled with Ibn Rashid, an ally of the Ottoman, and had decided to leave 
central Arabia for Safwan, a region in the south of Iraq. Ḍāri had great influence with 
his tribe and Philby thought that he should be included to assist in the common 
cause.67 This raises the question why Philby chose him. The obvious answer is that Ḍāri 
was one of the most important tribal chieftains in Arabia and his efforts with his tribe 
might have enhanced the military operations of the British alliance. Furthermore, 
because Ḍāri’s tribe was the same as Ibn Rashid’s, the enemy of the allies, it would be 
prudent to prevent any rapprochement between them. In addition, if Ḍāri was not 
included in the common cause, he might join his cousin, Ibn Rashid, and then form a 
source of precarious supply to his tribe in Ḥail and also might constitute a standing 
threat to Ibn Sa‘ūd, who had been asked to take offensive action against Ibn Rashid. 
Joseph Kostiner claims that Philby did not divulge to Ḍāri that the purpose of the 
alliance was to attack Ibn Rashid.68 Such a claim seems to be logical, in particular 
because it concerns the benefits to Ḍāri, with his powerful tribe, or the exploitation of 
him in the war. However, it should not be forgotten that one of the purposes of 
Philby’s mission was also to impose a blockade in Arabia and part of its strategy was to 
employ powerful forces to cut off the enemy’s supplies. 
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At any rate, on 7 November 1917 Philby held interviews with Ḍāri and afterwards 
suggested an increase of his allowance. He then ordered Ḍāri to move down with his 
followers to Hafer al- Batin, in central Arabia, in order to prevent any attempts at 
smuggling.69 Although Ḍāri was passionately loyal to his tribe, the Shammar, he did 
very well to intercept a caravan carrying goods that belonged to a branch of the 
Shammar called the Abdah, to which Ibn Rashid, the ruler of Ḥail, belonged.70 The 
consequent decision of Philby to transfer Ḍāri to central Arabia may be considered a 
strategic resolution, which contributed effectively to strengthening the blockade 
against the Emirate of Ḥail and thus depriving the Turkish garrisons in Madina of 
supplies.  
However, Ḍāri changed his position and left al-Hafer for Safwan, in the border region 
between Kuwait and Iraq. Kostiner asserts that Ḍāri did not obey Philby’s request that 
he should remain in al- Hafar. Kostiner presents two reasons for his disobedience. First, 
Philby had been absent in Arabia and so he had not yet paid Ḍāri’s monthly subsidy. 
The second reason relates to Ḍāri himself: he feared to have an open clash with the 
Shammar tribe, to which he and Ibn Rashid belonged, and also feared the toppling of 
Ibn Rashid’s emirate.71 
To respond to Kostiner’s claim, the reason behind Philby’s absence should first be 
clarified.  After meeting Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby went to Hejaz, where its ruler, Hussain, 
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refused to allow him to return to Ibn Sa‘ūd over land. He forced Philby to take the long 
route from Jeddah to Basra, via Suez, Karachi and Bombay before reaching Basra in 
March 1918. Consequently, the blame for his long absence lies not with Philby but with 
Hussain’s non-cooperation. Regarding the payment, in the second part of his mission to 
Najd in April 1918, Philby met Ḍāri for a second time and paid him the subsidy owing 
for the five previous months, plus the next three months in advance.  Documentary 
evidence for this is in a letter in Arabic, which has not so far been cited by historians; it 
was sent from Ḍāri himself to Philby: 
My friend Mr. Philby, I sent my men to you with several letters but unfortunately they 
could not find you. I wanted to say that, as you instructed, I moved to Hafar in order to 
take military action against the blockade running. My friend, you remember that, when 
we met at al- Hafar and you paid me 10,000 Riyals as a subsidy, you promised me that 
if I attacked any caravans smuggling goods to the enemy you would remunerate me.72 
Regarding the second reason for Ḍāri’s move, Kostiner seems to think it logical that 
Ḍāri would not wish to fight against Ibn Rashid and his tribe, which was also his own. 
Therefore, Ḍāri might believe that the best way for him was to attack the caravans of 
the smugglers from his new location of Safwan, and this would extricate him from any 
awkward or embarrassing confrontation with Ibn Rashid. 
Thus, in departing without Philby’s permission, it seems that Ḍāri had to search for a 
logical excuse. He could not find a better one than the absence of Philby and the non-
payment of the subsidy that Philby was already giving him. He contacted the Political 
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Agent in Zubair and it was decided that he should be transferred from Philby’s 
supervision to the Agent’s, as the following communication confirms.  
On April 20th Philby wrote asking that persons bearing written authority from Ḍāri Ibn 
Tawala should be given foodstuff [in] reasonable amounts. He has taken since April 26th 
4413 bags of rice which is about two and half months’ supply and now asks for a 
further 435 bags. I also learn that he is at the same time taking sufficient to feed his 
following from Zubair. Philby is now quite out of touch with Ḍāri and therefore 
suggests that Ḍāri should be replaced under A.P.O. Zubair and will issue a permit to 
Ḍāri’s men if they bring a written pass.73 
Before ending this section, it should be noted that the capitulation of Fakhri Pasha, the 
Turkish commander of Madina, was due not only to Hussain’s war effort, but also to 
the success of the blockade policy, to which Philby had contributed.74 At any rate, after 
resolving the issues of Ajman and the blockade, Philby proceeded to implement the last 
objective of his second mission, which was the invasion of the Rashidi Emirate. This is 
examined below.  
The invasion of Ḥail 
The hostility between the houses of Ibn Sa‘ūd and Ibn Rashid coincided with the 
interests of Britain in its war against the Ottoman Empire in Arabia. In 1915, Ibn Sa‘ūd 
experienced the fundamental challenge of being defeated by Ibn Rashid at the battle of 
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Jarrab.75 In these difficult circumstances, Cox obviously realized that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
position was in dangerand it appears that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s control of the internal Najd as 
well as the projected invasion of Ḥail would not be achieved unless Ibn Sa‘ūd was 
furnished with artillery and British financial aid. Therefore, Cox met Ibn Sa‘ūd on 11-12 
November 1916 at Uqair and agreed to supply the latter with 3,000 rifles, 250,000 
rounds of ammunition, four machine guns, and £5,000 per month in financial 
assistance. In return, Ibn Sa‘ūd promised to equip an army of 4,000 men in the province 
of Qasim, south of Ḥail, with a view to threatening Ibn Rashid.76 During the spring and 
early summer of 1917 Ibn Sa‘ūd was in command of a military expedition in the 
neighbourhood of Ḥail, to fulfil his obligations to the British for their financial and 
military aid. He returned to Riyadh for the fasting month of Ramadhan, leaving his son, 
Tūrki, to lead the operations.77 
Philby and Owen estimated that Ibn Rashid commanded 15,000 tribesmen, with 20,000 
good modern rifles, and five mountain guns, while Ibn Sa‘ūd had four machine guns 
and about 8000 rifles.78 Therefore, in his telegram to Cox, Philby suggested that a total 
force of 15,000 men, four guns with trained personnel to manage the artillery, 10,000 
rifles with ammunition and an initial grant of £20,000 for purchasing animals, transport 
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77
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and foodstuffs would be required to ensure Ibn Sa‘ūd’s success in his offensive against 
Ḥail. This pleased Ibn Sa‘ūd, who was minded to take this opportunity to procure basic 
assistance from Britain and agreed to embark upon the invasion of Ibn Rashid’s 
territory.79 
Howarth reprimanded Philby for going to Hejaz on 9 December 1917 and leaving Ibn 
Sa‘ūd just when he was set to begin an active offensive against Ḥail. Philby’s four-
month absence, he said, had prevented Ḥail from being attacked at the crucial 
moment.80Howarth’s contention is unlikely to be true, however, for a number of 
reasons. First, Ibn Sa‘ūd had not been ready; he had been waiting for British arms and 
ammunition to be despatched to him once his military needs had been assessed. 
Second, when Philby arrived at Jeddah on 24 December 1917, he discovered that it was 
no longer necessary to march on Ḥail,81 due to the marked improvement in the 
performance of the British forces when General Edmund Allenby82 defeated the 
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Ottoman in Palestine in early November 1917.83 Allenby’s success essentially changed 
the attitude of the British officials in Cairo, who no longer thought it important to 
pursue the invasion of Ḥail. As Wingate stated: 
The importance of the capture of Ḥail had lessened in the past few months and 
although the elimination of this Turkish centre was still very desirable we should not 
[take the risk of] upsetting the present balance of power as between Sharif and Ibn 
Sa‘ūd by largely increasing the fighting value of the latter’s forces.84 
Kostiner presents another circumstance that may have persuaded the British 
authorities in Cairo not to support Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position in Arabia. This was the fear lest 
the spread of the illiberal Wahhabi movement would increase its power in Arabia and 
therefore Ibn Sa‘ūd should be cut off from any military assistance.85 This may or may 
not have been a valid reason. Philby entirely opposed the refusal of the British 
authorities in London and Cairo to furnish Ibn Sa‘ūd with financial and military aid. 
Philby also argued that Ibn Sa‘ūd was facing a difficult economic situation and to 
overcome the shortage of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s income, he suggested that Ibn Sa‘ūd should be 
immediately given £50,000 a month for the period of the operations.86 
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As a result, it may be inferred that the threat of reducing a substantial sum of money 
was the crucial factor in accelerating the subsequent negotiations with Ibn Sa‘ūd and 
achieving Philby’s aim to invade Ḥail. 
Cox also strengthened and endorsed Philby’s proposal to Ibn Sa‘ūd to mount an active 
attack on Ibn Rashid in Ḥail.87 Silverfarb suggests three reasons behind Cox‘s decision. 
First, he was perhaps under the influence of Philby, who strongly believed that the 
repercussions of the campaign would be decisive. Second, Cox may have “acted partly 
from a sense of loyalty to his subordinate.” The third reason, which is probably the 
most important, is that Cox may have wanted to strengthen Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position in 
order to maintain a sufficient counterpoise to that of Hussain in Hejaz and, with regard 
to Britain’s undertakings to Hussain, he may have believed that these would weaken 
the British authority in Iraq after the war.88 
However, apart from Philby’s influence, Silverfarb’s assumption seems to be justified. 
In fact, Philby may have had no great influence on Cox, due to the fact that Ibn Sa‘ūd 
had been Cox’s protégé ever since Cox had written about the importance and increased 
power of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s sovereignty in central and Eastern Arabia. Thus, Philby was, in fact, 
following in the footsteps of Cox who had previously laid the basis for the relationship 
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with Ibn Sa‘ūd in the official British policy in Iraq.89 However, the question that should 
be asked is why Cox sent the telegram to the Government of India to say that the 
invasion of Ḥail should be undertaken at this time in particular. Cox thought the 
opportunity had come when a large body of ‘Nzāzāh tribespeople, called the Amarat,90 
emigrated from Syria to Iraq and announced their readiness to join Britain. Cox 
believed that the cooperation between these tribes and Ibn Sa‘ūd would contribute to 
the elimination of the Rashidi Emirate in Ḥail, given that they were the bitterest 
enemies of the Shammar tribe to which Ibn Rashid, the ruler of Ḥail, belonged. He also 
provided a persuasive argument that, after the elimination of Ḥail, Ibn Sa‘ūd would 
guarantee the peace in these territories by the appointment of a member of the 
Rashidi family, who many years before had escaped to Riyadh and joined Ibn Sa‘ūd. He 
promised too that the Rashidi Amir would be set over the Rashidi Emirate, ruling on 
behalf of Ibn Sa‘ūd.91 In his telegram, Cox summarized the outcomes of invading Ḥail: 
Such an event would have tremendous effect both among the Bedouin of the desert 
and tribes as it would sweep away stronghold of Turkish influence and intrigue. It 
would at the same time make our position on Lower Euphrates Valley line much more 
satisfactory … I assume therefore that it is common ground that the accomplishing of 
the project is in interests of our war aims: while from tribal point of view there can be 
no doubt that present moment is ideal opportunity for action. Should the movement 
terminate by the capture of Ḥail Ibn Sa‘ūd would I fancy install one of the members of 
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Rashid family who have been refugees with him for some years past remaining with 
him until he had gained adherence of the Shammar and then leave him as his deputy.92 
In addition, although Silverfarb’s claim is clearly persuasive, in particular regarding 
Cox’s attempt to reduce the influence of Cairo in Arabia, he does not support his view 
by any evidence. In this regard, it can be said that, by supporting Ibn Sa‘ūd, Cox used 
Philby as an essential instrument to strengthen the views of the Baghdad authorities; it 
seems that he was not happy about the ambition of the British officials in Cairo to 
control policy touching Arabian affairs and attempted to diminish their influence by 
depriving Hussain of power, above all after the war, against his archenemy, Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
Such an assumption is substantiated by Cox’s clearly indicating that support for Ibn 
Sa‘ūd would not only establish an adequate counterpoise to Hussain in the Hejaz but 
would also simply work in Baghdad to “… automatically correct secret inconvenient 
pre-eminence which our policy has obliged us to accord to [Hussain].”93 
It was apparent that Cox was not only experiencing considerable divergence between 
him and Cairo but also that another obstacle was awaiting him. On 5 January 1918 Cox 
learned that his support for Philby’s proposal was not echoed by the Government of 
India, which signalled that in its view Ibn Rashid did not constitute a serious threat. The 
important issue was to maintain the power balance between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain and 
this would be achieved by retaining Ibn Rashid in Arabia. As the Government of India 
ran the affairs of Central Arabia, Cox was informed that he “should keep Ibn Sa‘ūd in 
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play by a present of money but that, except very sparingly, assistance with arms and 
instructors should not be given ... we wish to avoid the possibility of putting him in a 
position to upset the equilibrium of Arabia by means of our generosity”.94 
Consequently, it should be noted that the Government of India was minded to keep Ibn 
Rashid as an instrument for maintaining the balance of power among the Arab rulers in 
Arabia and believed that eliminating him would increase the chance of rivalry and 
hostility between the important rulers now remaining in Arabia, Hussain and Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
However, it seems that Philby would not give up his support for Ibn Sa‘ūd. He 
recommended that the elimination of the Rashidi Emirate would serve the common 
cause, stating that Ibn Sa‘ūd was prepared to attack Ḥail as long as he received British 
military aid.95 Consequently, on 12 January 1918, when the Middle East Committee of 
the War Cabinet held its meeting, it discussed Philby‘s recommendation that Ibn Sa‘ūd 
should receive substantial assistance for an invasion of Ḥail. This committee was under 
the supervision of Lord George Curzon96 and consisted of representatives from the 
Foreign Office, India Office and War Office. In the meeting, it was mentioned that 
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Wingate, regarding Ibn Rashid as a weak governor too unimportant to justify the 
financing of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s capture of Ḥail, strongly opposed Philby’s proposal and was 
averse to arming Ibn Sa‘ūd on any large scale, because it would intensify the conflict 
between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain.97 It was evident that the members of the Government 
of India and the Foreign Office on the committee shared Wingate’s view and were 
against the entire elimination of Ḥail, which would upset the balance of power in 
Arabia. They recommended that Ibn Sa‘ūd “should not be supplied otherwise than very 
sparingly either with arms or military personnel”.98 However, while some members of 
the committee insisted that it was indispensable to aid Ibn Sa‘ūd in a major operation 
against Ibn Rashid, Curzon believed that it would be injudicious to equip Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
since the British funds were running short and the British Government no longer had 
any interest in Philby’s plan for Ibn Sa‘ūd to launch a campaign against his arch-enemy. 
Therefore, notwithstanding Ibn Sa‘ūd’s claims and Britain’s obligations and 
commitment to Najd, Curzon concluded that Britain should procrastinate over Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s present demands.99 
However, Philby, who represented the policy of Iraq, opposed this decision, saying that 
the expulsion or elimination of Ibn Rashid would be a grave blow to Ottoman prestige 
in Arabia and would further enfeeble the Turkish position in the Hejaz, most of all in 
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Madina, where the last Turkish garrison was strongly resisting. Philby also claimed that 
the collapse of Ḥail would enable the borders between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain to be 
defined.100 As a result, In order to challenge the decision of the committee, Cox 
immediately demanded a reconsideration in view of a number of telegrams from Philby 
recommending that Ibn Sa‘ūd should take Ḥail while Hussain had a chance to capture 
Madina.  Once the Ottoman were driven from Arabia there would be a great chance to 
demarcate the boundary between the two rivals. 101 
Kostiner suggests that Cox’s reconsideration tended to underplay Hussain’s dominance 
in the eastern area of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territories, which might jeopardize Britain’s interests 
in the Gulf; and that the only way to keep the Gulf peaceful was to cooperate and to 
maintain friendly relations with Ibn Sa‘ūd.102 Persuasive though Kostiner’s opinion is, it 
should be remembered that Hussain could not extend his dominance over Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
territory for one major reason. This was that Ibn Sa‘ūd had signed a treaty of protection 
with Britain, which acknowledged Ibn Sa‘ūd’s domination not only over the sea 
approaches to the eastern part of his Emirate but also the interior lands in central 
Arabia. At a later date Britain would not indeed allow Hussain to intervene in Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s affairs. 
At any rate, although Philby was disappointed with the Middle East Committee, he 
never lost the hope of enhancing Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position, indicating that, even if the 
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campaign against Ḥail was not an urgent military necessity, it would still enable Ibn 
Sa‘ūd to shift his forces against the Hejaz railway or join Allenby’s forces in a campaign 
against the Ottoman in Syria. Consequently, including Ibn Sa‘ūd in the war would, 
Philby believed, distract Ibn Sa‘ūd from the situation with Hussain. He also pointed out 
that ignoring Ḥail would give a clear signal to Ibn Sa‘ūd that Britain regarded Hussain, 
not him, as the most powerful leader in Arabia.103 Finally, Philby pointed out that 
unless the campaign against Ḥail went ahead, it would lead to the abortion of his 
mission, which would damage British standing in Arabia and put an end to the 
cherished relationship that Shakespear had built up.104 This is evidence to support the 
claim that Philby played an essential role in strengthening Ibn Sa‘ūd in Arabia, that of 
fighting any decisions that might undermine the position of the latter. Despite the 
remarkable efforts of Philby and Cox, the India Office did not in the end consent to 
Philby’s proposal that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s campaign against Ḥail should be supported. John 
Shuckburgh, the Secretary of the Political Department in the India Office, believed that 
if General Allenby had been successful in cutting the Hejaz railway, the Ottoman cause 
would have been lost, and therefore it would not have been necessary to take Ḥail. 
Shuckburgh also remarked that the original objective of the Najd mission was solely to 
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provide suggestions based on practical possibilities and the idea of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s invasion 
of Ḥail was considered “a necessary corollary of the negotiations”.105 
Going by Philby’s reports regarding the importance of the mission, Cox did not despair 
and his call for the question to be reconsidered was enough to persuade Lord Curzon to 
re-visit it in a Middle East Committee meeting. On 19 January 1918, consequently, the 
committee ordered the War Office to produce a memorandum regarding the military 
situation in Arabia in order for it to be discussed in the next session.106 On 21 January, 
however, the War Office provided a memorandum which entirely refused to reconsider 
the committee’s decision and advised that the financial subsidy suggested by Philby 
should be reduced, on the grounds that Ibn Sa‘ūd did not offer any military advantages 
to Britain and there was no comparison between his weak efforts and the important 
role of Hussain, who had dispersed the Ottoman troops from most parts of the Hejaz; it 
would not be an exaggeration to believe that he would succeed in capturing Ḥail.107 
At the Middle East Committee meeting of 26 January 1918, therefore, the earlier 
decision not to provide substantial financial assistance to Ibn Sa‘ūd was upheld and it 
was plain that the War Office memorandum had influenced this resolution.108  It seems 
that there was no room for flexibility in the committee’s decision and Cox was 
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therefore deputed to explain to Ibn Sa‘ūd that Britain was not then in a good position 
to help him with military support.109  As a result, on 12 February 1918, Cox sent a 
telegram to Philby outlining these new resolutions. He asked Philby to recommend a 
suitable way of communicating the recent developments to Ibn Sa‘ūd and finally 
decided to despatch Philby to him in person.110 
On 9 March 1918 Cox informed the Foreign Affairs Department of the Government of 
India that he had instructed Philby to inform Ibn Sa‘ūd that the British Government was 
not able to provide any appropriate artillery personnel for his guns and, therefore, he 
must depend on his own men. Furthermore, the only assistance that the British 
Government could supply him with was 1,000 Winchester rifles, 10,000 rounds of 
ammunition and the endowment of two months’ subsidy in advance. In principle, Cox 
indicated to Philby that if there was no interception Ibn Sa‘ūd would proceed with his 
plan against Ḥail and if he was successful the Government would increase his monthly 
subsidy from £5,000 to £10,000.111 
While he was in Basra, somewhat resentful over the shift of British policy concerning 
Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby received Cox’s instruction to return to Arabia and to acquaint Ibn 
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Sa‘ūd of the British Government‘s decision.112 In April 1918, Philby commenced the 
second part of his mission. He penetrated into the desert of the Dahna via the wells of 
Hafar Batin and met Ibn Sa‘ūd at Shauki, his customary spring bivouac in the desert.113  
It was clear that the news from Philby left Ibn Sa‘ūd in a state of exasperation. Ibn 
Sa‘ūd complained that the shortage of finance and income would prevent him from 
carrying out a major action against Ibn Rashid. He concluded that, if the British decision 
was final, he “could not but bow to their decision and regret his inability to be of 
further active assistance.”114 It is apparent that Ibn Sa‘ūd had no option of disputing the 
British decision, for several main reasons. First, the capture of Ḥail was the most 
important project for Ibn Sa‘ūd, a project that would not only assist him to expand his 
territories but also to strengthen his status in central Arabia against Hussain. Second, 
when Philby sensed that Ibn Sa‘ūd was depressed and dissatisfied and he might 
abandon the operations against Ḥail, which might contribute to or renew the conflict 
between Hussain and Ibn Sa‘ūd, he encouraged Ibn Sa‘ūd to invade Ḥail. In his 
conversation with Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby replied to the latter in the following words: 
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“You know” I replied, “that Cox and I have done our utmost for you, but in the eyes of 
the British Government Ḥail is but a small pawn in the great war. For you it is a 
different thing; war conditions enable you, with British assistance in money and 
materials, to seize it and make yourself master of all Central Arabia, but if you miss the 
present opportunity and the war comes to an end with the Arabian situation unaltered, 
you will not be able to count on further British aid.115 
Another reason for Ibn Sa‘ūd to proceed with Philby’s proposal and to begin hostilities 
against Ibn Rashid was that Philby furnished the former with £20,000, which Philby had 
stored at Uqair on his first arrival, obviously to meet the contingency of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
forces attacking Ḥail.116 By providing this loan to Ibn Sa‘ūd, Silverfarb argues, Philby 
wanted to play a major role in the war and, to do so, distorted Cox’s instructions, in 
Silverfarb’s interpretation, to carry out one of the primary objectives of the mission. 
Philby is described by Silverfarb as being ambitious to play a leading role in his own 
person and inclined to emulate the figure of T. E. Lawrence, who had led Hussain’s 
forces in the Hejaz.117 
It is perhaps true that personal ambition was not absent from Philby’s imagination and 
he may have wanted to see his name recorded among the famous British officials who 
achieved so much in the Middle East. However, it should be remembered that Cox too 
would have wanted to protect Ibn Sa‘ūd’s interests and to see him successful in his 
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campaign against Ḥail. Although the British officials in Cairo and London were minded 
to reject the idea of capturing Ḥail and although Cox acquiesced in the Middle East 
Committee’s decision not to provide Ibn Sa‘ūd with financial and military aid, in the 
second part of his telegram he asserted that there was no objection to Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
capturing Ḥail, but he should do so under his own steam. This muted approval 
obviously went against the Middle East Committee’s decision and, therefore, it 
invalidates Silverfarb’s assumption that Cox’s approval was expressed merely “to avoid 
the impression that Britain no longer sought Ibn Sa‘ūd‘s cooperation against the 
enemy”.118 Cox stated: 
As regards Ḥail I do not consider Ibn Sa‘ūd is keen on taking it except in circumstances 
which make it apparent that he is doing so at our bending and under our discretion. At 
the same time, should good opportunity arise for his doing so either by diplomacy or 
force with the above meagre assistance, I understand that there would no objection to 
it in principle either on the part of H.M.G. or the High Commissioner. If it comes to pass 
I think we should be prepared to double Ibn Saud’s subsidy or give him a good lump 
sum.119 
Consequently, regarding the controversy between Baghdad and Cairo, it seems that 
Cox never failed to put forward the view of the administration in Baghdad, which 
sought to strengthen Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position in Arabia; the latter could have had no hope 
of succeeding in his struggle without the loan from Philby. Furthermore, it can be noted 
that Cox’s continued support of Ibn Sa‘ūd would have meant that Cox, at this juncture, 
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wanted to preserve a dominant British presence in Iraq, believing that a strong position 
for Ibn Sa‘ūd would be desirable to oppose the dream and ambition of Hussain to rule  
over all the Arab countries.120 This meant that Hussain’s ambition would have some 
effect on British interests in the region after the war. As a result, It seems that Cox’s 
support for Ibn Sa‘ūd and his disputes with the Cairo authorities increased the tension 
between Hejaz and Najd, the tension that culminated in a great battle between the two 
parties, the battle of Turabah, described below in Chapter Five. Cox’s support for Ibn 
Sa‘ūd ended when he left Iraq and was appointed Acting Minister to Persia (1918-
1920). His main work there was to “negotiate the Anglo-Persian treaty”121 before 
returning to Iraq as High Commissioner and resuming his contact with Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
meeting him in the end of November 1922 at the port of Uqair, in the east. There, Cox 
succeeded in improving the relations between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Faiṣal and signed the al- 
Uqair treaty on 2 December 1922, to fix and demarcate the frontiers between Iraq and 
Najd as well as between Kuwait and Najd.122 As a result, it can be said that although the 
British Government adopted the Sharifian solution and placed Faiṣal on the throne of  
Iraq, and his brother Abdullah on that of Transjordan, Cox remained on good terms  
with Ibn Sa‘ūd until he retired from the British service in May 1923.123 
In any rate, Ibn Sa‘ūd accepted the offer of the money, of which he was in desperate 
need, and agreed to prepare a campaign against Ḥail within months, despite the 
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considerable challenges posed by Hussain’s claims to the Khurma oasis.124 After 
spending a few days in Ibn Sa‘ūd’s camp, the time came for Philby to return to Riyadh, 
where he discovered that the promised attack on Ḥail had had to be delayed for a 
couple of months. However, in order to report to Baghdad, Philby insisted on a definite 
date from Ibn Sa‘ūd for the start of the military campaign; Ibn Sa‘ūd told him that the 
beginning of August would be the appropriate time.125 Although Philby did not provide 
any reason for Ibn Sa‘ūd’s postponing the expedition, it might be asked why Ibn Sa‘ūd 
had done so. It should first be mentioned that Philby met Ibn Sa‘ūd in his camp on 21 
April 1918126 and found that the climatic conditions in Arabia at this time were suitable 
for a military expedition and there were two months to go before the fasting month of 
Ramadan. Hence, it seems that two vital factors had intervened and forced Ibn Sa‘ūd to 
decide to wait. In the first place, Ibn Sa‘ūd perhaps believed that the British 
Government might reconsider and reverse its decision not to furnish him with the 
financial aid and military equipment that Philby and Owen had previously proposed. 
Second, Ibn Sa‘ūd probably needed such financial and military support not only for a 
combat to capture Ḥail, which was in a weak condition, but for a combat against 
Hussain, the most powerful figure in Arabia; without British support he may have felt 
unable to confront such a ruler.   
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Bearing in mind that four months were left for mounting an attack against Ḥail, Philby 
found himself with the prospect of spending the summer months in the Wahhabi 
capital, but instead he had another idea. This was to explore the unknown southern 
lands of Najd, Kharj, Aflaj, Sulayyil and Wdi al Dawaser, for which he obtained Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s permission.127  Once again, in his account of two months of exploration, May 
and June 1918, Philby presented a basic historical background of the Wahhabi sect and 
the present political history of the central region of Najd. He also provided a significant 
geographical survey of the districts where his route ran, as well as a description of the 
ancient route by which coffee was sent between Yemen and the interior of Arabia.128 
Hence, it is noteworthy that while Philby was following his favourite avocation in 
wandering all over the little-known districts, his reports can be seen not only as a 
valuable scientific survey but also as serving the authorities in Baghdad by conveying 
the political, economic and social conditions that he observed. The evidence that 
supports this assumption is that his account was first issued by the Arab Bureau for 
official use and it probably contributed to a knowledge of the general conditions in 
Najd and, more important, the nature of Najdi-Hejaz relations in Arabia.129 
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Figure 4. A desert spring seen during Philby’s visit to Aflaj 




Photograph taken when Philby was in Sulayyil, the territory south of the Najd 
Source: Philby, The Heart of Arabia. 
In July 1918, Ibn Sa‘ūd commanded Tūrki, his eldest son, to start an offensive against 




August, Ibn Sa‘ūd, with Philby as escort, began the march. To begin with, he and his 
forces gathered in the district of Shqra, located in the north of Riyadh before reaching 
Buraida, the most important city in the Qasim territories and the advanced 
headquarters of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s campaign.130 There, Philby was disappointed to hear Ibn 
Sa‘ūd forbid him to take part in the battle; despite all his arguments, Ibn Sa‘ūd 
insisted.131 It is apparent that Ibn Sa‘ūd, apart from his sincere regard for Philby, did not 
want to lose him in the same way that Shakespear had been lost; it might have affected 
his relations with Britain. Whether or not this was the motivation, Philby was unwilling 
to stay where he was without anything to do and therefore indulged himself by writing 
a record of his journey from its beginning in Riyadh. He also took the opportunity to 
visit some places around Qasim, describing its geographical features and political and 
economic conditions. He also provided important accounts of the society of northern 
Najd.132 This excursion takes its place as his third one, after crossing Arabia from east to 
west and travelling to southern Najd.  
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Photograph taken by Philby in Qasim, northern Najd 
Source: Philby: Arabia of the Wahhabis 
 
Ten days after the start of military operations against Ibn Rashid, Philby received the 
good news that Ibn Sa‘ūd had been victorious at the battle called Yatap and had then 
unsuccessfully chased Ibn Rashid, who had escaped to Ḥail, the capital of his Emirate. 
Ibn Sa‘ūd launched a siege of Ḥail, but discovered that the walls of the city were very 
strongly defended, which made him withdraw to Qusaiba, a district to the north of 
Qasim, on 21 September.133 
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Ibn Sa‘ūd’s camp in Qusaiba after defeating Ibn Rashid 
Source: Philby: Arabia of the Wahhabis. 
 
Sabri al Hamdi presents two verdicts on the outcomes of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s expedition against 
Ḥail. The first is that the expedition did not achieve its desired result, in that Ibn Sa‘ūd 
failed to capture the city. The second, which is not supported by any evidence, is that 
Ibn Sa‘ūd defeated Ibn Rashid’s forces.134 However, Ibn Sa‘ūd did indeed triumph and 
the primary Saudi source gives an account of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s victory which is compatible 
with Philby’s.135 Philby, who was close to the battlefield, narrates specifically that Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s five thousand soldiers were able to beat Ibn Rashid who “not only suffered 
greater losses but had to decamp with all speed on receipt of the news of his enemy’s 
                                                          
134
 Hamdi, John Philby wa- Saudi Arabia fi ‘hd al -Malik Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud [Philby and Saudi Arabia in 
the ear of King Abdul Aziz], pp.70-71. 
135
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movement in the Ḥail district”.136 From the above, it can be inferred that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
engagement in the war strengthened the Allied forces in the north of Arabia, led by 
Lawrence and the sons of Hussain, and kept the enemy (Ibn Rashid) too busy to attack 
them. Furthermore, it can be noted that, with Philby’s encouragement and his own 
considerable efforts, the campaign of Ibn Sa‘ūd was able to quell Ibn Rashid and at 
least force him to supply nothing to the Ottoman forces, whether in Madina, the city in 
the north of Hejaz, or in Syria and Palestine. In this, it may be assumed that Philby 
played a positive role and the outcome contributed something to the British victory, as 
well as strengthening Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position in central Arabia. 
While he was preparing for the next blow against Ḥail, Ibn Sa‘ūd was disappointed to 
learn that the British Government wanted him to desist in the struggle against Ḥail due 
to a new development, the surrender of the Turks in Syria. The British Government no 
longer wished to keep its promise to send him the consignment of rifles and other 
military equipment and Wilson, who succeeded Cox in Iraq, informed Philby that Britain 
could supply Ibn Sa‘ūd with only 1,000 Winchester guns.137 
The reaction of Ibn Sa‘ūd to the change in British policy was remarkable. He was 
infuriated not only at the change of British policy toward him but also when he 
discovered that the consignment would consist of 1,000 rifles, calling them ‘pop-guns’, 
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which he described as ‘palmed off’ on him.138  In order to appease Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
indignation and wrath, Philby volunteered to return to Kuwait and try to work out 
some way of mitigating the British decision. Ibn Sa‘ūd warned him that if he did not 
succeed, Ibn Sa‘ūd would no longer have any need of him. Philby set off, but by the 
time he reached Kuwait he knew that the war was over.139 
Overview 
The chapter revealed that the cause of the Ajman revolt was economic; it took place 
because Ibn Sa‘ūd captured Ḥasa and ended its privileged charging of tolls. In addition, 
the revolt of this tribe caused a crucial controversy between two allies of Britain, Najd 
and Kuwait, and this was why Britain sent Philby out: to reduce the tension between its 
allies and to join them all in the common cause of defeating the Ottoman Empire. 
Philby worked hard to settle the Ajman revolt and his importance can be seen in his 
contribution to the treaty with Britain which was signed by the leaders of the Ajman. It 
ended their raids on Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territories and also re-located them outside Arabia. It 
was clear that Philby’s actions not only contributed to the common cause, but also 
strengthened Ibn Sa‘ūd’s power within Arabia.  
The chapter demonstrated that there is little truth in the claims that Ibn Sa‘ūd took a 
neutral position during the war and that he opposed the policy of the blockade, being 
under pressure from his people, who were incensed by the policy. However, the Anglo-
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Najdi treaty and the great effort of Ibn Sa‘ūd to maintain the blockade invalidate such a 
claim. The chapter also illustrated that the blockade put Kuwaiti-Najdi relations under 
serious tension, which led to the loss of massive amounts of contraband to the enemy. 
It was obvious that the success in reducing the amount of smuggling owed much to 
Philby’s efforts to organize soldiers to monitor the smuggling operations between Najd 
and Kuwait and that this system gave the Najdi people the chance to supply the same 
goods legally. Apparently, in leading the mission Philby played a prominent part in 
imposing the blockade by persuading some of the Arab Shaikhs who were hostile to the 
Amir of Ḥail to enter the struggle on the side of Britain.  
This chapter revealed also that the accusation that Philby neglected Ḍāri by not paying 
him his monthly subsidy is unlikely to be justified. It seems obvious that the delay was 
due to Hussain, who prevented Philby from taking the short way back to Najd, which 
involved Philby in a long voyage of about four months before he could return to Arabia. 
In addition, documentary evidence by Ḍāri, written in Arabic, proves that he had 
indeed received his subsidy from Philby, which clears the latter of any accusation of 
negligence. Furthermore, the chapter concluded that one motive lay behind Ḍāri’s 
move to Safwan. Cooperation in the imposition of the blockade was better for Ḍāri 
than entering a military confrontation against his relative, Ibn Rashid, the common 




The chapter also illustrated that the fundamental role in the capitulation of the Turkish 
garrison in Madina was played by the forces of Hussain, but Philby’s successful effort to 
set up the blockade seems also to have been a crucial factor in the collapse of the 
garrison and its final surrender.   
The accusation that Philby was responsible for the failure of the invasion of Ḥail seems, 
as the chapter has showed, to be verging on fantasy, for two main reasons. First, at the 
time that Philby arrived in Arabia, Ibn Sa‘ūd was not ready to take the offensive against 
Ḥail because he had not yet been furnished with the British arms and ammunition that 
Philby and Owen had suggested. Second, the change of British policy, due to the 
success of the British forces against the Turks in Palestine, was the major factor in the 
decision not to proceed with this initiative at a time when the British officials in Cairo 
were convinced that the Emirate of Ḥail should remain intact in order to maintain the 
balance between the Arab powers which would protect the British interests in the 
Arabian Peninsula. 
The chapter asserted that Cox was probably not under Philby’s influence. It appears 
that Philby was himself a tool with which to implement the policy of the authorities in 
Iraq to support Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position in central Arabia. This was against the policy of the 
British authorities in Cairo, who favoured Hussain’s dominance in Arabia.  
The claim that Cox reconsidered his support for Ibn Sa‘ūd in order to prevent Hussain’s 




for one essential reason. This is that the treaty between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Britain protected 
the former from any aggressive attack, including any from Hussain himself. 
It is clear that the decision of the Middle East Committee to make it nearly impossible 
for Ibn Sa‘ūd to invade Ḥail and to reduce the military assistance promised to him was 
taken under the influence of the British officials in Cairo and Cox’s call for it to be 
reconsidered more than suggests his dissatisfaction with it. In addition, although he 
bowed to the inevitable decision, Cox seems never to have relinquished his support for 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s resolve. Such support was evident in his informing Philby, who became an 
obstacle to the Middle East Committee, that there was no objection to Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
proceeding with his operation against Ḥail, which obviously contradicted the decision 
of the Middle East Committee. 
The chapter concluded that, judging by the reduction of British financial and military 
aid, Ibn Sa‘ūd had no power to change the decision of the Middle East Committee and 
yet he proceeded in his plan to capture Ḥail. Among the reasons for his doing so, first, 
was that occupying Ḥail would increase his land and, more important, would enhance 
his position in central Arabia at the expense of his enemy, Hussain. Second, Philby 
encouraged Ibn Sa‘ūd in this venture and provided him a loan of £20,000, which 
pleased the latter and persuaded him to continue. Philby’s behaviour on this occasion 




famous but was due to his desire to secure Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position, a desire that Cox 
shared and fought for. 
The chapter revealed that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s delay in invading Ḥail was probably based on two 
main factors. First, Ibn Sa‘ūd may have believed that the British Government might 
alter its previous decision not to support his venture. Second, since Ibn Sa‘ūd was very 
anxious to obtain British support, he may have believed that the benefit of British rifles 
and ammunitions would not only be used against Ḥail but also against his long-standing 
enemy, Hussain. 
The chapter illustrated that Philby, in his journey to the southern territories of Riyadh, 
was able to present significant accounts of the geographical, social, economic and 
historical condition of these lands. The speed with which the Arab Bureau published his 
reports is crucial evidence of the importance attributed to them, in understanding the 
situation of Najd as well as the relations between it and Hejaz. 
The chapter demonstrated that Ibn Sa‘ūd was very anxious for the safety of Philby. This 
is apparent from his forbidding Philby to take part in the battle against Ibn Rashid. He 
may perhaps have feared that Philby might meet the same fate as Shakespear’s, who 
was killed in battle; besides, he may have feared that the loss of Philby might affect his 
position and relations with Britain. This action of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s, however, gave  Philby the 




of another part of Arabia, counting as his third trip since coming to the Arabian 
peninsula. 
The claim that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s expedition against Ḥail came to an inconclusive end seems, 
according to this chapter’s evidence, not to be quite accurate. The victory of Ibn Sa‘ūd 
in the battle and the escape of Ibn Rashid are sufficient to show his overall triumph, as 
agreed by both contemporary Saudi sources and Philby himself, a close observer. More 
important, the success of the campaign is clearly observed from the fact that Ibn Sa‘ūd 
pursued Ibn Rashid and cut the contact between the latter and the Ottoman forces in 
the north of Arabia. In addition, it can be assumed that Philby’s effort to encourage the 
Ḥail expedition may be regarded as one of the factors that not only upheld Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
position in central Arabia but also helped the common cause before the announcement 
of the Ottoman surrender to the Allies. 
The next chapter illustrates Philby’s role in the rivalry between Najd and Hejaz and the 





PHILBY AND THE RIVALRY BETWEEN NAJD AND HEJAZ AND THE 





The purpose of this chapter is to examine Philby’s role in the conflict between Najd and 
Hejaz and the political competition between the two authorities in Baghdad and Cairo. 
It is also an attempt to address the main factors in Philby’s decision to support Ibn 
Sa‘ūd in his struggle to include the Khurmah oasis under Saudi sovereignty. In addition, 
it illustrates how Philby was able to protect Ibn Sa‘ūd from the British officials in Cairo 
and London who wanted to make Hussain the dominant figure in Arabia, in return for 
his remarkable efforts against the Turkish forces during WWI. Furthermore, the chapter 
seeks to shed light on what made Philby’s prediction come true regarding the decisive 
victory of Ibn Sa‘ūd against Hussain in the battle of Truabah, proving that the policy-
makers had mistaken the condition of affairs in Arabia .  Moreover, the chapter focuses 
on the main factors that led Philby to mediate between Hejaz and Najd in their conflicts 
and asks whether, despite his resignation from the British Government, it was true that 
Philby was still working on the side of Britain as an undercover agent and was one of 
the crucial actors in the elimination of the Hejazi kingdom. 
The Khurmah crisis 
Khurmah represented a major point of contention between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Hussain. 
This, as some historians have suggested, was due to its important location as well as 
the significance of its trade routes. It is situated in the west of Arabia on the frontier 




back-door to central Arabia.1 Philby believed that most of the people in Khurmah were 
Wahhabi and that the district had belonged to Najd since the early decades of the 19th 
century.2 Philby’s claim was probably true. The historical accounts, during that period, 
indicated that the inhabitants of Khurmah were influenced by the Wahhabi movement 
when the First Saudi State took control of them.3 
Hence, it is not surprising that the tendency of the population of Khurmah to support 
the Wahhabism continued to intensify in the following century, in particular after the 
great victories in central Arabia won by the Wahhabi soldiers and their leader, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd. However, it was not only, as Silverfarb suggests, the religious aspect that was the 
main reason behind Ibn Sa‘ūd’s demand to include Khurmah under his sovereignty4 but 
also political reasons. Ibn Sa‘ūd believed that the oasis was rightfully his because it had 
been ruled by his ancestors in the 19th century. 
Khair al-Din al-Zereky, a contemporaneous historian, asserted that Hussain’s claim to 
dominion over Khurmah was based on two factors. First, the nearness of the Khurmah 
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district to his own kingdom and second, the presence in Khurmah of some members of 
his family, called al-Ashraf.5 However, besides these, there was a factor that impelled 
Hussain to take aggressive action regarding Khurmah. This was the risk that the 
Wahhabi influence would threaten his kingdom and spread the Wahhabi creed among 
the Hejazi tribes who, in consequence, might fear Hussain and transfer their allegiance 
to Ibn Sa‘ūd.6 
As a result, when Hussain became aware of the Wahhabi occupation of the Khurmah 
oasis,7 he endeavored first to close the Hejazi markets to Najd commerce8 and second 
to replace the Amir Khalid Ibn Luwai,9 the chief of Khurmah, who, in return, rebelled 
and proclaimed his allegiance to Ibn Sa‘ūd, asking for his protection.10 Because of his 
ambition to become king of the Arabs, Hussain decided to crush the insubordination by 
despatching an expedition to take control of the Khurmah oasis but Khalid Ibn Luwai 
was able to defeat Hussain’s force in early June 1918 without any support from Ibn 
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Sa‘ūd. In July, Hussain decided to despatch another expedition to Khurmah, but this 
met with the same fate as the previous military expeditions.11 
Philby’s confrontation against the Cairo authorities 
It is apparent that Ibn Sa‘ūd realized that such a conflict with Hussain, the most 
important British ally against the Ottoman Empire, would place him in a state of 
dissension with Britain and might endanger the monthly subsidy that he was receiving 
from the British Government.12 Therefore, on the advice of Philby, Ibn Sa‘ūd notified 
the Amir Khalid that he would request Britain to prevent Hussain from mounting 
further offensives against Khurmah and at the same time Khalid himself must maintain 
in a defensive position and abstain from any further movement over the Hejaz.13 
Moreover, Philby confirmed to the British authorities in Baghdad that he was “perfectly 
convinced that Ibn Sa‘ūd has no aggressive designs of any part of Hijas”.14 
Indeed, Philby’s function at the time was to induce Ibn Sa‘ūd to set up friendly relations 
with Hussain.15 However, Philby’s advice and his satisfaction suggest that he realized 
that Hussain’s contribution to the war against the Turks was more stable than Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s. He therefore strongly urged Ibn Sa‘ūd to maintain peace in the region in order 
not to lose in his claim over Khurmah. It is clear that Philby’s advice did not meet with 
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approval from the British authorities in Cairo who believed that Ibn Sa‘ūd should 
withdraw from Khurmah and allow Hussain to exercise full sovereignty over the 
disputed province. Consequently, the British officials in Cairo brought out more and 
more arguments against Ibn Sa‘ūd.16 For example, Major K. Cornwallis, the Director of 
the Arab Bureau in Egypt, firmly believed that Khurmah belonged to Hussain’s 
territories and he supported the King in punishing the seditious elements among his 
people.17 Moreover, the British Residency, in Jeddah, showed its full support for 
Hussain’s position regarding Khurmah as follows: 
I have no doubt in my own mind that it is really necessary for Khurmah to be 
recaptured by the King and for Khalid [Ibn luwai] to be expelled from the 
neighborhood, not only for the Kingʼs prestige but equally, or more important, to 
prevent the activities of the Ikhwan from spreading further Westwards, which might 
have serious consequences.18 
In addition, Reginald Wingate, the High Commissioner in Egypt, prophesied that the fall 
of Khurmah would affect Hussain’s prestige especially when the latter was leading the 
Arab military against the Turks in Madina, the second holy city located in the north of 
Hejaz. He also requested that Philby should warn Ibn Sa‘ūd against intervening in the 
affairs of Khurmah and should prevent him from any further attacks in the district.19 
Philby, after investigating, retorted to Wingate that Ibn Sa‘ūd had not provided any 
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support to the inhabitants of Khurmah and, moreover, he prevented them from 
retaliating against Hussain’s forces.20 
To a great extent, it can be assumed that the controversy between Hussain and Ibn 
Sa‘ūd appeared recondite and complicated. This may have been due to the fact that 
much of Hussain’s political ambition was in conflict with the ambition of Ibn Sa‘ūd to 
establish his own kingdom. Cox confirmed this fact when he predicted that Ibn Sa‘ūd 
would not be reconciled to being Hussain’s subordinate and he doubted whether 
Hussain would crush Ibn Sa‘ūd.21 Consequently, it is clear that Cox’s support may be 
considered a vital element in intensifying Ibn Sa‘ūd’s power in his rivalry with Hussain 
and in opposing the policy toward Cairo. Therefore, one cannot be surprised that 
Philby, with his sympathy for Ibn Sa‘ūd, should follow Cox’s line, proceed with the 
British policy for Baghdad to boost Ibn Sa‘ūd’s position and warn Hussain that his 
attacks on Khurmah would contribute to an ominous result.  
As Philby noted: 
The Sharif [Hussain] has only himself to thank for the bitterness, which exists between 
himself and Ibn Saud.  His attacks on Khurmah will long rankle in the breasts of the 
people of Najd.22 
It also seems that there was a further fundamental factor which helped Philby to 
strengthen the position of Ibn Sa‘ūd. This was the policy of the Indian officials who 
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believed that supporting Hussain would encourage nationalism in the region. This 
might have an effect on Muslim opinion in India and they therefore suggested that Ibn 
Sa‘ūd was seeking only to maintain his position.23 As a result, it must be concluded that 
the policy of the India Office served to support the ambition of Ibn Sa‘ūd, when he was 
simply seeking to establish his own independence, unlike Hussain, who was demanding 
after the war to rule part of the territory of the Ottoman Empire, which, indeed, 
contradicted the intention of the British imperial policy at the time.24 
In any case, after the clash between the two Arabian chiefs in June 1918, Khalid Ibn 
Luwai continued to send many messages to Ibn Sa‘ūd to stiffen his rivalry with Hussain; 
however, Ibn Sa‘ūd still exercised restraint. As he wrote to Khalid: 
Mr. Philby visited us and we instructed him to inform the British Government that 
Hussain should stop his aggressive actions against you. Please do not take any 
aggressive action against Hussain and do not exceed your boundaries.25 
The question that arises is why Ibn Sa‘ūd should want to pursue a policy of peace at 
this particular period. It is obvious that Ibn Sa‘ūd was currently beset by a serious 
problem: the revolt of the Ajman tribe, who were still threating his eastern territories.26 
As a result, Ibn Sa‘ūd had no wish to multiply his hazards until he had dealt with this 
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revolt. In addition, as he realized that Hussain was Britain’s most important ally in the 
region, Ibn Sa‘ūd had no wish for political controversy with Britain and he may have 
wanted to prove to Britain that he had not initiated a war against Hussain. 
 In his ongoing support for Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby argued to Britain that the general feeling in 
Najd was indignant; the people were victims of religious oppression and Ibn Sa‘ūd was 
unable to restrain the Wahhabi warriors from helping their brothers in Khurmah. 
Furthermore, in order to avoid conflict, Philby seems to have advised Ibn Sa‘ūd that 
Britain would appoint an equitable British commission in order to draw the boundary 
between Hejaz and Najd.27 Consequently, it can be assumed that Philby’s 
recommendation of arbitration over the disputed territory may be considered the 
primary factor in enhancing the power of Ibn Sa‘ūd and acquiring for him the legitimate 
right to rule the Khurmah oasis. 
At this juncture, the British authorities in Baghdad endorsed Philby’s opinion that 
Hussain should be restrained from any further attack against Khurmah. Acting on 
Philby’s report, the authorities in Baghdad exonerated Ibn Sa‘ūd from being 
responsible for hostile action and found it a good moment to increase the pressure on 
Hussain in order to preserve peace in the region. Hence, Philby proposed that an 
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appreciative message to support Ibn Sa‘ūd should be sent from the Secretary of State 
for India.28 Cox made the following comments on the basis of Philby’s telegram: 
This account seems to clear Ibn Sa‘ūd of aggressive action. Suggest that pressure 
should now be brought on Sharif [Hussain] to maintain peace as conflict with Akhwan 
element would seriously compromise efforts against Turks. If you concur would argue 
appreciative message from [the] Secretary of State to Ibn Sa‘ūd as Philby proposes.29 
In the view of the British officials in Cairo, it was clear that Hussain should be supported 
on the Khurmah issue and therefore it was decided that Philby should respond to Ibn 
Sa‘ūd that it was impossible to arbitrate the frontier because Khurmah was considered 
purely a matter of internal administration in relation to Hussain and there was no 
intention of taking hostile action against Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territories.30 Such instructions 
made it plain that Hussain had every right to repress Amir Khalid Ibn Luwai, the ruler of 
Khurmah, and that Ibn Sa‘ūd was not entitled to demand control of Khurmah. It also 
appears that Hussain was now provided with a green light to control the area.31 
In response, Ibn Sa‘ūd virtually rejected the new British message that authorized 
Hussain to occupy Khurmah, complaining that the district did not belong to the Hejaz 
and informing Philby that the Najdi people would not accept the British decision. He 
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also expressed his full readiness to meet Hussain to resolve the fate of the disputed 
territory.32 
In July 1918, Hussain decided to discipline the insurgents and to drive Khalid Ibn Luwai 
out of Khurmah. He commanded Sharif Shakir Ibn Zaid33 to occupy Khurmah, but his 
force was crushed for the third time by the Amir Khalid Ibn Luwai.34  It was obvious 
after these triumphs that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s strength in Khurmah had increased rapidly, 
ignoring the British instructions that he must withdraw his supporters from the 
disputed region.  
Such a victory by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s followers in Khurmah had a negative impact on the British 
officials in Cairo, who seemed in consequence to put more pressure on the authorities 
in Baghdad. Their efforts were particularly successful in the absence of Percy Cox, who 
tended to exercise an impartial policy in Arabia. Philby was distinctly instructed to 
deliver a message to Ibn Sa‘ūd that he should renounce his claim of entitlement to 
Khurmah and should also put a stop to the extreme actions of his followers.35 
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Khalid Ibn Luwai to Ibn Sa‘ūd , 7 July 1918,MECA, Philby collection, B.15/5. 
35




However, Philby dismissed the idea of conveying this message to Ibn Sa‘ūd, stating that 
it seemed equivocal and might let Ibn Sa‘ūd believe that Britain tended to side with the 
position of King Hussain. He added, however, that he could persuade Ibn Sa‘ūd to 
prevent his followers from taking action against Hussain’s forces.36 Philby’s behaviour 
may appear inscrutable, but it may be inferred that it would be difficult for him to 
instruct Ibn Sa‘ūd to withdraw from Khurmah while the latter was vehemently insisting 
that the district lay under his suzerainty. Furthermore, Philby may have believed that 
such a message would have a negative impact on the relations between Britain and Ibn 
Sa‘ūd. As a result, whatever the cause of his omitting to send a message of this kind, it 
essentially indicates that Philby played a profound role in the conflict between the two 
authorities (Baghdad and Cairo) and enhanced or consolidated the decision of Ibn Sa‘ūd 
to expand his territories by capturing Khurmah. Therefore, it seems that, given the right 
moment by Philby, Ibn Sa‘ūd indicated that he would not abandon Khurmah, affirming 
that he would not leave Amir Khalid Ibn Luwai his agent in Khurmah if the latter were 
attacked by Hussain. This is clear from his order to despatch 450 warriors to the 
disputed province as reinforcements.37 From these rapid developments on the ground, 
it appears that the British authorities in Cairo were forced to put further pressure on 
Ibn Sa‘ūd by issuing a resolution from H.M.G. that Ibn Sa‘ūd should be ordered to 
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withdraw his followers from Khurmah province. The Political Agent in Jeddah, Edward 
Wilson, urged the following action: 
H. M. G. must choose between [the] King [Hussain] and Ibn Saud, otherwise the 
Arabian barrier will probably become like Russia. I argue most strongly that the King be 
chosen and that peremptory message be sent immediately to Ibn Sa‘ūd from H.M.G., 
ordering him to withdraw all [the] Akhwan from Khurmah district , and, failing 
compliance, H.M.G. will break off relations with him.38 
A few days later, Clayton supported Wilson’s proposal and suggested that Ibn Sa‘ūd 
should be informed without delay of the new instructions and if he refused to abandon 
Khurmah, all possibilities of pressure, not only diplomatic pressure, should be imposed 
on him in order to teach him that he could not be in the state of contradicting the 
policy of the British Government.39 Acting on Wilson’s report, Wingate informed the 
British Government that the spread of the Wahhabi would pose a great threat to the 
Islamic places in the Hejaz and that Ibn Sa‘ūd should relinquish and withdraw from the 
whole neighbourhood of the Khurmah district. If he refused to comply, measures 
should be taken against him such as the stoppage of his subsidy and the blockade of his 
markets; and, more important, retaliatory military measures would be taken against 
him.40 
In order to relieve the pressure on Ibn Sa‘ūd, Philby made it clear that all Hussain’s 
actions against Ibn Sa‘ūd would not change the attitude of the inhabitants of Khurmah 
                                                          
38
 Wilson to Arab Bureau, 3 December 1918, TNA, FO 882/9. 
39
 Clayton’s notes, 10 December 1918, TNA, FO 882/9.  
40




toward King Hussain and they would not accept his suzerainty over them. In addition, 
Philby endeavored to present the issue legally on the side of Ibn Sa‘ūd. This can be 
observed when he indicated that, in the treaty which had been signed with Ibn Sa‘ūd in 
1915, the British Government acknowledged his independence. According to articles 
two and seven of the treaty, Britain was obliged to defend Ibn Sa‘ūd from any 
aggression and to include a further detailed treaty to determine the boundaries of the 
territory.41 
The treaty shows impartially, under examination, that article two promised that in the 
case of unprovoked aggression by any foreign powers, Britain would be prepared to 
defend and protect Ibn Sa‘ūd to the extent and in the way that conditions might 
require. Furthermore, article six instructed Ibn Sa‘ūd to abstain from all aggression in 
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the coast of Oman, which were under British protection, 
and in any territories that would be determined hereafter.42 However, while it was 
difficult to accept that article two did not apply to Hussain, who could be considered a 
‘foreign power’, Philby was able to exploit these articles in order to modulate the treaty 
in accordance with Ibn Sa‘ūd’s interests and he was therefore luckily able to persuade 
his superiors to amend the treaty in favour of Ibn Sa‘ūd. Regardless of whether or not 
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the British Government recognized Philby’s hard work, the following statement refers 
to the approval of the Baghdad authorities regarding Philby’s action: 
Bin Saud to be informed in writing that Article two of Treaty of December 26th 1915 
applies equally to aggression by King Hussain and that a special Commissioner will be 
sent by H. M. G. as soon as conditions admit to determine the boundaries of the 
territories referred to in Article one of the treaty and to conclude the further 
agreement referred to in Article seven.43 
Needless to say, it was obvious that Philby played a prominent role in stabilizing the 
position of Ibn Sa‘ūd and provided him with the legal right that he needed in Khurmah 
district. He also represented a stumbling-block to the efforts of the British officials in 
Cairo, who would never have given up their support for Hussain. 
The British authorities in both India and Iraq were still favouring Ibn Sa‘ūd. For instance, 
while Shuckburgh, a considerable figure at the India Office, accused Hussain of being to 
blame for the repercussions of the recent war in Khurmah, he described Ibn Sa‘ūd as 
being right in his allegation that there was an alteration in the British policy toward 
him.44 Sir Arthur Hirtzel45 made some crucial points before the British officials in Cairo 
who wanted to set Hussain up as a prominent leader in the Arab world. First, he 
suggested that there was no Arab chief in Arabia and that Iraq would recognise 
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Hussain’s suzerainty over the whole of the Arab territories.46 Second, and more 
importantly, he pointed out that the establishment of a strong Arab State would be a 
more serious threat than that of the Ottoman Empire, which would encourage the 
nationalists and be an incitement to millions of Muslims in India and Egypt who were 
under British rule.47 In addition, in order to support ibn Sa‘ūd, Hirtzel claimed that Ibn 
Sa‘ūd had been given little justice by the British authorities in Cairo and Wingate’s 
proposal that Ibn Sa‘ūd should be compelled to withdraw his followers from Khurmah 
was not practicable.48  
At any rate, with regard to the authorities in Baghdad, Cox accepted Philby’s report 
that, although Ibn Sa‘ūd had received substantial provocation from Hussain, he showed 
great endurance and restraint.49  In addition, it was indicated that the insistence of 
Hussain over Khurmah would not only lead to increasing hostility but would also shake 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s confidence in the sincerity of Britain’s intentions toward him.50 
Influenced by Wilson’s report, Wingate realized that Philby might be considered as a 
thorny obstacle to the success of the Cairo authority’s policy in Arabia. Therefore, it 
was no surprise that Wingate requested, as replacement for Philby, the appointment of 
Lieut-Col. Leachman, who had a comprehensive knowledge of tribal affairs.51 However, 
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Wingate’s proposal did not succeed because Philby had previously decided with Ibn 
Sa‘ūd that he had to go to Kuwait and Baghdad in order to defend Ibn Sa‘ūd.52 
 
Philby and the meeting of the Inter-Departmental Conference 
It was plain that the contradictory policies from Cairo and Baghdad had turned 
Khurmah, a minor village, into a critical issue in the history of Arabia. This is evidenced 
by the decision that the Khurmah dispute should be handled by an Inter-Departmental 
Conference that replaced the Eastern Committee in 1919.53 Silverfarb observed that 
Lord Curzon, the acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had a pivotal effect on 
British policy in the Arabian Peninsula and it seems that he showed sympathy with the 
Indian view of Ibn Sa‘ūd. He was the most important opponent of the British officials’ 
proposition that the British Government should provide Hussain with absolute 
leadership of the Arab peoples. However, although Curzon showed support for Ibn 
Sa‘ūd he was forced to follow the British officials in Cairo; they were entirely upheld by 
the British government in supporting Hussain in the boundary dispute with Ibn Sa‘ūd.54 
The meeting of the Inter-Departmental Conference was held on 14 January 1919. 
Curzon submitted that it would show wisdom to ignore the rivals as much as possible 
but he feared the damage that might be inflicted by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s forces in the Holy 
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Places in Hejaz. This being the case Hussain should be provided only with the assistance 
of munitions. In general, for the moment, the meeting concluded that no necessary 
action need be taken by HMG55 
At this juncture, in January 1919, Philby returned to England to take some leave after 
more than ten years in the East. From his autobiography, it can be seen that, after 
working in Iraq and Arabia he had no desire to settle down in a career in the ICS.56 The 
state of frustration that Philby experienced may have been linked to several factors. 
First, the state of manifest controversy and conflict between the two authorities in 
Cairo and Baghdad, who could not reach a satisfactory solution among the Arab rulers, 
affected him badly. Second, when the war against the Turks was over, Philby left Arabia 
for Iraq but found no supporter such as Percy Cox. He found instead Arnold Wilson, the 
Acting Civil Commissioner, who had had considerable disagreements with Philby owing 
to political competition.57 In addition, during Philby’s mission to Arabia, he was 
annoyed by the alteration of Wilson’s attitude toward Ibn Sa‘ūd and by the fact that 
Wilson had joined the Cairo officials who supported Hussain in the Khurmah dispute. As 
a result, in order to relieve the pressure upon him, Philby found that he had no better 
option than going on leave for a year. 
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Before the Inter-Departmental Conference held its second meeting on 24 February 
1919 to consider the disagreements between the two Arabian rulers, it seems that the 
supporters of Hussain and Ibn Sa‘ūd mobilized their staff in order to present their 
opinions. For example, while Curzon selected Philby to provide Baghdad’s point of 
view, Wingate and Clayton backed Wilson to present Cairo’s opinion.58 
At the Conference, Philby pointed to evidence that during his year in Arabia he had 
reported the aggressive moves of King Hussain’s forces against the inhabitants of 
Khurmah, who had managed to defend themselves. As he confidently stated, the case 
was complicated because of the demands of King Hussain, who tended to resolve the 
boundary dispute in his own favour.59 Philby again repeated his suggestion that a 
British mission should be sent to demarcate the boundary between Hejaz and Najd.60 
It seems that Philby believed that demarcation was an equitable solution for the two 
rivals; indeed, Ibn Sa‘ūd had previously agreed to the idea of demarcation. Moreover, 
Philby suggested that having good relations with Ibn Sa‘ūd, in particular since the war, 
was the most important consideration, because if Ibn Sa‘ūd felt there was British 
animosity he might incline to France or Italy.61 In fact, it seems that Philby exaggerated 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s willingness to approach France or Italy. At this stage, there seems no 
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documentary evidence to substantiate Philby’s view. The Saudi establishment of 
relations with France and Italy occurred after Ibn Sa‘ūd’s victory against Hussain and 
the elimination of the kingdom of Hejaz in 1925. Furthermore, at this juncture, it seems 
unlikely that Ibn Sa‘ūd would have inclined to France or Italy when he had signed a 
treaty with Britain in December 1915 that put him under British protection and he was 
not allowed to deal with any foreign powers without informing Britain. At any rate, in 
the view of Philby, if the British Government let the two great Arabian leaders fight, 
there was the dire risk of an invasion of Mecca by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s forces.62 Monroe in her 
book claims that the conference marked Philby’s opinion as not in accordance with the 
British policy.63 However, it should be remembered that the conference was under the 
influence of the British officials in Cairo and the Foreign Office some of whose members 
were entirely on the side of King Hussain, as is shown below. 
At all events, Wingate responded to Philby’s submission opinion by saying that 
Khurmah was part of Hussain’s kingdom and he firmly believed that Hussain could 
easily crush the latter.64 He also rejected Philby’s proposal for a boundary commission. 
However, in the interests of imposing a peaceful settlement in the region, Wingate 
proposed a solution which was immediately to stop Ibn Sa‘ūd’s monthly subsidy until 
Hussain restored his suzerainty over Khurmah and all movement by Najdi warriors 
toward the Hejaz had stopped. It was also suggested that if Ibn Sa‘ūd did not acquiesce 
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in this arrangement the Anglo-Najdi treaty could be rescinded and his eastern ports 
could be besieged.65 
It was evident that, while Curzon agreed with Wingate’s objection to Philby’s 
suggestion of a boundary commission, he was not convinced by Wingate’s proposal 
that the British government should exert more pressure on Ibn Sa‘ūd to leave the 
Khurmah district. He concluded the conference by reaffirming the resolution made on 
14 January 1919 that Britain should not intervene between the two contenders and 
informed the authorities in Cairo and Baghdad of this decision.66 
Daniel Silverfarb claims that such a decision did not meet the desire of the British 
authorities in Cairo or Baghdad. While it did not arrange the boundary commission that 
Philby desired, it still did not compel Ibn Sa‘ūd to withdraw from Khurmah.67 This claim 
seems to be valid and it should be borne in mind that Curzon’s resolution was 
practically in favour of Ibn Sa‘ūd. To tell the truth, it not only allowed Ibn Sa‘ūd to keep 
control of  Khurmah, but also, by failing to insist on his withdrawal from disputed 
territory, it could be seen as legitimizing his possession of  Khurmah, which enhanced 
his overall power in the region. 
With regard to the attitude of the British officials in Cairo, it appears that they rejected 
Curzon’s decision. Clayton in Cairo, for example, stated that Britain should back Hussain 
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against the Wahhabi infringement and thus show Ibn Sa‘ūd that Britain held the power 
in the region.68 However, the surprise came from Iraq, where the officials had always 
shown a tendency to support Ibn Sa‘ūd. In opposition to the British officials in Iraq, 
Arnold Wilson changed his attitude to Ibn Sa‘ūd and stated that Hussain should retrieve 
and restore his authority in Khurmah. He also suggested an immediate end of Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s subsidy. He was anxious lest the Ikhwan movement should prove a threat to 
Mecca and the routes of Muslim pilgrimage.69 This changed view was sustained for the 
next few months and he later still believed that Khurmah was part of the Hejazi district. 
He had written: 
The Emir Ibn Saud claims that Khurmah is within the boundaries of his Emirate of Najd. 
As far as I am aware, practically no evidence has been produced by Ibn Saud to 
substantiate his claim. All evidence … is unanimous on the point that [the] Khurmah 
district for generations has been under the jurisdiction of the Emirs of Mecca.70 
Silverfarb has examined the reasons behind Wilson’s alteration toward Ibn Sa‘ūd. First, 
he suggested that Wilson might have been under the influence of the British 
authorities in Cairo, given that Wilson had visited Cairo not long before. Second, Wilson 
seemed to be infuriated that he had not been consulted in the policy-making by the 
Inter-Departmental Conference.71 Silverfarb’s suggestion appears to be logical but it 
should be noted that Monroe provided important accounts of Wilson’s apparent 
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dissatisfaction with Philby’s reports of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s affairs. He believed that Philby’s 
enthusiasm for Ibn Sa‘ūd was extravagant and his judgement of the ruler lacked 
objectivity, due to his long immersion in Arabian affairs during his tour of duty.72 
Consequently, it may be assumed that their previous unpleasant relationship and the 
difference of political views between Philby and Wilson in 1917-1919 may have played 
a negative part in forming Wilson’s attitude to the affair of Najd and Ibn Sa‘ūd, its 
ruler.73 
Wilson’s opinion was condemned by the India Office, which believed that such 
behaviour on his part would alienate Ibn Sa‘ūd from the British cause.74 However, it 
seems that the great impact of the British authorities in Cairo and now Baghdad were 
the fundamental reasons persuading Curzon to discuss the issue again at the Inter-
Departmental Conference.75 
The meeting was held on 10 March 1919 and, to no-one’s surprise, Wingate gave it his 
full support. He continued his advocacy of Hussain, repeating his suggestion that Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s subsidy should be interrupted. He added that there was no advantage in having 
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a boundary commission and that Khurmah should be ceded to Hussain.76 Al- Zaydey 
describes Wingate as ʻthe enemy of arbitration’. He assumes that the prime reason 
behind Wingate’s rejection of it was that Wingate feared that it would allow Khurmah 
to be awarded to Ibn Sa‘ūd because its residents were principally Wahhabi adherents.77 
Such a concern seems reasonable. However, it should not be forgotten that some 
sections of the inhabitants of Khurmah, called Subai, were located in Najd, and 
concentrated in Ramah, a village 74 miles to the north east of Riyadh.78 Therefore, 
Wingate’s fear of arbitration may not have rested on religious reasons only, as stated 
above, but may have had a tribal element. This may have been another factor that 
would provide Ibn Sa‘ūd with a strong argument in the case against Hussain if it came 
to arbitration. 
In the event, the policy of the India Office at the conference was to remain in favour of 
Ibn Sa‘ūd. Shuckburgh in particular asserted that the essential task was to restrain the 
Wahhabi from attacking the holy places in Hejaz. In addition, he argued that adopting 
Wingate’s proposal might exasperate the Wahhabi and, far from protecting the Holy 
Places, would increase the chances of their invading them.79 
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Once again, Curzon recalled Philby to attend the conference. It is noteworthy that 
Philby, aware of the conditions in Arabia, continued his defence of Ibn Sa‘ūd, asserting 
that the ending of his monthly subsidy would not disturb him at a time when he was 
also being ordered to withdraw from Khurmah. Moreover, Philby was convinced that 
Ibn Sa‘ūd was not able to abandon Khurmah easily. He repeated his argument that a 
British boundary commission should define the disputed frontier.80 
Ultimately, it seems that Philby for a while lost his battle, not only because of the 
domination of the British authorities in Cairo but because Curzon determined that 
Hussain should be authorized to seize Khurmah and that Ibn Sa‘ūd should be informed 
of the new decision, with a warning that any attempt to reject it would lead to the 
unmitigated displeasure of the British Government.81 Ahmed AL. Faiy’a claimed that 
Curzon was entirely on the side of Hussain.82 However, the minutes of the Inter-
Department show that Curzon refused to terminate Ibn Sa‘ūd’s subsidy, preferring to 
reduce it by half.83 This suggests that although Curzon was influenced by the 
representatives of the Cairo officials, he was able to save Ibn Sa‘ūd from having all his 
subsidy withdrawn, implying a policy of impartiality regarding the contending parties. 
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Before the end of the conference, Curzon asked Philby to assess Ibn Sa‘ūd’s attitude 
and forecast what was likely to occur when the Najdi ruler received the decision. Philby 
replied as follows: 
Well, Sir, I said, I have no doubt whatever that, when this message reaches Riyadh, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd will immediately mobilize his forces and march down to the defence of Khurmah 
… I have already told you my opinion of the probable result.84 
Hussain was delighted by the conference resolution and despatched a military force of 
about 5000 under the leadership of his son, the Amir Abdullah, in order to recapture 
Khurmah. He informed the Acting Political Agent in Jeddah that his son, Abdullah, had 
succeeded on 21 May 1919 in taking control of Turabah after a minor battle that had 
not lasted long and was now preparing to advance toward Khurmah.85 At the same 
time, as Philby predicted, Ibn Sa‘ūd began to counter Hussain’s preparations. First, he 
despatched reinforcements for his followers in Khurmah under the leadership of Sultan 
Ibn Bejad86 in order to defend and if possible consolidate his agent in Khurmah, Khalid 
Ibn Luwai. Second, Ibn Sa‘ūd marched toward Khurmah with about 12,000 warriors and 
camped in Sakphah, 80 miles to the north-east of it.87 
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It was clear that Ibn Sa‘ūd would not break his promise to support his followers in 
Khurmah yet he remained up to the last moment concerned to avoid a war against 
Hussain. He warned the British Government of the military operations against his 
followers, reasserting his desire for arbitration and justifying his movement toward 
Khurmah with the claim that pressure of public opinion obliged him to counter 
Hussain’s aggression. He promised that “If the King and [his son] Abdullah remain in 
their own place, I will remain in mine”.88 Such serious developments and the impending 
outbreak of warfare between the two Arabian chiefs obliged the Inter-Departmental 
Conference to hold another meeting on 28 May 1918 to debate the issue.89 Previously, 
the conference had received a telegram from General Allenby, who had now become 
the Acting High Commissioner in Egypt; he recommended that immediate action had to 
be taken to prevent a fateful battle between the two conflicting parties. He also 
pointed out that if Ibn Sa‘ūd defeated Hussain, the former would probably break into 
Mecca. He concluded his recommendations by stating that it was time for Britain to 
stand beside Hussain and support his demands against Ibn Sa‘ūd, who, in turn, should 
be warned that he must withdraw his troops from Khurmah. If he failed, his British 
subsidy should be cut off and his relations with Britain would be in a state of 
severance.90 In contrast, Philby firmly opposed Allenby’s suggestions for fear that they 
might prove fruitless. Once again, Philby argued that a British warning of this kind to 
Ibn Sa‘ūd would not force the latter to withdraw from Khurmah. Philby indicated that 
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Ibn Sa‘ūd considered that such withdrawal would reflect on his local prestige in the 
eyes of the Najdi people.91 
Despite being isolated at the conference and losing the support from Iraq, Philby 
remained steady in his extreme defence of Ibn Sa‘ūd, although he received no 
corroboration from the representative of the India Office, who was totally silent 
throughout the conference.92 Even worse, Philby’s opinion elicited sarcasm in 
particular from the representatives of the Cairo authorities. The conference was 
manifestly moving in favour of Hussain, most clearly when some members of the 
Foreign Office put forward a policy in his support and suggested that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
activities should be under a blockade while tanks should be despatched to Hussain in 
order to help him to victory.93 
However, none of these arrangements was accepted. Shuckburgh asserted that the 
policy of a blockade was arduous to implement in wartime.  He also rejected the idea of 
sending tanks to Hussain because, as he stated, Hussain had no personnel who could 
use these machines effectively.94 Eventually, Curzon ended the conference by stating 
that the British government was now in favour of Hussain and considered Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
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action hostile to H.M.G. If he refused to withdraw from Khurmah, he might lose all the 
benefits of the treaty that he had signed with Britain in December 1915.95 
However, the conference had hitherto known nothing about the unpleasant nocturnal 
events of 25th-26th May 1919. Without the participation of Ibn Sa‘ūd, the Ikhwan 
military under the leadership of Amir Khalid Ibn Luwai and Sultan Ibn Bejad 
substantially destroyed Abdullah’s regular forces, seizing all his guns and machine guns. 
Miraculously, Abdullah himself survived and at once fled with nothing but his life.96 
Some historical outcomes stemmed from this. In the first place, Philby’s experience 
enabled him to read the future confidently and he was entirely correct in forecasting 
that Ibn Sa‘ūd would easily beat Hussain. His prediction may have been accurate for 
several reasons. His long period in Arabia had allowed him to get very close to Ibn 
Sa‘ūd and comprehend the ruler’s insistence on regenerating and re-establishing the 
Wahhabi state. In addition, his mission to Najd had also enabled Philby to recognize the 
power that Ibn Sa‘ūd could depend on. It owed much to the high fighting capability of 
the Ikhwan. Second, Philby made the policy-makers who dealt with Arab affairs look 
blameworthy by obstinately refusing, in particular, to invite a British boundary 
commission which might have prevented a war between the two Arabian rulers. Third, 
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the outcome of the battle of Turabah not only led to greater power for Ibn Sa‘ūd in 
Khurmah but also added Turabah to his suzerainty. Fourth, and most importantly, the 
battle of Turabah proved that the assumption of Wilson, Allenby and Wingate that 
Hussain would easily crush Ibn Sa‘ūd was wholly inaccurate. Furthermore, the Hejazi 
cities were now open to let the Wahhabi fighters enter Mecca and a great many of the 
Hejazi people, in Turabah above all, preferred to be on the side of Ibn Sa‘ūd, perhaps 
due to his increased power or to fear of the Wahhabi soldiers.  
The impact of Hussain’s defeat on the British officials in Cairo was tremendous. The 
Political Agent in Jeddah, Colonel Wilson, was frightened that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s troops would 
extend their control and overrun all the territories of Hejaz; he suggested an immediate 
action to remove the large number of British Indians who were already denizens of 
Mecca and Jeddah. More importantly, he asked Allenby to send some of the British 
warplanes to Hejaz in order to impede Ibn Sa‘ūd’s onward march if it continued 
towards Mecca.97 However, the Government of India rejected Colonel Wilson’s 
request, indicating that the despatch of the warplanes to Hejaz, where Mecca was, 
might be considered to be disrespectful of Islam and increase the feeling of resentment 
on the part of the British Indian soldiers.98 Allenby ignored the Government of India’s 
warning and sent six aeroplanes with pilots to Hejaz for use in times of need. In order 
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to justify his behaviour he indicated that this action was in compliance with Hussain’s 
request to save Hejaz from the possible results of an incursion by the Wahhabi.99 
An Inter-Departmental Conference was held on 13 June to discuss these disturbing 
events in Arabia.100 The conference debated the issue of deploying Indian Muslim 
troops to Hejaz.  Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, strongly denounced 
such an action: 
The employment of Indian Mahommedan troops was the fear of unpleasant incidents, 
or even mutiny, amongst the Mahommedans of the Indian Army when they heard that 
Indian troops were being sent to support a Mahommedan chief [Hussain] who had 
rebelled against the Caliph.101 
 Allenby received a conciliatory message from Ibn Sa‘ūd, avowing that he had no 
intention of invading Hejaz and hoping that British arbitration would resolve the issues 
of the disputed territory. He also stated that Ibn Sa‘ūd had pledged to withdraw his 
forces to the internal lands of Najd if Britain assured him that Hussain’s military would 
not march forward to Khurmah. Moreover, Allenby recommended the establishment of 
negotiations between Ibn Sa‘ūd and the son of Hussain, Amir Abdullah.102 
It can be inferred from Allenby’s words that he had become less threatening and cruel 
to Ibn Sa‘ūd, perhaps because Allenby until then had not fully understood the power of 
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Ibn Sa‘ūd’s forces and the military tactics of the Ikhwan soldiers as Philby understood 
them. Consequently, it can be said that Ibn Sa‘ūd and Philby together led Allenby to 
moderate his harsh language and made him realize that Ibn Sa‘ūd’s military resources 
were stronger than those of his own man, Hussain.  
It seems that the recent developments in Arabia were not the main reason behind the 
Inter-Departmental Conference’s meeting on 17 June 1919; it was necessary also to 
discuss Allenby’s suggestion. However, the conference would not have taken place 
without the presence of Philby who was staying in Eastbourne at the time, writing his 
first travel book, The Heart of Arabia. He received an urgent message from the Foreign 
Office, asking him promptly to attend the conference.103 
Undoubtedly, Philby was now confident because his prediction of victory for Ibn Sa‘ūd 
had been vindicated. Curzon opened the conference by outlining the outcomes of the 
battle of Turabah and the state of widespread panic among the Hejazi inhabitants and 
asking what could be done to deter the Wahhabis if they advanced toward Hejaz.104 He 
requested Philby’s assessment. First, Philby criticized Allenby’s proposal, pointing out 
that his suggestion of a meeting between Ibn Sa‘ūd and Abdullah with their forces 
might lead to increased bloodshed if they were armed.105 This military reasoning seems 
to be valid, given the state of considerable enmity between the two sides. However, it 
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could be added that political reasons might strengthen objections to such a meeting, 
since Hussain would not agree to any negotiation with Ibn Sa‘ūd, whom he considered 
to be a subordinate.  
As an expert in Arabian affairs, Philby endeavored to ease the state of consternation 
among the attendants by stating that Ibn Sa‘ūd would not follow up his victory and 
move toward Hejaz; he had full ability to control his warriors and was too rational to 
place himself in the wrong with Britain by invading the Hejaz. In response to a question 
by Curzon about the measures that Britain might take to protect the Hejaz if the 
Wahhabi reached it, Philby suggested that first the Foreign Office should change the 
decision that had been made in the last meeting of the Inter-Departmental Conference, 
which was not at all in Ibn Sa‘ūd’s favour. Second, Philby proposed that Britain should 
accept Ibn Sa‘ūd’s tenure of Khurmah, but he should withdraw from Turabah, which 
was undoubtedly within the Hejazi boundary.106 
With these satisfactory solutions, as he saw them, combined with an invitation to the 
British boundary commission, Philby guaranteed that Ibn Sa‘ūd would be satisfied. In 
order to implement such arrangements on the ground, Philby proposed the despatch 
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of a messenger to tell Ibn Sa‘ūd the new proposals and also to encourage him to 
withdraw from the Hejaz region.107  Philby proposed himself as this envoy.108 
In the event, the conference preferred Philby’s recommendation to Allenby’s. Philby 
was requested to inform Ibn Sa‘ūd that if he halted his advance toward Turabah, then 
H.M.G. would arbitrate in the dispute between him and Hussain. Moreover, it was 
decided that Philby should fly to Cairo where he would temporarily be under Allenby’s 
instructions for the objective of the mission before meeting Ibn Sa‘ūd in Arabia.109 
From the resolution of the Interdepartmental Conference, Silverfarb observes that 
Britain abandoned its previous policy of supporting Hussain in his struggle to capture 
Khurmah. He also notes that Britain now preferred to negotiate with Ibn Sa‘ūd and 
eliminate the verdict of the British commission regarding Khurmah, which was now 
agreed to be on the side of Ibn Sa‘ūd.  He concludes that such a change in the British 
policy toward Ibn Sa‘ūd was due to concern to avoid any aggression that might occur in 
the future in the Holy Places of the Hejaz and also to impede any increase in the French 
influence in Arabia and the need of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s support for Britain in Iraq.110 However, 
what may be added in this case is that the British Government now realized the growth 
of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s power. Neither the cutting of his subsidy nor the threat of severing 
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relations with Britain would have much of an effect on him. In addition, the nature of 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s lands and their location might strengthen his position in central Arabia. 
Therefore, it seemed difficult, at this point, for the British army to involve itself in any 
military adventures in the Arabian Desert.  Consequently, in order to avoid such 
hazards and the embarrassment that might ensue, Britain altered all its previously 
harsh view of Ibn Sa‘ūd and found itself now in negotiations with the ruler of Najd, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd. 
As instructed, Philby prepared himself to meet Ibn Sa‘ūd. On 21 June 1919 he was 
taken by aircraft to Cairo.111 There he met Allenby who provided him with the further 
instruction that he must force Ibn Sa‘ūd to implement the conference’s decision and 
also persuade him not to perform the Pilgrimage this year because the emergence of 
the Wahhabi at Mecca would greatly exacerbate the issue. After three days of difficult 
weather, Philby arrived at Jeddah in early July 1919.112 
However, Philby could not meet Ibn Sa‘ūd because Hussain informed him that he was 
not permitted to proceed through the Hejazi provinces. Hussain also refused to debate 
the objectives of Philby’s mission, rejecting arbitration and asserting that Khurmah was 
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part of his territory.113 It was evident that he was not satisfied with the new British 
policy and would not negotiate while his antagonist was still in possession of Khurmah.  
Monroe claimed that Hussain’s refusal was the main factor in the disappointing end of 
Philby’s mission to Arabia.114 Such a claim seems logical, in particular because Hussain 
gave a misleading impression of having solved the issue both to the British Government 
and Ibn Sa‘ūd. It should be remembered, however, that while Philby was in Cairo, Ibn 
Sa‘ūd ordered his troops to return to Riyadh, as the Inter-Departmental Conference 
had decided, and proclaimed that he would not perform the Pilgrimage this year.115 
From this, one could have inferred that Philby’s proposal had succeeded and Ibn Sa‘ūd 
had met the desire of the British Government, at least when the danger of invasion by 
Ikhwan troops was ended by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s withdrawal.  
Philby and the mediation of the Najdi-Hejazi conflict 1924-1925 
Before dealing with Philby’s mediation regarding the collapse of the Hejazi kingdom, a 
brief historical sketch of the political conditions after the battle of Turabah between 
Najd and Hejaz should be provided. 
Britain did not lose hope of making peace between Najd, on the one hand, and the 
Hashemites in Hejaz, Iraq and Transjordan, on the other. It was decided in late 1922 to 
hold a conference in Kuwait to try to reach a satisfactory agreement between the 
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parties.116 After almost a year of discussions, Britain succeeded in persuading both 
sides to send delegates to the conference held on 17 December 1923, but Hussain 
refused to participate because he had not been consulted about these arrangements 
from the beginning. He sent his apologies for not attending the conference, under the 
pretext of lack of time.117 
Previously, Philby had been approached for his comments “on the draft of the 
instructions proposed to be issued to the president-elect of the Conference to enable 
him to guide the deliberations and decisions of the delegates in the direction desired 
by the British Government’’.118 Philby’s comments seem to have been highly critical, 
but this was not the only reason that the CO disregarded them. In fact, they were 
based on some unarguable facts. For instance, before holding the conference it had 
been decided that Ibn Sa‘ūd should restore Khurmah to Hussain. However, this 
undertaking would not only be refused by Ibn Sa‘ūd but it would also run counter to 
the British decision taken by the Inter-Departmental Conference on 17 June 1919, that 
Khurmah was to be on the side of Ibn Sa‘ūd.119 Hence, once again, Philby’s prediction 
regarding the failure of the conference came true and the conference ended without 
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any suitable agreement between the parties. In addition, Philby forecast that such a 
failure would result in the invasion of Hejaz by the Wahhabis within six months.120 
Consequently, it appears that Philby realized the crux of the matter. The demands that 
Hussain imposed on his two sons, over whom he had great influence, implied the 
following: that Ibn Sa‘ūd should abandon Khurmah and return Ḥail to its former ruler, 
Ibn Rashid; that Asir, the territory located in the south-west of Arabia, should be 
evacuated and restored to its original ruler; and that the Hejazi kingdom should receive 
compensation for the recent invasion of the Wahhabi.121 Indeed, Philby anticipated a 
great change in the map of Arabia because Ibn Sa‘ūd was determined to extend his 
territories to the north of Arabia. At present, they touched the southern borders of the 
Hashemites in Iraq and Transjordan. The Hejazi kingdom of Hussain was itself 
surrounded on the north, south and east by Ibn Sa‘ūd’s lands and it was only a matter 
of time, as Philby suggested, before Ibn Sa‘ūd included the Hejaz under his control 
before gaining control over the whole of Arabia.122 In addition, Philby clearly 
understood that Britain was beginning to lose patience with Hussain, who had become 
an obstacle; all attempts to induce him to accept the new general lines of British policy 
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in the Middle East had failed lamentably. As a result, Britain seems to have thought it 
wise to abandon Hussain, not least because Hussain’s sons, Abdullah and Faiṣal, 
showed full cooperation and consented to the British mandate in Transjordan and Iraq; 
Hussain himself was left to meet his fate with his sworn enemy, Ibn Sa‘ūd.123 
Therefore, the road now lay open to Ibn Sa‘ūd, whose followers entered Ṭaif on 6 
September 1924 and in the following month he managed to capture Mecca.124 Faced 
with this disaster, Hussain abdicated the throne in favour of his eldest son Ali, hoping 
that the latter could save the rest of the Hejazi kingdom. Hussain left Hejaz for Aqaba 
by British ship, but the British Government decided instead that he should be exiled to 
Cyprus in order to prevent any further conflicts between him and Ibn Sa‘ūd.125 
The reasons for Philby’s intervention 
At this stage, in April 1924, Philby resigned from Government service, but he remained 
a British official until May 1925 when his resignation would take effect, preferring to 
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use “the long terminal leave owed him” to go to London.126 While in London he learned 
that Ibn Sa‘ūd had driven Hussain out of Hejaz and was now preparing to besiege 
Jeddah, where Ali had organized the defences. Philby determined to enter Arabia in 
order to mediate between the conflicting parties.127 In fact, there were a variety of 
reasons for Philby to want to mediate in any conflict between the Hejazi and the Najdi. 
While Monroe and Halperin believed that Philby had nothing to do with the case of  
espionage when he had resigned from government service,128 Hammād claimed in his 
two books that Philby was still working as an undercover agent for his country and the 
real reason behind his desire to mediate was to eliminate the Hashimi presence in 
Hejaz.129 Hammād seems in fact to have had a negative view of British colonialism: his 
writings are mainly under the influence of nationalism and therefore this assumption 
on his part was unwarranted. In her book, Spies in Arabia, Priya Satia believes that 
Philby, like any British official, was an intelligence officer or informal spy during WWI 
and in the post war period.130 However, regarding Philby’s mediation, she indicates to 
the Guardian that Philby visited Arabia to mediate between King Ali and Ibn Sa‘ūd and 
that Philby acted as a government agent on that visit. She states: 
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Philby’s shifting status posed an equal problem. When he attempted to go to Najd to 
mediate between Ibn Saud and Hussain131 as a private individual just after leaving 
government service in 1924, the Middle East Department could only futilely contradict 
the press statement that he was going as a government representative, for precisely 
such private and unofficial relationships had been the mainstay of official interactions 
with Arabian potentates in the past. Their démentis were considered newsworthy only 
in the Guardian.132 
From the above, although Satia does not explicitly state that Philby was a spy, she 
implies that there is certainly some ambiguity or even some suspicion about his 
relations with the Arabian delegates, especially when the public/press had already 
decided that Philby’s visit was in an official capacity rather than a private one and the 
government could only futilely contradict the purpose of Philby’s venture in a press 
statement. However, neither Satia nor the Guardian could provide documentary 
evidence to substantiate their claim that Philby was a spy, least of all when Philby had 
officially resigned. Therefore, it can be argued that, Philby was not in the end 
authorized by the British Government to mediate in this conflict but, as it happens, he 
would have been unwelcome there. The following statement reveals how the British 
Government prevented Philby from visiting Arabia: 
I beg to inform you that His Majesty’s Government, having heard of your proposal to 
come to Jeddah, have instructed me to inform you that in view of the unsettled state of 
central Arabia they cannot permit you to enter the interior.133 
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It might be argued that the above telegram could have been sent if Britain had wanted 
Philby’s spying kept secret, even if he had been an undercover agent. However, the 
author went to the National Archives and the British Library and also explored Philby’s 
collection at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University, and found that there was no 
indication of secret letters between Philby and his government to suggest that he was 
involved in espionage especially after Philby’s request to resign from the service in April 
1924. In addition, the above documentary evidence shows that Philby was not a British 
envoy and also indicates, at this juncture in particular, that he did not have any official 
mission since he had resigned from the British service five months before. However, 
the question that should be asked is, ‘If Philby was so vehemently warned off by the 
British government, why did he venture to approach Naji al-Aṣail,134 King Ali’s agent in 
London, to arrange a visit to Hejaz?’ Perhaps there were both primary and secondary 
reasons for doing so. The essential reason pertains to the difficult conditions that Philby 
experienced after leaving the British service. He believed that the best way to get out 
of his economic predicament was to fall back on commerce. His letter to Ibn Sa‘ūd 
illustrates Philby’s desire to work in Arabia and, more importantly, it reveals that the 
letter was written before Ibn Sa‘ūd’s invasion of Hejaz. Philby stated: 
Your Highness knows that I have resigned from all my official posts for the love of your 
people and on the basis that I do not agree with British foreign policy in your Arab 
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country … Concerning these personal matters, you know that before the recent 
happenings in Hejaz I had written a letter informing you that I was coming to see you 
and I have proposed through Abdulatif al Mandil135 some commercial ideas and my 
intention was to consult you about these matters.136 
Regarding the secondary reasons, it may be speculated that Philby was perhaps in a 
state of frustration, after his resignation in particular, when his views were not 
appreciated by the British officials. He may have believed that his mediation would 
prove his ability to create a mutually satisfactory settlement between the contending 
parties. In addition, the craving for celebrity and personal fame may have been another 
factor that led Philby to seek entry into Arabia. Before the invasion of Hejaz, Philby had 
consented to join Rosita Forbes,137 in order to explore the Rubʼ al Khali (the Empty 
Quarter), the greatest desert in Arabia, and he probably thought that Forbes’ proposal 
would revive his old project of gaining fame by exploring such a little-known area, 
which was beyond the experience of any Western traveller.138 
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Whatever the motivation, Philby and Forbes decided to leave England secretly and 
separately and to meet in Bahrain and travel onwards in the hope of meeting Ibn Sa‘ūd 
in central Arabia. However, when Forbes learned that Ibn Sa‘ūd would be too busy to 
support their enterprise, she hesitated and then cancelled her plan, but Philby did not 
lose hope that Ibn Sa‘ūd would support him in his project and therefore travelled on 
towards Arabia. In Egypt, he telegraphed Ali offering his assistance as mediator and 
was welcomed and received by the king in Jeddah on 24 October 1924.139 It was 
evident that Philby’s adventure had caused a great stir and put Britain in an awkward 
position, not least because Britain had taken a neutral position in the conflict between 
Hejaz and Najd. The following lines illustrate the further effort to warn Philby and 
prevent him from entering Arabia: 
I am directed by His Majesty's Government to warn you that they cannot permit you to 
enter Central Arabia in view of the present conditions there. Any disobedience of these 
or any orders issued by His Majesty' Government will be viewed by them in a serious 
light.140 
In addition, Britain informed Ibn Sa‘ūd and Ali that Philby had no official standing to 
negotiate with either of them.141 However, Philby ignored the British instruction and 
advised Ali that the only solution for him, bearing in mind the weakness of Jeddah’s 
defence force, was to drive to Mecca and throw himself on the mercy of Ibn Sa‘ūd; this 
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would be the only way of  preventing bloodshed.142 In the meantime, Philby had to 
return to England. Monroe and other historians claim that the British Government 
warned Philby again and threatened that if he pursued his venture into the interior he 
might be exposing himself to the loss of his pension.143 That the British threat ended 
the first part of Philby’s adventure may be true. However, it seems that there were 
additional reasons for his return to England. First, after negotiating with Ali, Philby 
wrote to Ibn Sa‘ūd, who was still travelling towards Mecca, asking to mediate between 
him and Ali, but Ibn Sa‘ūd refused this offer, stating that the issue was an Islamic 
problem only. In a polite letter, Ibn Sa‘ūd reminded him: 
You mentioned that you came to us to discuss some personal matter – you hinted at 
the current problem. My dear sir, if you come to meet us and discuss some of the 
personal problems that concern us, you will be most welcome and we are ready to 
meet. But if you intend to interfere in the affairs of the Hejaz, I do not see that these 
discussions would be of any use … My dear Philby, it is not in my personal interests nor 
in yours to make you a mediator in such an Islamic matter.144 
The second compelling reason for Philby to leave Hejaz was his exposure to the serious 
illness of dysentery, which rendered him helpless for a couple of days. He then decided, 
on 3 January 1925, to sail to Aden for expert treatment before returning to England.145 
However, after recovering and spending several months in England, Philby determined 
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 A letter (in Arabic) from Ibn Sa‘ūd to Philby, 25 December 1924, MECA, Philby collection, B.15/5. 
145




to return. Philby and Ibn Sa‘ūd’s discussed the siege of Jeddah and, more importantly, 
the establishment of the Sharqieh Company.146 Brown at this point makes a serious 
accusation against Philby and portrays his meeting with Ibn Sa‘ūd as an act of 
espionage in Ibn Sa‘ūd’s favour, in that Philby delivered some military information 
about Ali’s forces, which were “in a military sense, quite incapable of putting up any 
serious opposition … the great majority of the people would be only too glad to see an 
end put to their suffering and hopeless situation.”147 
In response to this allegation, it may be noted that Brown is quoting here from Philby’s 
autobiography but has manipulated the words in order to accuse Philby.148 In addition, 
before the last visit of Philby to Jeddah, it was clear and well known, not only to Ibn 
Sa‘ūd but also to Britain and public opinion in Hejaz, that the military position of Ali was 
very weak and it was merely a matter of time before the latter would surrender to Ibn 
Sa‘ūd, after the collapse of all the cities of Hejaz and the secession of numerous Hejazi 
soldiers to Ibn Sa‘ūd’s forces.149 It is plain, then, that Philby did not play a significant 
role in the elimination of the Hejazi state; the ultimate victory of Ibn Sa‘ūd was a 
matter of course.  
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At any rate, Philby decided to leave Jeddah to Port Sudan and await the final verdict on 
the destiny of Hejazi kingdom. Ali came to a decision to leave the throne on 17 
December 1925 and Ibn Sa‘ūd therefore entered Jeddah and dominated the greater 
part of the Arabian Peninsula. He was now ready to develop his country with the 
assistance of Philby, who decided, in return, to settle there.150 
Overview 
The chapter showed that the religious factor was not the only reason behind Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s claim to include Khurmah in his territory. Political and tribal aspects might be 
considered further factors.  In addition, King Hussain’s allegation about the ownership 
of Khurmah was based not only on its proximity to his kingdom or the fact that some of 
its inhabitants were members of his branch of the family, but also on his fear of the 
spread of Wahhabi influence that might menace the Hejazi tribes in his kingdom. 
In order to maintain peace in Arabia between the British allies during the war against 
the Ottoman, the chapter concludes that Philby was able to persuade Ibn Sa‘ūd to take 
up a defensive position. This was perhaps a crucial factor in his defence of Khurmah. 
However, the chapter has demonstrated that the conflict between King Hussain and 
Ibn Sa‘ūd was more complicated than this, because of the collision of their rival political 
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aspirations to rule the same territory and the controversy created by what is called 
“the crisis of Khurmah”. 
Obviously Philby derived some benefits from defending Ibn Sa‘ūd’s case. First, Cox’s 
support may be considered crucial in enhancing Ibn Sa‘ūd’s attitude to Khurmah. 
Second, Ibn Sa‘ūd’s political project, which was to win independence, unlike that of 
King Hussain, who desired to take over the whole of the Ottoman Empire in the Near 
East, coincided with the policy of the India Office, who desired to keep the remnants of 
the Ottoman Empire under British occupation.     
The chapter revealed why Ibn Sa‘ūd took no offensive action against King Hussain. First, 
he recognized that such action would place him in a difficult position with Britain, 
which was in urgent need of the services of King Hussain who had led the Arab revolt 
against the Turks. Second, during WWI, Ibn Sa‘ūd had suffered from the great threat to 
his region from the Ajman tribe. Third, on the advice of Philby, Ibn Sa‘ūd wanted to 
prove to Britain that he had not been the one to initiate the conflict between Hussain 
and himself. 
Regarding Philby, it is plain that he played a vital role in the conflict. His proposal to 
send a British boundary commission may be seen an essential pillar to strengthen Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s position in preserving the Khurmah oasis. In addition, Philby was perhaps right 
to ignore the message from the Cairo authorities to instruct Ibn Sa‘ūd to relinquish 




Britain. However, such negligence fuelled Ibn Sa‘ūd’s obstinacy and gave him more 
time by despatching reinforcements to Khurmah. Furthermore, Philby found himself in 
a serious dilemma when he confronted Wingate, Colonel Wilson and Allenby and 
demolished their plan to impose a pro-Hussain policy in Arabian affairs. In addition, by 
referring to the 26 December 1915 treaty, Philby was able to persuade the authorities 
in Baghdad to reconsider Ibn Sa‘ūd’s boundaries. It was helpful to Ibn Sa‘ūd that he 
could consider King Hussain’s aggression to be like any other assault by a foreign 
power, and therefore he felt legally entitled to seize the Khurmah oasis 
It was clear that the unpleasant relations between Philby and Arnold Wilson exerted 
influence on the crisis in Khurmah, in which Wilson was persuaded to side with King 
Hussain. The chapter also reveals that Wingate’s objection to the idea of arbitration 
was not only that he feared that the inhabitants of Khurmah were Wahhabi but also 
due to the fact that a great number of the Khurmah tribes were living in other parts of 
Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territory.    
In the several meetings of the Inter-Departmental Committee, Philby’s conception of 
Arabian affairs was more accurate than those of the other participants, who were 
mostly supporters of King Hussain. Philby’s perception regarding Ibn Sa‘ūd’s victory was 
rational and realistic, perhaps owing to his long experience of local conditions, where 
he was able to absorb that Ibn Sa‘ūd possessed the strong backing of the warriors of 




The chapter concluded that the battle of Turabah had several outcomes. In the first 
place, the battle proved that the British officials in Egypt were mistaken about the 
power of King Hussain’s forces. Second, after capturing Turabah, the Wahhabi could 
use the roads to break into the Hejazi cities.  Third, after the great victory of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
forces, some of the Hejazi tribe proclaimed themselves loyal to Ibn Sa‘ūd, partly 
because he now had even greater power than before and partly out of fear of the 
Wahhabi soldiers. In addition, the battle forced Allenby to realize the power of Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s forces. He was also obliged to moderate his harsh treatment and to be more 
temperate and quieter toward him. 
Philby seems to have achieved his aim when the meeting of the Inter-Departmental 
Conference adopted his proposal that Khurmah should be ceded to Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
Moreover, the conference rejected Allenby’s proposal that a meeting should held 
between the two rivals and agreed with Philby’s objection that such a meeting would 
probably add to the bloodshed. In addition to the military reasons suggested by Philby, 
it can be inferred that political reasons may have discouraged the meeting, given that 
King Hussain would not agree to negotiate with someone whom he considered a 
subordinate. 
The chapter illustrated that political and religious reasons, which was the need of Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s support in Iraq and the fear of invasion of the holy places by the Wahhabi, were 




military reason that it was difficult for Britain to entertain any military adventures in 
the desert of Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
The chapter revealed that Philby’s comments regarding the Kuwait conference were 
rational and his perception that the conference would meet with failure turned out to 
be true. This was because of the alteration in the British policy towards Ibn Sa‘ūd, to 
whom the Khurmah territory had been ceded, but now, according to the Protocols of 
the Kuwait Conference, it was suggested that it had taken the side of King Hussain. 
It is plain that two major occurrences helped Philby to predict the invasion and the 
triumph of Ibn Sa‘ūd over the Hejazi state. The first is related to Ibn Sa‘ūd’s increased 
power and ensured his complete control over most of Arabia. The second is connected 
to the change in the British policy toward Hussain, who refused to accept the British 
and French mandates and therefore to sign the Anglo-Hejazi treaty, which caused 
Britain to decide to take up a neutral position in the Najdi- Hejazi conflict. 
The claim that Philby was a spy and was working in Britain’s interests to destroy the 
Hejazi kingdom seems untenable. The documentary any evidence contradicts any such 
claim and demonstrates that the British Government was entirely opposed to Philby’s 
visit and his mediation between the conflicting parties. 
The chapter illustrated that there were both fundamental and secondary causes behind 
Philby’s venture into Arabia. Documentary evidence suggests that economic factors 




from financial difficulties. It also shows that Philby communicated with Ibn Sa‘ūd after 
his resignation, and, more to the point, before the invasion of Hejaz, proposing some 
ideas for economic projects. Political reasons may be considered in addition, but they 
are not as important. It is likely that Philby, after his resignation, thought that he should 
enjoy the same political glory as others and that his chance would lie in mediation, 
which would let him prove to his country that his abilities should not be ignored. 
Moreover, searching for fame and registering his name on the list of famous travellers 
may have been a further secondary factor, tempting him to explore The Empty Quarter, 
the great desert to the south of Arabia. 
The chapter also concluded that the British threat against Philby was not the only 
reason for which he returned to England. There were also Ibn Sa‘ūd’s rejection of 
Philby’s offer to mediate and the severe attack of dysentery, both of which may have 
been further reasons for his going back to Britain. In addition, the chapter has 
established that Philby had no decisive influence on the collapse of the Hejazi state, 
which was at its last gasp in any case. 












The purpose of this chapter is to examine Philby’s efforts with regard to the 
government of Saudi Arabia. It examines how Philby helped to bring American 
recognition to Saudi Arabia. It seeks to recognize the methods that Philby used to fulfil 
this purpose. It will discuss the accusation that he betrayed his country by securing the 
oil concession for the US instead of Britain and looks for evidence that would exonerate 
him. The chapter also deals with Philby’s actions in the Idrisi’ revolt against King Ibn 
Sa‘ūd and asks what methods Philby suggested to help the king settle political 
conditions for his people. It endeavours to understand what prompted Philby’s mission 
to the southern boundaries of the kingdom and what made him visit Yemen. Finally it 
focuses on his contribution in the Buraimi crisis between Britain and Saudi Arabia and 
shows the arguments by which Philby strengthened the Saudi opposition to Britain’s 
demands and the main reasons that lay behind what Philby saw as the Saudi claim to 
Buraimi.  
Philby and the American recognition of Saudi Arabia 
In 1927, after the unification of most of the regions of Arabia, Ibn Sa‘ūd decided to 
change the title of his lands and seek recognition as the Kingdom of Najd and Hejaz, 
giving him the official title of ‘King of Hejaz, Najd and its Dependencies’.1 It must be 
admitted that the fundamental extension of Arabia increased the domain of its king 
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and his status generally rose, in particular after the capture of the two holy cities, 
Mecca and Madina. But Saudi Arabia could have no relations with any foreign country 
unless the king abandoned the British-Najdi treaty of 1915, which had forbidden all 
contact with foreign powers.2 Therefore, in 1927, after a series of conversations, Britain 
sent its representative, Gilbert Clayton,3 to negotiate with King Ibn Sa‘ūd; he managed 
to conclude an agreement, called the Treaty of Jeddah, which provided Ibn Sa‘ūd with 
British recognition for his sovereignty, extending from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf.4 
The Treaty of Jeddah paved the way for King Ibn Sa‘ūd to enjoy freedom of 
communication with every foreign state and then to establish European legations in his 
kingdom. 
Although Britain, France, the Netherlands and the Soviet Union had recognized Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s authority, the US hesitated at first to follow suit. The first contact between 
them occurred on 28 September 1928, when Fouad Ḥamza,5 the Saudi Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, contacted the American Legation in Cairo, asking for diplomatic 
recognition of the new kingdom in Arabia. Ultimately, the Department of State refused, 
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commenting that it was not suitable, at the present, to set up diplomatic relations but 
that the request would be taken into consideration in the future.6 
However, after his resignation from the British service when he had started to receive 
his pension in 1925 and after his failure to mediate between Ibn Sa‘ūd and King Ali, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, Philby, after discussing commercial matters with Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
who agreed to invest in Arabia at Philby’s instigation, left Arabia for London .7 In 
London, Philby met some English entrepreneurs who negotiated an investment in 
Arabia. It was decided to establish the Sharqieh Company Ltd. on 20 November 1925 
and to appoint Philby as Resident Director of the company in Jeddah. Philby left London 
for Jeddah in October 1926.8 Between 1926 and 1929, he ventured into such 
businesses as selling soap, searching for a gold mine, transportation and the minting of 
coins.9 However, even while becoming a businessman, politically he also became an 
unofficial adviser to Ibn Sa‘ūd who used him to implement political projects, as is 
shown below. 
In Arabia, Philby took full responsibility and put every effort into developing relations 
between Ibn Sa‘ūd and the Americans. Philby quite reasonably surmised that relations 
between them would not develop unless they had a commercial basis. Therefore, as 
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the director of the Sharqieh Company Ltd. in Jeddah, Philby began a full 
correspondence with the American Legation in Aden. This correspondence, which is 
held in the Middle East Centre in Oxford, illustrates how Philby sought to attract 
American companies to invest in the new kingdom by telling them of the stability of Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s regime and the major strides it had made and assuring them that American 
companies would have great opportunities to share privileges.10 
However, while Philby was offering interesting commercial projects, he never forgot to 
repeat the Saudi request for American recognition. In a letter to the American Vice-
Consul in Aden, Philby wrote: 
Since those days the Hejaz under its new regime has made great strides in a 
progressive direction and only quite recently it has forwarded an official letter to the 
United Sates Government asking for its formal recognition. It would be a very good 
thing if you could do anything to help in that direction as your country is easily first in 
the commercial fields in these parts thanks to your motor-car factories with which 
none can compete.11 
It is evident that Philby made further major efforts in order to obtain American 
recognition for the new regime. Examples of this are his expanded communications 
with Americans and his visit to the American Legation in Cairo, meeting with the 
American Consul and requesting to open relations. Clearly the most important 
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achievement would be the American recognition of the Kingdom of Hejaz and Najd.12 In 
addition, on 29 December 1929, Philby sent a letter to George Wadsworth,13 the 
American Minister in Cairo, indicating some crucial occurrences which might help to 
justify the resumption of Saudi-American negotiations. In the first place, Philby 
asserted that the US had declared that the first of its concerns was to have world 
peace, which ought to encourage the establishment of cordial relations with all 
countries. The second occurrence was the British Government’s decision which 
changed the status of its former diplomatic Agency in the kingdom of Hejaz and Najd to 
the full status of a legation; such diplomatic promotion distinctly indicated the British 
recognition of King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s authority.14 The third piece of evidence that Philby 
pointed out to Wadsworth was that some countries such as France and Persia had 
raised their diplomatic representation to a Legation and soon the primary powers in 
Jeddah would have their own legations as well. Last, in his letter, Philby expressed his 
surprise that, while trade between the two countries had increased in the last few 
years, there was, in fact, no American legation in the kingdom of Hejaz and Najd.15 
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Evidently Philby put forward some persuasive arguments for America to recognise Ibn 
Sa‘ūd’s kingdom. The first sign of success came when the American Consul in Cairo 
advised the Department of State, in January 1930, that it was necessary for the US to 
acknowledge the sovereignty of the kingdom of Hejaz and Najd and establish 
diplomatic relations with it. In addition, according to Philby’s account, the American 
Consul had a growing conviction of the permanency of King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s government, 
suggesting that a simple treaty of friendship should be signed between the two 
countries which would provide “the possibility of an exchange of diplomatic and 
consular representatives”.16 However, on 23 February 1930, the American Minister of 
Foreign Affairs replied that relations between the two countries would be limited to 
the economic field only.17 
It appears that Philby never gave up the quest to obtain American recognition. As the 
representative of the Ford Company in Jeddah, he may have advised King Ibn Sa‘ūd to 
stop importing motor-cars from this company; such pressure may have made the US 
reconsider the issue of recognition. At all events, as some historians have suggested, 
the State Department informed Ibn Sa‘ūd’s minister in London, Hafiz Wāhbāh,18 that 
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the US was willing to enhance its diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.19 From the 
above, it can be assumed that, although the US, at this juncture, had not opened its 
legation in Jeddah, Philby’s intense efforts – communicating with American diplomats, 
supplying them with information about the stability of King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s regime and 
enticing American companies to invest in the kingdom by means of commercial 
projects – were making the first steps towards American recognition for the country.  
Clearly, Philby realized that the world-wide economic depression, which began in 1929, 
had reached the Saudi kingdom. The income from the Hajj had declined dramatically, 
affecting in turn the customs dues and putting the country into debt to other countries 
and companies.20 As the depression increased, Philby met King Ibn Sa‘ūd and reminded 
him that his country was, in fact, full of buried riches, resources such as oil and 
minerals.21 Ibn Sa‘ūd’s severe economic position immediately led him to provide 
exclusive concessions to any international oil company that would give him a million 
pounds in advance because he had to secure the welfare of his country. He therefore 
had no chance to put all his trust in Philby to tackle the issue.22 As a result, Philby 
entered into a lengthy correspondence with a very important American figure, a former 
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diplomat, now businessman, Charles Crane,23 informing him that King Ibn Sa‘ūd was 
now receiving formal recognition from several countries but sadly had not yet entered 
full diplomatic relations with the US. Philby asked Crane to use his influence in 
resuming the negotiations regarding American recognition. He also invited Crane to 
visit him in his private house in Hejaz and informed him that King Ibn Sa‘ūd would be in 
Jeddah during February 1930. This would be a great opportunity to discuss with the 
monarch all the economic issues that concerned the country.24 Crane accepted the 
invitation, stating that he was very pleased to learn what Philby had told him; he 
wanted to see the kingdom of King Ibn Sa‘ūd in a good position for development.25 
On reaching Jeddah, Crane discussed economic points of interest with the king and 
agreed to send an eligible mining engineer to investigate the country’s mineral 
resources but stipulated that the king should provide all the requisite transport and 
other means to facilitate the work. It was also agreed at this meeting that Crane would 
place K.S. Twitchell,26 the American mining engineer, at the king’s disposal. He was to 
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report on the mineral prospects and other potential assets for development in Arabia.27 
Within only a few weeks, Twitchell arrived in the kingdom on 15 April 1931, and just 
after a week from his arrival he started his wanderings in the company of Khalid al 
Qarqani,28 King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s adviser, searching for a water supply to Jeddah and other 
natural resources in the north west of the kingdom. Unfortunately, Twitchell’s 
disappointing report indicated that this area had no geological proof that artesian wells 
might be found.29 However, the turning point came in December 1931 when he met 
King Ibn Sa‘ūd in his camp, together with Philby and the finance minister, Abdullah Al 
Suleiman.30 In their discussion it was agreed that Twitchell should carry out a survey of 
the natural resources in the east part of the kingdom. Philby accompanied Twitchell as 
far as the region of al- Hafuf, where they separated. He then went on to achieve his 
dream of exploring the Empty Quarter.31 
By the time Twitchell reached Ḥasa, in January 1932, some historians claim that he had 
discovered geological indications that oil deposits in commercial quantities were there 
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to be exploited.32  However, the fact is that Twitchell did not find any obvious traces of 
oil in Ḥasa but concluded in his report that Ḥasa was similar to Bahrain in its geological 
formation. Therefore, the main reason behind his departure to the US was the request 
of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, who asked him to find an American company that would explore the 
country.33 
In any case, after his arrival in the US, Twitchell first communicated with the Texas Oil 
Company; its officials suggested that he should contact the Near East Developing 
Corporation as well as Standard Oil of California (SOCAL). While the first company was 
not willing to take up the offer due to being forbidden by the Iraqi Petroleum Company 
(IPC) from competing in their territories, SOCAL showed some interest in taking on the 
oil concessions.34 However, it seems quite possible that the main reason behind 
SOCAL’s decision was that the company already had a concession in Bahrain and, as 
Benjamin Shwadran and other historians point out, the discovery of oil in Bahrain 
encouraged SOCAL and other international oil companies, such as the IPC, to negotiate 
another comprehensive concession in King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s kingdom, which now came to be 
known as Saudi Arabia.35 
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Philby and the oil concession 
Before dealing with Philby’s role and his contact with the American officials to arrange 
the first steps of the concession agreement, light should be shed on Twitchell’s opinion 
regarding Philby and his role. In his book, Twitchell not only totally ignored the major 
role that Philby played during the negotiations for an oil concession but also 
disregarded the communication between Philby and Crane, ignoring the fact that 
Philby should have received credit for bringing Twitchell himself to Saudi Arabia, since 
he was there only because Philby had been the first to bring Crane in without whom 
Twitchell would not have been sent for.36 Therefore, it is probable that Twitchell was 
not objective in presenting historical facts and his inadvertent undermining of Philby’s 
efforts cannot be explained except by his habit of ascribing  more merit to himself than 
anyone else. Evidence to substantiate this can be observed in Twitchell’s book. In the 
seven pages that he devotes to Philby he does not mention Philby’s efforts to bring the 
US in, nor his considerable part in the oil negotiations. In return, Philby pointed out his 
impartiality toward Twitchell in the following words: 
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In the autumn … Twitchell arrived at the king’s camp near Riyadh, where I                                                                                          
accompanied him to the Ḥasa coast, where we parted in pursuit of our respective 
objectives: I to explore the Empty Quarter… and Twitchell to discover the oil of Arabia 
at Dhahran. To him without question belongs the credit of the discovery; to Crane that 
of having placed his services at the disposal of the Government; and to me, I can fairly 
claim, that of having been principally instrumental in bringing Crane to Arabia at critical 
stage of its fortunes.37 
Whatever Twitchell’s shortcomings, the American officials obviously realized how 
influential Philby was in King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s Council and it seems that they recognized the 
nature of the friendship and confidence between him and the king. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the American diplomats sought to make contact with Philby. The 
American Consul General in London despatched a letter to Philby on 26 May 1932; he 
was at this time in London lecturing about his expedition to the Empty Quarter. The 
Consul requested Philby to meet Francis Loomis,38 the former Acting Secretary of State 
and now an adviser for the Standard Oil Company. In their meeting, Philby revealed, 
Loomis confessed that he wished to own the oil concession in Saudi Arabia and was 
willing to have the cooperation of Philby in this project.39 As Philby was aware of the 
difficult economic situation of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, he responded that such a concession 
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required satisfactory arrangements and he would be very pleased to help in any 
projects that contributed to the prosperity of Saudi Arabia.40 
 After much correspondence, Loomis informed Philby that SOCAL was about to submit 
a formal request for the permission of the Saudi Government to conduct a geological 
survey in the east part of the kingdom.41 It seems that Philby was anxious to preserve 
the Saudi interest and willing to help his personal friend, King Ibn Sa‘ūd, in his current 
economic crisis by informing Loomis that some considerable conditions would have to 
be met in order to obtain exclusive rights to the oil concession in Saudi Arabia. The 
most important condition that would lead to an agreement was an immediate payment 
of £100,000 in gold.42 In January 1933, the officials of SOCAL decided to despatch a 
representative, Lloyd Hamilton,43 to undertake negotiations regarding the agreement; 
they also sent Twitchell as technical advisor.44 
However, before the arrival of the Americans, Philby seems to have used his profound 
skills to increase the competition between the oil companies and to make the 
concession more profitable to the Saudi Government. For example, he leaked the new 
developments regarding the Saudi oil to the British Minister in Jeddah as well as to a 
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friend of his who was working for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, reporting that the 
Americans had designs on the Saudi oil and suggesting that the British companies 
should participate in the competition.45 
Consequently, when the news of the Saudi oil concession reached the British 
companies they immediately despatched their representatives to Saudi Arabia. In fact, 
it was not only the IPC, which despatched Steven Longrigg,46 as its representative, but 
also the Eastern General Syndicate which sent Major Frank Holmes47 to participate in 
the discussions.48 The actual negotiations began with the arrival of SOCAL’s 
representatives, Hamilton and Twitchell, to Jeddah, on 15 February 1933, to meet 
Abdullah Al Suleiman, the finance minister sent by King Ibn Sa‘ūd as the representative 
of the Saudi Government and Philby, as administrator.49 Philby may have been right in 
claiming that Major Holmes, the representative of the Eastern General Syndicate, had 
been unwilling to enter into a serious negotiation, perhaps because the Saudi 
Government had insisted that each competitor should advance £100,000 in cash; he 
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therefore withdrew and left Jeddah after only two days.50 However, there was another 
reason for the withdrawal of Holmes. He may have been reminded, whether by Philby 
or King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s representatives, of the £6000 in arrears of his annual rental that he 
owed the King from the period 1923-1927, when he had made an earlier oil agreement 
with him; his company, however, failed to find any traces of oil.51 
Hence, two competitors remained on the scene, IPC, represented by Longrigg and 
SOCAL, represented by Hamilton and Twitchell. It was probably on the advice of Philby 
that King Ibn Sa‘ūd informed his representatives that each competitor should make 
their tenders in writing. The IPC in the end refused to increase its bid of $5000, leaving 
the victory to SOCAL.52 
While King Ibn Sa‘ūd rejected the American offer and stood out for £100,000, Hamilton, 
in return, refused the figure of that payment but Philby was able to offer a successful 
compromise to the two parties. It was that Hamilton would raise the bid to £50,000 in 
gold, which the King accepted.53 On behalf of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, his finance minister, 
Abdullah Suleiman, concluded the agreement with Hamilton on 29 May 1933; this 
agreement was to last for sixty years.54 
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It is worth examining Brown’s portrayal of Philby as a traitor to his country who was to 
blame for the failure of the British companies in regard to the oil concession. He also 
asserts that one of the main reasons the British company missed out on a concession 
was that Philby tended to believe that the US was an anti-imperialist country interested 
in nothing but business, unlike the British Government which was anxious to take 
charge of the region in order to invest in its natural resources.55 
However, Brown’s claim seems to have been far from just and lacked impartiality for a 
number of reasons. In the first place, the directors of the IPC showed no serious 
motivation or determination to obtain an oil concession. This can be observed in the 
frank admission of Longrigg, the representative of the IPC, that the company was too 
slow and insistent on its original offer, refusing to raise its bid. As he stated: 
The Iraq Petroleum Company has this time decided to contest the issue.  Their 
representative (the present writer) arrived at Jeddah to find negotiation in progress 
between Hamilton and the Saudi Minister and was invited to make his own offer. Both 
negotiators interviewed the King, both advanced their proposal, each was assured that 
his Company and nationality would, all thing being equal, be the more acceptable to 
the Saudi King. But the IPC directors were slow and cautious in their offers and would 
speak only of rupees when gold was demanded. Their negotiator, so handicapped, 
could do little; and [an] arrangement was reached without difficulty between Hamilton 
and Shaikh Abdullah Suleiman.56 
From the above, it is plain that Longrigg’s reason for his company’s losing the 
concession was that the company was unwilling to pay more than its first offer. 
However, there may have been another reason: that the bad experience of the failure 
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of the Eastern and General Syndicate to find oil, as stated above, inclined the IPC to 
believe that there was no oil in King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territories. Hence the IPC would not 
launch any venture in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, there was the difficult condition of 
paying £10,000 cash in advance. Furthermore, it may have been true that the company 
thought that the oil reserves in Iraq, where it had a concession, were enough for its 
profitability; this made any new concession, including one in Saudi Arabia, unnecessary. 
Another reason is that Philby may have been on the Americans’ side during the 
negotiations (seeing them from the King’s point of view) because the American offer 
was higher than the British; he was guided by his conscience and the King’s trust that 
he would put Saudi interests first in order to develop the Saudi economy.57 
Consequently, Philby could only have been accused of betrayal if he had still been 
working officially with the British Government; or, following his resignation, if Britain 
had made him its official representative during the negotiations; but neither of these 
hypotheses is valid.  
From the above discussion, it can be inferred that Philby had considerable impact on 
Saudi foreign policy and his advice and efforts were of great importance in bringing 
American recognition to Saudi Arabia. In addition, his successful efforts over the oil 
agreement hastened the US’ opening of diplomatic negotiations with King Ibn Sa‘ūd, 
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setting up a legation in Jeddah and securing its oil interests, when it realized that Saudi 
Arabia had so much oil to extract.58 
Philby and the stability of Saudi Arabia 
By extrapolation from the historical events, it can be seen that Philby played a most 
important part in stabilizing the security of the Saudi kingdom, for instance, in the 
rebellion of 1932. Before examining Philby’s role, it may be useful to sketch in the 
background to this insurgence and see how far Philby’s cardinal contribution helped 
King Ibn Sa‘ūd to suppress the rebel leaders. 
The Idrisi’ revolt 
In 1908, Mohammad al- Idrisi59 proclaimed a revolt against the Ottoman Empire and 
when WWI broke out he was able to dominate all the region that extended from al-
Qunfidah, the city located in the south of Hejaz, to Jizan, together with large areas of 
the Asir in the south-west of Arabia and the city of Midi, a port in the north-west of 
Yemen.60 Because Britain was at war against the Ottoman forces, Mohammad al- Idrisi 
joined the Arab rulers who signed treaties in 1915 and 1917, with a view to waging a 
relentless war against the same enemy in Yemen. Britain, in return, committed itself to 
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giving him full independence, a monthly financial subsidy of £2000 and equipping his 
fighters with arms and ammunition.61 
In 1919, after the Ottoman capitulation, Muhammad al- Idrisi extended his regime and 
for his alliance and war efforts he was awarded Hodeidah city, the major Yemeni port 
on the Red Sea. Because both King Hussain and Imam Yahya considered Idrisi’ territory 
to be part of their regions, Mohammad al- Idrisi approached King Ibn Sa‘ūd and signed 
a treaty of friendship and cooperation in which he was supported by the latter until his 
death in March 1923.62 Idrisi’s son, whose name was Ali,63 succeeded him but after two 
years of his sovereignty, his father’s brother, al-Ḥasan,64 showed a determination to 
rule the territory. Under pressure from some notables of Jizan, Ali finally agreed to 
abdicate and was replaced in 1925 by his uncle.65 The main reason behind the 
abdication, as John Baldry has suggested, was the threat from Imam Yahya, who 
wished to restore the glory of Imamic authority after the defeat of the Ottoman rulers. 
He defeated the Idrisi family and captured Hodeidah in 1925. As Baldry asserts, Britain 
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found itself in an awkward position regarding the Idrisi’-Yemeni conflict. Although the 
Idrisi were its allies during the war, Britain now desired to reach a peace settlement 
with Imam Yahya, no ally of Britain, whose forces were successfully attacking parts of 
the Aden Protectorate, a settlement which seemed unattainable without abandoning 
Ḥasan al-Idrisi, who was still controlling some cities in the Yemen.66 
Consequently, in his search for a power to protect his territory, al-Ḥasan contacted King 
Ibn Sa‘ūd and put the region under his protection in a treaty that was signed in January 
1927 (the Mecca agreement). The most important term of this agreement was that al-
Ḥasan became an internal ruler leaving foreign affairs to King Ibn Sa‘ūd; the former was 
forbidden to contact any foreign powers or to provide commercial concessions without 
King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s approval. Soon the king had organized an indirect administration and 
sent some of his official personnel to help al-Ḥasan rule the territory.67 However, in 
November 1930, King Ibn Sa‘ūd decided to sign another treaty with al-Ḥasan that 
allowed the former to include the entire Idrisi’ region under his domination, turning al-
Ḥasan al- Idrisi into a mere local governor in a Saudi protectorate. In these 
circumstances King Ibn Sa‘ūd decided to assign to a representative the task of 
administering issues of finance.68 
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Within two years, Ḥasan al- Idrisi rebelled against the king; his forces not only 
succeeded in recapturing most of the cities of the territory but also destroyed the Saudi 
military garrison.69 Historians have conjectured reasons for the revolt. The first is that 
the Saudi governor exceeded his authority and prevented al-Ḥasan from meeting his 
notables of the territory. The second reason is that al-Ḥasan was influenced and 
supported by Imam Yahya and the notables of Hejaz, who established an opposition 
party of exiles called al- Ahrar; they had never forgotten the Saudi termination of the 
Hashemite family in Hejaz.70 Whatever the reasons behind the revolt, the main 
questions are how King Ibn Sa‘ūd succeeded in suppressing the rebellion and how far 
Philby supported the Saudi government afterwards in spreading peace in the kingdom. 
Before any military action, the king despatched a mission to explore the Idrisi’ demands 
and if possible to reach a peaceful settlement instead of offensive action; but Ḥasan al-
Idrisi ignored King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s emissary, determining to regain his former 
independence. This refusal compelled the king to send a large force to Jizan to throw 
off the threat from al- Ḥasan al- Idrisi; the latter then fled to Yemen.71 
Indeed, the military resources of King Ibn Sa‘ūd were greatly superior to the Idrisi’ 
forces but the primary factor in the Saudi triumph was probably Philby’s contribution. 
In 1931, after the unification of the Saudi kingdom, King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s resolve to bring his 
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country into the civilized world became obvious. He strongly believed that modern 
inventions offered the best means of developing and administering his country’s 
affairs.72 This desire of his coincided with Philby’s ambition to make a turning point for 
his Sharqieh Company. To do this, Philby asked the Marconi Company to supply King 
Ibn Sa‘ūd with 15 wireless stations and a complete system of telegraphic 
communication to be erected in different towns in the kingdom. In addition, two large 
stations were to be set up in Riyadh and Mecca, to which the King would be able to 
broadcast by special microphone connections.73 Furthermore, four Marconi sets were 
installed in lorries as general mobile telegraph stations to enable him to keep touch 
with the local governor during his many desert journeys.74 
The spread of the wireless stations and microphones resulted in a change in the war 
strategy of the Idrisi’ campaign. With this technology, King Ibn Sa‘ūd could very quickly 
send instructions to the leaders of his forces to move troops to Idrisi’ territory. For 
instance, Mohammad al- Aqili,75 the famous historian of the south west of Saudi Arabia 
who witnessed the Saudi-Idrisi’ war, provided significant historical narratives on the 
subject. He revealed that when Idrisi’ forces ambushed one troop of King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
forces, its leader telegraphed the government in Riyadh. Without checking, al-Aqili 
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briefly mentioned in his book the story that Khalid Ibn Luwai,76 the Saudi commander, 
was informed by a wireless message from the king of the recent developments in 
Jizan.77  These two examples show that one of the factors that made the campaign 
successful was wireless communication. Consequently, it cannot be denied that Philby 
played a major role by ensuring that the government of Saudi Arabia had such 
resources, above all at the time. Wireless not only made it easier to administer the 
kingdom in peace-time but also fulfilled a military purpose leading to its stabilization 
and the preservation of its civil conditions.  
However, directly after the suppression of the Idrisi revolt in 1933, war broke out 
between King Ibn Sa‘ūd and Imam Yahya, who captured some territory in the former 
Idrisi’ state. It ended with victory for King Ibn Sa‘ūd and Imam Yahya’s consenting to 
sign a peace treaty, on 20 May 1934, called the Ṭaif treaty, defining the boundaries 
between the two kingdoms.78 Hence, King Ibn Sa‘ūd, in urgent need of someone who 
could map the boundary on the southern frontier with Yemen, offered the task to 
Philby.79 Philby’s journey is examined in detail below.  
Philby’s mission to the southern frontier of Saudi Arabia in 1936 
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At the beginning of May 1936, Philby went to a camp in the west of the kingdom to 
meet King Ibn Sa‘ūd, who gave orders to the Finance Ministry to supply Philby with 
funds for his official mission. In addition, King Ibn Sa‘ūd furnished Philby with some 
equipment, as well as men to guard his safety, throughout the expedition.80 
Undoubtedly, this official mission coincided with Philby’s ambition to wander and 
explore the unknown internal area in the south of Arabia, such as Hadhramaut and 
Shabwa,81 the territories that, as Percy Cox 82 remarked, were the only places in the 
Arabian Peninsula that had not yet been explored.83  As a result, the mission began to 
have two main purposes for Philby. The first was politically to serve his personal friend, 
King Ibn Sa‘ūd, by mapping the southern boundaries of the kingdom and the second 
was to find celebrity by becoming the first Western explorer to venture into the 
unknown regions of the Yemen.  
Before starting the mission, Abdullah Al Suleiman, the Finance Minister, provided 
Philby with a lorry carrying enough petrol for the expedition, which would not 
otherwise be available. In addition, to facilitate Philby’s journey the king wrote to 
several local governors on Philby’s route to the south, instructing them to do whatever 
was needed for Philby’s convenience.84 On 21 May 1936, Philby set out on a secret 
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journey,85 one that may be regarded as the longest of his explorations of the Arabian 
Peninsula. Passing by the desert through Khurmah, Rayna, he reached Bisha, the last 
region of the Najd territory, and then started climbing the mountains until he arrived in 
Abha, the capital of Asir.86 There, Philby chose a guide with experience, who knew the 
roads of the district and, shortly afterwards, Philby left for Najran, the city that lay on 
the border with Yemen. He was received by its local governor who was highly educated 
and shared Philby’s desire to find ancient inscriptions. He accompanied Philby in all his 
excursions around Najran.87 The local governor can be credited with teaching Philby to 
recognize the new borderlands and his company is possibly the main factor in the 
success of the mission to the Najran territories. 
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Photograph taken by Philby in Najran, mapping the Saudi - Yemeni boundary 
Source: Philby, Arabian Highlands. 
After noting the various points of the new borderlands of the Saudi kingdom, Philby 
decided to enter Yemen to fulfil his dream of visiting Shabwa. With three vehicles, he 
left the border region in late July and en route discovered the old pilgrimage route and 
new places which Western travellers had never explored.88 Philby arrived at Shabwa to 
the delight of its inhabitants, who thought that Philby had been sent to them on behalf 
of King Ibn Sa‘ūd in order to include them under the authority of Saudi Arabia.89 
It has been claimed that Philby, while still in Najran, had feared that the king would 
prevent him from visiting Yemen but the local Saudi governor of Najran approved of his 
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plan.90 However, such a claim seems illogical in view of the historical events. Philby’s 
mission was clearly under the auspices of King Ibn Sa‘ūd; from this it may be inferred 
that the mission had a third purpose: to formally include the tribes that were located in 
the north of the Aden Protectorate and under King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s authority. In fact, there 
is some evidence that may support this inference. In the first place, before Philby’s 
mission, the king had been engaged in full negotiations with Britain regarding these 
disputed areas. His claim was based on the historical fact that his ancestors had ruled it 
and levied taxes on the people in the 19th century. Therefore, King Ibn Sa‘ūd was 
determined to control these tribes not only as a basic tactic but also to assert his 
historical rights.91 
To support the political motivation of Philby’s visit, Bullard the British Minister in 
Jeddah, suggested the following statement: 
Reports from Hadhramaut say that Philby did a good deal of propaganda in favour of 
Ibn Saud. He is a great admirer of Ibn Saud and does a good deal of log-rolling for 
him…He will no doubt back Ibn Saud against H.M.G., though he would never admit that 
he is always agin the Government.92 
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Consequently, it seems that arranging Philby’s visit to Yemen was a ploy by King Ibn 
Sa‘ūd to put more pressure on Britain in the hope of fulfilling some political purpose in 
the disputed areas. 
The second piece of evidence is that the governor of Najran would never have dared to 
support Philby’s entry into Yemen unless he had had some signal from the king 
permitting his incursion. However, he provided Philby with all the necessary baggage 
camels, as well as a small detachment of soldiers. In addition, original sources of the 
time suggest that King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s relations with the local governor were tranquil; there 
is no sign that his conduct led to any official punishment, which must mean that he had 
been instructed to support Philby on this visit. Third, the conversations between Philby 
and R. Bullard, the British minister in Jeddah, indicate that King Ibn Sa‘ūd was 
altogether delighted by Philby’s entry into Yemen, which would suggest that Philby’s 
mission had some political target.93 
The fourth piece of evidence can be found in Philby’s accounts. The news of his mission 
had reached the inhabitants of Shabwa before he arrived; they were unquestionably 
looking to King Ibn Sa‘ūd to protect their lives and security and calm the unsettled 
conditions that prevailed in their region. Philby commented: 
At Shabwa … the news of our coming had long preceded us and the people had had 
plenty of time to decide whether they desired closer relation with Ibn Sa‘ūd … Of Ibn 
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Sa‘ūd they spoke with unfeigned admiration and cordiality. They wanted letters from 
Ibn Sa‘ūd guaranteeing their security from attack.94 
A further element that indicates the presence of a political factor is that when the 
British condemned his mission, Philby renewed his criticism of the British Government’s 
case. He stated that Shabwa was outside the scope of British influence and declared to 
all readers that Britain had a tendency to exaggerate its colonial influence. In addition 
to his disapproval of British foreign policy, Philby pointed out that the only objective 
that he was seeking was the independence of the Arabic peoples and the chance to 
help rescue them from foreign powers.95 It may be noted that Philby’s critique, 
together with that of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, who was ambitious to take control over the north 
of Yemen, serves to indicate the political coordination between the two, and even 
suggests that Philby was simply implementing a policy that furthered the foreign 
ambitions of Saudi Arabia. The final evidence is obvious from Philby’s propaganda, 
designed to advocate and enhance King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s sovereignty in the north of Yemen. 
For example, he suggested to the people of Shabwa that they should despatch some 
representatives on their behalf to meet King Ibn Sa‘ūd and negotiate the issue with 
him. Philby also noted that these representatives could act as his escorts when he 
returned to Saudi Arabia.96 
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Philby with inhabitants of Shabwa 
Source: Philby, Sheba’s Daughters 
Despite all his advantages, after many incursions Philby’s mission to the north of the 
Aden Protectorate failed because British officials were disturbed by Philby’s entering it 
without permission. Bullard, the British minister to the Saudi kingdom, stated:  
Philby was accompanied on his incursion into Aden Protectorate by armed Saudi forces 
which might well have led Protectorate tribes to assume that he was travelling on 
Saudi mission. Object [sc. of ensuring the mission’s failure] would be to show Saudi 
Government that His Majesty's Government are maintaining their position regarding 
Protectorate frontier and do not acquiesce in any Saudi encroachment in this area.97 
Consequently, Philby was warned by Britain to evacuate the Aden Protectorate and 
was forbidden to venture further.98 However, it should be noted that, while Philby 
failed to expand the Saudi influence in the area of northern Yemen, he was still the first 
man to have crossed the Empty Quarter by motor-car from the north to the Indian 
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Ocean in the south and also the first explorer to have reached Hadhramaut from the 
north, another milestone in his career as one of the greatest explorers in the history of 
Arabia.99 
After the British warning, Philby returned to Najran, in Saudi territory, for there were 
several lands still to be mapped in the southwestern part of the Saudi kingdom. He 
examined the landmarks and added some information to his maps.100 That the mission 
was not easy is evident from the rocky ground, the slopes, plateaus, foothills and 
mountains, which made the mission so intractable. However, Philby, who was now in 
his fifties, was determined to succeed for the king’s sake. He completed the survey of 
boundary markers in Najran and then had to cross hundreds of miles to Asir and Jizan, 
located in the east of Najran on the borders of Yemen. These territories consist of a 
coastal plain and high mountain. He had to deal with the varied geography, spending 
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Philby in Jizan, mapping the mountain between Saudi Arabia and Yemen 




Philby in Jizan, mapping the lowlands between Saudi Arabia and Yemen 






Map 2. Philby’s map of Saudi Arabia 
Source: Philby, Saudi Arabia 
After completing this mission, however, another political challenge awaited him: the 





Philby and the Buraimi dispute 
According to The Times, Buraimi is an oasis that consists of eight villages located in the 
south-eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Six of the villages belonged to the ruler of 
Abu Dhabi and the other two were under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Muscat; both 
rulers were under British protection.102 
In the early 1950s, the area witnessed much tension in the international confrontation 
between Saudi Arabia and the British Protected Trucial Shaikhdoms. The oasis had 
approximately six to ten thousand inhabitants and was famous for its plentiful water 
and fertile soil, which gave the citizens a variety of fruit and other crops, as well as 
grazing for their cattle. However, the most important aspect of this Buraimi oasis is its 
geographical location, which grants control over Muscat and Trucial Shaikhdoms.103 
The first Saudi conquest of the Buraimi oasis dates back to 1800 and resulted from the 
first great growth of Wahhabism which ultimately brought most of Arabia’s territories 
under the control of Imam Abdul-Aziz Ibn Mohammad al-Sa‘ūd,104 the second ruler of 
the first Saudi State.105 It has been said that religious fervour was the main motivation 
for this first Saudi expansion; it was, indeed, influenced by the teaching of one of the 
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most important Islamic reformers, Muhammad Ibn Abdul Wāhāb,106 who proclaimed 
Wahhabism in the 18th century.107 
It may be difficult to believe that the Saudi expansion over Arabia, including Buraimi, 
was based on the religious factor alone. As noted above, Buraimi represented an 
economic treasure to enhance the Wahhabi possessions and strengthen its source of 
income. In addition to the economic factor, political vision may have been a further 
reason for the Wahhabi expansion, in a search to transform the divided territories in 
Arabia into a single unified political entity.  
Whatever the motivation, Buraimi became a Saudi fulcrum of the Wahhabi expansion 
directed against Oman and the Trucial Shaikhdoms in the Gulf, until the expedition of 
Muhammad Ali,108 Pasha of Egypt, who conquered and fatally weakened the first Saudi 
State in 1818.109 However, within a few years of these events, a new Wahhabi Amir 
emerged, who could restore the regime of the Saudi dynasty in central Arabia. He was 
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 Mohammad Ibn Abdul wāhāb al- Tamimi (1703-1792) was the leader of what is known the Wahhabi 
movement. He was educated in Najd before his trips for religious research to Hejaz, Iraq and Syria. His 
endeavours to reform the religion of Arabia were not successful until he allied himself with Mohammad 
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the Imam Tūrki Ibn Abdullah al-Sa‘ūd,110 the great grandfather of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, who 
recaptured most of the lands that had been lost in 1818, including the Buraimi oasis; he 
sent one of his commanders in 1833 to requisition the district.111 In the era of his 
successor – his son, Imam  Faiṣal,112 the grandfather of Ibn Sa‘ūd – the Saudi expansion 
increased rapidly through a military campaign in 1852 led by Amir Abdullah,113 Iman  
Faiṣal’s son. This extended the boundaries in the south east of Arabia, notably around 
Oman and the Trucial Shaikhdoms.114 However, after the death of Imam Faiṣal in 1865, 
the Wahhabi State entered into a civil war, the outcome of which led not only to the 
loss of the Buraimi oasis by the Sultan of Oman, but also to the elimination of the 
second Saudi State by another Najdi family dynasty, the al- Rashidi, in 1891.115 
After the emergence of King Ibn Sa‘ūd in the 20th century and the unification of most 
parts of Arabia, the king began in the 1930s to claim the Buraimi oasis as part of the 
kingdom that had been ruled by his ancestors in the 18th century.116 However, some 
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historians suggest that the regime of King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s ancestors over Buraimi was not 
precisely what encouraged him to demand control of the Buraimi oasis, so much as the 
discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula in 1932.117 Such a claim seems reasonable and 
it may be added that King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s demands collided with British interests, in 
particular when Britain gained the oil concessions from the Trucial Cost and Oman; it 
always wished to keep its last bastion in the Gulf against the loss of its economic 
interests.118 
At any rate, in order to settle the issue, King Ibn Sa‘ūd proposed a definition of the 
southern and eastern boundaries of his kingdom with Shaikh Abu Dhabi and the Sultan 
of Oman, asserting that his frontiers extended to about 15 miles within the Buraimi 
oasis and also extended for 25 miles along the coast at Khor-al Odaid, running 
southwest. To discuss his demands, several meetings between Saudi Arabia and Britain 
were held during the 1930s in London and in many Saudi cities such as Ṭaif and Riyadh, 
but without reaching agreement. In these meetings, King Ibn Sa‘ūd refused a British 
offer of further land in the east and southeast of Arabia because it cut off any access to 
the sea; he stated that in the 19th century the whole coast had belonged to his 
family.119 
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The situation began to get worse when some engineers of SOCAL (now called 
Aramco)120 entered Abu Dhabi territory through its western region in March 1949. Al-
Zerekly suggested that the American engineers were instructed by King Ibn Sa‘ūd to 
explore the oil prospects in Buraimi.121 Indeed, these instructions would have helped  
Aramco, which made great efforts to expand its commercial profits in Saudi Arabia. But 
the main question to ask here is whether Philby had any dealings with Aramco, 
especially after the visit of its American engineers to Buraimi. In fact, as Philby was  
mainly responsible for bringing the Americans to Saudi Arabia and their signing the oil 
concession, SOCAL hired him in order to benefit from his services, offering him an 
annual retainer of £1,000.122 Therefore, it is not surprising that Aramco used Philby’s 
account and explorations of Saudi Arabia to acquaint themselves with its geographical 
features, using his maps to trace oil wells in the east part of the country.123 As a result, 
from the close relations between Philby and Aramco, it can be assumed that Philby 
may have encouraged Aramco staff to visit the western region of the Abu Dhabi 
territory especially when Monroe suggested that Philby was in Saudi Arabia between 
September 1948 and mid-August 1949.124 
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At any rate, the British Political Officer protested against this incursion and requested 
the American party to withdraw from the region, asserting that these territories were 
not yet defined and were pending a settlement. In reply, King Ibn Sa‘ūd concurred with 
the British objection and ordered the Aramco staff to withdraw until the settlement of 
the boundary issue.125 Again, negotiations between the two countries took place in 
Britain and Saudi Arabia during the years 1951 and 1952, but the talks had reached a 
state of deadlock in the matter of the boundaries.126 It was evident that King Ibn Sa‘ūd 
would never abandon his demand for Buraimi. This intransigence explains his decision 
in August 1952 to despatch Tūrki Ibn AL Utaishan,127 with an escort of 40 armed men, 
to be the local governor and thus to establish Saudi administration in the village of 
Hamasa in Buraimi.128 
Therefore, Britain fought to publish the matter in all the British newspapers and it was 
not surprising to find a Foreign Office spokesman providing an account of the history of 
the oasis. He claimed that for almost a century there was no Saudi influence in the 
region and that British officers had for many years visited the oasis without any 
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objection from the Saudi Government. He also presented another argument: that while 
the Saudi Government in recent years had started to allege its ownership of the oasis, 
the oasis itself was situated far outside Saudi territory. In addition, he pointed out that 
the Government of Saudi Arabia had made its first objection to a routine visit by a 
British officer to the oasis in 1952. Furthermore when King Ibn Sa‘ūd sent armed forces 
to the Hamasa’ village in Buraimi, the Foreign Office spokesman accused the Saudi 
Government of escalating the situation.129In reply, the spokesman of the Saudi Arabian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that his country would raise the issue of Buraimi, 
claiming that the continuation of the dispute would threaten international peace and 
security.130 
In the considerable controversy between the two parties, the US intervened to mediate 
and a Standstill Agreement was reached on 26 October 1952 in Jeddah. This agreement 
allowed both Saudi officials and British forces to remain in Hamasa, the essential village 
in Buraimi, and stipulated that both governments should abide by their respective 
positions and not menace each other or do anything that might endanger a future 
resolution on the suzerainty of the Buraimi oasis.131 
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In addition, in order to reach a final peaceful settlement, Sir Anthony Eden,132 the 
Foreign Secretary, proposed asking an international tribunal to arbitrate.133 However, 
in December 1952, the Saudi Government replied that King Ibn Sa‘ūd consented to 
arbitration if it defined only the boundaries with Abu Dhabi and Qatar, but wanted the 
Buraimi district to be excluded from the arbitration because, in reality, it was under 
Saudi sovereignty and, therefore, was indisputable.134 
At this period, the era of the British Empire was obviously in decline, in particular after 
WWII. At this time the US, the new superpower, entered the Middle East, threatening 
the British interests in the region. In addition, King Ibn Sa‘ūd believed that the 
permanence of friendship with the US was the essential consideration of the Saudi 
policy and vital for its economy. Eden stated: 
Ibn Saud was once utterly dependent on us for money, arms and international 
protection. Today he obtains all these benefits from his new friends in the United 
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States. Ibn Saud is in no way beholden to us, and it is our influence alone that stands in 
the way of his absorption of his less powerful neighbours.135 
Consequently, in order to preserve British prestige, and indeed its oil interests in the 
Gulf, Eden proposed, in March 1953, to escalate the tension by despatching British 
armoured cars and military aeroplanes to Sharjah, a district not far from the oasis of 
Buraimi.136 In reply to the British action, King Ibn Sa‘ūd sent a telegram to the Saudi 
Embassy in London to inform Eden as follows: 
I’m depressed that our relations have worsened to such a degree, threatening us by 
military aeroplanes. I cannot imagine this incident would happen in a government 
headed by Churchill and his Deputy Eden, the Foreign Secretary. I hope that the British 
Government will stop its aggression, otherwise we will be obliged to raise a complaint 
with the United Nations in order to defend our historical rights.137 
Soon after, Eden replied that he was desirous to maintain friendly relations between 
the two countries, hoping to resolve the issue in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. He 
informed King Ibn Sa‘ūd that he understood the Saudi objection regarding Buraimi and 
said that it would be wise for Britain and Saudi Arabia, for the time being, to stay away 
from recriminations, repeating and recommending the proposal of arbitration. Eden 
added that he was obliged to mention the Saudi local governor in Buraimi who, by 
spreading Saudi propaganda, had been responsible for the chaos in the district. He had 
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tried to subvert the loyalty of the inhabitants and distort it by paying them from Saudi 
funds, which was incompatible with the British-Saudi agreement.138 
To strengthen the Saudi objection to arbitration and to the British operation in Buraimi, 
the Saudi government began a press campaign against the British. However, the 
question that should be asked is who could present the Saudi demands to the world’s 
public opinion and at the same time belong to the Western world?  The only answer 
was Philby, the ally of King Ibn Sa‘ūd and his closest friend, who had always stood as an 
obstacle to British imperialism but without hostility, as he always claimed.139 Philby 
devoted himself to a campaign which he led in favour of Saudi Arabia, raising the issue 
in several articles in the press and also in his published and unpublished books. Before 
engaging in the Saudi-British controversy, it appears that Philby equipped himself by 
learning about Buraimi’s historical background. From unrevealed documents in his 
collection at St. Antony’s College, it is evident that he made profound efforts to read 
and translate the Saudi sources that examined the history of Buraimi and Oman during 
the 19th century. For example, he read the main source of information on the Second 
Saudi State, called Unwān al- Majd fī Tārīkh Najd [The symbol of glory in the history of 
Najd], written by Othman Ibn Bisher, a Najdi scholar.140  This historical source narrates 
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that, the Imam Tūrki  al- Saud, the great grandfather of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, received some 
chiefs of Oman in Riyadh in 1828, who asked him to despatch a Qadhi (judge) to spread 
the Wahhabi teachings and also asked for a military detachment to support them 
against their adversaries. The Imam sent them a Qadhi and a commander with a force; 
when they arrived in Oman, the inhabitants of al-Dhahira and al- Batina proclaimed 
their obedience and it was agreed to assign them a Saudi governor who would live in 
Buraimi.141 
In addition, because Ibn Bisher ended his historical annals in the year 1850, Philby tried 
to find another Saudi account of the relevant events in the second half of the 19th 
century.  He found a source entitled Tārīkh Ibn Eisā (The History of Ibn Eisā), written by 
Ibrahim Ibn Eisā142 and translated some pages of it. These pages indicate that the Imam 
Faiṣal Ibn Tūrki, the grandfather of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, prepared an expedition against the 
Nu'im tribe and Oman. After defeating them, he was approached by the chiefs of the 
villages, who offered peace and agreed to pay taxes to the Saudi ruler in Riyadh.143 
From the above some important explanatory points emerge: 
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1- Because of his reasonable arguments, Philby may have given the Saudi 
Government access to the Saudi historical sources in order to illustrate and 
endorse the legitimate right of King Ibn Sa‘ūd to preserve the oasis from British 
demands. 
2-  In the view of Philby, Buraimi was part of the Wahhabi State; the ancestors of 
King Ibn Sa‘ūd had exercised suzerainty over the disputed territory for the 
greater part of the 19th century.  
3- For many years, some tribes of the Buraimi oasis had readily accepted Saudi 
sovereignty by their tax payments, or what is called in the Islamic heritage their 
Zakat. 
4-  Many tribes in Buraimi had adopted the Wahhabi precepts and endorsed the 
spiritual authority of the Wahhabi rulers. 
As a result, after mastering the required historical background of Buraimi, Philby set up 
a campaign in favour of the Saudi government. From his private papers at Oxford, it 
seems that he was anxious to follow what had been written in the British press, 
whether by the British spokesman of the Foreign Office or in articles written by 
diplomatic correspondents. He first approached The Times but the editor refused to 




the paragraph were a little dangerous.144 The last paragraph as Philby wrote it ran as 
follows: 
It is to be hoped that the British Government will think again, and realize the absurdity 
of its position as champion of the Middle East Defence pact when in fact its military 
activities in Egypt, in the Subaihi territory of the Yemen border and now at Buraimi 
expose it to the suspicion that it is actually the only source from which the Arabs need 
fear ‘aggression’.145 
From the above quotation, it may be inferred that Philby sought to put the British 
Government in an awkward position for all to see, in particular when he asserted the 
failure of the British policy not only as regards the Buraimi crisis but also with respect 
to the political conditions in Egypt and the Aden Protectorate. This, of course, put more 
pressure on Britain to change its uncompromising stance in the negotiations with the 
Saudi government.  
Moreover, to the statement of the Foreign Office spokesman who had given the short 
history of Buraimi cited above (p.30), Philby replied that the last years of the 19th 
Century illustrated the full Wahhabi revival over Buraimi, which was a centre of 
resistance against Oman. In addition, Philby presented a strong argument against the 
statement of the Foreign Office spokesman, when he suggested that during the period 
of Imam Faiṣal (1838-1865), the grandfather of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, Buraimi was actively 
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ruled by one of the most important Saudi governors, Ahmad al- Sudairi,146 and his 
successors, and that the status of Buraimi was recognised by Colonel Lewis Pelly,147 the 
British Resident in the Persian Gulf, who had visited the Imam Faiṣal in 1865.148 
The above suggests that Philby’s account of the Wahhabi claim to the Buraimi oasis 
was probably true, at least in the era of Imam Faiṣal. However, Pelly’s recognition of 
the legitimate Wahhabi rule of Buraimi, as Philby believed, seems less than 
incontrovertible. As mentioned in Chapter 3, above, the main reason behind Pelly’s 
mission to the Wahhabi state was to bring to an end the state of hostility between 
Britain and the Wahhabis and therefore there was no negotiation between the two 
parties about boundaries.149 As a result, because Pelly did not mention the boundary, 
or the Buraimi oasis, Philby thought that the former merely implied the legitimacy of 
Wahhabi rule over Buraimi. Hence, whether or not there was an agreement between 
the parties, Philby was simply attempting to defend the Saudi’s right to rule the 
Buraimi oasis and also to respond to or rebut the apparent reluctance of the press and 
other public channels to do the same, instead of supporting the Government line.  
It also appears that Philby never ceased to work on consolidating King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s 
position and at the same time to undermine the British demands over Buraimi. This is 
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exemplified by his assertion that during the era of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, the Buraimi had been 
ruled as part of Ḥasa, the Saudi territory, by another strong sovereign, Abdullah Ibn 
Jiluwi,150 the cousin of King Ibn Sa‘ūd; after the death of Ibn Jiluwi, the administration 
of Buraimi passed to his successor in the region.151 
Another interesting piece of evidence of Philby’s to strengthen the Saudi government’s 
position was that the inhabitants of Buraimi refused in 1927 to receive Bertram 
Thomas,152 the British civil servant who was working as the Finance Minister for the 
Sultanate of Muscat. They warned him not to enter their district because they owed 
loyalty to Riyadh and his reception and admission would upset King Ibn Sa‘ūd.153 
Moreover, in his subsequent exploration of the Rub al Khali (the Empty Quarter) in 
1932, Philby stated that his escort had just come back to Ḥasa from Buraimi to collect 
taxes from the inhabitants of the south-east, who lived along the boundary of Oman.  
In addition, the escort informed him that some of his tribe, AL Manasir, had settled in 
Buraimi under the Wahhabi rule.154 By presenting these historical arguments, Philby 
seems to have sought to indicate that the Buraimi district was not outside the kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, thus casting doubt on the British allegations.  
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Another argument that Philby made against the British action over Buraimi is that he 
was willing to show the world that Britain was still pursuing its imperial policy, which 
contradicted the principles of justice and humanity. His argument is seen in his 
assertion that Britain had nothing to do with the Middle East and there was no 
controversy over Buraimi between King Ibn Sa‘ūd and either the ruler of Abu Dhabi or 
the Sultan of Oman. Britain wanted to make use of them to cloak its purpose of 
expanding its recent interest in oil from the Trucial Coast and Oman.155 
It seems fairly clear that Philby believed that the military confrontation with Britain was 
not sufficient, in view of British military superiority. Therefore, in an article in The 
Manchester Guardian, Philby suggested that, after the signature of the standstill 
agreement, the Saudi Government had tried to resolve the Buraimi issue amicably by 
diplomatic means and that King Ibn Sa‘ūd had showed an honest determination to 
avoid any accidental show of animosity against Britain. He concluded that the issue 
could be settled by a plebiscite of the inhabitants of Buraimi oasis rather than 
arbitration.156 
However, the British Press set up a counter-campaign against Philby’s articles. Previous 
British officials, Bullard, for example, had voiced strong opposition to the historical 
rights argument by which Philby sought to strengthen the Saudi case over the Buraimi 
district. It was said that if the Saudi claims had been based on historical fact, as Philby 
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suggested, it would have given the Saudi Government strong leverage if it came to 
arbitration, but the previous government had unfortunately rejected the British 
proposal to have a tribunal.157 In any case, the controversy took a new turn when King 
Ibn Sa‘ūd died on 9 November 1953 and his eldest son, King Saud,158 succeeded to the 
throne of Saudi Arabia.159 
In the time of King Saud, it had been agreed that the dispute over boundaries should be 
resolved by an international arbitration tribunal. The hearing took place in Geneva, in 
September 1955 and after some difficult negotiations, the arbitration failed when 
Bullard, the British representative, withdrew, claiming that the Saudi delegation had 
been representing its government instead of being unbiased.160 It is likely that the 
reason behind the retreat of Bullard was his feeling that the tribunal’s decision would 
be in favour of the Saudi government. Whatever the reason was, it seems that Britain 
had no wish to lose its last interests in the Middle East and for this reason the British 
Government made the decision to support the Sultan of Muscat and Shaikh Abu Dhabi 
and occupy the Buraimi district at the end of October 1955.161 
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Philby was depressed not only by the death of his friend, King Ibn Sa‘ūd, but also by the 
British occupation of the Buraimi oasis. He asserted that the failure of the Saudi policy 
was due to the difference of character between the late King Ibn Sa‘ūd and his son King 
Saud.  He believed that the father had been an intelligent person and had had a 
lifetime’s experience to secure the interests of his kingdom by presenting reasoned and 
friendly arguments. In addition, while the essential Saudi advisers had caught the ear of 
King Saud, the son, they had never had any influence on King Ibn Sa‘ūd, the father, with 
whom they were not allowed to argue with in public. All discussion had taken place in 
the privacy of his council. In this way the father had been able to get to know them and 
their ideas intimately and it would have been impossible for them to exceed his orders. 
However, there was no doubt, as Philby suggested, that the successor, King Saud, did 
not have the background of his father and was under the influence of his father's 
ministers and advisers, who encouraged the political propaganda that tended always to 
be anti-West in general.162 
Philby’s claim was probably logical, notably when it touched on the Arab nationalist 
movement led at the time by the Egyptian authorities; but it should never be forgotten, 
as noted above, that the oil interests in the Trucial coast and Oman were the vital 
factor that was leading to the British occupation of Saudi land. In addition, it can be 
assumed that the high status of King Ibn Sa‘ūd, and his long friendship with Britain, 
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together with Philby’s efforts to support the King over the disputed boundary, may be 
considered the main reason for the delay over the British occupation of Buraimi. 
Whatever their rights and wrongs, Philby’s efforts in the Buraimi dispute were the last 
political contribution that he made before King Saud, the son who had succeeded his 
father King Ibn Sa‘ūd, came to the decision that Philby must leave Saudi Arabia, owing 
to Philby’s considerable criticisms of the son and his rule as well as his personal 
advisers and Ministers.163 As Philby was devoted to life in the Middle East, he chose 
Lebanon for his exile, concentrating on his writings and attending Orientalists’ 
conferences until he died in Beirut on Friday 30th September 1960,at the age of 
seventy-five.164 
Overview 
The chapter demonstrated that the considerable expansion of King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s kingdom 
may have been the main reason behind the treaty of Jeddah, which was signed in 1927, 
and provided full independence for King Ibn Sa‘ūd, releasing him from British 
protection and giving him the chance to contact any foreign powers he chose for the 
purpose of establishing diplomatic relations. 
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The chapter suggested that Philby played a major role; he took the first steps toward 
American recognition of Saudi Arabia. This is testified by his continual contacts with 
American officials, using such persuasive arguments as the need for stable political 
conditions in the Saudi kingdom and using the tool of commercial profit to persuade 
American companies to promote their products in the Saudi markets. In addition, it is 
probably clear that Twitchell tried to ignore Philby’s efforts not only to bring Crane to 
Saudi Arabia but also to secure contact with American officials, who would be swayed 
by the great influence Philby had in the negotiations for oil concessions from Saudi 
Arabia to the US. In contrast, Philby seems to have avoided bias in declaring that 
Twitchell had worked hard to discover oil in the east of Saudi Arabia only after the 
American companies had been persuaded to look for oil there in the first place. 
This chapter revealed that the high position of Philby and his close relationship with 
King Ibn Sa‘ūd may have been the main reason behind the American officials’ contact 
with Philby; they had made it to further their ambition to gain the oil concession. 
Furthermore, before the actual negotiations and during the correspondence between 
Philby and the American officials, it appears that Philby was anxious to keep the Saudi 
interests foremost in order to help his friend, King Ibn Sa‘ūd, whose country was 
suffering from economic difficulties before the discovery of oil. Moreover, before the 
arrival of the American representatives in Saudi Arabia, Philby showed his great loyalty 




companies so that many would participate in the negotiations; he had done so 
principally to make the concession more advantageous for the Saudi government.  
The chapter concluded that the accusation of treason against Philby – that he deceived 
his country by securing the oil concession for the Americans instead of a British 
company- is for a number of reasons probably neither objective nor thorough. First, the 
explicit confession of Longrigg, the representative of the IPC, that his directors had not 
shown any interest or made any serious endeavour to obtain the concession and they 
had refused to pay more than the American bid. Second, the hesitation of the IPC may 
have been because its directors thought that there would be no oil in Saudi Arabia, 
after the bad experience of the Eastern and General Syndicate which had spent about 
five years without managing to find any indication of oil in the east of Saudi Arabia.  For 
the IPC to have paid £100, 0000 in cash would have been a serious venture of the 
company’s funds. Third, the directors of the IPC may have believed that there was no 
requirement to gain any more concessions when the company already had adequate oil 
reserves in Iraq and was making such good profits. Fourth, as Philby had been asked by 
King Ibn Sa‘ūd to put Saudi interests as his primary consideration, he was simply 
following his conscience and justifying the king’s trust to implement the Saudi policy. 
Moreover, Philby could only have been a traitor if he had still been working for the 




The chapter demonstrated that Philby had great influence on Saudi foreign policy; he 
made a cardinal contribution in the American diplomatic recognition of Saudi Arabia, 
resulting in the opening of the American Legation in Jeddah after the US became aware 
of the considerable oil reserves in Saudi Arabia. 
The chapter showed that Philby played a major role by providing the Saudi Government 
with wireless, which not only helped to run the kingdom more easily in peace-time but 
also could be in military targeting in times of war, notably when the Idrisi revolt broke 
out against Ibn Sa‘ūd’s regime; thanks to this, Philby may be regarded as supplying a 
vital factor in preserving the internal security of Saudi Arabia. 
Regarding Philby’s mission to the southern territories of Saudi Arabia, the chapter 
concluded that the main reasons behind the mission were not only to map the 
southern boundaries between Saudi Arabia and Yemen or Philby’s desire for fame by 
exploring the unknown areas in Yemen, but also the political factor that sought to 
incorporate into Saudi lands the territory located in the north of Aden. This reason is 
supported by some important pieces of evidence. The first one was before Philby’s 
mission and can be seen in the political correspondence between Britain and King Ibn 
Sa‘ūd, who claimed that the tribes located in the north of Yemen had been governed by 
his ancestors during the 19th century and for this reason they should be included under 
his authority. The second piece of evidence is related to the assistance of the local 




to enter Yemen; he would not have done so without King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s approval, which 
could be taken seriously. Another piece of evidence is connected with a report by 
Bullard, the British Minister in Jeddah, who remarked, after conversations with Philby, 
that King Ibn Sa‘ūd was pleased by Philby’s entry to Yemen. The fourth piece of 
evidence is related to Philby’s propaganda, which was designed to eulogize King Ibn 
Sa‘ūd among the tribes in the north of Yemen. The final piece of evidence can be found 
in Philby’s strictures against his own country, stating that while the areas of the north 
of Yemen were outside British protection, the British Government was continuing its 
usual imperialistic policy of including these. Such criticism coincided with the desire of 
King Ibn Sa‘ūd to control the north of Yemen, which turned Philby into a political tool 
implementing the expansion policy of Saudi Arabia.  
The chapter found that, despite the difficult nature of the geography in the south of 
Saudi Arabia, Philby successfully completed his mission to map the national boundaries 
for the Saudi Government and he also achieved another goal: to explore the unknown 
lands in the south of Arabia. However, Philby was not fortunate enough to bring the 
north of Yemen under Saudi sovereignty, owing to the fact that Britain considered 
these territories part of the Aden Protectorate. 
The chapter illustrated that religious reasons may not have been the essential factor 
behind the expansion of the first Saudi State in Arabia. The economic reason may have 




to enrich the Wahhabi treasury. Furthermore, the political factor may have provided an 
additional reason for this expansion, in which the Wahhabi rulers sought to integrate 
the discrete Emirates under their regime. 
Evidence was brought up that King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s demand for Buraimi was based not only 
on historical facts that his ancestors had ruled it but also on the discovery of oil in the 
Gulf, which conflicted with the British economic interest and the fact that Britain would 
never abandon its position in particular after obtaining oil concessions in the Trucial 
Coast and Oman and after the threat by the US to British interests in the Gulf region. 
The chapter suggested that the Saudi Government could not have found anyone better 
than Philby to express the Saudi demands before Western public opinion. Here, Philby 
succeeded in putting pressure on the British Government to alter its political attitude 
to Buraimi. It also concluded that, before starting to pressurise Britain, Philby had had 
access to Saudi archives to learn about the historical background of Buraimi. In this he 
made considerable efforts, reading and translating some pages of the historical sources 
in Saudi Arabia that date back to the 19th century, in order to make a strong case 
against Britain’s demands. These arguments were based on several indications that 
during the 19th century Buraimi was ruled by the first and second Saudi States and for 
many years its inhabitants were paying taxes to the Saudi authorities, as well as 
embracing Wahhabi concepts. Starting his campaign, Philby showed strong 




British Government and assert that its policy had not only gone awry in Buraimi but 
also in many places in the Middle East such as Egypt and Aden.  
The chapter illustrated that Philby’s allegation that Pelly had acknowledged the 
allegiance of Buraimi to the Wahhabi State in the 19th century was probably 
unfounded. Such a claim seems to be disingenuous and was merely an attempt by 
Philby to strengthen the Saudi attitude over Buraimi in the face of British demands or a 
reaction against the British press, which was supporting the British Government. In 
addition, during King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s reign, Philby went on to present further arguments to 
support him. The first one was that Buraimi was part of Ḥasa province, whose local 
governors administered the affairs of Buraimi for many years. The second argument 
was that the inhabitants of Buraimi refused to receive Bertram Thomas, the British 
official in Oman, which obviously indicates their allegiance to King Ibn Sa‘ūd before any 
other powers. The third was that Philby was an eye-witness that the Saudi Government 
was still levying taxes on the inhabitants of Buraimi and there actually was a Najdi tribe 
who had settled in that district. The result of these arguments was that the district was, 
indeed, within the framework of Saudi sovereignty and therefore the British claim was 
questionable. Moreover, Philby suggested another argument: that the British defence 
of Shaikh Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Oman was a flimsy allegation that was used by 





Regarding the British occupation, it seems that Philby blamed the king’s heir, King Saud, 
for being less experienced than his father and being influenced by his advisers who 
were under the sway of Arab nationalist movements and tended to oppose any deal 
with the West. These criticisms may have been justified but it should never be 
forgotten that the oil interest for Britain was a national security interest which had no 
desire to lose the Gulf. In addition, the chapter asserted that the close relationship 
between King Ibn Sa‘ūd and Britain combined with Philby’s contribution in support of 
the Saudi position in Buraimi were probably enough to deter Britain from taking any 







This thesis, having answered its series of research questions, found that Philby began to 
be politically active in India; there, despite being under the influence of socialist 
ideology, he loyally served the Empire in the ICS. His political ideals, formed when still 
an undergraduate in Cambridge, eventually made him embrace libertarian principles 
both in India and the Middle East. 
This study found clear evidence that Philby succeeded in the Indian mission not only 
because he was a competent negotiator with the officials of the Government of India 
but also because the fundamental controversy between the Government of India and 
Whitehall regarding the future of Iraq may be considered the essential factor in 
facilitating Philby’s mission to provide Iraq’s administration with great financial 
authority. 
 This greatly contributed to Cox’s authority and independence as Chief Political Officer 
in Iraq. The exchequer of Iraq was equally in debt to Philby’s capable planning which 
culminated in reclaiming the agricultural lands and thereby improving the country’s 
finances. In addition, the thesis finds that, while Cox’s part in the establishment of 




establishing the democratic framework in legal terms and should be credited with an 
electoral law for Iraq on which its future democratic status could be based. 
The evidence in this thesis supports the view that the British officials, who could see no 
flaw in British Government policy and who painted such a negative image of Philby, 
may not have done so because of his personality and those views of his that so 
uncompromisingly opposed the policy, but simply because Philby’s opinions were so 
unlike theirs, in particular his support for the spirit of the independence and liberation 
movements.  
It is plain that Philby played a considerable role, with Cox and Bell, in consolidating the 
political conditions in Iraq, especially after the creation of the ‘Iraq Assembly’ that 
allowed Iraqi people to rule themselves. But he was frustrated by the change of British 
policy when the Iraqi people were forced to accept Faiṣal as their king.  
Philby was made the British Chief Representative in Transjordan, an appointment 
which he took very seriously; in fact his arguments were so persuasive that they greatly 
contributed to the recognition of Transjordan by the League of Nations and possibly 
was one of the first moves that led to the country becoming independent in the 1940s. 
Its ruler, Amir Abdullah, who was at first deeply under the influence of Arabs from 
elsewhere whom he did not want to send away, was in power when Philby was 
appointed; he would have resented and feared a constitutional government and its 




Philby seems to have resigned from the British service for three main reasons, 
according to the findings of the present thesis. The first reason had to do with the 
political situation, and foremost the disagreement between Philby and Abdullah, 
coupled with Philby’s conviction, thanks to his standing with the British authorities in 
Palestine and the CO, that he could never become one of the most celebrated British 
officers, because the officers of these bodies did not value his views. The second 
reason is tied up with financial factors – his salary was now substantially reduced. 
Finally, his love of exploring the Arab territories and the cordiality of Ibn Sa‘ūd towards 
him count as the third and positive reason for his resigning. He may have seen Ibn 
Sa‘ūd as offering both financial support and encouragement for his urge to explore. 
The thesis found that Philby did well in the first part of his mission to Najd, not only 
because Ibn Sa‘ūd apparently trusted in the strength of Britain above all, but also 
because of his own gifts and sincere wish to be less of an outsider. Moreover, he 
represented Britain as wholly aligned to Najdi interests throughout the war. 
Furthermore, the thesis sees as less than convincing any accusation that Philby did not 
clear the tension between Hejaz and Najd but instead, by misrepresenting Cox’s 
instructions, interpreted the invasion of Ḥail as the most important step. Ibn Sa‘ūd 
promised that he would not attack Hussain and thus averted open hostility between 
Hejaz and Najd while the war lasted. Philby’s defence was that the invasion of Ḥail 
would divert Ibn Sa‘ūd’s attention from attacking Hussain and ultimately bring about a 




However, Philby went to Hejaz, according to the findings of this thesis, not only en 
route to exploring the eastern region of Arabia to the west, but in pursuit of a political 
purpose. He was trying to protect Arab affairs, mainly in the east, which Cox 
administered, from as much interference on the part of the Cairo officials as possible. It 
must be concluded that Philby in the Jeddah negotiations was in full possession of the 
facts about the Hejaz-Najd dispute and persuaded Hussain that Ibn Sa‘ūd was not 
working with anyone to subvert the interests of the Allies.  
Some historians have sought to link the unbroken tension between Husain and Ibn 
Sa‘ūd to Philby’s visit or his conduct in the negotiations, but this is mistaken. What is 
mostly to blame for this tension is the century and more of hostility between their two 
tribes. The negotiations may have failed because Hussain would not tolerate anything 
less than acknowledgment as king of the Arab countries, disregarding the claims of 
other Arab leaders. Other elements that significantly inflamed the conflict and 
consequently intensified the antagonism between Hejaz and Najd were the differences 
of opinion in designing policy for Arabia and the rivalry between the British authorities 
in Cairo. 
Other purposes behind Philby’s mission to Najd, which the thesis showed are ignored 
or inadequately explored by some historians, and which he certainly managed to 
grapple with, are the settling of the Ajman revolt and the arrangements for the 




treaty with the leaders of the Ajman to stop them raiding Ibn Sa‘ūd’s territories and 
keep them outside Arabia. This achievement protected Ibn Sa‘ūd from disturbance by 
such raids and involved him in the common cause. The latter too was high among the 
purposes of the Najdi mission. Philby managed to reduce the level of smuggling and 
allowed the Najdi to supply the same goods legitimately by dispersing troops between 
Najd and Kuwait to keep watch for smuggled goods. He strengthened the blockade by 
co-ordinating the enemies of the Amir of Ḥail on Britain’s side. Even the collapse and 
final surrender of the Ottoman garrison in Madina can be seen as due to Philby’s 
efforts.   
Another finding is that Philby persuaded Ibn Sa‘ūd to prepare a military expedition 
against Ibn Rashid, the Amir of Ḥail, even when the king’s supply of British arms and his 
own subsidy were cut. This gave Sa‘ūd complete victory and also allowed him to 
prevent Ibn Rashid from contacting the Ottoman forces to the north. In this way, by 
supporting the Ḥail expedition he supported Ibn Sa‘ūd’s international standing and 
authority and strengthened the common cause against the Ottoman Empire. 
The thesis found that Philby managed to persuade Ibn Sa‘ūd to moderate his 
aggressiveness, despite his long-standing hostility against Hussain over the Khurmah 
oasis and their rivalry over power in Arabia. Distinguishing himself, Philby, in the 
interests of peace, proposed a British boundary commission between the two rivals, 




called for help to control the oasis. Ibn Sa‘ūd’s boundaries, however, were unfailingly 
protected by Philby, who recalled to Cairo that under the treaty of 26 December 1915, 
Britain would protect Sa‘ūd from any assault, even Hussain’s. The Inter-Departmental 
Committee held several meetings, at which Philby showed a better grasp of Arabian 
affairs than Wingate or Allenby, who generally took Hussain’s side. Perhaps it was 
Philby’s accurate perception of Ibn Sa‘ūd’s victory, based on his protracted 
acquaintance with conditions in Arabia, that taught him how securely Ibn Sa‘ūd was 
protected by the famed warriors of Ikhwan. Philby was able to forecast that Ibn Sa‘ūd 
would be victorious against Hussain in the battle of Turabah and this may have 
persuaded the Inter-Departmental Conference to let Khurmah be ceded to Ibn Sa‘ūd. 
Following the end of WWI, the thesis vindicates Philby; after the failure of the Kuwait 
conference, prepared by the British Government to make a peace settlement between 
Hejaz and Najd, Philby’s well-founded comments on it were once again justified and his 
forecasts about it came true. The reason for the failure was that, under the protocols of 
the Kuwait Conference, from endorsing Ibn Sa‘ūd, to whom the Khurmah territory had 
been ceded, British policy was now taking the side of King Hussain. 
Moreover, the thesis can rebut the claim that Philby was a spy and was working in 
Britain’s interests to destroy the Hejazi kingdom. It refers to documents showing that 
the British Government totally opposed Philby’s visit and his mediation attempts. 




other political actors and to convince his country that he was as gifted as they were; in 
any case, it had no particular effect on the Hejazi state, which would have fallen apart 
with or without it. 
Unlike other studies, this thesis emphasizes how important and how influential Philby, 
the trusted friend of Ibn Sa‘ūd, was on the Saudi Government when he decided to help 
the king’s political decisions. Most importantly, his were the first steps to make sure 
that the US would recognize Saudi Arabia, as it can be seen from his constant meetings 
and correspondence with American officials; he reminded them that the kingdom was 
in a stable political condition, while also tempting American companies by the thought 
of Saudi markets to pursue profitable deals in. In the event, his efforts succeeded in 
bringing the US to negotiate for oil concessions and eventually, when they appreciated 
the size of the kingdom’s oil reserves, to open the American Legation in Jeddah. Hence, 
it can be said that by spurning Philby, the British government perhaps missed a chance 
to forge a special relationship with a country which would become the world’s largest 
oil producer. Instead, it was the Americans who stepped in and developed close ties 
with Saudi Arabia. 
This thesis also brings to light the new finding that Philby was foremost in bringing 
wireless to the Saudis. He convinced the Saudi government that this facilitated 




advent of stability and renewed civil order, notably after the revolution against Ibn 
Sa‘ūd by the Ḥasan al-Idrisi movement. 
Another finding that has emerged in the course of the research is that Philby went to 
the southern territories of Saudi Arabia not merely to map the southern boundary with 
Yemen or to gain fame by exploring the unknown parts of the latter but also for 
political reasons. He was trying to extend the Saudi influence in the north of Aden and 
incorporate Shabwa and Hadhramaut, which were outside British protection, into Saudi 
territory. However, Britain rejected this attempt and included Shabwa and Hadhramaut 
straightaway within the Protectorate of Aden. 
The thesis explored Philby’s political action in withstanding British pressure against the 
firm position taken by the Saudi government over the oasis of Buraimi. He chose to 
express the Saudi demands and bring international public opinion to bear on this issue. 
Evidence exists to show that the Saudi Government opened its archives to Philby so 
that he could make out the case for Saudi Arabia’s possession of Buraimi and against 
British demands, based on historical events. Philby’s campaign brought the British 
government into disrepute in the press by claiming that British imperial policy was not 
holding up in Buraimi any more than it was in many situations in Egypt, Aden and 
elsewhere in the Middle East. 
The thesis asserted Britain was probably persuaded not to occupy Buraimi and its 




support of the Saudi claim to Buraimi. However, King Ibn Sa‘ūd’s son and heir, King 
Saud was less experienced than his father and more under the influence of his anti-
Western nationalist advisers, who wanted no allegiance with Britain and opposed 
British control of the Buraimi oasis. These criticisms may be justified but it should never 
be forgotten that the oil interest for Britain was a matter of national security. It never 
wanted to lose its influence in the Gulf. 
 In terms of the imperial policy of Britain, Philby believed that some members of the 
Middle East Department at the Colonial Office did not understand the social and 
political transformation of the Arabs and still espoused a retrograde policy. As a British 
official from the imperial system, Philby remarked that there were systemic faults in 
the British system of governance when these members of the Middle East Department 
were exercising an executive capacity without the specific authority of the Secretary of 
State; they were only semi-experts or self-deceived about their own ability. Philby 
criticised the mandate system and gradually understood that that it was merely an 
episode of imperialism. He judged that his efforts to establish constitutional 
government and a representative assembly, in Transjordan, had been disrupted by the 
authorities both in Palestine and in the Colonial Office in order to prevent any 
meaningful recognition of Transjordan. As a result, Philby cannot be compared with 
Sykes or Lawrence, who undoubtedly shaped the map of the Middle East. Furthermore, 
Philby, with his strong desire to give the Arabs independence, cannot be seen as a 




any role in terms of imperial expansion, for two main reasons. First, he embraced the 
liberal spirit that allowed nations to become independent, which was not in line with 
the imperial policy of Britain. Second, after the end of the Great War, Philby remained 
in Iraq only for a few months before leaving his post as a British Advisor to the Minister 
of the Interior. Much the same may be said of his post in Transjordan, where he spent 
less than three years before resigning from the British foreign service. 
After leaving the service, Philby endeavoured, in the 1930s, to be a messenger of peace 
and to solve the critical issues between the Arabs and the Jews. In 1937, he 
enthusiastically supported the Peel Commission’s recommendation of partition and 
encouraged the Arabs to accept it; the Arabs, however, rejected it and also rejected the 
White Paper of 1939 that limited the size of the Jewish papulation in Palestine and the 
recognition of the right of Jews to settle there. Philby gave reasons for the Arabs’ 
refusal: being driven by their obstinacy and optimism and making a political blunder, 
which, in Philby’s view, led to the loss of Palestine itself. 
Philby never ceased to support the nations who were under British occupation. In the 
1940s, he was aware of the growth and strength of nationalist movements in the 
colonies. For instance, he advised the British Government that there was nothing 
better than letting the Indian people have complete independence. Because he had 
lived and worked in India as an Indian civil servant for several years, he was convinced 




races and religions. He, therefore, became an advocate of the separation of India, 
suggesting that the Pakistan ideal would be inevitable as the way to solve the Indian 
problem, a prophecy which came true when India and Pakistan gained their 
independence in 1947. 
Britain, anxious after the war to safeguard its assets, especially the prospect of 
substantial oil supplies and revenues, and to strengthen stability in the Middle East, 
soon realized that it could no longer depend on direct rule. From 1919, moreover, 
Britain made it clear that it did not want to remain in a tutelary role once its 
dependencies could look after themselves. Here Britain failed to adjust to the pace of 
history rather than to change in the functions open to it. Western democracy in 
practice was the most notable omission from Britain’s legacy to its former possessions 
— which may be put down to yet one more instance of European arrogance. This thesis 
should acknowledge, at least at this point, that Britain did achieve some substantial 
good, with goodwill, in many areas during its term of sovereignty over the Empire, but 
it created much else besides, leading to some instability in the region. 
Recommendations for future research 
A number of scientific fields for future research can be identified regarding Philby, as 
this thesis has noted. The findings propose the need for future work to examine the 
relations between Philby and the imperial policy of Britain. The thesis suggests that 




false reputation for being unpatriotic to some historians. In addition, it seems that it is 
not appropriate to accuse him of espionage because he was an important opponent of 
Britain’s policy or merely because his son, Kim, deceived and betrayed Britain. Eleanor 
Philby, Kim’s ex-wife, said that she was delighted that Kim’s father died before he could 
learn of Kim’s defection. She also mentioned that her father-in-law had led a campaign 
against his country in India and the Middle East, but on his own terms he was loyal to 
its best interests.1 More importantly, although Philby was detained by the Home Office 
in August 1940, the Advisory Committee that investigated his case found that he had 
no intention of escaping to the US for the purpose of conducting anti-British 
propaganda and therefore decided to release him.2 Hence, it is crucial to revise or 
recommend a reconsideration of Philby’s character and views before accepting a 
negative image of him. 
Among Philby’s collection of papers at St. Antony’s College, there is a great deal of 
material relating to Philby and his economic role in Saudi Arabia. It consists of 51 boxes 
dealing with Sharqieh Ltd., which was established on 20th November 1925 in Jeddah, 
where Philby was appointed its Resident Director.3 It is clear that King Ibn Sa‘ūd 
cooperated with Philby to bring his country to the civilized world and to import modern 
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inventions, as the best solution for developing and administering the affairs of Saudi 
Arabia. Therefore, it is worth examining Philby’s work in this regard, especially when 
these materials suggest that he was the man who brought in wireless, provided the 
country with water and electricity supplies, planned a railway and an oil pipeline, 
arranged for the import of luxury goods and worked out several construction projects 
which benefited not only Saudi Arabia but also the British companies engaged in them. 
They conducted a number of trade agreements with the Saudi government, which 
allowed commercial tenders and projects to go forward, making considerable profits 
combined with those from the exporting of British products to the kingdom.4 
In his enormous number of books and articles, considerable materials may be found 
relating to the welfare and social life of the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia. Philby was 
generous in providing specific information on the culture, customs and traditions of his 
adoptive country. He lived in Saudi Arabia for a very long time and future research will 
find how he examined the transformation in people’s lives, especially the significant 
changes after the discovery of oil, which influenced all aspects of existence; these 
materials undoubtedly deserve to be examined and consulted. 
  
                                                          
4
 The materials to reconstruct Philby’s economic role and Sharqieh Ltd can be found in MECA, Philby 





1 Primary sources 
1.1 India office Library and Records, The British Library, London 






 Records of the British Residency and Agencies in the Persian Gulf (R): 
15/1/476;478;470;479;513;1/557;594;595;604;607;733;735;737;740;745;R/15/
2/31;32;33;34;38;465;638; R/15/5/10; 24; 25; 27; 71; R/5/15/10; 101. 
1.2 The National Archives (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO), London 
 Foreign Office (FO): 371/390; 2143; 1249; 2479;2486;2769; 2782; 3044; 3054; 
3056;3057;3061;3380;3381;3383;3386;3390;4144;4146;5066;5120;6242;6343;6
371;6372;6373;6461;8946;8953;8998;10014;10015;10810;11434;12250;14468;
15291;16025;16028;1680;20843; 45522;91764; 406/41; 608/80; 686/17;37;40; 
882/2; 7; 8; 9; 13; 967/59; 1016/209; 269; 303. 
 Colonial Office (CO):537/15;537/822/857; CO 
725/39/16;725/42/8;730/3;733/6; 733/7; 15;17;20; 22;23;24;39; 47; 50; 51; 59; 
CO 831/17/12. 
 Cabinet Office Records (CAB): 27/22; 23; 24; CAB 129/57. 
 Home Office (HO): HO/45/23780. 
1.3 St. Antony’s College, Re. The Middle East Centre (SAMAC), Oxford University 
 Philby collection, Reference code:GB165-0229, Files: 1/1/1; 1/2/1; 1/2/2; 
1/2/3;1/2/9;1/3/1/2;1/3/1/3;1/3/4/2;1/3/4/3;1/3/4/4;1/4/1/2;1/4/6/1;1/4/7/1




7/1/5; 7/1/6; 7/1/7; 16/6. Boxes that have not been archived are: 
15/2;15/5;16/4. 
 Sir Percy Cox collection, Reference code:   GB165-0341: Files: 4/1; 5/37; 38; 39. 
 Sir Reader Bullard collection, Reference code: GB165-0042, File: 1/1; 1/2; 2/1. 
 Sir Herbert Samuel collection, Reference code: GB165-0252, Box: 1. [Samuel’s 
files have not yet been archived with its new reference]. 
1.4 Gertrude Bell Archive: Newcastle University 
Available from: http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/. Accessed 2 May 2014. 
1.5 Gilbert Clayton’s Papers, Durham University Library: Archives and Special 
Collections (DULASC) 
 Re.GB-0033-SAD. Files: 694/10; 471/3; 10; 11. 
1.6 Parish Record Collection, Chigwell, Essex: vol.4A, p.49. 
1.7 The Elizabethan, Westminster: May 1901, vol.x, no.4; April 1902, vol.x, no.12; 
December 1902, vol.x, no.16; February 1903, vol.x, no.20; April 1903, vol.x, no.22; 
May1903, vol.x, no.23;December 1903, vol.x, no.28; February 1904, vol. xi, no.1; 
March1904, vol. xi, no.2; June1904, vol. xi, no.4;July1904, vol. xi, no.4,1904;August 
1904, vol. xi, no.6; October 1904, vol. xi, no.7. 
1.7 Westminster School Archives 
- The Challenge Examination Paper, Westminster School Archives, no. 
WS/EXA/1/1/2/1898. 
- Candidates Minors, Westminster School Archives, no. WS/EXA/1/1/3/1/1898. 
1.8 Books 
Al-Rashid I. (ed.). Documents on the History of Saudi Arabia, vol. 3. Salisbury: 
Documentary Publications, 1976. 
Al-Rihani A. 
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Al- Faiy‘ A. al-‘lāqāt bina al-Malik Abdul Aziz wa-al- Malik Hussain wa- ḍam al-
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Hammād K. 
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Ibn Bisher O.ʻUnwān al- Majd fī Tārīkh Najd [The symbol of glory in the history of Najd]. 
Riyadh: King Abdul Aziz Foundation, 1982. 
Ibn EisāI. 
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Ibn Ghanām H. Tārīkh Ibn Ghanām [The History of Ibn Ghanām].Beirut: Dar al-Shroq, 
1994. 
James L.  
- The life and times of Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby 1861-1936. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993. 
- The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. London: Abacus,1995. 
James R. Anthony Eden. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson,1986. 
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